

William of Ockham

Reportatio, Book II

Question XIII

Selected Texts on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition

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[p.253]

### Question XIII

Whether a higher angel understands through fewer species than a lower angel  
That it is so:

It is proved because according to the philosopher (*De Caelo et Mundo* 262<sup>a</sup>22-292<sup>b</sup>15), to the degree that nature is more complete [*perfectior*], to that degree it needs fewer things for its operation; therefore etc.

For the opposite:

Distinct cognitions require distinct reasons [*rationes*] in the understanding no matter when; therefore the superior as much as the inferior need reasons.

Here first of all I assume that a species is a being that exists prior to an act of understanding and can endure both before and after it, even when a thing [which falls into the species] is absent. And so as a consequence, it is distinguished from habit, because a habit of the intellect follows an act of the understanding, but a species precedes the act as well as the habit.

#### [The Opinion of Thomas Aquinas]

When this is assumed, and extends the first question to the angelic intellect as much as to ours, here is one opinion: \* that for that which is understood it is necessary to posit a species impressed by the intellect.

That is proven in many ways. The first is as follows: it is necessary for that which may be understood that the intellect come to be in act. This however comes about through the species which is its form [i.e. the form of that thing understood]; therefore, etc.

Again, the potency of an angel is limited; therefore for that which can understand every thing, it is necessary that it [the potency] be extended and become unlimited. This however is through the species of everything; therefore, etc.

Again, every cognition comes about through assimilation. The intellect however according to itself [i.e. its own nature] is not assimilated to a thing except through a species; therefore, etc.

[Again, according to the commentator, \*\* those things that are caused by the same thing are assimilated. But an angel and an object are not assimilated except through a species; therefore, etc.]

Again it is proven that an inferior angel may not understand a superior through its own essence, because that by which the intellect understands is more complete [*perfectius*] than the intellect. If therefore an inferior were to understand a superior through the essence of the inferior, then the essence of

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\* Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, I, q. 55, aa. 1-3; *Summa contra gentiles*, II, c. 98; *De veritate*, q. 8, aa. 8-10.

\*\* See esp. Aristotle *De generationes et corruptione* 324<sup>a</sup>5-14.

the inferior would be nobler than the essence of the superior. This is false; therefore, etc.

Again, if so, then an angelic intellect would be inside the intellect of an angle that is **seeing** and understanding. But this not possible through contact – this is evident in itself [*de se*] – nor through a flowing of one thing into another, because only God is in anything in this way.

Again, the Commentator, (*Metaphysics* XII, comment 42\* ) says that what [p. 255] one mover understands about a first mover is different from what another mover understands.

Again, the Author of the *Liber de Causis*\*\* [Proclus] says that a lower intelligence understands through the mode of its substance, not through the mode of a higher substance.

Again, one angel is not assimilated to another through an essence but through a species; therefore, etc.

As for the second question, he proves that a superior angel understands through narrower [*pauciores*] species whereas an inferior does so through more universal [*universaliores*] species. This is because God, who is the end of intelligibility, understands everything through one thing, namely through his essence. And intellectual nature other than God understands diverse things through diverse things. But to the degree that a nature is nearer to God in completeness [*in perfectione*], to that extent it understands fewer things. The nature of a higher angel, moreover, is nearer to God than that of an inferior; therefore, etc. And the example of those listening [to these words, i.e. the students in this lecture] is posited, some of whom cannot understand without the greatest possible explanation, while others need only a modest one, depending on how they more or less blossom in natural gifts.

This is confirmed because architecture due to its perfection needs fewer things for its operation than do inferior arts. Therefore, it is as the proposition says.

#### [p. 256] [The Opinion of Scotus]

It is this opinion on the first conclusion that the Doctor Subtilis holds and proves by other explanations. In John's\* discussion three conclusions are investigated. Of these the second conclusion he does not hold.

That opinion as far as the first part is concerned cannot be made probable in an evident way through natural explanations [*rationes*]; moreover, it is evident to me that the opposite part is more probable, and this is the case because one should not posit pluralities without necessity [*non est ponenda plures sine necessitate*]. But anything that can be solved with species may be solved without species; therefore, there is no necessity for their postulation.

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\* Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.*, XII, t 44 (Iuntia, VIII, f. 154r.)

\*\* *Liber de causis*, Vii (VIII), nn. 74-75 (Pattin, pp. 64 and following)

\*Scotus, *Ordinario*, I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1 (Vaticana, III, 201-44)

[p. 256, l.10] [Concerning Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition]

Again concerning this question, I first premise some distinctions. One is that some cognition is intuitive, and some abstractive. Intuitive is that medium by which it is understood that a thing is when it is, and it is not when it is not. Because, when I apprehend completely some extreme [i.e. term of a mental proposition] in an intuitive manner, I am immediately able to form a complex [i.e. proposition] stating that these extremes are unified [i.e. the proposition *S is P* unifies the terms *S* and *P*] or not unified [as in *S is not P*]; and am able to assent to or deny it. [p.257] For example, if I should intuitively see a body and a whiteness, immediately the intellect is able to form this complex *a body is, a white thing is, or a body is white*, and when these complexes are formed, the intellect immediately assents. And this holds by virtue of the intuitive cognition that which is had about the extremes. When the intellect [is] such by the apprehending terms no matter what the principle [i.e. proposition at issue] – for example, this *every whole [is greater than its parts]* etc. – and when the complex is formed through the apprehensive intellect, the intellect immediately assents by virtue of the term's apprehension.

It should be known that when intuitive cognition takes place, as much of sense as intellect, with respect to some incomplexes, the intellect is able to form a complex out of these incomplexes [i.e. mental terms, as opposed to propositions] that are known intuitively in the foresaid way, and nevertheless that neither the formation of the complex [i.e. proposition] nor the act of assenting to the complex is an intuitive cognition. This is true because both [1] [some abstractive] cognition is complex cognition, and [2] an intuitive cognition is an incomplex cognition. And then, if those two, the abstractive and intuitive, divide all cognition, as much the complex as the incomplex, these cognitions should have been called abstractive cognitions, and every complex cognition should have been called abstractive, whether it be in the presence of a thing, when an intuitive cognition of extremes is taking place, or in the absence of a thing, when an intuitive cognition is not taking place.

And thus in this way, it is possible to concede that intuitive cognition, as much of the intellect as of sensation, is the partial cause of an abstractive cognition which holds in the aforesaid manner. And this is true because every effect depends in a sufficient way on its essential causes which when posited, the effect can be posited, and when not posited, the effect cannot be naturally posited, nor does it follow from anything else, as is frequently said.

[p. 258] But this cognition by which I assent in an evident manner to this complex *this body is white*, the extremes of which I understand intuitively, could not be naturally unless both sorts of cognition take place. Because if the thing were absent and the intuitive cognition should corrupt, the intellect does not assent in an evident manner to the fact that the body which it saw previously is white, because it fails to know whether it is or not. But with respect to

apprehensive cognition<sup>\*</sup>, through which I form the complex, neither sensory nor intellectual cognitive intuition is the partial cause, because without these it is possible for any complex to be formed that can be formed from them, because [it can be] so [formed] in the absence as well as in the presence [of things and their resulting intuitive cognitions].<sup>\*\*</sup>

So therefore it is clear that through an individual cognition we would judge that a thing is when it is, and this is true generally whether intuitive cognition is caused by nature or supernaturally by God. Now if it is caused naturally, then it is not possible that it be unless the object should exist in the present in the appropriate proximity; to the degree that there can be a distance between the object and the potency, to that degree the potency cannot naturally confront the object. And when the proximate object is thus present in such a manner, the intellect can by means of an act of assenting judge that the thing is, in the aforesaid way. If however it is a supernatural thing, for example if God should cause in me an intuitive cognition of some object existing at Rome, immediately when an intuitive cognition of it occurs, I can judge that **that which I face and see** exists, as well as if I were to have had that cognition naturally.

[p. 259] If you were to say that the object is not here present, not proximate in the appropriate way, I reply: it is a rule that intuitive cognition cannot be caused naturally unless the object is present at a determinate distance, notwithstanding that it can exist supernaturally. And likewise the *differentiae* that John [Dunns Scotus] gives between intuitive and abstractive cognition<sup>\*</sup>, that “an intuitive cognition is of the present and existing, as it is present and existing,” understood as a naturally, and not supernaturally, caused intuitive cognition. Hence, speaking absolutely, if it can happen that the intuitive act does not terminate [in an existing thing]<sup>\*\*</sup>, some presence is not necessarily required for intuitive cognition. And when this occurs nothing would be the object, or due to too great a distance, it would be something standing apart [*distans*]. And no matter how far away the object, when it is cognized intuitively, it is possible to judge by its power [*virtute eius*] that it is if it is, in the aforesaid manner. But since intuitive cognition is not caused naturally or conserved unless the object be proximate in the appropriate way, existing at a certain distance, so likewise it is not possible to judge that it is intuitively cognized naturally unless the object be present.

In the same way through intuitive cognition we are able to judge that a thing is not when it is not. But this cognition cannot be natural because such cognition never is, nor is it conserved naturally unless by an object being present and existing. Likewise this natural intuitive cognition is corrupted through the

<sup>\*</sup> Compare Ockham *Quodlibet*. V, of. 6: a second distinction is that apprehension is twofold; one is composition and division of a proposition, or formation; the other is that which is cognition of the complex itself as already formed, as the cognition of whiteness is called apprehension.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Forming the mental proposition, i.e. performing the mental act or thinking the proposition *S is P*, does not have as a necessary condition the direct perception of the terms, because one can possess the terms and form propositions of them without such perceptions. In such cases immediate assent to the proposition fails.

