

**Proclus**

## **Elements of Theology**

On The One

PROPOSITION I.

Every multitude partakes in some respect of The One.

PROPOSITION II.

Every thing which partakes of The One is alike one and not one.

PROPOSITION III.

Every thing which becomes one, becomes so by the participation of The One, and is one so far as it experiences the participation of The One.

PROPOSITION IV.

Every thing which is united is different from The One itself.

PROPOSITION V.

All multitude is posterior to The One.

PROPOSITION VI.

Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.

It is evident that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and,

PROPOSITION VIII.

That which is primarily good, and which is no other than The Good itself, is superior to all things which in any way whatever participate of good.

PROPOSITION IX.

Every thing which is self-sufficient, either according to essence or energy, is better than that which is not self-sufficient, and depends on another cause for its perfection.

PROPOSITION X.

Every thing which is self-sufficient is inferior to that which is simply good.

PROPOSITION XI.

All beings proceed from One First Cause.

PROPOSITION XII.

The Principle and First Cause of all beings is The Good Itself.

PROPOSITION XIII.

Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union is good; and The Good is the same as The One.

PROPOSITION XIV.

Every being is either immovable or moved. And if moved, it is either moved by itself, or by another: and if it is moved by itself it is self-motive, but if by another it is alter-motive. Every nature, therefore, is either immovable, self-motive, or alter-motive.

PROPOSITION XV.

Every thing which is able to return to itself is incorporeal.

PROPOSITION XVI.

Every thing which is able to return to itself has an essence separate from every body.

PROPOSITION XVII.

Every thing which moves itself primarily,<sup>7</sup> is able to return to itself.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

Every thing which imparts being to others is itself primarily that which it communicates to other natures.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings is present to all the beings which are arranged according to that nature, conformably to one reason, and in the same manner.

PROPOSITION XX.

The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature is beyond all souls, and The One is beyond, all intellectual hypostases.

PROPOSITION XXI.

Every order, beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad.

PROPOSITION XXII.

Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is wholly one alone.

PROPOSITION XXIII.

Every imparticable produces the things which are participated: and all the natures which are participated strive for imparticable essences.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated by it; and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticable.

PROPOSITION XXV.

Everything perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the One Principle of all.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and those which are successive.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

Every producing cause, by reason of its perfection and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

Every producing cause constitutes things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

PROPOSITION XXIX.

Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to primary natures.

PROPOSITION XXX.

Everything which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

Every thing which proceeds from, another essentially, returns to that from which it proceeds.

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

Every thing which proceeds from another and returns to it has a circular energy (activity).

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

Every thing which is converted according to nature makes its return to that from which it received the progression of its characteristic essence.

PROPOSITION XXXV.

Every thing caused abides in, proceeds from, and returns to, its cause.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

Of all things which are multiplied in progression the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, and after the same manner successively.

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

Every thing which proceeds from many causes returns through as many, and every conversion is through the same causes which produced the progression.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

Every being either alone essentially returns, or vitally, or gnostically.

PROPOSITION XL.

The natures which exist from and of themselves, and have a self-subsistent essence, precede those which proceed from, another cause.

PROPOSITION XLI.

Every thing which is in another is alone produced, by another; but every thing which is in itself is self-subsistent.

For that which is in another and is indigent of a subject can never be

PROPOSITION XLII.

Every thing self-subsistent is able to return to itself.

PROPOSITION XLIII.

Every thing which is able to return to itself is self-subsistent.

For if it returns to itself according to nature, it is perfect in the conversion

PROPOSITION XLIV.

Every thing which is able to return to itself through energy or activity, is likewise able to return to itself through essence.

PROPOSITION XLV.

Every thing self-subsistent is unbegotten.

PROPOSITION XLVI.

Every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible.

PROPOSITION XLVII.

Every thing self-subsistent is impartible and simple.

XXXIII. and XXXVI.

On the Perpetual, Demonstrating That the World is Perpetual.<sup>19</sup>

PROPOSITION XLVIII.

Every thing which is not perpetual is either a composite subsists in another.

PROPOSITION XLIX.

PROPOSITION L.

Every thing which is measured by time, either according to essence or according to activity, is generation so far as it is measured by time.

PROPOSITION LI.

Every thing self-subsistent is essentially exempt from the natures which are measured by time.

PROPOSITION LII.

