

# TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY

## PHILOSOPHY 7070

Fall 2013

---

### I. **PROF. POLGER**

Department of Philosophy  
206A McMicken Hall  
Office Hours: open door and by appointment

thomas.polger@uc.edu  
(voice) 556.6328  
(fax) 556.2939

---

### II. **LOCATION & TIME**

210 McMicken Hall

Thursday, 3:35-5:50

---

### III. **COURSE SYNOPSIS**

What is philosophy? Is philosophy possible? If so, how do we do it? If not, why not? Self-consciousness about philosophical methods and goals periodically becomes more acute. We are currently in one of those phases. This is a course in the methodology of philosophy, equally in the epistemology of philosophy. Sometimes this topic is called meta-philosophy, in special cases metametaphysics, or in general the philosophy of philosophy.

---

### IV. **TEXTS**

Many required readings will be posted on Blackboard or otherwise made available electronically. There are also three required books:

- Frank Jackson, *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis* (Oxford)
- Herman Cappelen, *Philosophy Without Intuitions* (Oxford)
- Timothy Williamson, *The Philosophy of Philosophy* (Blackwell)

---

### V. **ASSIGNMENTS**

There will be three kinds of assignments for this class:

A. *Papers*. All students will prepare a paper written according to American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division submission standards (online). The most crucial bit of information about the format is that the *approximate* and *maximum* length is 3,000 words (approximately 10-12 typed double-spaced pages.) I will provide suggestions and guidelines for paper structures and topics, but the topic must be distinct from your presentation topic.

Graduate students beyond their first year may propose to write a paper of 4,000-6,000 words, or a co-authored paper (with another student in the class) of 7,000-9,000 words. (I do not promise

to accept all proposals.) The details of such a paper will be negotiated with me on a case by case basis.

*B. Presentations.* During our first meeting I will assign all students to make presentations during a future class meeting. Assignments will be made using a suitably arbitrary system of my own design. There will be no swapping, bartering, auctioning, or selling of assigned days. Students will each make one presentation to the class in which they (a) give a concise overview of the reading assigned for presentation that is informed by the other required and non-required readings, and outside literature as necessary; and (b) critique one argument that was put forth in one of the required readings for that week.

If, in preparing for your presentation, you discover that some reading other than but related to the one assigned (e.g., by the same author, commenting on the assigned reading, recently published on the same topic) is better or more appropriate, you may suggest that we change the assigned reading. For best effect, you should suggest this more than a week in advance so that other students have time to read the thing(s) you suggest.

Students do not have to submit written papers when they make their presentations; but it is useful to distribute at least an outline or handout. Powerpoint slides will not be permitted for this purpose. You will be graded on your presentation style as well as content.

*C. Case Studies.* All students will be assigned to analyse a case study of philosophical method. This will be a thought experiment, real or imaginary case, or similar. By noon on the day of the class meeting for Week 4, each student will upload to Blackboard (under Discussions) a brief description and initial analysis of the case study (about 300-600 words), the details of which will be described in class. Throughout the semester students will be called upon to apply the classroom discussion to their case study.

By noon on November 26, each student will upload a written paper of about 1000-1500 words in which they explain as thoroughly as possible their metaphilosophical assessment of how the case study works or should be taken to work.

*Late assignments will be penalized at a rate of 30% per calendar day, starting the moment that the assignment is due.*

## V.

## GRADES

Grades for this class will be based on four factors. These will contribute to the final grade as follows:

Case Study Initial Description	10%
Presentation	20%
Case Study Final Assessment	15%
Paper	55%

In addition there is an expectation of class participation which may modulate your final grade by as much as one increment from its computed value, e.g., turn either a B+ or an A into an A-.

Attendance is mandatory. If you miss two meetings, your final grade will be penalized 20%. If you miss three meetings, then unless you can document extraordinary circumstances you will fail the class if you do not withdraw.

## **VI.**

## **THE FINE PRINT**

---

You are responsible for knowing and following all University and College regulations, for example with respect to registration, drop or withdrawal, and grading status. It goes without saying, but we will nevertheless, that this course will be conducted according to the University's Student Code of Conduct. Any student who is academically dishonest will *at least* fail the course; further actions may be taken. Please familiarize yourself with the University's guidelines on academic integrity, online at <<http://www.uc.edu/studentlife/conduct/guide.html>>.

Any student who, because of a disabling condition, needs special arrangements to meet course requirements must contact us *immediately* so that the appropriate arrangements can be made. (All disabilities must be documented with the University and us.)

Any student who requires accommodation for religious observances must notify the instructor in advance.

You are expected to show respect for your classmates and the instructors. This means that you will turn off telephones before class, and only use laptop computers and other electronic devices for class-related activities. Checking email, sending and receiving text messages, and listening to music are not among the permitted class-related activities.

