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Philosophy 32
Professor Rutherford

 

Summary of Spinoza's Ethical Theory

1. Spinoza's Perfectionism

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Spinoza's ethics is organized around the search for the highest or
supreme good [/summum bonum/], which once achieved will guarantee
lasting happiness. This search is evident in his early /Treatise on the
Emendation of the Intellect/: "I resolved at length to enquire whether
there existed a true good, one which was capable of communicating itself
and could alone affect the mind to the exclusion of all else, whether,
in fact, there was something whose discovery and acquisition would
afford me a continuous and supreme joy to all eternity" (p. 233).

The conclusion he reaches is that this good is not wealth, honor, or
sensual pleasure but "the achievement of the highest human perfection"
(p. 236), and that this depends upon the acquisition of a kind of
universal knowledge: "man conceives a human nature much stronger than
his own, and sees no reason why he cannot acquire such a nature. Thus he
is urged to seek the means that will bring him to such a perfection, and
all that can be the means of his attaining this objective is called a
true good, while the supreme good is to arrive at the enjoyment of such
a nature, together with other individuals, if possible. What that nature
is we shall show in its proper place; namely, the knowledge of the union
which the mind has with the whole of Nature" (p. 235).

Much of this echoes themes in ancient and medieval philosophy. However,
Spinoza gives his own distinctive twist to perfectionism. This is most
evident when he writes: "it must be borne in mind that good and bad are
only relative terms, so that one and the same thing may be said to be
good and bad in different respects, just like the terms perfect and
imperfect. Nothing, when regarded in its own nature, can be called
perfect or imperfect, especially when we realise that all things that
come into being do so in accordance with an eternal order and Nature's
fixed laws" (p. 235). In this passage, Spinoza effectively rejects a
central assumption of traditional ethical theory, namely, that there are
things (actions, states of affairs) that are /intrinsically/ good
(things involving greater perfection) and things /intrinsically/ bad
(things involving lesser imperfection), and that right action consists
in pursuing the things that /should/ be pursued (the good) and avoiding
those that /should/ be avoided (the bad). Instead, Spinoza suggests that
good and bad are always relative to the desires of particular
individuals, and he seems to support this by denying that there is any
form or order that nature should have different from the order it is
determined to have by its "fixed laws." There is no "proper," or
"perfect," order of things that human beings should try to realize
through their actions (compare the appendix to Part I of the /Ethics/).

The challenge is how to reconcile these claims with the idea presented
above that it is the goal of the best sort of human life to pursue the
"highest good," which will guarantee lasting happiness. Doesn't this
imply that there is a form of life that human beings /should/ pursue,
one that is likely different from the life they currently lead? In a
sense, yes, but here is what Spinoza is going to add. (1) The good we
/should/ pursue is good because it is what we are determined to pursue
given the nature of our power (the desires of which we are the adequate
causes). Thus, desire defines good and not vice versa. (2) The power
characteristic of the human mind is the power of understanding. (3) The
exercise of this power tends not only to preserve our existence (IIIP7)
but to /increase/ our power (understanding breeds greater
understanding). (4) Pleasure is simply the passage from lesser to
greater power/perfection, so the more active we are, the happier we
shall be. (5) Finally, since the /Ethics/ itself purports to give an
understanding of God and nature, Spinoza can claim that he is not so
much exhorting human beings to live an ethical life as providing them
with the means to do so: an understanding of their own place in nature,
which is the source of the "highest human perfection" and the highest
happiness, or blessedness.

 

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2. Virtue as Power

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The metaphysical foundations of Spinoza's ethics are laid in IIIP6
("Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its
own being") and IIIP7 ("The conatus with which each thing endeavors to
persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the things
itself"). These propositions establish that (1) each thing "in so far as
it is in itself" has an intrinsic power that defines its nature and its
capacity to /act/ on itself and other things; (2) from that power
certain things necessarily follow (namely, whatever can be deduced from
an understanding of that power); (3) whatever follows from that power
promotes (or at least is consistent with) the continued existence of
that thing (i.e. no thing /acts/ to bring about its own destruction).

In Part III Spinoza goes on to elaborate this power in psychological
terms. The power that characterizes human beings (in relation to the
mind and body together) is /appetite/, or when it is accompanied by
consciousness, /desire/ (IIIP9S; Def. Emotions 1). At this point, it is
important to note three things: (1) From the power of a human being,
there follow things (desires) that tend toward its preservation;
however, a given individual can be an /adequate/ or /inadequate/ cause
of its desires, and only in the former case are the desires fully /its/
desires, which are guaranteed to preserve its existence. Desires caused
in it by external things can lead to its destruction. (2) In IIIP11S
Spinoza reiterates the point that "we do not endeavor, will, seek after
or desire because we judge a thing to be good. On the contrary, we judge
a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it."
(3) Desires themselves are emotions; thus (IIID3), they are the products
of changes (increases and decreases) in our "power of activity" and they
contribute causally to bringing about such changes. We experience such
changes as pleasure (transition to a state of greater perfection/power)
or pain (transition to a state of lesser perfection/power). In IIIP11S,
Spinoza specifies these as /passive/ transitions, meaning they are
caused in us by external things. However, a central task of the /Ethics/
is to specify the way in which we can become/ more active/, that is, the
adequate cause of desires whose fulfillment necessarily promotes the
preservation of our existence, /and/ produce changes which we experience
as pleasure of the highest sort. So, there can also be /active/
transitions to states of greater perfection (see IIIP58). To summarize:

 

	

Increases in perfection/power

	

Decreases in perfection/power

 

We are the adequate cause of changes in our state (i.e. active)

	

 

 "Good" emotions (pleasure/freedom)

	

 

 

 

We are the inadequate cause of changes in our state (i.e. passive)

	

 

"Lucky" good emotions (pleasure/bondage)

	

 

"Bad" emotions (pain/bondage)

 

In IVD8, Spinoza defines /virtue/ in terms of an individual's power of
acting: "By /virtue/ and /power/ I mean the same thing; that is (Pr. 7,
III), virtue, in so far as it is related to man, is man's very essence,
or nature, in so far as he has the power to bring about that which can
be understood solely through the laws of his own nature." (Compare the
similar remarks about perfection in the final paragraph of the preface
to Part IV.)

From this, he infers that virtue involves the seeking of our own
advantage: "The more every man endeavors and is able to seek his own
advantage, that is, to preserve his own being, the more he is endowed
with virtue. On the other hand, in so far as he neglects to preserve
what is to his advantage, that is, his own being, to that extent he is
weak [or: lacks power]" (IVP20); and he later argues that there is no
notion of virtue more basic than this one (IVP22). (Note the denial in
IVP20S that anyone can commit suicide of his own will.)

In IVP19, Spinoza further proves that "Every man, from the laws of his
own nature, necessarily seeks or avoids what he judges to be good or
evil." Given the definitions of "good" as "that which we certainly know
to be useful to us" (IVD1), and "bad" (or "evil") as that which we
certainly know to be an obstacle to our attainment of some good" (IVD2),
this proposition is equivalent to IVP20.

Finally, in IVP8, Spinoza equates the knowledge of good and evil with
"the emotion of pleasure and pain in so far as we are conscious of it."
The basic idea here is that pleasure is an increase in power, and we
call any such increase in power "good," because it is useful to us in
the preservation of our existence (IVD1). Therefore, the knowledge of
something as good is simply the awareness of that thing as producing
pleasure in us. There is some subtlety to this proposition and its
demonstration. For example, I experience many things as pleasurable or
painful, and this may be enough to /call/ them "good" or "evil" (see
IIP11S), but it does not follow from this that I certainly know them to
be useful to me (IVD1), in the sense of knowing that they are
/guaranteed /to preserve my existence. Many things I desire because they
give me pleasure (e.g. fatty foods) can turn out to be harmful to me.
What Spinoza must mean, therefore, is that I certainly /believe/ them to
be useful to me, where this belief is evidenced in my desire for them.
Remember that Spinoza equates "knowledge" with "idea," and assumes we
can have both adequate and inadequate knowledge/ideas. The point of this
proposition is to establish the coextension of the predicates "x is
pleasurable," "I desire x" and "x good." In most cases, but not all,
these predicates will be true of some x in virtue of an inadequate idea
of x. In this case, x may be something that is advantageous in the
short-run but disadvantageous in the long-run.

 

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3. Virtue as Understanding

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The results of the previous section point to the conclusion that
Spinoza's ethics is both egoistic (virtue is the seeking of one's own
advantage) and hedonistic (pleasure is the good). As it turns out,
however, neither of these theses fully captures Spinoza's position. This
is because of the restrictive meaning he gives to the mind's "power of
activity." According to Spinoza, the mind is active only in so far as it
understands (IIIP1) or has adequate ideas (IIIP3). Therefore,
understanding is the basis of virtue and defines what is (actually) to
our advantage.

The crucial propositions are IVP23, 24, 26 and 27:

"In so far as a man is determined to some action from the fact that he
has inadequate ideas, he cannot be said, without qualification to be
acting from virtue; he can be said to do so only in so far as he is
determined from the fact that he understands."

"To act in absolute conformity with virtue is nothing else in us but to
act, to live, to preserve one's own being (these three mean the same)
under the guidance of reason, on the basis of seeking one's own advantage."

"Whatever we endeavor according to reason is nothing else but to
understand; and the mind, in so far as it exercises reason, judges
nothing else to be to its advantage except what conduces to understanding."

"We know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what is really
conducive to understanding or what can hinder understanding" (compare
here IVD1-2)

The above propositions address the issue of power/perfection/virtue from
the perspective of the mind. But one might ask, what about the body?
Spinoza answers this question in IVP38-39, but it is unclear how neatly
these passages mesh with the main line of argument.

