

OCKHAM

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
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS

A selection
edited and translated
by

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NELSON



Beginning of Ockham's Logic
*From MS Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge,
464/571, fol. 1^r, written in 1341*

II
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
PROBLEMS

Sources :

1	Prologue to the <i>Ordinatio</i> , Q. i, N <i>sqq.</i>	18
2	<i>Quodlibeta</i> , VI, Q. vi	25
3	<i>Quodlibeta</i> , I, Q. xiii	27
4	<i>Summa totius logicae</i> , I, c. xiv	32
5	<i>Summa totius logicae</i> , I, c. xv	35
6	<i>Summa totius logicae</i> , I, c. xvi	37
7	<i>Ordinatio</i> , D. II, Q. viii, prima redactio	41
8	<i>Expositio super librum Perihermenias</i>	43

1. Ostendam, quod intellectus noster, etiam pro statu isto, respectu eiusdem obiecti sub eadem ratione potest habere duas notitias incomplexas specie distinctas, quarum una potest dici intuitiva et alia abstractiva. . . .

Ad declarationem primae conclusionis primo prae-mittam aliquas distinctiones et conclusiones praeambulas, secundo probabo conclusionem principaliter intentam.

Est ergo prima distinctio ista : Quod inter actus intellectus sunt duo actus, quorum unus est apprehensivus : et est respectu cuiuslibet quod potest terminare actum potentiae intellectivae, sive sit complexum sive incomplexum, quia apprehendimus non tantum incomplexa sed et propositiones et demonstrationes et impossibilia et necessaria, et universaliter omnia quae respiciuntur a potentia intellectiva. Alius potest dici actus iudicativus, quo intellectus non tantum apprehendit obiectum, sed etiam illi assentit vel dissentit; et iste actus est tantum respectu complexi, quia nulli assentimus per intellectum nisi quod verum reputamus, nec dissentimus nisi quod falsum aestimamus. Et sic patet, quod respectu complexi potest esse duplex actus, scilicet actus apprehensivus et actus iudicativus.

Hoc probatur : Quia aliquis potest apprehendere aliquam propositionem, et tamen illi nec assentire nec dissentire, sicut patet de propositionibus neutris, quibus intellectus nec assentit nec dissentit, quia aliter non essent sibi neutrae.

Similiter : Laicus nesciens Latinum potest audire

[*The basis of immediate cognition*]

1. First I intend to show that our intellect, even in this life, can have two specifically distinct kinds of non-complex knowledge even when it is concerned with the same object under the same aspect. The one may be called intuitive, the other abstractive cognition. . . .

In order to explain this first conclusion, I shall present a few preliminary distinctions and conclusions ; after that I shall prove the conclusion which is principally intended.

The first distinction is between two acts of the intellect. The first act is an act of apprehension and relates to everything that can be the term of an act of the intellectual power, whether this be something complex or non-complex. For we apprehend not only that which is non-complex, but also propositions and demonstrations, and impossibilities and necessities, and, in general, anything within the scope of the intellectual power. The second act may be called an act of judgment, by which the intellect not only apprehends its object, but also gives its assent or dissent to it. This act has to do with a proposition [*complexum*] only. For our intellect does not assent to anything unless we believe it to be true, nor does it dissent from anything unless we believe it to be false. It is clear, therefore, that in reference to a proposition, a twofold act is possible, namely an act of apprehension and an act of judgment.

Proof : It is possible that someone apprehends a proposition, but nevertheless gives neither assent nor dissent to it ; this is clearly true, for instance, of indifferent propositions, to which the intellect gives neither assent nor dissent, because otherwise they would not be indifferent for it.

Likewise, a layman who does not know Latin may

multas propositiones in Latino, quibus nec assentit nec dissentit, et certum est, quod intellectus potest assentire alicui propositioni et dissentire alteri ; ergo etc.

Secunda distinctio est : Quod, sicut respectu complexi est duplex actus, sic respectu complexi est duplex habitus correspondens, scilicet unus inclinans ad actum apprehensivum et alius inclinans ad actum iudicativum.

Ista distinctio patet : Quia aliquis post multas apprehensiones alicuius propositionis, quae est neutra, magis sentit se inclinatum ad apprehendendum et cogitandum de illa propositione quam prius ; ergo habet habitum inclinantem ad actus apprehensivos. Quod autem sit habitus inclinans ad actus iudicativos, patet per Philosophum vi^o *Ethicorum*,* ubi ponit intellectum, scientiam etc.

Prima conclusio praeambula est ista : Quod actus iudicativus respectu alicuius complexi praesupponit actum apprehensivum respectu eiusdem. . . .

