**Review of Drew Khlentozos' *Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge***

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Drew Khlentozos' *Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge* is a meticulous introduction and roadmap to the core arguments of the contemporary realism/antirealism debate. It has several features that I especially admire. The book is carefully argued and for the most part clearly written. Rare among recent writers in Anglo-American philosophy, Khlentzos is a charitable reader of his opponents and earnestly endeavors to present their views as clearly and generously as possible. This generosity and thoroughness are also the book's main fault, as it is long (weighing in 408 pages) and sometimes plodding. In a few cases Khlentzos' charity is overly generous. This seems to me to be the case, for example, with some of his contortions on behalf of Dummett, not least of which being a lengthy chapter on how intuitionism drives Dummett's antirealism that probably should have been an appendix. But these are drawbacks that we can all live with—especially for the purpose of graduate teaching, for which this monograph is well suited.

*Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge* begins (Section I) by setting out the realist/anti-realist debate. Khlentzos argues that the kinds of metaphysical realists who have been quickest to shrug off semantic arguments against realism are particularly susceptible to those arguments. Specifically, naturalistic realists—among whom Khlentzos counts himself—cannot dismiss critiques like those from Dummett and Putnam merely by observing that realism is a metaphysical rather than semantic or epistemic doctrine. The trouble is, "If the world is as resolutely mind-independent as the realist makes out, then there is a problem about how we get to know about it in the first place" (4). Khlentzos calls this *the representation problem*, saying,

"A main contention of this book is that realism is vulnerable to antirealist attack precisely because the representation problem remains unsolved" (5, italics removed).

The standard strategy for converting the representation problem into an argument against realism is familiar. Without solving the representation problem, it is unclear how one can make any true claims about the independently existing world, or perhaps even to make any claims that refer to it at all. So the antirealist contends that we have no justification for believing realism, or that the assertion that realism is true is self-defeating. Khlentzos focuses on the antirealist arguments of Dummett (Section II) and Putnam (Section III), and specifically on their "manifestation" and "model theoretic" arguments, respectively. His achievement is to explain very clearly these well-known contemporary versions of the *Hume-Kant gambit* (as he calls the standard strategy), and to show that they are able to survive the usual realist replies and dismissals.

In chapters 5 and 6, Khlentzos concerns himself with a certain H. Putnam (an ancestor of the current H. Putnam) whose flourishing period was about 1975-1992. This H. Putnam, according to Khlentzos, has in his anti-realist arsenal the brains in the vat argument, an argument from equivalent descriptions, and three versions of the model theoretic argument. For my part, I am not convinced that Putnam has four distinct and subtle mapping arguments (one equivalence argument, and three model theoretic arguments.) This is another case of Khlentzos' charity, and I suggest we take him as offering us four Putnamian arguments rather than four that are readily identifiable in Putnam. Khlentzos offers no evidence that Putnam regards himself as having four distinct arguments. These are interesting arguments, but some readers will be surprised that the chapter concerning the model theoretic argument(s) is the shortest in the book. And many will wonder whether Khlentzos' objections apply to the current H. Putnam—the author of the Dewey

Lectures and subsequent works who goes so far as to call himself a "natural realist." Unfortunately Khlentzos treatment of this later philosopher is brief and indirect. This Putnam's current antirepresentationalism is presented and critiqued at the start of chapter 7, though mainly through the views of John McDowell. While Putnam claims affinity with McDowell, it is a kinship that McDowell has sometimes disowned. So we cannot be sure that the latest Putnam is given his due.

As chapter 7 develops and through the end of the book, the line of argument begins to tumble. One gets the sense that Khlentzos recognized that this was becoming a lengthy book and tried to pick up the pace. The result is more compressed argument that too often abandons the clear prose of the early chapters in favor of the artificial clarity of logical formalisms. Chapter 8 includes useful critiques of Kripke's Wittgenstein and of Jackson's new "conceptual analysis," but by this time the reader wants to know what replacement Khlentzos is offering. If he has been successful, and I believe that he has at least made substantial progress, he has shown that the main antirealist arguments fail. How then shall we understand realism? As he puts it, "It is implicit in the arguments against antirealism advanced in this book that truth does indeed require mind-independent links between our truthbearers and the various things in the world that they represent" (331). That is to say, there must be a realist solution to the representation problem. The solution that Khlentzos offers involves a substantial notion of truth based on "correspondence" (in a sense explained) to "facts," understood as properties of the world. But only a dozen pages are dedicated to the explication and defense of this view, with some objections earning only a paragraph of response. This is surely too brief given the regiment to which he subjects the antirealists.

The last few pages argue that Khlentzos' view is not subject to the same liar paradox objection raised for disquotationalists. Then the book ends. (Besides being sudden, this anti-disquotational conclusion raises questions about the legitimacy of the appeals to deflationary truth in defense of realism, in Sections I and II.) The result is a book with many wonderful passages and insights that is nevertheless ultimately unsatisfying. One hopes that Khlentzos will write a book in which he gives his own views that same careful and clear treatment that he lends to his opponents in this book.