The readings and schedule are subject to change. You should expect to be treated with respect and fairness by the instructor and by your classmates.

# TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY

Thomas W. Polger

University of Cincinnati

Fall 2013

---

## KEY TO ICONS

- |   |                                 |    |  |
|---|---------------------------------|----|--|
| ® | Required reading                | ★  | Every graduate student should read this  |
| 🔍 | Deep background (very optional) |    | sooner or later (the sooner the better), |
| 🌐 | Global/historical overview      |    | because most philosophers will expect    |
|   |                                 |    | you to know this information and/or this |
|   |                                 |    | specific article/chapter.                |
|   |                                 | ★★ | Really.                                  |
- 

## Suggested Background

- ®★★ Gettier, Edmund. 1963. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? *Analysis*, 23: 121-123.  
(web)
- ★🌐 Burge, Tyler. 1992. Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990. *Philosophical Review*  
101 (1): 3-51. (JSTOR)

## Week 1. August 29. Moore and the “Man on the Clapham Omnibus”

- ®★ Langford, C. H. 1942. The Notion of Analysis in Moore’s Philosophy. In Paul Schilpp  
(ed), *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University  
Press): 321-342. (scanned)
- ® Malcolm, Norman. 1942. Moore and Ordinary Language. In Paul Schilpp (ed), *The  
Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press):  
345-368. (scanned)

® Moore, G. E. 1942. A Reply to My Critics. In Paul Schilpp (ed), *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press): 660-677. (scanned)

🌐 Soames, Scott. 2005. *Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century, Vol. 1.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press.) (Part 1, ch. 1, pdf from web)

## **Week 2. Semptember 5. The Linguistic Turn: Ordinary Language and Positivism**

®★ Ayer, A. J. 1946. *Language, Truth, and Logic.* Dover. (ch. 1, “The Elimination of Metaphysics.”): 13-29. (scanned)

®★ Carnap, Rudolph. 1950/1967. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Reprinted in Richard Rorty (ed), *The Linguistic Turn* (Chicago: Chicago University Press): 72-84. (scanned)

Carnap, Rudolph. 1934/1984. On the Character of Philosophic Problems. *Philosophy of Science*, 1/51 (1): 5-19. (JSTOR)

®★★🌐 Rorty, Richard. 1967/1992. Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy. In Richard Rorty (ed), *The Linguistic Turn* (Chicago: Chicago University Press): 1-39. (scanned)

Williams, Michael. 1987. The Elimination of Metaphysics. In *Fact, Science, and Morality : Essays on A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic* (G. Macdonald and C. Wright, Eds.) (Oxford, UK: Blackwell.)

## **Week 3. September 12. No Meeting This Week: Case Study Assignment**

#### **Week 4. September 19. Philosophy Without Intuitions**

®★ Cappelen, Herman. 2012. *Philosophy Without Intuitions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

® Nado, Jennifer. 2012. Why Intuition? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

® Chudnoff, Elijah. 2011. What Intuitions Are Like. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 82 (3): 625–654.

® Malmgren, Anna-Sara. Review of *Philosophy Without Intuitions*, NDPR. <

<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/39362-philosophy-without-intuitions/>>

Pust, Joel. 2012. Intuition. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuition/>>

Chalmers, David. Author's manuscript. Intuition: A Minimal Defense.

#### **Week 5. September 26. Quine and Naturalism**

®★★ Quine, W. V. O. 1953. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In W. V. O. Quine (ed), *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): 20-46. (scanned)

®🌐 Maddy, Penelope. 2001. Naturalism: Friends and Foes. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 15: 37-67. (JSTOR)

®🌐 Soames, Scott. 2005. *Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century, Vol. 1*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press.) (Part 5, chs. 16-17)

★ Quine, W. V. O. 1969. Epistemology Naturalized. In W. V. O. Quine (ed), *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press): 69-90. (scanned)

🌐 Romanos, George. 1984. *Quine and Analytic Philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (ch. 1, scanned)

🌐★ Kitcher, Paul. 1992. The Naturalists Return. *Philosophical Review* 101 (1): 53-114. (JSTOR)

#### **Make-Up. September 29 (Sunday): The Psychological Critique of Intuition**

® Bishop, Michael and J. D. Trout. 2005. The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology. *Noûs* 39 (4): 696-714. (OhioLink)

®★ Stich, Stephen. 1999. Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity. In Michael Ramsey and William Ramsey (eds.), *Rethinking*

*Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield): 95-112. (scanned)

- ® Goldman, Alvin and Joel Pust. 1998. Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence. In Michael Ramsey and William Ramsey (eds.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield): 179-197. (scanned)
- ® Nagel, Jennifer. 2007. Epistemic Intuitions. *Philosophy Compass* 2/6: 792–819.
- ¶ Goldman, Alvin. 1989. Psychology and Philosophical Analysis. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 89:195–209.
- ¶ 🌐 Gutting, Gary. 1999. “Rethinking Intuition”: A Historical and Metaphilosophical Introduction. In Michael Ramsey and William Ramsey (eds.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield): 3-23. (scanned)