Every thing eternal is a whole which subsists at once: whether it has its essence alone eternal, possessing the whole at once present, but not having one of its parts already constituted, and another to be constituted because it is not yet in existence, but as much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution and without extension - or whether it has its activity as well as its essence at once present, it possessing this likewise collectively, abiding in the

same measure of perfection, and as it were fixed immovably and without transition according to one and the same boundary.

PROPOSITION LIII.

Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior to every thing which subsists in time.

PROPOSITION LIV.

Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the measure of things in time; and these are the only two measures of life and motion in beings.

PROPOSITION LV.

Every thing which subsists in time, either subsists through the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a part of time.

PROPOSITION LVI.

Every thing which is produced by secondary natures is produced in a greater degree by prior and more causal natures, by whom those which are secondary were also produced.

PROPOSITION LVII.

Every cause energizes prior to the thing caused, and constitutes more effects posterior to it.

PROPOSITION LVIII.

Every thing which is produced by many is more composite than that which is produced by fewer causes.

PROPOSITION LIX.

Every thing which is simple in essence is either better or worse than composite natures.

PROPOSITION LX.

Every thing which is the cause of many effects is better than that which is allotted a power of producing few, and which produces the parts of those things the wholes of which the other constitutes.

PROPOSITION LXI.

Every power which is impartible is greater, but when divided is less.

PROPOSITION LXIII.

Every thing which is impartible constitutes two-fold orders of participated natures - one in things which occasionally participate, but the other in things which always and consensually participate.

PROPOSITION LXIV.

Every archical monad constitutes a twofold number; one of self-perfect hypostases or natures, but the other of illuminations which possess their hypostasis in other things.

PROPOSITION LXV.

Every thing which subsists in any manner whatsoever, either subsists causally, having the form of a principle, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation, iconically.

PROPOSITION LXVI.

All beings in relation to each other are either wholes or parts, or the same or different.

PROPOSITION LXVII.

Every totality is either prior to parts, or consists of parts, or is in a part.

PROPOSITION LXVIII.

Every whole which is in a part is a part of that whole which consists of parts.

PROPOSITION LXIX.

Every whole which consists of parts participates of the wholeness which is prior to parts.

PROPOSITION LXX.

Every thing which is more total is among principal causes, and, prior to partial natures illuminates participants; and that which participates something remains secondary to principal causes.

PROPOSITION LXXI.

All things which are among principal causes, since they possess a more universal and higher order in their effects, according to the illuminations proceeding from them, become in a certain respect subject to the communications of more partial causes. And the illuminations indeed from higher causes receive the progressions from secondary causes; but the latter are established in the former. And thus some participations precede others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from on high, to the same subject, more total causes having a prior activity, but those which are more partial supplying their participants with their communications, posterior to the activities of more total causes.

PROPOSITION LXXII.

All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject proceed from more perfect and total causes.

PROPOSITION LXXIII.

Every whole is at the same time a certain being and participates of being, but not every being is a whole.

PROPOSITION LXXIV.

Every form is a certain whole; for it consists of many things, each of which completes the form. But not every whole is a form.

PROPOSITION LXXV.

Every cause which is rightly so called is exempt from its effect.

PROPOSITION LXXVI.

Every thing which proceeds from, an immovable cause has an immutable hyparxis: but every thing which proceeds from a movable cause has a mutable hyparxis.

For if that which makes is entirely immovable, it does not produce that which is

PROPOSITION LXXVII.

Everything which is in capacity or power proceeds from that which is in activity: and that which is in capacity proceeds to that which is in activity. That likewise which is in a certain respect in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in activity: but that which is all things in capacity proceeds from that which is all things in activity.

PROPOSITION LXXVIII. Every power is either perfect or imperfect.

For the power which is prolific of activity is perfect, because it makes other things to be perfect through its own activities. That, however, which is perfective of other things is in a greater degree perfect, because it is more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of another which pre-exists in activity, according to which indigence it is something in capacity, is imperfect. For it is indigent of the perfection which is in another, in order that by participating of it, it may become perfect. Hence such a power as this is of itself imperfect. So that the power of that which is in energy is perfect, because it is prolific of energy: but the power of that which is in capacity is imperfect, because it derives its perfection from the power which is in activity.

PROPOSITION LXXIX.