<sup>\*</sup>Scotus, *Quad.* I., quest. 13, n.8 (ed. Wadding, XII, 309), *Ordinatio* I,d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1-4 (sd. Vaticana, II, 352).

<sup>\*\*</sup>~pvq. Equivalent to p→q: if some presence is required, then the intuitive act can terminate.

absence of the object. And when it is posited that it remains after a corruption of the object, then it is supernatural with [p.260] respect to [its] conservation but not with respect to its causation. Likewise it is fitting that intuitive cognition by which I cognize that a thing is not when it not should be supernatural in its causation or conservation or anything else. For example, if God were to cause in me an intuitive cognition of some not-existent object and should conserve that cognition in me, I can by means of that mediating cognition judge that the thing is not because **in seeing that thing intuitively** and by forming this complex *this object is not*, immediately the intellect by virtue of the intuitive cognition assents to this complex and denies its opposite, so that that intuitive cognition is a partial cause of that assenting as it was earlier said about natural intuition (above pp. 257 and following). And so through a consequence [i.e. valid argument] the intellect assents that **that which I face** is pure nothingness. As an example of a supernatural conservation but not causation, [consider]: if first an intuitive cognition should be naturally caused concerning some object, and later, when this object is destroyed, God conserves the intuitive cognition previously caused, then the cognition is natural as far as causation is concerned and is supernatural in its conservation. Then for all these the same thing is said as if that cognition had been caused supernaturally. Because through that we can judge that a thing is when it is, no matter how far away the cognized object stands, and that it is not when it is not when it is posited that the object is corrupted. And so it can be conceded that in a way through natural intuitive cognition I judge that a thing is not when it is not because [it is] caused by naturally caused cognition albeit conserved supernaturally.

[p. 261] So it is therefore clear that intuitive cognition is that through which I know that a thing is when it is and is not when it is not. But abstractive cognition is that by which I may not judge that a thing is when it is and that it is not when it is not, and this [is the case] whether it be natural or supernatural.

#### [On Complete and Incomplete Intuitive Cognition]

But the intuitive is subdivided because some is complete and some incomplete. Complete intuitive cognition is that of which it is said that it is **experiential** [*experimentalis*] cognition by which I cognize that a thing is etc. And it is that cognition that is the cause of a universal proposition that is a principle of art and science (*Metaphysics* I [980<sup>b</sup>35-981<sup>a</sup>16] and *Posterior Analytics* II [100<sup>a</sup>39]); it is the cause of assenting to a universal proposition formed immediately by the complete intuitive cognition. On the other hand, incomplete intuitive cognition is that by which we judge that a thing at some time had been or had not been. And this is called memory [i.e. *cordativa*] cognition; for example, when I see something intuitively, a habit inclining toward abstractive cognition is generated, mediately by which I judge and assent that such a thing was at some time because at some time I saw it.

And this should be noted that when an **intuitive** cognition of something occurs, then and there I have an **abstractive** cognition of the same thing. And this **abstractive** cognition is a partial cause, concurrent with the intellect, of the generating of a habit inclining [p. 262] towards an **incomplete** [*imperfectus*]

**intuitive** cognition through which I judge that a thing sometime had been.\* The reason for this is that a habit is always generated from acts inclining to similar acts of the same species. But **intuitive** cognition is not of this sort [i.e. such that it may cause a habit towards a complete memory intuition] because **complete intuitive** [cognition] and **incomplete** are cognitions with a different definition [*alterius rationis*], [and] because **incomplete intuitive** cognition is **simpler** than **abstractive** cognition. Nevertheless, **complete intuitive** and **abstractive** cognition are of different definition, therefore etc. [i.e. abstractive and complete intuitive cognition cannot establish habits towards one another]. If therefore some habit is generated from **complete intuitive** cognition, it will incline only to **complete intuitive** cognition and not to **incomplete**, because they are of different definition. Therefore, if a habit inclining to **incomplete intuitive** cognition is generated from some cognitive act, [the only possibility remaining is] that cognition will be **abstractive**, and that will be simultaneous with the **complete intuitive** cognition.\* This is true because immediately after a **complete intuitive** cognition, should the object be destroyed or becomes absent, the intellect can consider the same thing, which previously it saw **intuitively**, and form this **complex** *this thing was at some time*, and assent [to it] evidently, as anybody **experiences** for oneself.

Therefore one should posit some habit inclining to that act because [it is that] form which the intellect can now promptly elicit that act after an **intuitive** cognition, and before it cannot; therefore there is now something inclining the intellect to that act which there was not before. But that habit so inclining the intellect cannot be caused by a **complete intuitive** cognition, as has been shown [above p. 261], nor by some **abstractive** cognition following after an **intuitive** cognition – [p. 263] because that\*\* is a first [**abstractive** cognition], according to

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\* Ockham will now explain a process. A simple intuitive cognition is accompanied by a simple abstractive cognition of the same thing. The former is a pre-conceptual cognition of “this thing”, and the later is a concept of the individual, a proper noun in the language of thought. By a further act, which is also called abstractive, the intellect forms a complex proposition in the language of thought, *this thing exists*. Ockham also refers to a complete intuitive cognition. This would be the pre-conceptual proto-propositional cognition of the fact that the things exists, but before this thought is put into language. The issue facing Ockham, then, is which of these events – the simple or complex intuition, or the simple or abstractive act – causes a habit to form that inclines one to form an intuitive cognition of the thing when it is no longer present to sensation (this would be a simple intuitive cognition) and which then leads by abstraction to the evident memory proposition formed in the intellect *this thing was*. The principle Ockham invokes is that a habit is only formed linking acts of the same species or definition.

\* Ockham’s view seems to be that once the intellect abstracts the individual name *this thing* and forms by abstraction the complex proposition *this thing exists*, a habit is established that inclines one to form a special sort of incomplete intuition, a memory intuition, of that thing when it is not present to sensation. This memory intuition in turn leads to intellectual acts, including the forming of the evident memory proposition *this thing was*. It is not particularly clear why the complex complete abstractive act of thinking *this thing exists* can count as being “of the same species” as the simple incomplete act of intuiting the simple memory intuition *this thing*. The idea seems to be that the abstractive cognition of the complete and therefore more perfect concept *this thing* suffices for setting up the habit of intuiting the incomplete and less perfect memory intuition.

\*\* Namely that abstractive from which the habit is generated inclining to a second abstractive or to a complete intuition, as explained more clearly in the following paragraph.

the case posited, which **abstractive** [cognition] occurs after the **intuitive** cognition. Therefore it is necessary to posit some **abstractive** cognition simultaneous to the existing **complete intuitive** cognition, which is a partial cause with the intellect of the generating of that habit that so inclines the intellect.

Suppose you were to say that, when the terms of a first principle are apprehended and a complex formed, the intellect assents to it. The intellect is no more inclined to an assenting after many assents that it is prior to any assent, but on the other [p. 264] hand, the habit in the intellect is generated from these acts of assenting, in the same way so it can be for intuitive cognition:

I reply: it is not required to posit that habit for the sake of inclination or **experience**, but rather it is posited for the sake of the reason [*rationem*] evidently leading to this. But in intuitive cognition neither **an experienced thing** nor evident reason leads to positing a habit there, therefore etc. Or it is possible to say that it is obligatory to posit a generating habit from these acts for the sake of **experience**, namely because anybody **experiences** that he is more and more firmly inclined to an assenting after a habit than before.

But if you were to say that a habit can be generated as well from frequently elicited complete intuitive cognition as well as from frequently elicited abstractive cognitions, and that thus it is not obligatory to posit abstractive cognition in addition to intuitive, I reply that a habit cannot be generated from any intuitive cognition either sensory or intellective. Because if so, that habit is inclined to either abstractive or intuitive cognition. It is not abstractive, on account of what was already stated [pp. 261 and following], because they are of different species. Nor is it intuitive, because nobody **experiences** that he is inclined more to an intuitive cognition after frequently having such a cognition that he is before any intuitive cognition. Because just as a first intuitive cognition cannot naturally be caused without the existence and presence of an object, so neither can any other of any sort; it is not more habituated because of such frequent cognition that it is in the beginning.

But it is another thing with regard to abstractive cognition, because after a first occurring intuitive cognition, anybody **experiences** that he is more inclined to [p. 265] an understanding of that thing which he had **seen** earlier than he was before any intuitive cognition. But this is not possible through a habit generated from intuitive cognition, as was proven, therefore it is generated from abstractive cognition existing simultaneously with the intuitive cognition. And with respect to this cognition, intuitive cognition is a partial cause, but it is not with respect to the habit generated through such abstractive cognition.

