

Ockham, Ord 27.3 (OTh IV 238-248)
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(*Opera Theologica IV*)
(John Martin translation, draft)

[Against the opinion of Peter Aureoli]

[238.4] That opinion as far as its conclusion goes, the reasons for which were set out earlier, seems to me false. This is so because though I have seen little of what that doctor has said -- for if all the interchanges in which I have looked into what was said were put end to end at the same time they would not exhaust a single natural day -- and so I do not intend to argue much against that advocate. For, due to ignorance of what he said I might easily argue more against his wording than his intention. However since the conclusion, just as it sounds, appears to me false, I am going to argue against it, whether what is argued comes out against the advocate's intentions or not. Some arguments which I have made, by using the 36 distinctions of this book [d. 36, q. un.], against a single opinion about cognitive being [*esse cognito*]¹ -- this material, and perhaps as all the rest in Book I, I developed before I saw the opinion recited here -- can also be adduced against this conclusion. The earlier arguments may be sought in that place, and anybody who likes may apply them.

[238.18] But against the present [issue] I argue first as follows: concerning that apparent and intentional being [*esse apparenti* and *esse intentionalis*], I ask whether it has only objective being [*esse obiectivum*] and does so in such a way that it never [*nullibi*] has subjective being [*esse subjectivum*], or whether it ever has subjective being. /239/ The first [namely, that it has objective but not subjective being] cannot be granted because then no true quality would ever be apprehended through sense, or in sensation there would never

be two objects apprehended, namely the real quality and the thing that has only subjective being. First because nothing is the object of sense [*sensus*] *per se* and properly [*i.e.* as an individual] unless it is a real sensible [*sensibile reale*]. Secondly, there is no such thing [*i.e.* that objective but not subjective being] unless it is a “being of reason” [*ens rationis*]; but a being of reason is not *per se* apprehensible by sense [*apprehensibile a sensu*].

[239.7] The second [*i.e.* that intensional being has subjective being] also cannot be granted because whatever has subjective being, when it has subjective being, it is truly [*vere*] a real being [*ens reale*] and not only intentional. Therefore if such an apparent and intentional being were to have subjective being, it would truly be a real being. Furthermore, if it has subjective being, it is necessarily a substance or an accident, and as a consequence it will necessarily be a real being.

[239.13] Furthermore, of that apparent being in which whiteness is produced when whiteness is seen, I inquire whether it is really the same as whiteness, or whether it is not really the same.

[239.16] If it should be said that it is really the same, the contrary [is argued]: whenever there are things that are really the same, they are simultaneous with respect to generation and corruption, according to the Philosopher of *Metaphysics* IV [1003b26-30]; and as a consequence if the apparent being were ever to come about, so would the whiteness itself [*ipsa albedo*]. Similarly, whenever things are really the same, it is impossible that one exists while the remaining one does not exist [*unum esse reliquo non existente*]. But this – when it is exhibiting the whiteness – is able to be, while that – when it is exhibiting apparent being –

¹ *Esse cognito* would be more accurately but clumsily translated “being due to being cognized.” Likewise below *esse apparenti* and *esse intensionali*; are briefly as apparent being and intensional being respectively, though a fuller of *esse apparenti* would be “being due to something appearing”

may not exist, because otherwise the apparent being would be apart from vision [*sine visione*].² Similarly [it may be argued as follows: an instance of] whiteness exists apart from vision [*sine visione*], therefore the whiteness and the apparent being are not really the same.

/240/ If they are not really the same, and it is certain that neither is the a part of the other, then they wholly differ and do so according to themselves as wholes. From which I argue thus: when things differ according to themselves as wholes, whether they be distinct things, or one an absolute thing and the other a being of reason [*ens rationis*], the one absolute thing can be apprehended – at least through divine power – by a power of which it is the *per se* object, while the other [whether absolute or a being of reason] is not apprehended. Therefore whiteness can be apprehended by vision [*a visu*], while the apparent being is not apprehended. And as a consequence no apparent being is required as a medium for the thing that is going to be sensed, and if posited is superfluous.

