Español

Français

Morgan Institute for Human Rights

B. The Domestic Battlefield

Kosovo fractured both political parties and old ideological camps. Some domestic critics insisted the President deploy ground troops, while other foes demanded an end to the bombing. Liberal, humanitarian hawks, mostly Democrats, allied with conservative internationalists, mostly Republicans. In their view the U.S. is exceptional with unique responsibilities for world leadership--the indispensable power. The pro-war liberals applauded Presidential leadership in stopping genocide; An ardent Presidential defender in the impeachment hearings, Senator Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, now blamed Clinton for refusing to commit ground troops. The pro-war conservatives believed defeat would endanger vital security interests in Europe and U.S./NATO credibility. "Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security adviser, accused the administration of indulging in a new ‘technological racism’47 based on the premise that the life of ‘one American serviceman was not worth risking in order to save the lives of thousands of Kosovars.’"

In the opposing camp, anti-war liberals were allied with conservative isolationists--truly a new world order. Liberal religious pacifists rallied to denounce the bombing, and rule of law advocates protested Clinton's disregard for U.S. and international norms. They insisted that humanitarian ends could not justify violent and extra-legal means. Stray bombs killed innocent women and children turning Serb moderates against the U.S.

Conservative isolationists opposed shedding more U.S. treasure in another European quagmire. Submission to international organizations and compromise with weak allies undermined effective unilateral defense. The House Republican majority adopted a resolution opposing U.S. troop commitments for peacekeeping; on a tie vote they defeated a Democratic proposal to endorse Operation Allied Force. In the Senate, procedural tactics stopped debate on whether or not the President should use "all appropriate means." On his own authority, the Commander-in-Chief called up 5,000 reserves, and Congress duly appropriated all the funds he requested for military operations and humanitarian relief.

As he stood firm in the middle, Clinton lost points in the polls. Confused and undecided centrists questioned whether the President's strategy made sense. Sixty per cent thought it was an error to announce in advance that no ground troops would be used.48 Some pragmatists complained that the bombing had brought on the very evil it was intended to prevent. On May 10 Newseek reported fewer than fifty per cent approved the President's Kosovo policy. Jesse Jackson embarrassed the President with a mission to Belgrade resulting in the release of three U.S. soldiers in Serb custody. Investigative reporters concluded that Clinton had stumbled into war, distracted by impeachment proceedings and misled by a strong willed Secretary of State. Negative editorial commentary forecast disaster. The President responded in a May 23 column "A Just and Necessary War" in the New York Times indicating that "I do not rule out other military options."

Contents