Manuscripts and Conference Papers
Identity, Variability, and Multiple Realization in the Special ScienceS
(With Larry Shapiro. Penultimate draft; forthcoming in S. Gozzano and C. Hill [Eds.], The Mental and the Physical: New Perspectives on Type Identity, CUP.) Compositional variation and variability in nature is abundant. This fact is often thought to entail that multiple realization is also ubiquitous. In particular, compositional variability among cognitive creatures is thought to provide conclusive evidence against the mind-brain type identity theory. In this chapter we argue that the type identity theory, properly understood, is compatible with a wide range of compositional and constitutional variation and variability. Similarly, contrary to received wisdom, variation poses no threat to reductionist ventures. Multiple realization as we understand it, requires a specific pattern of variation. Multiple realization is not self-contradictory; the kinds of variation that qualify as multiple realization are not impossible, but they are less common in general than is widely supposed.
(Penultimate draft; forthcoming in WIRE Cognitive Science) Review Article: Functionalism is a philosophical theory (or family of theories) concerning the nature of mental states. According to functionalism psychological/cognitive states are essentially functional states of whole systems. Saying that psychological states are functional states, the functionalist claims more than that psychological states have functions. Rather, functionalism is the theory that psychological states are defined and constituted by their functions. On this view, what it is to be a psychological state of a certain sort just is and consists entirely of having a certain function. Anything that has that function in a suitable system would therefore be that psychological state. If storing information for later use is the essential function of memory, then anything that has that function counts as a memory. Similarly, one might say that anything that traps or kills mice counts as a mouse trap. Functionalism characterizes psychological states according to what they do, by their relations to stimulus inputs and behavioral outputs as well as their relations to other psychological and non-psychological internal states of a system. It is most recognizable in its computational variation, according to which psychological/cognitive states are computational states of whole systems, e.g., paradigmatically, human beings and other organisms. The functionalist approach was first explicitly introduced by Hilary Putnam.
ARE SENSATIONS STILL BRAIN PROCESSES?
(Penultimate draft; published in Philosophical Psychology.) Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, “Sensations and Brain Processes.” It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and replies that Smart discussed as well as some that he did not anticipate. Finally, I offer a brief manifesto for the identity theory, providing a small list of the claims that I believe contemporary identity theorist should accept. As it turns out, these are more or less the ones that Smart defended fifty years ago.
(Revised manuscript) G. E. Moore argues that goodness is an intrinsic non-natural property that supervenes irreducibly on the intrinsic natural properties of its bearers. Accordingly, it is often supposed that “Moorean” supervenience is incompatible with physicalism, a naturalistic thesis. In this paper I argue that Moorean supervenience is not in itself incompatible with physicalism, Moore’s ethical non-naturalism notwithstanding. Understanding why will help us to better appreciate the full range of resources available to physicalists. Keywords: physicalism, naturalism, supervenience, superdupervenience, cosmic hermeneutics, dependence, Moore, Horgan, Dreier, Jackson.
REALIZATION AND MULTIPLE REALIZATION, CHICKEN AND EGG
(Revised manuscript) A common view is that the truth of multiple realization, e.g,. about psychological states, entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. Here I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents the arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in philosophy of psychology. And I explain the proper way to understand the relation between realization and multiple realization.
MECHANISMS AND EXPLANATORY REALIZATION RELATIONS
(Penultimate draft; published in Synthese.) My topic is the confluence of two recently active philosophical research programs. One research program concerns the metaphysics of realization. The other research program concerns scientific explanation in terms of mechanisms. Elsewhere I have argued that metaphysical functionalism, a realization-based ontology of the special sciences, gets illicit support from its conflation with the explanatory theses of mechanism (2004). Here I will address some questions that arise if we agree that realization and mechanism are at least interesting or useful, and if we think that they can be brought together. In particular, I will argue that a well-known account of realization, due to Carl Gillett, is incompatible with a well-known account of mechanistic explanation, due to Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver (2000). This is surprising, not least of which because Gillett has cited Craver’s work as evidence that his account of realization is the right way to think about realization in the sciences.
(Penultimate draft; forthcoming in Continuum Companion to Metaphysics.) A survey of views and problems in the contemporary metaphysical debates about the nature of minds, withh detailed references and a brief annotated bibliography. The audience is advanced undergraduates or beginning graduate students.