Alternately it can be said that the habit is generated from the intuitive cognition as partial cause, and denied that there is that abstract cognition put forward as simultaneous with the intuition. One reason is that nobody **experiences** that he then and there knows the same thing intuitively and abstractly. Rather on the contrary when this is said about abstract cognition, [it is observed that] a person **experiences** the opposite, especially when these cognitions possess various opposite conditions. Another reason is that every abstract cognition can outlast a destroyed intuition; however that thing which is posited as taking place cannot persist because then the intellect might judge by



its means that that thing which the cognition is about existed some time in the past. And so that would be an incomplete intuitive cognition, for which the inclining process is proposed as generated from a mediating abstract cognition together with the complete intuitive cognition. Therefore, as is seen, the abstract cognition does not endure along with an intuitive cognition of the same thing, but a habit is generated from a repeated intuitive cognition inclining to an incomplete cognition, be it abstract or intuitive.

If you were to say that according to the philosopher (In *N.C.* II cl [1103<sup>a</sup>14-25]) a habit would incline toward acts similar to those from which it was generated

[p. 266] and not to acts with a different definition, as it is in the proposal about intuitive and abstractive cognition, I reply: this is generally true when the habit is not generated from an intuitive cognition as from a partial cause. But when an intuitive cognition is a partial cause, as it is in the proposal, then it is not true. For it appears less implausible that a dispositional habit toward abstractive cognition should be generated from intuitive cognition as from a partial cause than that a cognitive abstraction generative of a habit always remains together with the intuition, when moreover **experience** is not to that effect but rather to the opposite.

From what has been said, the differences [*differentiae*] between complete and incomplete intuitive cognition are apparent: the first neither exists nor is naturally possible unless the object should exist, the second can exist even if the object is destroyed.

If you should say that incomplete intuitive cognition is simpler than the abstractive because it abstracts from the existence of the thing and is therefore not intuitive. I reply: It is called intuitive to the extent that the intellect by its mediating can assent to a variety of complexes that concerns a temporal difference, e.g. that *this was*, as through a complete intuition it can judge that *this is*. When an [abstractive] cognition is given over to the intellect, it is not through it that the object is or was; on the contrary, [on that basis] it fails to know. For example, if God were to cause in me an abstractive cognition of some singular thing that I had never seen, I would not judge by means of that as a mediator that the thing is or was. It is similar when I understand some singular that I've never seen in a common concept that applies to itself and to others; I then have an [p.267] abstractive cognition about this singular, but not in itself, rather under some common concept, and moreover through that I judge neither that the aforesaid singular is or was, or the opposite of these.

Likewise, that abstractive cognition which happens to occur simultaneously with an intuition is such that I do not judge by it as a mediator that a thing is or was, or the opposite of these. Therefore it is to be granted that that cognition through which I judge that a thing was at some time is abstraction *simpliciter*, because in contrast I assent and judge by this as a mediator that a thing was, and not by the mediating of the two other cognitions; therefore, in contrast to these the intuitive cognition can be called incomplete.

### [Concerning Reason of the Understanding]

Another distinction is that of the reason appropriate to the understanding. Because in one way it is understood as everything that is prior to an act of the understanding; and as such, as any sort of partial cause of the intellect as well as of the object, as God is called "the reason for the understanding." In another way, it is understood as distinguished from the possible intellect, and as such the chief idea is that of the reason for the cognizing of a conclusion [i.e. reason as that which draws logical consequences]. In a third way it is understood as distinguished from both the agent and possible intellect, but as that predecessor that a necessary prerequisite for intellection.

### [Conclusion]

[p.268] By what has been shown, I am proving several conclusions. The first is that for the possessing of intuitive cognition no postulation is required of anything beyond the intellect and the thing cognized, especially of any species. This is proven because it would be unreasonable for that which can come to be through fewer things should come to be through more. But through the intellect and the **thing seen**, without any species, cognitive intuition can come to be, therefore etc. What was assumed [moreover] is proved because when somethings that are themselves proximate are sufficiently active and passive, an effect can be posited without [need to appeal to] anything else. The agent intellect with the object moreover is a sufficient agency for this sort of cognition; that which is possible is that which is sufficient to be acted upon, therefore etc.

Again, nothing should be put forward as necessarily required by nature for some effect unless certain reason would lead to it as proceeding from what is known *per se* or by certain **experience**; but neither of these lead to the positing of a species; therefore etc. The assumption is proved because **experience** does not lead to it, because it includes intuitive knowledge. For example, if somebody **experiences** that something is white, he **sees** that whiteness is in the thing itself, but nobody sees a species intuitively; therefore **experience** does not lead to this.

If you were to say that there is **an experiential cognition** in some things that are potentially sensible by **vision**, either a thing interior or exterior, but it is not intuitive, I reply that no matter what the source, he who has some cognition in virtue of which he can cognize that a thing is when it is and that it is not when it is not, that cognition is both intuitive and **experiential**. Because cognitive intuition is that through which I so know that a thing is or is not. [p.269] And therefore I concede that in every sense, both of interior and exterior things, there is intuitive cognition, that it exists, that it is in virtue of such cognition that it is possible to cognize in the aforesaid way that a thing is or is not, notwithstanding the fact that it would not be ocular intuitive cognition. And in this many have been mistaken, for they have believed that there could be no intuitive cognition except that which is ocular, what is false.

Reason proceeding from what is known *per se* again does not lead to this. Because no reason is able to prove what is required unless it is that which is efficacious. Because every effect depends in a sufficient way on its essential causes, according to John [Dunns Scotus]\*; but it is not possible to prove

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\* See above p. 258, note 7

demonstrably that some creature is an efficient cause only by **experience**, namely through that which the presence of the effect follows and its absence does not. Now, however, the presence of an object together in the intellect follows an act of the understanding without a species, therefore, etc.

Again, if a species is put forward as necessarily required as the efficient cause of an intuitive cognition, since that species could be conserved in the absence of the object, it could be possible to cause an intuitive cognition in the absence of the thing, which is false and contrary to **experience**.

A second conclusion is that for the possession of an abstractive cognition, there must necessarily be posited some predecessor in addition to the object and the intellect. This is proved because when an object persists with its potency now as it was before, any potency which is now possible in some act in which it was not possible beforehand, now possess something which it did not have **[p. 269]** before. But it is possible for an intellect that possess an intuitive knowledge to be in abstractive cognition, but not possessing it, cannot be, while the object persists the same in itself [*in se*] both after and after the intuitive cognition. Therefore, when an intuitive cognition is possessed, something is left in the rational intellect of the sort which can be in the abstractive cognition, which beforehand was not possible. Therefore, in addition to the object and potency, it is necessary to posit something else for the possession of an abstractive cognition [i.e. the intuitive cognition].

Again, according to the Philosopher (*De Anima* II [417<sup>a</sup> 9-417<sup>b</sup> 2]), when something is in both essential and accidental potency, it has something when in accidental potency that it did not have when it was in essential potency. Indeed this is true also in sensory potency. Now, after an intuitive cognition of a particular sense, a fantasy can exist of that thing sensed in the absence of the sensible thing, of which it was not possible prior to the intuitive cognition of the particular sense. And as a consequence, by virtue of the thing fantasized, something is left through the mediation of the intuitive cognition of the particular sense which was not there beforehand, because otherwise it would not be possible for the fantasy to possess any act concerning a sensible thing in its absence. Therefore, this is true the same way for the intellect [as it is for phantasy], that before a cognitive abstraction it is essential potency for abstractive cognition, but when it possess this [i.e. intuitive cognition], the intellect is in accidental potency, so that it can be in abstractive cognition while beforehand it was not able to be, therefore, etc. The hold indeed for a separate soul which after an intuitive **[p.271]** cognition can be in abstractive cognition, which it could not have been in beforehand. And this is because of something left behind; this holds in the same way therefore for our intellect.

A third conclusion is that the thing left behind is not a species but a habit. This is proven because that which is left behind from an act follows that act; a species however does not follow but proceeds, therefore, etc.

Again, when something is an accidental potency with respect to cognition, it is not necessary to posit something through which it is in potential potency towards the appropriatedly elicited act. But when a habit is posited in the intellect, inclining to some cognition, the intellect is in *accidental* potency.

Therefore, it is not necessary to posit anything in the intellect in addition to the habit. The assumption is evident according to the Philosopher (*De Anima* III [429<sup>b</sup>5-10]) where he says that the intellect is different before learning or discovering than after. Because before it is in essential potency, and after, when through some act some habit is left behind, then it is in accidental potency towards a similar act. Therefore, through a habit generated from an act, the intellect is in accidental potency. Whence, nobody ever **experiences** that they are in accidental potency with respect to cognition unless it is after an intellection. Indeed, if a thousand species existing prior to an act of the intellect were posited, if there were no act of the intellect, then nothing more exists nothing, nor does one **experience** that one is in accidental potency any more than one would if there had been no species at all. And if no species is posited in the intellect, yet an act of the understanding were posited, immediately the intellect **experiences** that it is in accidental potency with respect to other cognitions. [p.272] And this could not be unless it is through a habit left behind in the intellect from a first act.

Again, anything that can be solved by a species can be solved by a habit; therefore a habit is required, but species is superfluous. Moreover it is evident that a habit is necessarily required for the understanding of any object, because if not, but a species only were required, if the species were therefore corrupted after many intellections, it would not be possible to understand that object of which it is the species any more than before any intellection, because no habit is posited, and the species is corrupted. This conclusion is seen to be absurd.

If you were to say that species is argued for on account of many cognitions, I reply against this view as follows: through such argumentation for species, the intellect always is inclined more to understanding, and as a consequence habit is totally superfluous – a consequence that is set out by everybody. And so either the species or the habit is put forward superfluously. Since therefore habit but not species is posited by everybody, it is seen that it is species that is superfluous.