[240.11] Furthermore I ask whether whiteness itself truly appears [*apparet*] to sense [*sensu*] or not. If not, then it is not seen, which is clearly false. If it does appear, and then after it, apparent being appears [*esse apparens apparet*], then there are here two appearances and two things that are viewed [*duo apparentia et prospecta*]. From which I argue thus: there are always two appearances to a power [*alicui potentia*, e.g. to one of the senses], for the reason [*ratione*] that one of these becomes an apparent being, while one is left as it was. Therefore if the whiteness in apparent being in some way could be distinct [*aliquo modo distincto*] from whiteness, by parity of reason, that apparent being would then

² i.e if it were otherwise, namely if something which is being seen as white (an apparent being) were required to co-exist with a actually existing white thing, then an absurdity would follow, namely something

become an apparent being distinct [from itself] in some way [*aliquo modo distincto*], and as a consequence there would be for such things an infinite regress, which is manifestly absurd.

[240.21] And if it should be said that apparent being appears *per se ipsum* without any medium [*sine onmi medio*], the contrary [is argued]: when something is as much the *per se* object of one power [*alicuius potentiae*] as it is of another, if that other can appear to the power without any medium between itself and the power's act [*actum potentiae*], then by parity of reason [*ratione*] the *per se* object could appear to the power without any medium between the object and the power's act. Therefore whiteness /241/ could be seen without any apparent being as a medium between the whiteness and the [act of] vision [*visionem*]; therefore it is superfluous for such an apparent being to be posited as a medium [*frustra ponitur tale esse apparens medium*].

[241.3] Furthermore, that which immediately terminates the act of a power [*actum alicuius potentiae*] does not require some medium for that which is apprehended by the power; but it is whiteness that immediately terminates the act of seeing; therefore such an apparent being is not require as medium.

[241.7] Furthermore, when something is naturally apprehended by a power successively apart from two things in such a way that it is first apprehended without one and later without the other, it can through divine power be apprehend without either of them, so that neither of them is apprehended. But the same object, that is to say the whiteness, is first apprehended without true apparent being [e.g. when the object sensed continues to exist], and later without false apparent being [e.g. when the object sensed has ceased to exist], as

which by its nature need not be seen at all (the white thing) could both not be seen (*qua* thing unsensed)

is according him [Aureoli] clearly evident. Therefore it can be apprehended without apparent being, and as a consequence it is superfluous for it to be posited.

[241.15] Against the second proposition³ it could be argued from what has been said [ex *praedictis*], because if it is not the case that such a apparent being would come about in every intellection, it is clear that such a being is not universally [*universaliter*] a word in our mind [*verbum mentis nostrae*]. Therefore, as to those two propositions are concerned, I say briefly that the first⁴ is generally accepted as false. So I say first that in no intuitive knowledge [*notitia intuitiva*], neither sensitive nor intellective, is a thing constituted, in whatever being, that is a medium between the thing and the act of cognizing [*actum cognoscendi*]. But I say that the thing itself, without any medium between itself and the act, is immediately seen or apprehended. There is no more a medium between the thing and the act on account of which it could be said that the thing is seen, than there is a medium between God and a creature [*creaturam*] /242/ on account of which God would be called 'the Creator'. But just as a creature exists *eo ipso* because God exists -- because a creature could not exist while God did not exist [*non posset esse Deo nonexistente*] -- God is called 'the Creator' inasmuch as he really is a Creator without a medium. Thus a thing is said to be seen and cognized [*cognosci*] without a medium because *eo ipso* it exists and there is

yet have to be co-existent with apparent being.

