On January 19, 1999, President Clinton had more on his mind than impeachment and an 8 p.m. State of the Union address. Earlier that Tuesday, U.S. General Wesley Clark confronted Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade for six hours. The Yugoslav leader denied all Serbian responsibility for a Kosovo massacre that Clark documented with color photographs. When Clark renewed threats of NATO air strikes, a defiant Milosevic repudiated concessions made the prior October. Yugoslavia expelled the U.S. observer in Kosovo and barred admission to the U.N. War Crimes Prosecutor. Intelligence reports indicated a continuing build-up of Yugoslav troops for action against Kosovo's Albanian majority.

In a White House situation room meeting Secretary of State Madeline Albright renewed her proposal for immediate air strikes. NSC adviser Sandy Berger, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Henry Shelton agreed.

Berger informed the President that his top advisers now all recommended NATO bombing. The mission: compel Milosevic to allow 30,000 peacekeepers in Kosovo, including 7,000 U.S. troops. Clinton's decision required a complex strategic, political, and legal calculus.

• Could a lame duck, Democratic President impeached by a Republican controlled Congress successfully lead the U.S. and its NATO allies into war?
• Would U.S. national interests be served by humanitarian intervention in Kosovo?
• Could international human rights be advanced by a military response?
• Did U.S. and international law grant the President authority to use armed force without prior approval of Congress and the U.N. Security Council.