TOWARD A DISTRIBUTED COMPUTATION MODEL OF EXTENDED COGNITION
(Penultimate draft; published in APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computer.) In this short paper I suggest that the traditional model of extended cognition is less compelling than an alternative proposal that invokes not just extended systems or processes, but actually extended representations. The proposal is sketchy, not least of which because a great deal more needs to be said about what makes representations (and computation) extended or distributed, and philosophers would be well served to attend to what computer scienists have to say about these matters.
UNDERSTANDING THE DIMENSIONS OF REALIZATION
(With Larry Shapiro. Penultimate draft; published in Journal of Philosophy.) Carl Gillett has defended what he calls the “dimensioned” view of the realization relation, which he contrasts with the traditional “flat” view of realization (2003, 2007; see also Gillett 2002). Intuitively, the dimensioned approach characterizes realization in terms of composition whereas the flat approach views realization in terms of occupiers of functional roles. Elsewhere we have argued that the general view of realization and multiple realization that Gillett advances is not able to discharge the theoretical duties of those relations (Shapiro 2004, unpublished manuscript; Polger 2004, 2007, forthcoming). Here we focus on an internal objection to Gillett’s account and then raise some broader reasons to reject it.
TWO CONFUSIONS CONCERNING MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY
(Penultimate draft; published in Philosophy of Science.) Despite some recent advances, multiple realization remains a largely misunderstood thesis. Consider the dispute between Lawrence Shapiro and Carl Gillett over the application of Shapiro’s recipe for deciding when we have genuine cases of multiple realization. I argue that Gillett follows many philosophers in mistakenly supposing that multiple realization is absolute and transitive. Both of these are problematic. They are tempting only when we extract the question of multiple realization from the explanatory context in which it is invoked. Anchoring multiple realizability in its theoretical context provides grounds for arbitrating disagreements. Doing so, I argue, favors the view advanced by Shapiro..
A consideration of the benefits of taking physicalism to be necessarily true if true, against the standard view that physicalism is at best contingently true. Presented at the 2006 Central Division meeting of the APA, in the session Themes from Jaegwon Kim, sponsored by the Society for Asian and Asian-American Philosophy.
H2O, 'WATER', AND TRANSPARENT REDUCTION
(Penultimate draft; published in Erkenntnis.) Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics?David Chalmers and Frank Jackson argue that they do. Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker argue that they do not. In the first half of this paper I argue that Chalmers’ and Jackson’s critique of Block and Stalnaker crucially hinge on a reductio argument, and that the reductio can be defused. I conclude that the counterexamples given by Block and Stalnaker are cogent. If I am right, then we have no reason to accept Chalmers’ and Jackson’s contentions that physicalism requires a priori, transparent, reductive explanations of all facts in terms of microphysical facts.
PHYSICALISM AND COSMIC HERMENUETICS: COMMENTS ON HORGAN
Terry Horgan’s, “Materialism: Matters of definition, defense, and deconstruction” (Philosophical Studies) addresses three questions: “How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense…?” Here I’ll discuss Horgan’s answers to the first two questions, suggesting that each is problematic. Then I will step back to look at the structure from which Horgan is working. I argue that we should reconsider Horgan’s assumptions concerning what form a defense of materialism must take, especially in light of his professed dissatisfaction with his own pessimistic assessment of the prospects of such a defense. In particular, I argue that Horgan has not shown that all metaphysically brute relations are ipso facto physically unacceptable. If I am right, physicalists have more resources than is often supposed. Because Horgan’s view is shared also by Frank Jackson (1998), David Chalmers (1996), and many of their interlocutors, the present result has quite general implications for the current debate over physicalism.
SOME METAPHYSICAL ANXIETIES OF REDUCTIONISM
(Penultimate draft; published inRethinking Reductionism: Studies in the Philosophy of the Mind-Brain.) In this chapter I characterize four general approaches: Metaphysical Reductionism, Metaphysical Antireductionism, Antimetaphysical Reductionism, and Antimetaphysical Antireductionism. In each case I offer some paradigm examples. In the process of distinguishing these approaches and presenting examples, I make the case that each originates in a reaction to a metaphysical (or antimetaphysical) concern. Then I argue that all four approaches accept an assumption that I call the autonomy thesis. If the autonomy thesis can be rejected, then we need not choose among the four approaches. Reductionism and antireductionism are not the only ways of resolving our metaphysical concerns.