³ [230.7] «The first is that in every intellection what emanates and proceeds, is not something other, but the cognized thing itself in objective being, by which the terminating of the intellect's intuition [*intuitum intellectus*] occurs. The second is that the object should be posited and formed, and is a *dictum* within the mind whereby it [the object] is conceived and in which the cognizing intuition is terminated by word in our mind [*verbum mentis nostrae*]. The third is that the Son emanates in the divine in a similar and conspicuous [*conspicuo*] being, in such a way that he is truly formed in a real manner and takes on real being [*esse reale*].» From which [three propositions] it follows that that produced in the divine is truly the Word.

⁴ See [230.7] and the previous note.

knowledge of such [*notitia talis*]. Nor does there exist anything else there to be seen [*visum*] other than the thing itself, just as there is nothing imaginable as the Creator save God.

[242.8] Secondly I say that through abstractive knowledge [*notitiam abstractivam*] immediately following intuitive knowledge [*notitiam intuitivam*] nothing comes to be nor does anything take on [*capiſ*] being other than abstractive knowledge itself, because exactly the same thing is the case for the object of intuitive knowledge and for the abstractive knowledge that immediately follows, and for the same reason [*ratione*]. Therefore just as nothing is a medium between an intuitively cognized object [*obiectum intuitive cognitum*] and intuitive knowledge itself, there will be nothing as a medium between the object and abstractive knowledge.

[242.15] Thirdly I say when there is some abstractive knowledge by which a universal occurs in the intellect [*universale in intellectu*], it can probably be maintained either way, namely that there is a medium or that nothing is a medium. If a medium should be posited, it can probably be said, as was said previously, that there is no medium unless it is a fictum common to all singulars [*fictum commune omnibus singularibus*] that is understood, and then by that intellection [*intellectione*] nothing with respect to the singular is understood. Or it can be said that there is a intellection [*intellectio*] of the soul having subjective being in the soul really distinct from every other object of the soul. It can probably also be said that no such thing is a medium, but then that the universal /**243**/ is itself a confused cognition that is immediately terminated [*ipsamet cogntio confusa terminata immediate*] in all the singular things of which it is common and universal [*communis et universalis*] in the manner I have spelled out elsewhere recitatively. Since what I say about positing or not positing such

fictive being [*de tali esse ficto ponendo vel non podendo*], I say recitatively, it is if you will not always said explicitly.

[243.6] Fourthly I say that not every word is such an apparent being. Because, just as has been shown in a previous question, every intellection is a word; but not every intellection is such an apparent being; therefore etc.

[243.10] Against the arguments for of the earlier opinions, there must [now] be a reply; it will be apparent from those replies [which follow] that some are perhaps contrary to the intention of the speaker [*contra mentem dicentis*]. I am, however, not certain [about this] because I have not looked into it in the various places that deal with that material.

[243.14] To the first⁵ I say that the act of an external sense [*actus sensus exterioris*] does not posit a thing in intentional being, namely one such that there exists in addition to the act of sensing [*actus sentiendi*] and the external thing some other intentional being as medium [*sit aliquod esse intentionale medium*]; however on account of the fact that an act of sensing [*actus sentiendi*] is posited in real being [*in esse reali*], the external thing itself can be called 'a being sensed' [*sentiri*] without anything happening to it [*sine omni sibi adventient*], except perhaps what is stated earlier [*per praedicationem*] in one opinion. But even that would only be through an act of the intellect [*per actum intellectus*], just as something happens to God from the fact that a creature is posited in real being [*in esse reali*]. And if he offering the opinion [*opinans*] is understood [*intellexit*] in this way, I do not disagree with him; however his words purport the first understanding.

⁵ Ockam describes Peter's argument for the first proposition as follows [230.17]: «Here it should be seen that in the act of the intellect the intellected thing is of necessity posited in some seen [*conspicio*] intentional and apparent being. First [I argue] thus: nothing, either inner or outer [*interior aut exterior*], is a more formative of sense [*sensus*] than the act of the intellect; but the act of the outer sense posits a thing in intentional being, as is evident in many experiences...»

