Immanuel Kant, (From The Critique of Pure Reason)

THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON A452 B480 FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

Thesis

There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.

Proof

The sensible world, as the sum-total of all appearances, contains a series of alterations. For without such a series even the representation of serial time, as a condition of the possibility of the sensible world, would not be given us.

Time, as the formal condition of the possibility of changes, is indeed objectively prior to them; subjectively, however, in actual consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is given only in connection with perceptions. P 415a

Antithesis

An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.

Proof

If we assume that the world itself is necessary, or that a necessary being exists in it, there are then two alternatives. Either there is a beginning in the series of alterations which is absolutely necessary, and therefore without a cause, or the series itself is without any beginning, and although contingent and P 416a conditioned in all its parts, none the less, as a whole, is absolutely necessary and unconditioned. P 415 But every alteration stands under its condition, which precedes it in time and renders P 416 it necessary. Now every conditioned that is given presupposes, in respect of its existence, a complete series of conditions up to the unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. Alteration thus existing as a consequence of the absolutely necessary, the existence of something absolutely necessary must be granted. But this necessary existence itself belongs to the sensible world. For if it existed outside that world, the series of alterations in the world would derive its beginning from a necessary cause which would not itself belong A454 B482 to the sensible world. This, however, is impossible. For since the beginning of a series in time can be determined only by that which precedes it in time, the highest condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the time when the series as yet was not (for a beginning is an existence preceded by a time in which the thing that begins did not yet exist). P 416a

The former alternative, however, conflicts with the dynamical law of the determination of all appearances in time; and the latter alternative contradicts itself, since the existence of a series cannot be necessary if no single member of it is necessary. If, on the other hand, we assume that an absolutely necessary cause of the world exists outside the world, then this
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cause, as the highest member in the series of the A455 B483 causes of changes in the world,
must begin the existence of the latter and their series. Now this cause must itself begin to
act, and its causality would therefore be in time, and so would belong to the sum of
appearances, that is, to the world. It follows that it itself, the cause, would not be outside the
world -- which contradicts our hypothesis.

The word 'begin' is taken in two senses; first as active, signifying that as cause it begins (infit)
a series of states which is its effect; secondly as passive, signifying the causality which begins
to operate (fit) in the cause itself. I reason here from the former to the latter meaning. P 416

Accordingly the causality of the necessary cause of P 417 alterations, and therefore the cause
itself, must belong to time and so to appearance -- time being possible only as the form of
appearance. Such causality cannot, therefore, be thought apart from that sum of all
appearances which constitutes the world of sense. Something absolutely necessary is
therefore contained in the world itself, whether this something be the whole series of
alterations in the world or a part of the series.

OBSERVATION ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY A456 B484

I. On the Thesis

In proving the existence of a necessary being I ought not, in this connection, to employ any
but the cosmological argument, that, namely, which ascends from the conditioned in the [field
of] appearance to the unconditioned in concept, this latter being regarded as the necessary
condition of the absolute totality of the series. To seek proof of this from the mere idea of a
supreme being belongs to another principle of reason, and will have to be treated separately.
The pure cosmological proof, in demonstrating the existence of a necessary being, P 418 has
to leave unsettled whether this being is the world itself or a thing distinct from it. P 416a

Therefore neither in the world, nor outside the world (though in causal P 417a connection
with it), does there exist any absolutely necessary being.

II. On the Antithesis

The difficulties in the way of asserting the existence of an absolutely necessary highest
cause, which we suppose ourselves to meet as we ascend in the series of appearances, cannot
be such as arise in connection with mere concepts of the necessary existence of a thing in
general. The difficulties are not, therefore, ontological, but must concern the causal
connection of a series of appearances for which a condition has to be assumed that is itself
unconditioned, and so must be cosmological, and relate to empirical laws. P 418

To establish the latter view, we should require principles which are no longer cosmological
and do not continue in the series of appearances. For we should have to employ concepts of
contingent beings in general (viewed as objects of the understanding alone) and a principle
which will enable us to connect these, by means of mere concepts, with a necessary being.
But all this belongs to a transcendent philosophy; and that we are not yet in a position to
discuss. If we begin our proof cosmologically, resting it upon the series of appearances and
the regress therein according to empirical laws of causality, we must not afterwards suddenly
deviate from this mode of argument, passing over to something that is not a member of the series. Anything A458 B486 taken as condition must be viewed precisely in the same manner in which we viewed the relation of the conditioned to its condition in the series which is supposed to carry us by continuous advance to the supreme condition. P 417