### **Week 6. October 3. Defense of Philosophical Intuition as Such**

- ®★ Bealer, George. 1998. Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Michael Ramsey and William Ramsey (eds.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield): 201-239. (scanned)
- ® Lycan, William G. 1996. Bealer on the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge. *Philosophical Studies*, 81: 143-150. (pdf)
- ® Levin, Janet. 2004. The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition. *Philosophical Studies* 121: 193–224.
- ® Goldman, Alvin and Joel Pust. 1999. Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence. In Michael Ramsey and William Ramsey (eds.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield): 179-197. (scanned)
- Bealer, George. 1996. On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 10: 1-34. (JSTOR)
- Bealer, George. 1996. A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. *Philosophical Studies*, 81: 121-142. (pdf)

Sosa, Ernest. 1996. Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status. *Philosophical Studies*, 81: 151-162. (pdf)

Bealer, George. 1996. A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa. *Philosophical Studies*, 81: 1163-174. (pdf)

Bealer, George. 1987. The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 1: 289-365. (JSTOR)

### **Week 7. October 10. More Defenses of Philosophical Intuition (in a Way)**

® Sosa, Ernest. 1998. Minimal Intuition. In Michael Ramsey and William Ramsey (eds.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield): 257-269. (pdf)

® Hintikka, Jaako. 1999. The Emperor's New Intuitions. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 96 (3): 127-147. (JSTOR)

® Symons, John. 2008. Intuitive Content: Kripke and Common Sense. *Axiomathes* 18:67–89

® Pust, Joel. 2001. Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions. *Philosophical Studies* 106: 227-258. (OhioLink)

Sosa, Ernest. 2006. Intuitions and Truth. In Patrick Greenough and Michael Lynch (eds), *Truth and Realism* (Oxford): 208-226. (scanned)

Lynch, Michael. 2006. Trusting Intuitions. In Patrick Greenough and Michael Lynch (eds), *Truth and Realism* (Oxford): 227-238. (scanned)

Horgan, Terence and David Henderson. 2001. The A Priori Isn't All It Is Cracked Up To Be, But It Is Something. *Philosophical Topics* (2001), 219-250. (web)

Sandin, Per. 2006. Has Psychology Debunked Conceptual Analysis? *Metaphilosophy* 37 (1): 26-33.

### **Week 8. October 17. The Canberra Plan and the New Analysts**

® ★ Jackson, Frank. 1998. *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

® Harman, Gilbert. 1994. Doubts About Conceptual Analysis. In Michaelis Michael and John O' Leary Hawthorne (eds), *Philosophy in Mind* (Kluwer): 43-48. (scanned)



- ® Byrne, Alex. 1999. Cosmic Hermeneutics. *Nous* 33 (supplement): 347-383.
- Horgan, Terence. 1984. Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics. *Southern Journal of Philosophy*. Supp. 22:19-38. (JSTOR)
- Tye, M. 1984. Supervenience, Materialism, and Functionalism: Comments on Horgan. *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 22 (S1): 39-43.
- ¶ Lewis, David. 1994. Lewis, David: Reduction of Mind. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers: 412-431. (scanned) (esp. 412-421.)
- ¶ Jackson, Frank. 1994. Armchair Metaphysics. In Michaelis Michael and John O' Leary Hawthorne (eds), *Philosophy in Mind* (Kluwer): 23-42. (scanned)
- ¶ Nolan, Daniel. 1996. The Credo of the Canberra Planners. <https://sites.google.com/site/professordanielnolan/credo>

### **Week 9. October 24. Armchair Philosophy: From Metaphysics to Ethics**

- ® Chalmers, D. and F. Jackson. 2001. Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation. *The Philosophical Review*, 110 (3): 315-361.
- ® Block, N. and R. Stalnaker. 1999. Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. *The Philosophical Review*, 108 (1): 1-46.
- ® ★ Stalnaker, Robert. 2004. Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics. *Philosophical Studies* 118 (1-2): 299-322.
- ® Yablo, Stephen. 2000. Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 81: 98-122. (OhioLink)
- Jackson, Frank. 2001. *Precis of From Metaphysics to Ethics*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62 (3): 617-624. (JSTOR)
- Williamson, Timothy. 2001. Ethics, Supervenience, and Ramsey Sentences. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62 (3): 625-630. (JSTOR)
- Stalnaker, Robert. 2001. Metaphysics without Conceptual Analysis. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62 (3): 631-636. (JSTOR)
- Stich, Stephen and Jonathan Weinberg. 2001. Jackson's Empirical Assumptions. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62 (3): 637-643. (JSTOR)