[243.23] Therefore I reply to the evidence. To the first experience⁶ I say that when someone is carried along on water, there is no motion in the eye either objectively or subjectively, because there is no motion in the /244/ trees themselves. However, the proposition 'the trees are being moved' is objectively [*objective*] in the intellect, and it is indeed true that the intellect can form propositions, and assent to and dissent from them, but that fact does not bear on the proposition [at issue].

[244.5] And if it should be said that the trees seem to be moving not so much to the intellect itself as it is to sense [*sensu*], even to the extent that they are seen to be moved by brute animals none of which posses intellectual cognition:

[244.9] It should be said that if by the proposition 'the trees seem to sense to be moving' is understood [as saying] that some motion, real or otherwise, may be apprehended by sense, then it is false. Because nothing but motion that is real or that could be a real being [*esse realis*] is apprehended by the sense, just as nothing but a real whiteness, or which could be a real being [*esse realis*], is apprehended by sense. And therefore no motion, either real or apparent, is constituted through sense, nor does any motion whatever appears to sense.

[244.16] If however the previously stated proposition should be understood [as saying] that in sense there is an apprehension or apprehensions of diverse objects in virtue of which operations [*operationes*] can be elicited by sensing that are similar to operations elicited by sensing a truly moving body, then the proposition is true. From this however it does not follow that there is some thing appearing in motion; it does follow however that, when

⁶ [231.1] «First indeed because when something is carried along on the water, the trees standing on the shore seem to be moved. Therefore that motion, which is in the eye objectively, cannot be posited as something that is vision itself; otherwise vision would be the object of vision, it would be seen, and vision would be a reflexive power [*visus potentia reflexiva*]. Nor can it be posited that it is really in the tree or bank, because then they would really be moved. Nor can it be posited that it is in the air because it is not

speaking in a way in which [*illo modo loquendo quo*] it is posited that motion can be seen, there are in a sense perceptions equivalent [*apprehensiones aequivalentes*] in degree to operations [*ad operationes*] elicited by an appearance or vision by which the motion appears.

[244.25] And I confirm this reply [just given], because ‘the trees appear to be moved, therefore some thing that is moved is appearing or has objective being,’ follows no more than it follows that⁷ ‘the trees really appear /245/ to be moved, therefore some real moved thing appears or has objective being’, because the manner of arguing is the same. But the second entailment is not valid according to anybody, therefore neither is the first. And thus I say that when it is granted that trees really are seen in to be moved or to be moved by real motion, it should not be granted that there are apprehensions taking place equivalent in degree to [the sort of] elicited operations by which trees are truly apprehended. Thus something similar should be said about this ‘the trees are being seen to be moved’, and thus not motion exists intentionally, any more than it really exists, in either seen being [*in esse viso*] or in judged- through-sense-being [*in esse iudicato per sensum*], because there is no motion being seen.

[245.12] Secondly, I confirm [further] that [earlier] reply because if something moving is seen to be there, and there is no real motion, then the motion has only objective being. But it is more important to distinguish such intentional motion from real motion than it is to distinguish it from whiteness or blackness. Through vision [*per visionem*] of such intentional motion, then, it should no more be judged that the motion is real motion than that whiteness

attributed to the air but to the tree. Therefore it exists only intentionally, not really, in seen being and in judged being [*in esse viso et in esse iudicato*].»

⁷ *non plus sequitur...non plus quam sequitur*

or blackness are real, something they deny.⁸ Therefore I say that there is there no motion being seen. Because however on account of the motion of those things that are on the ship, which only move as a result of the ship's motion, those trees are seen in varying distance and aspect by those on the ship, the trees are therefore seen to be moved. This is true to the extent that these propositions are equivalent: 'without any medium produced or made [*producto vel facto*] in any sort of real or intentional being, the trees are seen successively in varying /246/ distance and aspect by the eye moving as a result of the ship's motion' and 'the trees are seen by the eye to be moved'. And therefore as from the first proposition it does not follow that something appears as an intentional motion, so it does not follow from the second.