REALIZATION AND THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND
(Penultimate draft; published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2007.) According to the received view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are realized by physical or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called realization physicalism. Carl Gillett has recently defended a detailed formulation of the realization relation. However, Gillett’s formulation cannot be the relation that realization physicalists have in mind. I argue that Gillett’s “dimensioned” view of realization fails to apply to a textbook case of realization. I also argue Gillett counts as realization some cases that should not count if realization physicalism is to be distinguished from its competitors in the usual ways. I conclude that the relation described by Gillett cannot be realization. I then offer my own account of realization in terms of having a function. And consider the consequences that Gillett’s view and my own have for questions of multiple realizability.
TRUE COLORS, OR HOW TO BE RIGHT ABOUT RED BY BEING WRONG ABOUT COLOR
Versions presented as ASSC talk, SPP poster (2001), and APA (2002) talk (this version, "True Colors: A Problem for Tye's Color Realism.") Michael Tye has recently been a vocal defender of color realism or, as I call it, color objectivism. Objectivism about color is the view that color properties are identical to intrinsic physical properties of the surfaces of objects. Subjectivism about color is the denial of color objectivism. Objectivists argue that color claims must be taken at face value. In this paper I forego the usual bickering about whether there are surface reflectance properties that can be identified with colors as the objectivist theory requires. Supposing that some such properties could be found, I argue that if objectivism about color were correct it would have the consequence that we are rarely if ever right—perhaps never right—about the particular colors of particular things. So objectivism does not bear out ordinary attribution of colors to the surfaces of things, pace Tye.
NATURALISM, EXPLANATION, AND IDENTITY
(with Robert A. Skipper, Jr.)
Some people believe that there is an “explanatory gap” between the facts of physics and certain other facts about the world — for example, facts about consciousness. The gap is presented as a challenge to any thoroughgoing naturalism or physicalism. We believe that advocates of the explanatory gap have some reasonable expectations that cannot be merely dismissed. We also believe that naturalistic thinkers have the resources to close the explanatory gap, but that they have not adequately explained how and why these resources work. In this paper we isolate the legitimate explanatory demands in the gap reasoning, as it is defended by Chalmers and Jackson (2001). We then argue that these demands can be met. Our solution involves a novel proposal for understanding the relationship between theories, explanations, and scientific identities. Presented at SSPP (2005), OPA (2005) and SPP (2005).
RETHINKING THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In Companion to Consciousness, S. Schneider and M. Velmans (eds.), Blackwell Publishers. Evolution and consciousness are two topics that seem to lure otherwise sensible theorists into dubious lines of reasoning. So it is unsurprising that the question of the evolution of consciousness has been a magnet for wild speculations and bad explanations. In this paper, I consider some of the most familiar lines of reasoning about evolution and consciousness, finding most to be problematic. I will then introduce some less familiar but better justified strategies for thinking about the natural history of consciousness. I do not endorse any general account of the evolution of consciousness. My aim, rather, is to help philosophers, psychologists, and others who study consciousness to avoid pitfalls without worrying that the evolution of consciousness is unduly mysterious.
REVIEW OF KHLENTZOS'
NATURALISTIC REALISM AND THE ANTIREALIST CHALLENGE
Published version in Review of Metaphysics. “Drew Khlentozos’ Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge is a meticulous introduction and roadmap to the core arguments of the contemporary realism/antirealism debate. It has several features that I especially admire. The book is carefully argued and for the most part clearly written. Rare among recent writers in Anglo-American philosophy, Khlentzos is a charitable reader of his opponents and earnestly endeavors to present their views as clearly and generously as possible. This generosity and thoroughness are also the book’s main fault, as it is long (weighing in 408 pages) and sometimes plodding. In a few cases Khlentzos’ charity is overly generous… But these are drawbacks that we can all live with—especially for the purpose of graduate teaching, for which this monograph is well suited.”
CLOSING THE GAP ON PAIN
(with Ken Sufka)
Published version in Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, M. Aydede (ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Based on a presentation at ASSC (2003), and a distant relative of papers presented at SSPP 2002. In light of various skeptical concerns about the prospects for understanding consciousness, it would be an achievement to show that there is no in-principle explanatory gap between experience and naturalistic theories. We don’t suppose that we can achieve that much, but we think we can make some progress. This paper has four parts: First we sketch a general approach to the explanatory gap challenge. Next, we argue that our approach counts as a response to the gap problem. Third, we provide an example of how the approach can be implemented in the case of pain experience. Finally, we argue that the example fits the model provided earlier. If we are right, there is reason to doubt that there is an unbridgeable explanatory gap.