Balog, Katalin. 2001. Commentary on Jackson's *From Metaphysics to Ethics*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62 (3): 645-652. (JSTOR)

Jackson, Frank. 2001. Responses. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62 (3): 653-664. (JSTOR)

~~~~~  
¶ ¶ Boghossian, Paul. 1996. Analyticity Reconsidered. *Noûs*, 30 (3): 360-391. (JSTOR)

¶ ¶ Harman, Gilbert. 1996. Analyticity Regained? *Noûs*, 30 (3): 392-400. (JSTOR)

¶ ¶ Boghossian, Paul. 2003. Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense. *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, vol. 66: 15-35. (web)

~~~~~  
**Week 10. October 31. Experimental Philosophy: Burning the Armchair**

® Knobe, Joshua. 2007. Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophy Compass*, 2 (1): 81-92. (web)

® Nadelhoffer, Thomas and Edward Nahmias. 2007. The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophical Explorations*, 10 (2): 123-149. (OhioLink)

® Alexander, Joshua and Jonathan Weinberg. 2007. Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophy Compass*, 2 (1): 56-80. (web)

® Swain, Stacey, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan Weinberg. 2008. The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LXXVI, 1: 138-155. (OhioLink)

® Nahmias, Eddy, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner. 2006. Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73(1): 28-53.

® Nahmias, Eddy, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Jason Turner. 2005. Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility. *Philosophical Psychology* 18(5): 561-584, October 2005.

® Machery, Edouard, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. 2004. Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style. *Cognition* 92: B1-B12.

® Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. (2001) *Philosophical Topics*, 29, 429 - 460.

- Weinberg, Jonathan. 2007. How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Scepticism. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, XXXI: 318-343. (OhioLink)
- ☯ Kauppinen, Antti. 2007. The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophical Explorations*,10 (2): 95-118. (OhioLink)
- ☯ Knobe, Joshua. 2007. Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Significance. *Philosophical Explorations*,10 (2):119-121. (OhioLink)
- Scholl, Brian. 2008. Two Kinds of Experimental Philosophy (and their methodological dangers). (web)

### **Week 11. November 7. Doubts About Burning Armchairs**

- ® Machery, Edouard, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich. 2013. If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Vol. LXXXVI (3): 618-635.
- ® Devitt, Michael. 2012. Whither Experimental Semantics? *Theoria* 73: 5-36.
- ® Cullen, Simon. 2010. Survey-Driven Romanticism. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*1: 275–296.
- ® Sosa, Ernest. 2007. Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition. *Philosophical Studies*132: 99-107. (OhioLink)
- ® Nagel, Jennifer. 2012. Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LXXXV(3): 495-527.

### **Week 12. November 14. Post-Millennial Philosophy, à la Williamson**

- ® Williamson, Timothy. 2008. *The Philosophy of Philosophy*. New York: Blackwell.
- Williamson, Timothy. 2004. Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality, and Counterfactual Thinking. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. (OhioLink)
- Williamson, Timothy. 2004. Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement. *Dialectica* 58 (1): 109-153. (OhioLink)

### **Week 13. November 21. More Philosophy of Philosophy, à la Williamson**

- ® Sosa, David. 2006. Scepticism About Intuition. *Philosophy* 81: 633-647. (OhioLink)

- ® Jenkins, C. S. 2008. Modal Knowledge, Counterfactual Knowledge and the Role of Experience. *Philosophical Quarterly*, 58 (233): 693-701. (OhioLink)
- ® Weinberg, Jonathan. 2009. On Doing Better, Experimental Style. *Philosophical Studies*, 145:455–464.
- ® Williamson, Timothy. 2009. Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg. *Philosophical Studies*, 145: 465–476.
- ® Russell, Gillian. 2010. A Review of Timothy Williamson’s *Philosophy of Philosophy*. *Philosophical Books* Vol. 51 No. 1: 39–52

**Extra Friday Meeting, November 8 or 22?**

**Week 14. November 28. Thanksgiving**

**Week 15. December 5. Post-Millennial Philosophy, Other Views**

- ® Papineau, David. 2009. The Poverty of Analysis. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*: 1-30.
- ® Kornblith, Hilary. 2006. Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology. In Stephen Hetherington (ed), *Epistemology Futures* (London: Oxford University Press): 10-25. (scanned)
- ® Weatherson, Brian. 2003. What Good Are Counterexamples? *Philosophical Studies* 155: 1-31. (OhioLink)
- ® Gendler Tamar Szabó. 2007. Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, XXXI: 69-89. (OhioLink)
- ® Fumerton, Richard. 2007. Render Unto Philosophy that Which is Philosophy’s. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, XXXI: 56-67. (OhioLink)
- Fumerton, Richard. 1999. A Priori Philosophy after an A Posteriori Turn. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy: XXIII*: 21-33. (scanned)