Every thing which becomes, becomes from a twofold power.

PROPOSITION LXXX.

Every body of itself is naturally adapted to be passive, but every thing incorporeal to act. One, indeed, is essentially inefficacious, but the other is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however, may become passive by its association with the body; just as bodies are able to act through the participation of incorporeals.

PROPOSITION LXXXI.

Every thing which is participated separably, is present to its participant by a certain inseparable power which it imparts to it.

PROPOSITION LXXXII.

Every thing incorporeal, since it is revertible to itself, when it is participated by other things is participated in a separable manner.

PROPOSITION LXXXIII.

Every nature which is gnostic of itself is able to return wholly to itself.

PROPOSITION LXXXIV.

Every nature which always is possesses an infinite power.

PROPOSITION LXXXVI.

Every nature, which is truly being is infinite, neither through multitude nor through magnitude, but by power alone.

PROPOSITION LXXXVII.

Every eternal nature is being, but not every being is eternal.

PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

Every nature which is truly being is either prior to eternity, or in eternity, or participates of eternity.

That there is true being prior to eternity, has been demonstrated. But true being is likewise in eternity: for eternity possesses the always in union with being. And every nature which is eternal has both the being and always by participation. Eternity, however, possesses the always primarily, but being by participation. But Being itself is primarily being.

PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

Every nature which is truly being consists of bound and infinity.

PROPOSITION XC.

The first bound and the first infinity subsist by themselves, prior to every thing which is constituted of bound and the infinite.

PROPOSITION XCI.

Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power emanates from infinite power: and infinite power emanates from the first infinity.

PROPOSITION XCII.

Every multitude of infinite powers depends on one first infinity, which is not a participated power, nor does it subsist in things which are endued with power, but by and of itself; not being the power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.

PROPOSITION XCIII.

Every infinite which is in true beings is neither infinite to superior natures, nor is it infinite to itself.

PROPOSITION XCIV.

Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity is a perpetuity.

PROPOSITION XCV.

Every power which is more single is more infinite than that which is multiplied.

PROPOSITION XCVII.

Every archical cause in each series or causal chain imparts to the whole series its characteristic; and that which the cause is primarily, the series is according to diminution.<sup>36</sup>

PROPOSITION XCVIII.

Every separate cause is at one and the same time everywhere and nowhere. For by the impartance of its own power it is everywhere. For this is a cause

PROPOSITION XCIX.



Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, is not constituted by another cause. But it is itself the principle and cause of all its participants; and thus every principle in each causal chain is unbegotten.<sup>37</sup>

PROPOSITION C.

Every chain of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause and principle: but all imparticipables depend on the one principle of all things.

PROPOSITION CI.

Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things which participate of intellect, imparticipable life of all things, which participate of life, and imparticipable being of all things which participate of being. And of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to intellect.

PROPOSITION CII.

All beings which exist in any manner whatsoever consist of bound and the infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings are motive or active of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings participate of knowledge through the first intellect.

PROPOSITION CIII.

All things are in all, but each is appropriately in each.

PROPOSITION CIV.

Every thing which is primarily eternal has both an eternal essence and activity.

PROPOSITION CV.

Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is immortal.

PROPOSITION CVI.

Between every thing which is entirely eternal both in essence and activity, and every thing which has its essence in time, the medium, is that which is partly eternal and partly measured by time.

PROPOSITION CVII.

Every thing which is partly eternal and, partly temporal is at one and the same time being and generation.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

Every thing which is partial in each order is able to participate in a twofold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior order, viz. either through its own wholeness, or through that which is partial in the superior order and co-ordinate with the thing according to an analogy to the whole causal chain.

PROPOSITION CIX.

Every partial or particular intellect participates of the Primal Unity which is above intellect, both through the Universal Intellect and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with it. And every partial soul participates of Universal Intellect through Universal Soul, and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body participates of Universal Soul through Universal Nature, and a partial soul.

PROPOSITION CX.

Of all the things which are arranged in each causal chain, those which are first and are conjoined with their monad are able to participate of the natures which are proximately established in the superior causal chain through analogy. But those which are more imperfect and remote from their proper principle are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures.

PROPOSITION CXI.

Of every intellectual causal chain some are divine intellects, receiving the participations of the Gods; but others are intellects alone. And of every psychical chain some are intellectual souls, which depend on their proper intellects; but others are souls alone. And of every corporeal nature some have souls supernally presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the presence of souls.