MINDING BRAINS AND BODIES:
REVIEW OF SHAPIRO, THE MIND INCARNATE
Published version in Trends in Cognitive Science, 8/9 (2004): 394-95. “To what degree must the brains and bodies of any creatures with minds be similar to the brains and bodies of human beings? Many philosophers and cognitive scientists have supposed that there are relatively few constraints on what sorts of brains and bodies can realize minds. It is widely believed that minds can be implemented in many ways – that they are ‘multiply realizable’. Of course there were always dissenters, and in recent years their grumbling has grown harder to dismiss. In The Mind Incarnate, Lawrence Shapiro provides the first book-length study of multiple realizability. Such an examination is long overdue, and Shapiro’s treatment is sure to set the standard for the renewed debate.”
NEURAL MACHINERY AND REALIZATION (DRAFT)
Published version in Philosophy of Science, 71 (2003): 997-1006. The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains. The question arises, What is the realization relation? I approach the question of realization through a case study: David Marr's (1982) computational account of early visual processing. Marr's work is instructive because it is the textbook case of the hierarchy of mechanisms that has seemed to bear out the arguments of functionalist philosophers and cognitive scientists. I argue that realization as employed by Marr has some but not all of the characteristics that it is usually taken to have.
IN FAVOR OF AN ECOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF COLOR
(with Scott Huettel and Michael Riley)
In Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8/9 (2003): 26:33. Byrne and Hilbert understate the difficulties facing their version of color realism. We doubt that they can determine reflectance types and magnitudes in a way that does not invoke relations to perceivers. Byrne and Hilbert’s account therefore resembles the dispositional or ecological accounts that they dismiss. This is a good thing, from our point of view, for a dispositional account is promising if understood in an ecological framework.
CONSCIOUSNESS, FUNCTION OF
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Macmillan). An encyclopedia article surveying different questions (and answers) that are commonly discussed concerning the functions of consciousness. To inquire about the function of consciousness is to ask what consciousness does, what it enables us to do that we might not be capable of otherwise, or why some creatures came to be conscious.
In Philosophical Studies, 109 (2), 2002; a version appears as chapter 2 of Natural Minds. I argue that the standard way of construing multiple realizability is a much stronger claim than that of Putnam’s intuition alone. I distinguish four interpretations of the multiple realizability intuition. Some common formulations of multiple realizability are almost certainly true, while others are not at all plausible. I argue that the plausible forms of multiple realizability do not impugn the prospects for a mind-brain identity theory.
CONSCIOUSNESS, ADAPTATION, AND EPIPHENOMENALISM
(with Owen Flanagan)
In Consciousness Evolving, J. Fetzer (Ed). John Benjamins Publishing. Consciousness and evolution are complex phenomena. It is sometimes thought that if adaptation explanations for some varieties of consciousness, say, conscious visual perception, can be had, then we may be reassured that at least those kinds of consciousness are not epiphenomena. But what if other varieties of consciousness, for example, dreams, are not adaptations? We sort out the connections among evolution, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism in order to show that the consequences for the nature and causal efficacy of consciousness are not as dire as has sometimes been supposed.
REVIEW OF DANIEL DENNETT'S BRAINCHILDREN
In Philosophical Psychology, 14 (2), and via Catchword. A review of an anthology of papers by Daniel Dennett. I am critical of the anthology as a collection, for I do not think that all the papers belong together, or need to be anthologized at all. Nevertheless, I argue that they provide some insight into Dennett’s overall theoretical framework, and his ways of thinking about philosophy and philosophical problems. I enumerate seven of the central features as aspects of what I call the “Dennett Stance,” a play on his famous idea of the “Intentional Stance.” Finally, I criticize Dennett’s metaphilosophical view.
A DECADE OF TELEOFUNCTIONALISM:
LYCAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE
(with Owen Flanagan)
In Minds and Machines. (With a reply from Lycan.) A full-length review essay of Lycan's two books about consciousness. Concerning Consciousness, we urge that Lycan owes a detailed explanation of how teleological functions can be the basis for conscious experience, and that he underestimates the extent to which competing accounts (such as identity theories) can adopt the multilevel picture that he defends. Concerning Consciousness and Experience, we worry that Lycan's divide-and-conquer strategy leads him to neglect important connections between aspects of experience. We argue that questions about qualia cannot be isolated from questions about “what it's like” to be conscious or about our knowledge of our experiences.