Again, species is not posited except for assimilation, or for the causation of intellection, or for the representation of an object, or for the determination of a potency, or for the union of the mover and moved. It is on account of that that species are most of all posited. But for none of these must it be posited; therefore it should not be posited.

It is not necessary for assimilation because either assimilation is in the essence and nature of the thing understood through which it is assimilated to the cognized object, or the assimilation is of an effect to a cause. It is not necessary in the first way, because if the intellect understands a substance, then that which is substance is more assimilated in nature to its own object than that which is through its species something accidental, because accidents of substances are less [p.273] assimilated than the substance of substances. Nor is it necessary in the second way, because this assimilation is of the sort that it suffers from the agent in this that it receives some effect caused by the agent. But in this way the intellect is sufficiently assimilated through the intellection caused by the object and received into the intellect; therefore species is not required.

If you were to say that species is required as some predecessor for the assimilating of this object, as an agent for the intellection, which is itself passive to that which receives intellection, against this I say: in the same way I would say that the received species require another species or agent before it for the assimilating of the intellect to that which receives the species you posit, and that species here would require another, and so on into infinity.

Again, to the extent that assimilation is required for intuitive knowledge, it is also required for abstractive; but nothing proceeding as assimilation is required for the intuitive; therefore neither is it required for the abstractive.

If you were to say that species is posited in **vision**; I say that this is not the case as later will be evident.\*

Nor should species be proposed for representation, because nothing representing is required for intuitive knowledge [p. 274] other than the object or the act, as was evident above\*\*. Therefore, beyond the object and the act, neither is there anything required in the abstractive which immediately follows the intuitive. The inference is evident, because as the object sufficiently represents itself in one cognition, so does it in the other which immediately follows the intuitive.

Again, what is represented should be prior to what is cognized; otherwise in cognition a representative would never lead to a thing being represented as similar. Example: a statue of Hercules would never lead me to Hercules in cognition unless I **had first seen Hercules**; nor could I otherwise know whether the statue was similar to him or not. But according to those positing species, species is some entity preceding any act of understanding the object; therefore it is not possible that it be put forward as a representation of the object.

Again, if it were put forward for the sake of representation, this would not be proposed unless a distant thing cannot act on something distant. But this is false as will later be evident. Now if a distant object could not act on the intellect by causing an intellection unless it had first caused a species – because it is necessary that the object be present as a passion either in itself or in another – then in the same way the distant object cannot cause a species in the intellect unless by the positing of some entity previous to the species through which the object is present to the intellect for the purpose of causing that species. And likewise there should be posited another, and so on into infinity. Therefore if a distant object can cause a species in the intellect without something previous through which it would be present, then in the same way it can immediately cause the intellection without any previous representational species.

Nor should species be proposed as a cause of intellection because according to these, it is not possible to act in spiritual thing in a way that is bodily or material, and therefore such a species must be posited in the intellect. But against this I say: since the bodily and the material cannot be an immediate partial cause with respect to an intellection which is received in a spiritual being –

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\* In Book III, q.3.

\*\*p. 268

because it is in the possible intellect, and this is a spiritual quality – neither can the material be a partial cause along with the concurrent agent intellect for the production of a species, which is spiritual, in the possible intellect which is also spiritual. Just as you say that the bodily can be a partial cause for the causing of a species in a spiritual thing, so I propose that the corporeal is a partial cause for the causing of an intellection in a spiritual entity.

If you were to say that the nature of things intellectual requires a material thing for the production of a species, so I would say about intellection.

Nor should species be proposed for the sake of the determination of a potency, because every passive potency is sufficiently [p. 275] determined through a sufficing agent, especially when that very potency itself is active. But the sufficient agent is the object and the intellect, as is proven (above in the first conclusion, p. 268 and following), therefore, etc.

Nor should it [i.e. species] be posited for the union of an object with a potency as a thing moving to the thing moved. Because in the same way I might have argued that before that species there should be posited another thing, because in order for an object to cause a first species in the intellect, it is necessary for it to be unified for itself [*sibi*], as unity is required for that which causes intellection, and this will be through another species, and so on into infinity. So then it is evident that habit, not species, should be posited for the sake of **experience**.

#### [Reply to the First Question]\*

These things being seen I say, in reference to natural intuitive cognition, that an angel and our intellect understands something different from itself not through a species, not through its own essence, but through the essences of things understood. And just as “the through which” [*ly per*] is called the circumstances of the efficient cause, so the reason [*ratio*] of the understanding, as distinguished from potency, is the essence of the cognized thing itself. That is proved because when that which when is posited enables another to be posited, setting aside other things, and which when it is not posited, to not make it possible to posit the other naturally, the former is the cause of the later. But when that thing is posited as present in either the angelic intellect or ours without any other prior thing, it is possible for the intellect to understand that thing intuitively. Therefore, such a thing is a cause of its cognition. But it is not able to do so unless it is the efficient cause, therefore etc.

[p.277] When speaking truly about abstractive knowledge, we are then talking either about that which always follows from intuition or about that which occurs after the corruption of the intuition. If we speak in the first way, then what is required is an object, the intellect, and the intuitive cognition as a partial cause. That is proven as before\*\* because “that which being posited” etc. If we were to talk in the second way, then what is required is the intellect, and a habit generated from an abstractive cognition elicited at the same time as the intuitive.

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\*whether an angel understands another by itself through its own essence or through a species,” p. 251.

\*\* p. 257 and following

Moreover, for that second abstractive cognition the object is not required as a partial cause, because that can occur even if the object is annihilated. And either of these [kinds of] abstractive knowledge is incomplex. And it is this second that is the partial cause of the complex [i.e. propositional] knowledge by which I judge that a thing sometime was.

But that such a habit could be in an angel cannot be shown by natural reason, but it may be through this [observation], namely that we **experience** such a habit in ourselves. And an angel in its natural ways can have twofold cognition, intuitive and abstractive; therefore, accurately, it is the case that a similar habit should be posited in angels. And this habit should be posited either as infused or acquired. And, accurately, it is the case that the habit would be acquired.

**[Response to the Second Question]**

To the second question\*: if it understands species in its proper sense, it is so that a superior angel does not understand either through more or through fewer things because it does not understand through any entity. Moreover, if it takes species to mean reasons for the understanding [*rationes cognoscendi*], it is so that it does not understand through universal species, for example concepts of things, but rather understands through diverse reasons; this exists when diverse things are cognized [*hoc est diversa cognita*]. When speaking about intuitive cognition that occurs naturally, this exists because the object [i.e. thing outside the mind] is such a reason of the understanding, as distinguished from a potency.

This is shown because when two things occur one of which can be understood intuitively while the other not, these are understood by distinct reasons. But an angel can understand one thing intuitively and another not, because God can destroy one and conserve another. And as a consequence, an angel **can see one intuitively** and another not. Since therefore the reason of the understanding in intuitive cognition is the thing cognized, when speaking naturally, it follows that to the degrees that there may be a distinction among the reasons of the understanding, there is also to that degree a distinction among the things cognized.

If however we were to speak about a reason of the understanding in non-complex abstractive cognition, while taking a reason of the understanding to be distinguished from a potency, then it can so happen that there be both many and one reason of the understanding with respect to a plurality. The first is evident because as understood a reason of the understanding, both in us and in angels, is a habit, not an object or a species. Then this is so: when things comport themselves in such away that one thing is frequently known while another is not, it is possible that a habit be formed inclining towards the cognition of the one but not the other, because a habit is generated from the [cognitive] acts. And if another should later be frequently known, it is possible then that with respect to it another habit be generated, and to the degree that they can be frequently known in a diverse way, to that degree cognitive habits with respect to them can be generated; therefore, etc.

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\* “whether a higher angel understands through fewer species than a lower,” p. 253.

The second is proved because with respect to those for which an act is the same, or could be, so also the habit is the same, or could be. This is evident because a habit is generated from acts, so that there is a distinction among habits to the degree that there is one among acts. But it is possible for them to be the same act with respect to many things. For example, when I understand a proposition having distinct extremes [i.e. different subject and predicate], I understand the subject and the predicate at the same time, and this is one act; and consequently many; therefore etc. And likewise, by one act I understand the whole of a discourse and all its propositions; therefore, etc.

If you were to say that I understand many as one, because there are many terms inasmuch as they come together in one proposition, I say against this: when I understand this proposition *Socrates is not Plato*, I understand the terms. I ask, what is it that terminates the act of the understanding? It is either something absolute or relative. If absolute, since here there are two things, there is no more reason to question whether one is understood rather than the other – for example Socrates rather than Plato – or one is understood as distinguished from the other, or neither. If it is something relative that terminates [the act of understanding], since a relation may not be understood without extremes [i.e. *relata*], by an understanding of that relation I therefore understand distinct extremes. And so the proposition is established.

Again, I say that just as in the first apprehension or formation of a complex [i.e. proposition], I have one act with respect to the subject, another with respect to the predicate, and a third with respect to the complex, I can understand those three after the formation – by the inclining mediating habit – through an act that is numerically one, so that those three – or three absolute concepts – terminate that intellection, and nothing else does either as a reason or as a real thing. And from that frequently elicited act it is possible to generate a habit that is numerically one.