It must be shown that regress in the P 418a series of causes (in the sensible world) can never terminate in an empirically unconditioned condition, and that the cosmological argument from the contingency of states of the world, as evidenced by their alterations, does not support the assumption of a first and absolutely originative cause of the series. A strange situation is A459 B487 disclosed in this antinomy. From the same ground on which, in the thesis, the existence of an original being was inferred, its non-existence is inferred in the antithesis, and this with equal stringency. We were first assured that a necessary being exists because the whole of past time comprehends the series of all conditions and therefore also the unconditioned (that is, the necessary); we are now assured that there is no necessary being, and precisely for the reason that the whole of past time comprehends the series of all conditions (which therefore are one and all themselves conditioned). The explanation is this. The former argument takes account only of the absolute totality of the series of conditions determining each other in time, P 419a and so reaches what is unconditioned and necessary. P 419

If, then, this relation is sensible and falls within the province of the possible empirical employment of understanding, the highest condition or cause can bring the regress to a close only in accordance with the laws of sensibility, and therefore only in so far as it itself belongs to the temporal series. The necessary being must therefore be regarded as the highest member of the cosmical series. Nevertheless certain thinkers have allowed themselves the liberty of making such a saltus (metabasis allo genos). From the alterations in the world they have inferred their empirical contingency, that is, their dependence on empirically determining causes, and so have obtained an ascending series of empirical conditions. And so far they were entirely in the right. But since they could not find in such a series any first beginning, or any highest member, they passed suddenly from the empirical concept of contingency, and laid hold upon the pure category, which then gave rise to a strictly intelligible series the completeness of which rested on the existence of an absolutely necessary cause. P 419a

The latter argument, on the other hand, takes into consideration the contingency of everything which is determined in the temporal series (everything being preceded by a time in which the condition must itself again be determined as conditioned), and from this point of view everything unconditioned and A461 B489 all absolute necessity completely vanish. Nevertheless, the method of argument in both cases is entirely in conformity even with ordinary human reason, which frequently falls into conflict with itself through considering its object from two different points of view. M. de Mairan regarded the controversy between two famous astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty in regard to choice of standpoint, as a sufficiently remarkable phenomenon to justify his writing a special treatise upon it. The one had argued that the moon revolves on its own axis, because it always turns the same side towards the earth. The other drew the opposite conclusion that the moon does not revolve on its own axis, because it always P 420a turns the same side towards the earth. P 420
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Since this cause was not bound down to any sensible conditions, it was freed from the temporal condition which would require that its causality should itself have a beginning. But such procedure is entirely illegitimate, as may be gathered from what follows. In the strict meaning of the category, the contingent is so named because its contradictory opposite is possible. Now we cannot argue from empirical contingency to intelligible contingency. When anything is altered, the opposite of its state is actual A460 B488 at another time, and is therefore possible. This present state is not, however, the contradictory opposite of the preceding state. To obtain such a contradictory opposite we require to conceive, that in the same time in which the preceding state was, its opposite could have existed in its place, and this can never be inferred from [the fact of] the alteration. A body which was in motion (= A) comes to rest (= non-A). Now from the fact that a state opposite to the state A follows upon the state A, we cannot argue that the contradictory opposite of A is possible, and that A is therefore contingent. P 420a

Both inferences were correct, according to the point of view which each chose in observing the moon's motion. P 421 To prove such a conclusion, it would have to be shown that in place of the motion, and at the time at which it occurred, there could have been rest. All that we know is that rest was real in the time that followed upon the motion, and was therefore likewise possible. Motion at one time and rest at another time are not related as contradictory opposites. Accordingly the succession of opposite determinations, that is, alteration, in no way establishes contingency of the type represented in the concepts of pure understanding; and cannot therefore carry us to the existence of a necessary being, similarly conceived in purely intelligible terms. Alteration proves only empirical contingency; that is, that the new state, in the absence of a cause which belongs to the preceding time, could never of itself have taken place. Such is the condition prescribed by the law of causality. This cause, even if it be viewed as absolutely necessary, must be such as can be thus met with in time, and must belong to the series of appearances.