[246.5] And if it should be said that since of those seeing many judge and know that they [the trees] are not being moved, that it is not by any kind of eye that trees are seen to be moved, it should be said that this is true because it is the intellect that judges that they are not being moved, or if this occurs in brutes or in those lacking reason, it is true on account of an apprehension impeding the action of a natural cause. How this might happen, however, I omit explaining for the sake of brevity.

[246.12] For the same reason I say against the second experience⁹ that there is no circle appearing to the eye. The intellect however sometimes believes this proposition is true 'a circle exists in the air'. But there is no circle appearing to the eye except "equivalently", that

⁸ See note 4

⁹ [231.9] «The second experience is of the sudden motion of a stick and of it's being circled in the air. For a circle appears to be brought into being from a stick being so moved. Thus it must be asked, what is that circle that appears to be seen? For either it [the circle] is a real existing thing in the stick, which is not possible since it [the stick] is strait. Or it [the circle] is in the air; which it is not, because a colored and completed circle cannot exist in air. Nor is it [the act of] vision because then [the act of] vision would itself be seen, and moreover vision it is not in the air where the circle appears. Nor for the same reason can it

is, there occurs an apprehension or apprehensions equivalent [*apprehensionem vel apprehensiones aequivalentes*] in degree to the operations elicited by the apprehension or apprehensions [*ad operationes eliciendas apprehensioni vel apprehensionibus*] of a circle.

How this could come about, however, would be tedious to explain. Truly however from what has been said seriously on the question, appearing “equivalently” would be possible.

[246.20] However that it should be inferred from this argument that ‘there is a circle in the air that has intentional being or that exists in apparent or judged being’, it is simply as false as it sounds, because nothing is imaginable [*imaginabile*] /247/ in air unless it is real.

Because if it has being in air, it is either subjective or objective being. If it is subjective, it is real. If it is objective, this is impossible, because air is neither something that knows nor

wills [*cognitivus nec volitivus*]. Therefore even if the circle must be posited [*esset*

ponendus], it does not exist in the air. Nor does it follow: ‘it is judged to be in the air,

therefore it is in the air’, any more than it follows: ‘God is judged to be a body, therefore God is a body’. And from this a reason can be deduced more for the opposite of his intention

than for it, because just as on these grounds it does not follow from the fact that the circle is judged to be in the air, that the circle exists in the air, either really or intentionally, so too on

these grounds it does not follow from the fact that a circle is judged to exist, that the circle exists, either really or intentionally.

[247.12] On the same ground [I argue] against the third experience¹⁰ that based on sensation [*per sensationem*] there is no breakage, even if according to the intellect [*per intellectum*] this proposition ‘the stick is broken’ is believed to be true, and in sense there is

be anywhere within the eye. It is left therefore that it exists in the air having intentional being, or in apparent and judged being.»

¹⁰ [231.19] «The third experience is of a broken stick in water.»

an apprehension or apprehensions equivalent to something causing such a belief in the intellect of the sort that sensation would cause if the stick were outside the water, apprehended, and broken.

[247.18] On the same grounds [I argue] against the fourth¹¹ experience that there exists a sensation or sensations that are equivalent in degree to the operations that are elicited in the intellect or in an exterior or interior power, by either the sensation or sensations of two really existing candles. Nor do there exist two candles in apparent being [*in esse apparenti*], which apparent being [*esse apparens*] mediates [*mediate*] between the sensation or sensations, and the candle itself or parts of the candle. This being understood, it can be granted that in the intellect and equivalently in the senses, there exist two candles in apparent being /248/ in the sense that there exists a judgment in which the two candles are judged to exist. But from this it does not follow in any way whatever that there exists anything different from the candle, its parts, and the act in a power of cognizing [*ab actu cognoscendi in potentia*].

¹¹ [231.19] «The fourth concerns the duality of the appearances of candles when one eye is lifted. For in apparent being there are two, though in fact there is only one candle in real being.»