Suppose you were to say that in a first apprehension though yourself [*per te*] there are three acts with respect to the complex, and from these three habits are generated inclining to three acts that formally fall alternate definitions [*alterius rationis*], because acts with respect to a subject and a predicate can be of different definition. Therefore, when these habits are mediating, it is not possible that some act be elicited that is numerically one with respect to the complex; rather, they are necessarily three:

I reply: when it is posited that these [come to] be through acts in the aforesaid way, an act that is terminated in the copula or in the concept of the copula is not terminated there absolutely, but simultaneous with this [i.e. the copula or its concept] it is terminated in the subject and predicate. Again, acts that are terminated only in the subject and predicate are non-complex. But an act terminated in a copula is complex in as much as it is terminated immediately in the whole complex. And this is called composition or division, and from this single act a habit is generated inclining to similar acts with respect to the whole complex. Whence, if this third act should be terminated in the concept of the copula, the explanation [*ratio*] given above would be evident.



If you were to ask whether there are three acts in the first formation of the complex, I say no. Because the complex may be formed by a mediating cognition, whether it be intuitive or abstractive – in this the extremes may be distinguished or not – only two things are required, one of which I understand to be the extremes alone and a second of which I understand to be the copula together with the extremes. Because if I were to understand intuitively some extremes of different species by a single act – for example, if at the same time I were to **see** a whiteness and a blackness by a unique act of the understanding – and then form this complex *a white thing is black* by that mediating intuitive cognition, [p.281] here I possess only a twofold act: an intuitive one terminated in a whiteness and a blackness, and another complex by which a whiteness is denied of a blackness, which is terminated negatively in the copula and the extremes. And I possess only those two.

Likewise, if when that intuitive cognition takes place, I understand the same extremes by a non-complex abstractive cognition, then I possess a single non-complex act terminated in those extremes, which I know intuitively. And if I should then form by this mediating act this complex in the aforesaid way *a white thing is not black*, I possess a second act terminated negatively in the concept of the copula, and with this in the extremes. And if these two acts suffice when the extremes of the complex are really distinguished, the two acts suffice much more when they [the extremes] are really the same.

#### [Doubts about the Reply]

Against this there are many doubts. First it seems that the intellect cannot possess intuitive knowledge with respect to an individual, because the intellect abstracts from material conditions, for example from being here and now. But neither a singular thing nor an intuitive cognition abstracts from the aforesaid conditions; therefore, etc.

Again, that which puts the intellect in error should not be posited in the intellect; but intuitive knowledge is of this sort. This is evident [because] if a thing were destroyed but maintained by the one intuitive cognition, then I would judge that a thing is when it is not; therefore, etc.

Again, it is proven that a single thing is not understood either intuitively or abstractly, because when some things are similar, there is something that is [p. 282] the likeness in the one and the other. But intellection is a likeness of the object, and through this, the intellect understands through the fact that it is assimilated to the object. This however is through intellection, not through species, according to what was previously said. If therefore many similar individuals were taken – for example many angels in the same species, or intellectual souls – by the explanation, the intellection through which I understand one thing is a likeness to it, and to all the other similar things, by which entity they are similar. Therefore, speaking always about the similar things, I understand through such intellection either all the singulars equally or none. But I do not understand them all equally, which is evident from itself [*de se*], therefore none is understood in itself [*in se*], neither intuitively nor abstractly.

Again, against this is what is said about complete and incomplete intuitive cognition. Because according to that it seems that there is no abstractive

cognition *simpliciter* because it is nothing but that through which I am able to understand that a thing at some time was.

Again, against this is the fact that it is habit not species that is posited in the intellect. Because the sensitive part, notwithstanding that it has intuitive cognition, received the species beforehand; therefore the intellect is similar. The implication is evident, because “as sensation is to things sensible so the intellect is to things intelligible.”\*

Again, the *De Anima* III \*\* in many places says that the intellectual part is receptive to species; and the [p.283] soul is the place of species; and the stone is not in the soul, but the species of the stone. And the intellect is every intelligible thing just as sensation is every sensible thing.

Again, the intellect is in essential potency towards the cognition not only of the complex things but also of non-complex. But that which reduces the intellect from essential potency to accidental cannot be a habit. This then is so because habit presupposes act, and consequently it also presupposes that the intellect be reduced to essential potency. Next this is so because habits exist only with respect to complex things, and consequently this holds if habit can reduce the intellect from essential potency to accidental with respect to a complex cognition, which consequence in contrast does not hold with respect to a non-complex cognition, with respect to which habit is not posited.

Again, through the same reason through which you prove that habit is in the intellect but not species, it is possible to be shown that it is in the fantasy. This is because we do not **experience** that we are in accidental potency towards a phantasizing unless we were not previously suffering phantasy [*phantasiati*]. Therefore, from this act of phantasizing a habit remains inclining to similar acts. That is contrary to the Philosopher, who says in *De Sommo et Vigilia* \* that an image of things remain in the absence of things.

Again, if this is so, the intellect while in understanding does not need a fantasized thing. This is because when something is in accidental potency it does not need an extrinsic mover to that which it passes in act. If therefore such a habit were in the intellect and not species, an extrinsic mover would exist along with the phantasm; the conclusion follows; therefore, etc.

[p. 284]

### [Solution to the Doubts]

To the first of these [pp. 281] I say that the intellect first understands a singular thing intuitively. This is so first because the intellect understands intuitively that which exists as a thing [*in re*], but nothing is like this except a singular thing. Next this holds because it agrees with the potency of lower things, for example those that sense [i.e. animals], as it does for things that are more complete [*perfectionis*]; therefore, etc.

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\* See Aristotle *De Anima* 429<sup>a</sup>15-18.

\*\*429<sup>a</sup> 15-18, 27-28; 431<sup>b</sup>21-432<sup>a</sup>1

\* *De insomniis* 459<sup>a</sup>-23-459<sup>b</sup>20.

Again, that which knows for example that something is here, in this site, in this thing, is in the present time, and so on about other circumstances, knows more completely [*perfectius*] and is of a more complete [*perfectionis*] nature than that which does not know in this way. If therefore sensation were to understand in this way but the intellect not, the intellect would be less complete [*imperfectior*] than sensation. Therefore, I say that the intellect understands a singular thing in an intuitive way, like here, now, under any of the conditions by which sense understands, and it is like this according to many [authorities]. Whence an angel and a man understands more completely where and when this body is moved, and when other such material conditions hold, that it does in some sensitive potency.

If you were to say that sensation requires a determined site for an object in a straight line [from the sense organ] and a determined proximity, but that the intellect does not, [and therefore the intellect does not know a singular thing], I say against this: according to this author, sensation can intuitively cognize that a thing is absent and non-existent. Therefore, without contradiction it is possible that **a thing be seen** without a situation, especially through divine potency, and in this way the intellect can **see**. And as it is not possible that [p.285] sensation **see** an object unless it is proximated and situated in a determined way in a straight line, so neither can the intellect intuit an apprehended thing **by a mediating vision** unless the thing be proximated in a determined way – in the same way that sensation is. This is because nothing is naturally intuited by the intellect except by an existing mediating sense in its act, though it is supernaturally possible, and likewise for sensation.

Therefore I say that the possessing of material cognition can be understood in two ways. In one way it is that somebody would possess a cognition which completes [*perficit*] matter extensively as by a material form. And so sensation possess material cognition as cognition which is here and now, because **corporeal vision** is extended to the whole organ or composite of form and matter, and so it here and now possess being. And in this way the intellect abstracts from material conditions, because intellection exists subjectively in the intellect, not extensively in some composite, or corporeal organ. And so the term *common* [*commune*]\* can be understood as concerning these material conditions from which “the intellect abstracts,” etc. There is another way in which somebody’s having of a material cognition is possible because he knows matter or a material object. And so devine, angelic and human intellects possess material cognition, because they understand not only the material thing, but also matter; and sensation cannot know matter. For it would be amazing if, given matter is some positive thing, it were not possible for it to be apprehended by some potency.

[p.286] And when he says that the Commentator in *Physics* I and *De Anima* III says that matter is not intelligible, I say that matter impedes that intellection by which something is understood and is understanding. This is because nothing

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\* See Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 85, a.1.

can understand except it is abstracted from matter, and so it is the case that for an understanding there is no need for a corporeal organ.

To another [doubt] it is said that “naturally occurring intuitive cognition is imprinted by an object and as is light by the sun. Therefore it does not happen that the intellect errs”<sup>\*\*</sup> notwithstanding the fact that intuitive cognition caused supernaturally might put the intellect into error.

Against this I say: that the person himself says that intuitive knowledge can exist naturally with respect to non-existing things – I say this about sensory knowledge. Therefore, it is not contrary to the nature of intuitive knowledge that it be imprinted and conserved by a non-being. And if sensitive knowledge can be in this way, so can intellective. The implication is shown through what he says, that intuitive, intellective, and sensory knowledge, when possessed naturally, are always conjoined.

Therefore I say that cognitive intuition is that by which by its existing I judge that [p. 287] a thing is, when it is, and is not, when it is not, in the way explained above, and this may be caused either naturally or supernaturally. This is so because when intuitive knowledge of any sort is possessed, I can immediately form this complex *this thing is* or *this thing is not*, and in virtue of the intuitive cognition assent to the complex if the thing should be or to deny if it were not, as was said above [p.256 and following]. And so in no way does it place the intellect in error.