 

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4. Morality

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The account given so far suggests that even if Spinoza's ethics is not
based on a simple notion of desire satisfaction (I ought to pursue
whatever I desire, or believe advantageous to me), it nonetheless is
focused on self-perfection rather than on the good one can do for others
or the duties one owes them. This largely turns out to be true, since
for Spinoza, "The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the
mind's highest virtue is to know God" (IVP28), and this presumably is
something each person can only do for himself or herself. Nevertheless,
Spinoza's ethics also includes a place for morality, or the duties we
owe others, and he interprets this as one part of what it means "to live
under the guidance of reason."

In VP41 Spinoza distinguishes morality (or piety) from the salvation, or
blessedness, that depends upon the third kind of knowledge. This
receives a fuller treatment in IIIP59S:

"All the activities which follow from emotions that are related to the
mind in so far as it exercises understanding I refer to strength of mind
(/fortitudo/), which I subdivide into courage (/animositas/) and
nobility (/generositas/). By courage I understand 'the desire whereby
every individual endeavors to preserve his own being according to the
dictates of reason alone.' By nobility I understand 'the desire whereby
every individual, according to the dictates alone, endeavors to assist
others and make friends of them.' So I classify under courage those
activities that are directed solely to the advantage of the agent, and
those that are directed to the advantage of another I classify under
nobility. So self-control, sobriety, and resourcefulness in danger, etc.
are kinds of courage; courtesy and mercy are kinds of nobility."

According to Spinoza, it to our advantage to live under the guidance of
reason even in our everyday life, where this doesn't involve any special
sort of philosophical knowledge. Indeed he believes that providing an
adequate basis for the organization of society and our relations with
other people has to precede the pursuit of knowledge of God and of the
mind's relation to God, since the former guarantees the conditions under
which the latter becomes possible. For more on this, see IVP18S,
IVP32-37, and IVP73 (look in particular at the Hobbesian account of the
formation of the state in IVP37S2)..

 

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5. Self-Contentment and Freedom

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Why, in the end, should one /want/ to live under the guidance of reason?
Spinoza supplies three, closely related answers to this question. (1)
Although he rejects the notion of morality as a set of /external/
constraints on action, he believes that reason itself prescribes "rules"
for action, i.e., it tells us that certain ways of acting are right
(virtuous, honorable) and others wrong (wicked, dishonorable) (IVP18S).
In considering the authority of these imperatives, it is essential to
remember that reason itself is power, or an endeavor to persevere in
existence. Thus, through reason, we understand which types of action
contribute to preserving our existence and which do not, /and/ in so far
as we are rational we desire to perform those actions and not to perform
the others. (2) Closely related to this, is the distinction Spinoza
draws between the conditions of "bondage" and "freedom": "I assign the
term 'bondage' to man's lack of power to control and check the emotions.
For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not his own master but is
subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies that he is often
compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse" (IV
Pref.). No one, it is assumed, wants to be a passive victim of fortune;
and no one wants to pursue the worse in preference to the better. In so
far as one is rational, one lives freely and is best able to preserve
one's existence (IVP66-73). (3) Finally, Spinoza claims that by living
under the guidance of reason we will enjoy our greatest pleasure, that
of self-contentment. See in particular IVP52.

 

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6. Salvation/Blessedness

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This is achieved only through the third kind of knowledge and
presupposes the notoriously obscure doctrine of the eternity of the
mind. See VP22-42. Two other important statements of Spinoza's position
are found in the Appendix to Part IV:

"Therefore it is of the first importance in life to perfect the
intellect, or reason, as far as we can, and the highest happiness or
blessedness for mankind consists in this alone. For blessedness is
nothing other than that self-contentment that arises from the intuitive
knowledge of God. Now to perfect the intellect is also nothing other
than to understand God and the attributes and actions of God that follow
from the necessity of his nature. Therefore for the man who is guided by
reason, the final goal, that is, that highest Desire whereby he strives
to control all the others, is that by which he is brought to an adequate
conception of himself and of all things that can fall within the scope
of his understanding." (IV App. 4)

"But human power is very limited and is infinitely surpassed by the
power of external causes, and so we do not have absolute power to adapt
to our purposes things external to us. However, we shall patiently bear
whatever happens to us that is contrary to what is required by
consideration of our own advantage, if we are conscious that we have
done our duty and that our power was not extensive enough for us to have
avoided the said things, and that we are a part of the whole of Nature
whose order we follow. If we clearly and distinctly understand this,
that part of us which is defined by understanding, that is, the better
part of us, will be fully resigned and will endeavor to persevere in
that resignation. For in so far as we understand, we can desire nothing
but that which must be, nor, in an absolute sense, can we find
contentment in anything but truth. And so in so far as we rightly
understand these matters, the endeavor of the better part of us is in
harmony with the order of the whole of Nature." (IV App. 32)