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C. NATO vs. Russia.
Despite Russia's devastating economic collapse, Clinton could not ignore Moscow's anticipated reaction to air strikes on Yugoslavia. President Boris Yeltsin depended on Western financial aid, but the Russian military could still offer meaningful support to Milosevic. Russian nationalists viewed Serbs as traditional allies who shared an Orthodox faith. Old line communists might exploit public resentment at NATO to bring down pro-Western reformers in Moscow. NATO support for autonomy in Kosovo would also threaten Moscow's campaign against Muslim secessionists in the Caucasus.
Russians felt diminished when NATO admitted as members three former client states in Eastern Europe-- Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. To assuage the pain, NATO had assured Moscow that the organization remained purely a defensive alliance in a "Partnership for Peace." In the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation the alliance promised not only to cooperate with Moscow on peacekeeping but also to respect the U.N. Charter and OSCE.
NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as . . . persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, . . .
This Act does not affect, and cannot be regarded as affecting, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, or the role of the OSCE as the inclusive and comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its area and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:
. . .
* refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter . . .
* respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;
. . .
* prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles;[36]
Those sweeping promises appear wholly unenforceable in light of a comprehensive escape clause: "Provisions of this Act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action."
The Moscow press had reported the Racak massacre in language suggesting that at least some Russians might favor collaboration on humanitarian intervention.[37] As one of six members on the Balkans contact group, Russia would have a voice in allied deliberations. Skilled diplomacy might allay Yeltsin's concerns sufficiently to avert outright opposition, even if active Russian support was unattainable.