To the next [doubt] [on p. 281] I say that it concludes equally against the positing of a species either in the intellect or in the phantasy as it does against me, especially if it were posited as caused by God, because through that [viz. the positing of species] the intellect would be no more assimilated to one singular than it would to another. From which [proposal it follows that] it is a principle for the understanding, as if it were something naturally caused; indeed it is a principle for understanding equally any singular thing or none at all, because it does not determine to itself some [one] singular; from this it is true that it is not produced from any.

I say then that the intellect is a likeness to an object in just the way in which species was proposed to be, and that it is so in a way that it is no more a likeness to one thing than another. That this is so can be made evident in an example because cognizability is like univocal causation. For, univocal causation is caused by assimilation, and therefore it is univocal because the effect is assimilated to it, and moreover it is not produced determinately through assimilation by one univocal cause but not from another. This is true because if two “heats” [i.e. hot things] [p. 288] of equal intensity were posited and one were to produce a third, this third is only assimilated, the one being like the others, each in an equal way, and it is moreover produced only by one of these. Therefore, assimilation does not give cause for querying why one thing rather than another does the causing. It is the same way in the proposition: for while the intellect is assimilated to every individual equally in the posited case, it is nevertheless possible to know one thing in a determinate manner but not know

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<sup>\*\*</sup> \*Peter Aureslus

another. But this is not due to assimilation but rather to the fact that a cause exists, because every effect naturally producible determines from itself by its nature what may have been produced by one cause and not another. For if it were otherwise, it would follow that the same effect could be produced in two matters by different agents at one and the same time, which is impossible. This assumption is evident because if there are two agents here, for example two heats of equal intensity in two matters, of the same definition [*rationis*], arranged and set apart in the same way, each like the other in every way, and taking place here and now – this is certainly possible – then heat must be produced; from this, according to you, the case does not determine for itself from what either of these agents would be produced, either it is produced here and now in two matters by each respectively, or neither produces heat, since either is a natural agent proximate to the thing being acted upon and neither is impeded in any way. This is because from the case the effect determines for itself no more one agent than the other, and regardless which of the two matters is brought any way near, either the same effect is produced by either agent in either matters or in none. But both of these alternatives is absurd. It must be the case therefore that an effect determined for itself one agent rather than another of the same definition [*rationis*] in such a way that it [i.e. the effect] can [p.289] be produced from that and not from any other. Therefore in the same way it holds for the proposition in question: that notwithstanding the intention or species, if it were posited, that it were equally assimilated to multiple individuals, it would nevertheless determine for itself from its nature that it leads the intellect to a cognition of that object from which it is particularly caused, because in this way it determines for itself that it is caused by that object since it cannot be caused by any other. And therefore it so leads to the cognition of that which does not lead to the cognition of another.

If you would say that that intention could be caused by God alone and then the intellect through that intention would no more understand one similar thing than another, because it is assimilated as much to one as the other. Nor does causality work toward the intention of one thing rather than another because it is immediately caused by nothing other than God alone.

I reply: no matter what intention of creatures is caused by God, it can be partially caused by a creature, notwithstanding that as a matter of fact it was not caused this way. Therefore through that intention, that singular thing is understood by which it would have been caused if it had been caused by a creature. There is moreover one singular that acts in this manner and no other; therefore, etc.

If you would say that in Book I, part 2,\* it is frequently said that numerically the same effect can be produced by two complete causes, and [p. 290] consequently neither determines by itself, of which the contrary is said here, look at the reply there\*\*.

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\* *I Scripto*, dist. 2, q. 10.

\*\* q. 10 (12) of the 4<sup>th</sup> book.

If you would say as far as the example put forward about two heats is concerned that notwithstanding the fact that the heat produced would not determine a definite [*certum*] agent of the same definition [*rationis*] it nevertheless determines for itself a definite matter in which it can be produced in such a way that it cannot be produced in any other. And so it does not follow that numerically the same heat may be produced by two agents in two matters, but that one heat is produced by two agents in one matter which it determines for itself, and in addition that another heat is produced by the same agents in another matter which it determined for itself.

I reply that from the fact that matters are of the same definition it is not apparent how the definition of the effect would determine for itself one matter rather than another, because matter is equally restricted and undetermined to one form rather than another. Nor can another explanation be pointed out for how an effect would determine for itself a matter without equally entailing that it determines for itself a definite agent. And therefore that is accepted as a manifestly true explanation.

To the other objection [p. 282] I say that it is not possible for there to be in the intellect any abstractive cognition through which I judge neither that a thing is, nor that is not, nor that is was, as it was show above [pp. 261, and 266 and following]; I therefore move on.

To the other objection about the sensitive part, [the reply] will become clear in other places.

### [Book III, Question 3]

To all the authoritative texts of the Philosopher [see above p. 282] I say that he accepted [p. 292] species in place of action or habit. This is clear because the Commentator never use the name *species* he always uses the name *form*, and he accepted *form* in place of intention [*intentione*] or habit.

If you were to say that the Philosopher said that 'the locus of species is not the entire soul but just the intellective [soul]' [*De Anima* III, c.4 t.6 429<sup>a</sup>27-28]; now moreover sensation is as much the subject of its acts as is the intellect; therefore, in a way different from a what was said before, the intellect is a locus of species. [That is, according to Aristotle species are in the intellect only, but what Ockham's substitute for species, viz acts and habits, are not just in the intellect; so Aristotle's species are different.]

I reply: it is true. The intellect is a locus or subject different from sensation because it receives intentions not only of those things sensed by a single sense, but also of those sensed by any sense whatever, because unlike sensations it can understand sensibles of every sense.

If you were to say that common sensibles are apprehended by every sense, to this the reply is above, in the question about motion [p. 125, Question 7].

Likewise, the intellect as the subject of intentions and a sense in sensations differ because sensations are extended in senses, but intentions in the intellect are not.

To another objection [see p.283] I say that habit should be put forward in the same way regarding incomplexes [i.e. terms] as complexes [i.e. propositions]

and for the same cause. But when it is there and when not, should be deferred to **experiences**. Because, when it happens that somebody is more inclined after a frequently elicited act than before [p. 293] to an understanding, of either an incomplex or a complex, it [i.e. a habit] should be postulated, and when these things do not occur, it should not be put forward. Hence just as not all incomplex knowledge is generative of an incomplex habit, so not all complex knowledge is generative of a complex habit. For example: intuitive cognition – when being proposed in the way described above [p. 261 and following, and 264 and following] for intuitive and abstractive cognition which occur at the same time – is not generative of an incomplex habit, since it is still incomplex knowledge. And this is because nobody **experiences** that he is more inclined to knowing something intuitively after frequently having an intuition than before. And this holds in the same way for complex cognition, through which I judge that a thing is by means of a mediating intuitive cognition serving as a partial cause. Because neither that cognition, even if it were abstractive, as described above [pp. 257 and 261 and following], nor complex knowledge, are generative of a habit. And this is because nobody **experiences** that he is more inclined to judging that a thing is, or is not, by means of a that mediating intuitive cognition after a frequently elicited judgement than he is before any such judgement. This holds because it is never possible to judge in this way that a thing is or that it is not unless it is by means of a present and existing intuitive cognition. And when it is had and a complex formed, in the manner often described [above pp. 256 and following], the intellect can with equal ease judge and assent. Hence for seeing whether such habits ought to be posited, when to do so and when not, one should make recourse to **experience**, in the way described earlier.

To another objection, whether habit or species should be posited in the senses, the truth will be clear in other places [Book III, Question 3].

To another [see p. 254] I say that it argues as much against positing species as it does against me. Since just as they say that no extrinsic mover is required for an act of the understanding, so I say that no extrinsic mover is required other than habit as the partial cause for an act of the understanding, not a phantasm or anything else in one of the senses; and this holds also for abstractive cognition, notwithstanding the fact that it may perhaps be opposite [i.e. contrary] to intuitive cognition. And therefore no such reversion to phantasms as partial cause is required. However a necessary complex and disposition of a body and all its power are required for this, namely that somebody be in accidental potency for understanding, and consequently phantasies are also required. And if it does not have such a disposition, it cannot understand, as is clear in boys and madmen. And so phantasies are required for intellection but not otherwise. And it can perhaps happen that some corporeal complex is a partial cause of an act of the understanding for which it is necessarily required.

#### **[Against Thomas' Explanations of the First Question]**

To the reasons for the first opinion.

To the first [Book III, Question 3] I say that he said first that that through which the intellect understands is an inhering form. And later he says the

opposite because he says that he does not refer to this that it would be some principle of action either as something inhering or subsisting [see *Summa Theologica* I, Question 56, article 1, reply]. Similarly, according to him [p.295] [*ibid*, Question 12, article 2, reply] divine essence is **seen** through itself [*per se ipsam*] and not through species, and moreover divine essence is not a form inhering in the intellect. Therefore I say the argument is not valid, because that by which the intellect understands as by a partial cause can be a subsisting thing – for example in the intuitive intellection of a substance – and can be inhering in another, not however as something understanding, as is clear in the intuitive cognition of whiteness. And it can be inhering in an intellect, and is moreover not a species but a habit. Therefore the explanation has no validity.

To another objection [p. 254 above] I say that it suffices for the intuitive cognition of an angel that there be an object [*viz.* the angel] and for abstractive cognition of one it suffices that there be a habit, and through that [*viz* habit] it is possible to understand anything without any species.