PROPOSITION CXII.

Of every order those things which are primal have the form of the natures prior to them.

PROPOSITION CXIII.

Every divine number is unical.

PROPOSITION CXIV.

Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a God.

PROPOSITION CXV.

Every God is super essential, supervital, and superintellectual.

PROPOSITION CXVI.

Every deity except The One is participable.

PROPOSITION CXVII.

Every God is the measure of beings.

PROPOSITION CXVIII.

Every thing which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and super essential. Hence all things are contained in them unically and superessentially.

PROPOSITION CXIX.

Every God subsists through its own superessential goodness, and is good neither through participation, nor through essence, but superessentially; since habits and essences are allotted a secondary and remote order from the Gods.

PROPOSITION CXX.

Every God has in lots own essence a providence of the whole of things. And a providential activity is primarily in the Gods.

PROPOSITION CXXI.

Every divine nature has for its essence goodness, but a unical power, and a knowledge arcane and incomprehensible by all secondary natures.

PROPOSITION CXXII.

Every divine nature provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from the subjects of its providential care, providence neither remitting the pure and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence.

PROPOSITION CXXIII.

Every divine nature is itself, by reason of its superessential union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is comprehended and known by its participants. Hence that which is First is alone entirely unknown, because it is imparticipable.

PROPOSITION CXXIV.

Every God knows partible natures impartibly, temporal natures without time, things which are not necessary necessarily, mutable natures immutably; and, summarily, all things in a manner more excellent than the order of things known.

PROPOSITION CXXV.

Every God, from that order from, which he began to unfold himself into light, proceeds through all secondary natures, always indeed multiplying and dividing the impartances of himself, but preserving the characteristic of his own hypostasis.

PROPOSITION CXXVI.

Every God who is nearer to The One is more universal, but the God who is more remote from it is more particular.

PROPOSITION CXXVII.

Every divine nature, since it is simple, is specially primary, and on this account is most self-sufficient.

PROPOSITION CXXVIII.

Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is participated without a medium; but when -participated by natures more remote from himself, the participation is through fewer or more media.

For the former, since they are uniform and self-existent through their

PROPOSITION CXXIX.

Every divine body is divine through a divine soul: every soul is divine through a divine intellect: and every intellect is divine through the participation of a divine unity. Unity indeed is of itself a God: intellect is most divine: soul is divine, but body is deiform.

PROPOSITION CXXXI.

Every God, begins his own activity from himself.

PROPOSITION CXXXII.

All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by a medium.

PROPOSITION CXXXIII.

Every God is a beneficent unity or an unific (?????????) goodness; and each God

PROPOSITION CXXXIV.

Every divine intellect knows as intellect, but acts providentially as a God.

PROPOSITION CXXXV.

Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately; and every deified nature is extended to one divine unity. As many likewise as are the unities which are participated, so many are the genera of beings which participate.

PROPOSITION CXXXVI.

Every God who is more universal and ranks nearer to the First, is participated by a more universal genus of beings. But the God who is more partial and more remote from the First, is participated by a more partial genus of beings. And as being is related to being, so is unity to divine unity.

PROPOSITION CXXXVII.

Every unity with the one constitutes the being which participates of it.

PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.

Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, the first and highest is Being itself.

PROPOSITION CXXXIX.

All things which participate of the divine unities begin from being, but end, in a corporeal nature.

PROPOSITION CXL.

All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and proceeding through appropriate media, extend even to the last of things and to the terrestrial regions.

PROPOSITION CXLI.

Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one exempt from the natures for which it provides, but the other co-ordinated with them.

For some divine essences, through their hyparxis and the peculiarity of their

PROPOSITION CXLII.

The Gods are present to all things in the same manner, but all things are not in the same manner present to the Gods. But every thing participates of their presence according to its own order and power. And this is accomplished by some things uniformly, but by others manifoldly; by some eternally, but by others according to time; and by some incorporeally, but by others corporeally.

PROPOSITION CXLIII.

All inferior natures yield to the presence of the Gods, though the participant may be adapted to participation. Every thing alien recedes from the divine light, but all things are illuminated at once by the Gods.

PROPOSITION CXLIV.

All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their progressions as the orders of the Gods.

PROPOSITION CXLV.