ZOMBIES EXPLAINED
In Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, A. Brooks, D. Ross, & D. Thompson (Eds). MIT Press, 2000. (With a reply from Dennett.) In this article I reply to the challenge set forth by Dennett in his critique of Flanagan and Polger (1995). Through careful textual analysis, I show that Dennett is presenting us with a dilemma and that this dilemma is the keystone of Dennett’s argument in his Consciousness Explained. I argue that one horn of the dilemma does not have the consequence that Dennett claims; Specifically, I argue that theories that allow for the possibility of non-conscious functional duplicates of conscious beings (so called zombies) do not thereby entail epiphenomenalism about consciousness. I demonstrate how Dennett’s argument falls prey to a common mistake in reasoning about the functions of things, and recommend a correction.
REVIEW OF JAEGWON KIM'S MIND IN A PHYSICAL WORLD
In Philosophical Psychology, 2000, 13 (1):135-139, and via Catchword. A review of a book by Jaegwon Kim. I mainly point out some of the novel contributions of the book, and specifically to draw readers’ attention to changes in Kim’s view. My most substantial criticism is that Kim does not give an account of the “realization” relation that he now thinks is fundamental to philosophy of mind, and which relation explains the supervenience relation previously relied upon by Kim.
COLOR VISION AND THE FOUR-COLOR-MAP PROBLEM
(with Dale Purves and Beau Lotto)
In the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2000, 12 (2):233-237. Four different colors are needed to make maps that avoid adjacent countries of the same color. Because the retinal image is two dimensional, like a map, four dimensions of chromatic experience would also be needed to optimally distinguish regions returning spectrally different light to the eye. We therefore suggest that the organization of human color vision according to four-color classes (reds, greens, blues, and yellows) has arisen as a solution to this logical requirement in topology. (This paper is one result of several years of collaboration and discussion with neurobiologists in Dale Purves’ laboratory at Duke University. The article was the featured cover article for its issue of the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. One response letter was later published, with our reply.)
REPLY TO SCHWARTZ AND COHEN
(with Dale Purves and Beau Lotto)
In the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2000, 12 (5). A brief explanation filling in one of the gaps in the original paper, which was pointed out in a short letter by Schwartz and Cohen. See Purves, Lotto, and Polger (2000), above.
NATURAL ANSWERS TO NATURAL QUESTIONS
(with Owen Flanagan)
In Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays, V. Hardcastle (Ed). MIT Press, 1999. In this chapter we consolidate and elaborate on our earlier work to show how the natural method, the method of seeking reflective equilibrium from psychology, neuroscience, and phenomenology, can lead to progress on the central questions about consciousness. The chapter is primarily a summary of tactics in philosophy of mind, with the purpose of introducing them to some philosophers of science and a more general audience. We provide a useful framework for thinking about different kinds of questions about consciousness, and suggest a methodology for a naturalistic approach to consciousness. (This paper originated as a presentation at the 1996 meeting of the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology. Our paper emboldened at least some philosophers of science to take on questions about conscious experience, e.g., Shaun Nichols and Todd Grantham (2000), “Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness,” Philosophy of Science, 67: 648-670.)
ZOMBIES AND THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
(with Owen Flanagan)
In the Journal of Consciousness Studies. (Full paper ©1995 Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger.) Also available via Ingenta. Todd Moody's “Zombie Earth” thought experiment is an attempt to show that conscious inessentialism is false or in need of qualification. We defend conscious inessentialism against his criticisms, and argue that zombie thought experiments highlight the difficulty of explaining why consciousness evolved and what function(s) it serves. This is the hardest problem in consciousness studies. (When Flanagan and I wrote this response to Moody, we circulated it to several philosophers with whom we were corresponding. Some of them also wrote responses to Moody, and to our article. In the end, the editors of the Journal of Consciousness Studies dedicated a special issue of the journal to our exchange. Twelve responses were written, of which five explicitly respond to our article. Dennett’s, “The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies: Commentary on Moody, Flanagan, and Polger,” was reprinted in an anthology; see my response, “Zombies Explained.”)
In the Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind, M. Nani and M. Marraffa (Eds.), Societa Italiana Filosofia Analitica. A taxonomy and survey of recent philosophical discussions of so-called zombies.