To another objection [p. 254] I say no prior assimilation, which would be a species, is required before an act of the understanding. Rather what suffices is an assimilation that would be the act of understanding that is a likeness of the thing cognized. Because according to Augustine [*De Trinitate* [xv. Cc. 12-14, nn. 21-23 (PL 42, 1073-77)] whenever something is understood as it is in itself [*in se*], then the intellection will be maximally similar to the thing, and so other likeness in addition to the intellection is required.

To another objection I say that those things that are caused by one and the same agent are made to be similar. Now, moreover, the essence of an angel and the thing which an angel understands are caused by the same agent, because they are caused by God; therefore, they are made to be similar. Therefore, through its essence and angel is made to be similar to any other angel.

If it were said that by the same [argument] it is not possible for something to be made similar to more than one thing [*diversis*], that is false, because God through his most simple essence is made similar to everything that he understands apart from himself.

To another [see p. 254] I say that if he would proceed correctly he would conclude that a species if it were posited would be more noble than a higher angel if it is an inferior angel that would be understanding the higher angel or if it would be by an intelligent angel. Of these either is false because if it were to exist a species would be an accidental perfection. And this holds the same way for a habit, which is an accidental perfection and is in part the principle for the act of understanding a substance.

To another [see p. 254] I say that there is no form within the intellect that is the principle by which the intellect understands. But there certainly is another form in it – for example habit – which is in part the principle by which it does so.

To the Commentator [see p. 254] I say that he does not understand that there should be a distinction in mover by the intellect, that something may be understood to be from one mover and another thing from yet [p. 297] another



mover, but that something comes forth from a first mover in a single mover and another in another.

To another objection I concede that the essence of an angel does not suffice for a cognizing things other than itself be means of the essence itself, because in intuitive cognition objects as partial causes and distinct definitions [*rationes*] of the understanding agrees [*concurrunt*]. However he [viz. the angel] does understand well everything else [about itself] through its essence as a partial cause because he is such that through his intellect he is in no way distinguished from essence.

[To another [p. 295] it is clear what should be said from the solutions of the third objection].

#### **[Against Thomas' Explanations of the Second Question]**

To the argument for the second question. I say to the first that a greater or lesser propinquity to God does not argue for lessor degrees of cognizing, neither of intuitive or abstractive cognition. But it does argue for the fact that a nature closer to God as an entity of one and the same sort has a more perfect intellect than a more distant nature, because he who is the principle cause has a more perfect intellect, albeit partial with respect to an act of understanding. And when he says that a boy cannot understand without great explanation that which another conceives instantly, this does not establish that the boy is lacking more in the quest for knowledge than the other is. But it does argue either that there are many things sought after by an elder that are [p. 298] not by a boy for the quality of the complexes in one is greater than in another. Therefore from one original habit one can discover more conclusions than another can. And it is evident from the clear example [of the boy] that a more perfect nature does not show a paucity of explanations in the understanding: for man is more perfect than fire, and yet is in need of more thing for acting than fire is.

And when it is said of architecture, etc. [see p. 255] I say that it requires less than an inferior science because it does not concern itself with those thing that an inferior science is concerned with, nor does it think about those things.

#### **[Against Scotus' Explanations of the First Question]**

To John's explanations. The first is deficient in many ways. First what he assumes is dubious, namely regarding universals etc. Because I ask, what does he understand by a universal, either a species, or something composed of these. It is not in the first way because then he would have begged the question, because he intends to argue through the fact that a universal in act is present in the intellect. If then he would understand species for universal, he would thereby prove that a species is present because a species is present. This is presupposed, because then he would have said that a universal was present because of a universal. Nor is it in [p. 299] the second way. Because just as it is impossible that something indistinct in every way should represent some things under distinct but opposite definitions [*rationibus*], so is impossible that something should exist under opposite definitions. But according to him [Scotus, *ibid*, p.211 and follows, note 352], it is inconsistent for a universal to represent under the definition of a universal and under the definition of a particular, because they are opposites. Therefore it is not possible that really being a

universal and really being a particular could coincide in reality as the same thing, because they are no less opposite in existing than they are in representing. Because a singular on the part of a thing is determined to be one thing, a universal is not determined to be one thing but is indifferent to many. Since therefore given that every thing that exists apart as a thing is a singular, it is impossible that as a thing a universal be the same as a singular. Nor is it in the third way, because according to him [*ibid* n. 359] that which is in the soul in this way follows after an act of the understanding, but a universal precedes it. Nor is it in the fourth way, to the extent that it is true that what is composed of something existing in the soul follows after an act of the understanding, this composite is contrary to it, and to the extent that they apply to this composite distinct and contrary definitions cannot correspond to it.

Likewise his entailment is not valid [Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, q. 1, n. 349]: “the intellect can have a present object; therefore, it has an intelligible species.”

Because either by universal he understands a *fictum* and a “being of reason” [*ens rationis*] or he means a *real being* [*ens reale*]. If in the first way, then it is not necessary on account of this object to posit some prior species representing to cognition, because that being of reason is caused by an act [p. 300] of the understanding. If in the second way, then without any species it is possible for it to exist for the intellect in the present through itself [*per se ipsum*] under the object’s definition, just as it exists for sense without any species, as was said above.

This is confirmed because according to him the mover and the movable, the cause and the effect, can be distinguished by place and subject [*ibid.*, dist. 37]; the universal however is the thing moving and the intellect movable; therefore nothing prevents the universal existing outside the soul from standing apart from the intellect, though it can nevertheless partially cause an intellection without any mediating species.

To the first proof of the entailment, I ask how he understands a sensible species or phantasm to represent a singular thing under the definition [*ratione*] of a singular. For he understands either that it represents an individual difference or a quiddity or a composite of these, inasmuch as a plurality of things cannot be posited in a singular thing. He cannot understand it in the first way because then that which is at first represented by a species is reason for acting [*ratio agendi*] because according to him individual properties are not reasons for acting. This holds also because that first represented by a species is that which is first cognized and which terminates the act of cognizing; however, individual difference is not cognized by one of the senses nor does it terminate the *sensory act of seeing*, something else that is true according to him. Nor can he understand it in the second way because then sensible and intelligible species represent [p. 301] in the same way and under the same definition [*ratione*], because both represent quiddity as distinct from singularity. And thus it is not necessary to posit any species in the intellect, rather it suffices that species are in phantasy.

If you say that species in phantasy represent quiddity as conjoined to singularity, intelligible species represents that it is joined together or that it is not.

Against this is the fact that a species can persist in phantasy even when the thing has been destroyed, and then quiddity is not conjoined to the singular thing; therefore, etc.

If you say that sensible species represents under material conditions here and now, but that intelligible species do not but rather abstract, contrary to this is the fact that sensible species abstract from material conditions just as intelligible species do. This is evident because a species if posited in phantasy represent a thing when it does not exist just as it does when it does exist. Therefore, something imagining abstracts like the intellect from material conditions.

If you say that species in phantasy represent under a definition of singular quiddity but represent in the intellect under a definition of universal quiddity, against this is the fact that either a species in phantasy represents a singular thing or it does not and rather represents only quiddity or a composite of both. But if it does so in the first way then singularity is apprehended from a sense just as quiddity is, a result contrary to his views.

If it does so in the second way then there would be no difference between the representation of a sensible and intelligible species, because the same thing is represented by both. Nor does it in the third way, i.e. when taken as a composite of both, because then one part is not be represented more than another, and consequently one part is not understood more than another, and thus quiddity is no more understood than singularity. This result is contrary to what his views because he said that individual difference cannot be apprehended for that state, especially by a sense. This is also true because just as it is repugnant to all reason for individual difference to terminate or move to cognition, so it is repugnant that it should be represented. Also according to him, nature is what is primarily [Scotus, *Reportatio Paris.*, III, d.14. q. 3, n.9] seen and as a result what is primarily represented. And from this it follows that the same thing is represented by both intelligible and sensible species; by both thus it is not necessary to posit distinct species.

To the explanation [Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p.3, q. 1, n. 352] and therefore reply that it is only species in phantasy that do not suffice for understanding something. But just as potency and an object without any species is required for corporeal intuitive cognition, so an object together with the intellect suffices for intuitive intellection. And for first abstractive knowledge [*notitiam*], which accompanies intuitive knowledge, intuitive knowledge along with the intellect suffices, but for secondary abstractive knowledge habit is required, as was said above [pp. 262 and following]. Nor does phantasy taken alone necessarily do anything towards either intuitive or abstractive cognition, but acts only accidentally for that state. For a separate soul **can intuitively see a thing** as present to itself without any phantasy. But the [p. 303] Philosopher did not see anything but things and courses of things for that state, and just as a thing is required for that state [i.e. singular cognition], he well says that a phantasism is likewise required [see *De Anima* 431<sup>b</sup>28].

To another objection [*ibid.* 352] I say that there are not two representable definitions [*rationes*] in reality [*in re*] of which one is represented to phantasy and the other to the intellect. Because there are no such two things in reality, nature

being contracted and property possession restricted, because whatever exists in reality in a singular thing, as is clear from what was said earlier in another place [Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.*, dist. 3, qq. 4-7].