The peculiarity of every divine order pervades through all secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate genera of beings.

PROPOSITION CXLVI.

The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end, through the return of all to their principles.<sup>65</sup>

PROPOSITION CXLVII.

The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the natures which are proximately above them.

PROPOSITION CXLVIII.

Every divine order is united to itself in a threefold manner, viz. by the summit which is in it, by its middle, and by its end.

For the summit having a power which is most unical transmits union to all the

PROPOSITION CXLIX.

Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded by number.

PROPOSITION CL.

Every nature which proceeds in the divine orders is not naturally adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor in brief are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the natures prior to themselves, but these have certain powers exempt from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings posterior to themselves.<sup>66</sup>

PROPOSITION CLI.

Every paternal order or genus in the Gods is primary, and pre-exists in the rank of The Good, according to all the divine orders.

For the paternal genus produces the hyperxes of secondary natures, and total

PROPOSITION CLII.

Every thing which is generative in the Gods proceeds according to the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through all things, and transcendently exhibiting a never-failing power in the progressions of secondary natures.

PROPOSITION CLIII.

Every thing perfect in the Gods is the cause of divine perfection.

PROPOSITION CLIV.

Every thing which is of a guardian nature in the Gods preserves every thing in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt from secondary and established, in primary natures.

PROPOSITION CLV.

Every thing vivific in the Gods is a generative cause, but every generative cause is not vivific.

PROPOSITION CLVI.

Every cause of purity is contained in the guardian order: but on the contrary every genus of a guardian order is not the same with the purifying genus.

PROPOSITION CLVII.

Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and constitutes the hyparxes of beings. But every nature which is fabricative of the production of form exists prior to composite natures, and precedes their order and division according to number, and is likewise of the same coordination with the paternal cause in the more partial genera of things.

PROPOSITION CLVIII.

Every elevating cause in the Gods differs both from a purifying cause and from the revertive genera.

PROPOSITION CLIX.

Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, Bound, and Infinity. But one order is caused more by Bound, and another by Infinity.

PROPOSITION CLX.

Every divine intellect is uniform, and perfect. And the first intellect is from itself, and produces other intellects.

PROPOSITION CLXI.

Every thing which is truly being, and because it depends on the Gods, is divine and imparticipable.

PROPOSITION CLXII.

Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being is arcane and intelligible; arcane since it is conjoined with The One, but intelligible because it is participated by being. For all the Gods are denominated from the things which depend on them; because

PROPOSITION CLXIII.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable intellect is intellectual. For as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to the

PROPOSITION CLXIV.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by every imparticipable soul is supermundane.

For because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the Gods also

PROPOSITION CLXV.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain sensible body is mundane.

PROPOSITION CLXVI.

Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if participable, it is either participated by supermundane or by mundane souls.

PROPOSITION CLXVII.

Every intellect thinks itself: but the Primal Intellect thinks itself only, and in this intellect Thought and the object of thought (the intelligible) are one numerically. But each of the subsequent intellects thinks itself and the natures prior to itself. And the intelligible to each of these is partly that which it is (itself) and partly that from which it emanates.

PROPOSITION CLXVIII.

Every intellect in activity knows that it thinks, and it is not the peculiarity of one intellect to think, and of another to know that it thinks.

[124]

For if it is intellect in activity, and thinks itself to be no other than the

PROPOSITION CLXIX.

PROPOSITION CLXX.

Every intellect thinks all things together. But imparticipable intellect thinks all things together simply: and each of the intellects subsequent to it thinks all things according to one or under the form, of the singular.

PROPOSITION CLXXI.

Every intellect is an imparticipable essence.

PROPOSITION CLXXII.

Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of natures perpetual and immutable in essence.

PROPOSITION CLXXIII.

Every intellect is intellectual, and the things which are prior and posterior to itself are likewise intellectual.

PROPOSITION CLXXIV.

Every intellect constitutes the things posterior to itself by thinking, and its creation is in thinking, and its thought in creating.

PROPOSITION CLXXV.

Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are intellectual both in essence and in activity.

For it is necessary that every intellect should either be participated by those,

PROPOSITION CLXXVI.

All intellectual forms are in each other, and, each is at the same time per se and distinct from the others.

PROPOSITION CLXXVII.

Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one intellect contains more universal but another more partial forms. And the superior intellects contain more universally the things which those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior intellects contain more partially the things which those that are prior to them contain more universally.

PROPOSITION CLXXVIII.

Every intellectual form constitutes eternal natures.

For if every intellectual form is eternal and immovable, it is essentially the

PROPOSITION CLXXIX.

Every intellectual number is finite.

PROPOSITION CLXXX.

Every intellect is a whole, because each consists of parts, and is at once united to other intellects and differentiated from them. But imparticipable intellect is a whole simply, since it has in itself all the parts totally or under the form of the whole; but each partial intellect contains the whole as in apart, and thus is all things partially.

PROPOSITION CLXXXI.

Every participated, intellect is either divine because it depends on the Gods, or is intellectual only.

PROPOSITION CLXXXII.

Every divine participated intellect is participated by divine souls.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIII.

Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual alone is participated neither by divine souls nor by those which experience a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIV.

Every soul is either divine, or is that which changes from intellect into a privation of intellect, or that which always remains as a medium between these, but is inferior to divine souls.

PROPOSITION CLXXXV.

All divine souls are Gods psychically. But all those which participate of an intellectual intellect are the perpetual attendants of the Gods. And all those which are the recipients of mutation are only occasionally the attendants of the Gods.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVI.

Every soul is an incorporeal essence and separable from the body.

For if it knows itself, but every thing which knows [137] itself returns to

PROPOSITION CLXXXVII.

Every soul is indestructible and incorruptible.

For every thing which can in any way whatsoever be dissolved and destroyed is



PROPOSITION CLXXXVIII.

Every soul is both life and vital.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIX.

Every soul is self-vital.

PROPOSITION CXC.

Every soul is a medium between impartible natures and the natures which are divisible about bodies.

PROPOSITION CXCI.

Every participable soul has an eternal essence, but its action is temporal.

PROPOSITION CXCII.

Every participable soul ranks among the number of truly existing beings, and is the first of generated natures.

PROPOSITION CXCXIII.

Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.

For if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an immovable

PROPOSITION CXCIV.

Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.

PROPOSITION CXCV.

Every soul is all things, containing sensibles paradigmatically, but intelligibles iconically.

PROPOSITION CXCVI.

Every participable soul primarily uses a perpetual body, which has an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.<sup>86</sup>

PROPOSITION CXCVII.

Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and, a life essential and gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All these, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic, subsist in it together; and all are in all, and each is apart from the others.

PROPOSITION CXCVIII.

Every nature which participates of time, and is always moved, is measured by circuits.

PROPOSITION CXCIX.

Every mundane soul uses circuits of its proper life, and restitutions to its pristine state.

PROPOSITION CC.

Every circuit of soul is measured by time. The circuit of other souls is measured by a certain time, but the circuit of the first soul measured by time is measured by the whole of time.

PROPOSITION CCI.

All divine souls have triple energies: one as souls, another as receiving a divine intellect, and another as attached to the Gods. And they provide for the whole of things as Gods, but know all things through an intellectual life, and move bodies through a self-motive essence.

PROPOSITION CCII.

All souls attending upon and always following the Gods are inferior to divine, but are developed above partial souls.

For divine souls participate of intellect and deity, and hence are at the same

PROPOSITION CCIII.

Of every psychical multitude, divine souls are greater in power than other souls, but less in number. But those which always follow divine souls have a mediate order among all souls, both in power end, quantity. And, partial souls are inferior in power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.

For divine souls are more allied to The One, on account of a divine hyperaxis,

PROPOSITION CCIV.

Every divine soul is a leader of many souls which always follow the Gods, and of a still greater number of those which occasionally receive this order.

For since it is divine it is necessary that it should be allotted an order which

PROPOSITION CCV.

Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one has to the vehicle of the other.

PROPOSITION CCVI.

Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and to

PROPOSITION CCVII.

The vehicle of every partial soul is fabricated by an immovable cause.

For if it is perpetually and connascently attached to the soul which uses it,

PROPOSITION CCIX.

The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation of every thing material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous to the soul which uses it.

PROPOSITION CCX.

Every connascent vehicle of the soul always has the same figure and magnitude. But it appears to be greater and less and of a dissimilar figure through the additions and ablations of other bodies.

PROPOSITION CCXI.

Every partial soul descending into generation descends as a whole; nor does one part of it remain on high, and another part descend.