To another objection [*Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, nn. 359-363] I say that the agent intellect causes anything in the possible intellect, because [causing] an intention is its primary end. And when he says that action of the agent intellect terminates at a universal in act, he understands that it is terminated at a universal, either because it is terminated at that universal which, according to him, was first understood, or because its action is terminated at the first representative of the universal which exists in reality [*in re*]. This does not hold in the first of the way because according to him, intellectual action is terminated at a species [Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, n. 360], but it is not a species that is first understood. Nor is it in the second way, because then the action of the agent intellect is no more terminated in a universal than at a particular. Because just as it is possible to produce a species representing a universal, it is possible to [p. 304] produce a species representing a singular thing, especially since that species, if it were posited, would be a singular thing and have being here and now. For it thus has being in that intellect and in none other, and is now when it which had no prior existence is caused for the first time. For unless a singular could represent a singular, it would never be possible for a singular to be understood.

If you were to say that the agent intellect makes a universal because it makes a species that represents indifferently many things, I would say against this then that a sense would in the same way make a universal because it makes a species that indifferently represents many. The assumption is evident because when some things are similar, nothing can be a likeness or representative of one unless it be also a likeness and representative of another. Example: if Socrates existing here and another Socrates in Rome were similar, there could not be some image serving as a likeness of the Socrates here which would be a representative of him, indeed the same, similar in everything to the Socrates existing at Rome and a representative of him. Therefore, if there were two similar whitenesses, no species in a sense could be a likeness or representative of one unless it were equally a likeness and representative of the other. And as a consequence sensible species can represent many things just as intelligible species do, and thus an act of sense would terminate at a universal just as an act of the intellect would.

Likewise I say that an act of the intellect is real because it terminates in a **real intuitive or abstractive cognition**, in the way described earlier. And when he says that the agent intellect makes a universal in act, what he says is true because it makes is true that some *fictum* exists [*quoddam esse fictum*] and produces [p. 305] some concept having **objective being** [*in esse objetivo*], which terminates its act, which has **objective being** only, and does not have in

any way **subjective [subjectiva] being**. And thus it makes a universal, as it is said elsewhere.\*

And when he says that the agent intellect makes an intelligible in act out of an intelligible in potency, I say that this proposition is not first proposed by the Philosopher, nor by the Commentator, but rather this is: that the agent intellect makes the intellect to be in act from the intellect in potency. And this is true because it makes an intellection through which something understood [*aliquid intellectum*] is in act which earlier was understood in potency. This is clear according to the Commentator in *De Anima* III, comment 18 [*ibid.*] where he says that the operation of the agent intellect is to make the intellect understand in act and that the agent intellect and the possible intellect stand to each other as agent and patient with respect to intellection. Whence he says: “since it is necessary that there be in it a part which is called the intellect ... by which it makes things understood [*intellecta*] or that something understood in potency is something [**p. 306**] understood in act.” And this by being caused in the way explained earlier. And therefore the action of the agent intellect is to make an intellection and that of the possible intellect to receive an intellection. Hence he says that the agent intellect is always in act – sometimes as the material intellect in potency, sometimes in action.

And when it is said [Scotus *Ordinatio* I, d.3, p. 3, q. 1, n. 359] that, according to the Commentator, the agent intellect transfers a thing from order to order, this is true because it makes a thing into something understood that previously was not. For he says there [Averroes *loc. Cit* p. 439] that “to abstract is nothing other than making imagined intentions to be understood in act after they used to be in intellectual potency. To understand however is nothing other than to receive these intentions.” Meanwhile he says himself, “we find the same, that it is in its being to be transferred from order to order, viz. to imagined intentions; we say that it is necessary that this would be by an agent cause and a recipient.” And there is there much else about this.

Suppose say that the Commentator wants the action of the agent intellect to be prior to the action of the possible intellect [Averroes, *loc. Cit.* P. 440]. For he says that “the intellect, of which it is true that it abstracts what is understood and causes it to be understood, necessarily is such that it precedes the thing understood as it exists in us or which the intellect is to receive.

I reply that according to him [Averroes, *In Aristot. De Anima* III, t.4, Crawford pp. 383-413] the agent and possible intellects are two separate substances, one of which is active, the other passive. Moreover, an active thing is prior in perfection to a passive thing, because it is more perfect. Nor moreover is it necessary that the intellect be prior to one which could be received in a remainder.

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\* Editors note: This is the view that Ockham earlier proposed as probable, while he had been lecturing on the first book of the *Sentences*, and which he defends in an unfinished redaction. See *Scriptum in I*

*Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 8. In codes 50 this is annotated in the margin, “He fel;t this when he lectured, but later changed this view about a *fictum*.”

And when the Commentator says that if the quiddities [p. 307] of things could be abstracted from matter, as Plato posits, then we would not need an agent intellect, and therefore the agent intellect does not abstract, I reply that the abstraction of the agent intellect is two fold. One is to cause partially either intuitive or abstractive intellection accompanying the object or a habit, in the way explained earlier, the intellection of which is in every way abstract from matter, because it is immaterial in itself [*in se*] and has subjective being [*esse subjectiva*] in an immaterial thing. The other is abstraction through which it produces a universal or universal concept of a thing in an objective being [*esse objectiva*], as is explained elsewhere [above p. 305, note 3]. As far as the first abstraction is concerned, if quiddities of things were abstracted from matter, as Plato would posit, then we would need the agent intellect if they should be understood, because they would not be understood either intuitively or abstractively without an intellect causing an intellection. Being in this way it is an agent intellect. But concerning the second abstraction we would not need the agent intellect, if Plato's opinion were true, because if universals were to really [*in re*] exist separated from singulars, as Plato would posit, then the intellect would not produce these objective beings alone, because they would then have subjective being in reality [*in re*], indeed it could well that they are "these understandings" [*ea intelligere*].

[Also it is possible to say, supposing one view, namely that it is impossible to cognize a universal except as abstractive, because that alone is cognized intuitively which has subjective being in reality, the sort of being that universals do not have, as was shown above [p. 303, and note 3.], and this is [p. 308] so also according to the opinion of the Philosopher and the Commentator. It is certain however that we cognize some universals by cognition caused by the agent intellect, which is not intuitive. Therefore, if Plato's opinion is postulated, universals could be cognized intuitively, because they would be subjective in reality, therefore it is not necessary to posit another agent intellect for universal cognition sufficiently be a single cognition].

Hence it is clear from the Commentator's words there that there is no species in the intellect, because he there enumerates for the intellect all the dispositions that it takes on. Hence he lists the agent intellect, as either material or possible; the speculative intellect when it speculates; the intellect is a habit to the extent that it so disposed, the adept intellect to the extent that it has reached the goal of perfection; and the possible intellect. He does not however mention the intellect that is a species.

From this the falsity is clear of the opinion [namely the opinion of Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theolo* I, q. 85, a. 1] which posits that the agent intellect manifests action that concerns phantasms and the possible intellect through the medium of depuration, illustration, irradiation, remotion, abstraction, or sequestration. Because such remotion or sequestration is either according to subjective or objective being. But it is not in the first way because then by the causing of a species the agent intellect would move from a phantasm or something would cause something positive in phantasy, both of which according

to him are false. Nor is it in the second way, because according to him **objective being** is caused through the possible intellect.

[p. 309] To another objection [Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 1, n.366] I say that for the presentation of an object the presentation of it itself suffices, either in intuitive or abstractive knowledge [*notitia*] which is a perfect likeness to the object, or in a habit.

To another [Scotus, *ibid.* n. 367] I say that it entails a conclusion contrary to what it posits, namely that an object cannot be present to the intellect unless it is through a species or an inferior potency. That is not true because it suffices that the object itself be proximate in the way required for it. Nor is distance an impediment so long as it does not exceed the causative power of potency and object. Because if a distant object can be an immediate cause of a species in a sense or in the intellect – according to them it can be so at least in one of the senses – in the same way it can be an immediate cause of an act of sensing or of the understanding, without any species; nor is the explanation from one [i.e. species] better than that from the other [i.e. no species].

To another [Scotus, *ibid.* n.371, p. 226] I say that the soul is in some way everything through the cognition of everything. For through sensory cognition it is everything sensible and through intellectual cognition everything intelligible. And either such cognition is a perfect [*perfecta*] likeness to the object and is more perfect than a species. But the difference is in this that a sense is not every sensible except through an actual cognition, but the intellect is every intelligible through an actual or habitual cognition. Hence a habit perfect in this way is a likeness to a thing, like a species or an act.

[p. 310] To another objection [Scotus, *ibid.* nn. 375-376, pp. 228 and following] concerning the statement of Augustine about knowledge and cognition. I say that it is true. And when he [i.e. Scotus] says that the object is not present in itself [*in se*], I say that it is present in itself in intuitive cognition; that it is present “in habit” in abstractive cognition.

#### [Against the Main Argument]

To the main objection of the first question [above p. 251] I say that an angel cannot understand anything by itself [*a se*] through its own essence, and this is so because its essence would be the total cause of reasoning about the object [*in ratione objecti*], without any other concurrent reason [*ratione*], either in itself [*in se*] or in a habit. This is because [in this case] one thing cannot be understood through another. And when you argue through a subject and a passion [i.e. when the subject is that reason for understanding a passion, *ibid.*], I say that a subject does not induce an incomplex cognition of a passion, as it is said in the *Prolog* [Ockham, *Scriptum in I Sent.*, prol. Q.9]. Moreover, a thing outside the soul can be cognized through a thing in the soul – for example, through a habit – so that it can be a partial cause with respect to its cognition.

To the rest what should be said is clear from what has been said previously.