Ex istis sequitur secunda conclusio : Quod omnis actus iudicativus praesupponit in eadem potentia notitiam incomplexam terminorum : quia praesupponit actum apprehensivum, et actus apprehensivus respectu alicuius complexi praesupponit notitiam incomplexam terminorum. . . .

Tertia conclusio est : Quod nullus actus partis sensitivae est causa immediata et proxima, nec partialis nec totalis, alicuius actus iudicativi ipsius intellectus.

Haec conclusio potest persuaderi : Quia qua ratione ad aliquem actum iudicativum sufficiunt illa quae sunt in intellectu tamquam causae proximae et immediatae, et ad omnem actum iudicativum ; sed respectu alicuius actus iudicativi sufficiunt ea quae sunt in intellectu,

* Cf. cap. iii-viii

hear many propositions in this language to which he gives neither assent nor dissent. On the other hand, it is certain that the intellect can give its assent to one proposition and its dissent to another proposition. Therefore, apprehension and judgment are distinct.

The second distinction is, that just as in regard to a proposition there can be a twofold act, so also there can be two corresponding *habitus* ; the one inclines the intellect towards an act of apprehension ; the other towards an act of judgment.

This distinction is manifest. For after someone has frequently apprehended an indifferent proposition, he finds himself more inclined to apprehend and think about this proposition than he was before. Therefore he has now a *habitus* inclining him towards acts of apprehension. The fact that there is also a *habitus* inclining one towards acts of judgment is clear from the statement of the Philosopher in the sixth book of the *Ethics*, where he affirms the existence of [the several *habitus* of] understanding, knowledge, etc.

First preliminary conclusion : The act of judgment in reference to a proposition (*complexum*) presupposes an act of apprehending the same proposition. . . .

Second conclusion, following from the preceding discussion [here omitted]. Every act of judgment presupposes in the same faculty a non-complex cognition of the terms ; for it presupposes an act of apprehension, and the act of apprehending a proposition presupposes non-complex cognition of the terms. . . .

Third conclusion : No act of the sensitive part of the soul is either partially or totally the immediate and proximate cause of the intellect's own act of judgment.

A persuasive argument can be adduced for this conclusion. If we assume that contents of the intellect suffice as proximate and immediate causes to produce some act of judgment, then they suffice to produce every such act. Now contents of the intellect suffice for some

scilicet respectu conclusionis, quia si sit in intellectu actus sciendi praemissas, statim scitur conclusio omni alio circumscripto : ergo ad omnem actum iudicativum sufficiunt ea quae sunt in intellectu tamquam causae proximae.

Praeterea : Ex quo causae quae sunt in parte intellectiva sufficere possunt, frustra ponuntur aliae causae.

His praemissis probo primo primam conclusionem sic : Omnis notitia incomplexa aliquorum terminorum, quae potest esse causa notitiae evidentis respectu propositionis compositae ex illis terminis, distinguitur secundum speciem a notitia incomplexa illorum quae, quantumcumque intendatur, non potest esse causa notitiae evidentis respectu propositionis eiusdem. Hoc patet : Quia illa quae sunt eiusdem rationis et aequae perfecta possunt in eodem passo aequaliter disposito habere effectus eiusdem rationis, vii^o *Topicorum* * ; sed certum est, quod intellectus potest habere notitiam incomplexam, tam de Sorte quam de albedine, cuius virtute non potest evidenter cognoscere, an sit albus vel non, sicut per experientiam patet ; et praeter istam potest habere notitiam incomplexam, virtute cuius potest evidenter cognoscere, quod Sortes est albus, si est albus. Ergo de istis potest habere duas notitias incomplexas, quarum una potest esse causa notitiae evidentis illius propositionis contingentis, et alia, quantumcumque intendatur, non ; ergo specie distinguuntur. . . .

Secundo arguo principaliter sic : Omne intelligibile, quod est a solo intellectu apprehensibile et nullo modo sensibile, cuius aliqua notitia incomplexa sufficit ad notitiam evidentem alicuius veritatis contingentis de eo, et aliqua notitia incomplexa eiusdem non sufficit, potest cognosci ab intellectu duabus cognitionibus specie dis-

* cap. i (152^a, 2 sq.)

act of judgment, namely a conclusion ; because when the knowledge of the premises is in the intellect, the conclusion is immediately known without the help of anything else. Therefore contents of the intellect suffice as the proximate cause of every act of judgment.

Furthermore, since the causes existing in the intellectual part can be sufficient, the assumption of other causes is superfluous.

Given these premises I shall prove the main conclusion as follows. Any non-complex cognition of terms that can cause evident cognition of a proposition composed of these terms, is specifically distinct from a non-complex cognition which, no matter how intense it is, cannot cause evident cognition of the same proposition. This is manifest. For things of the same kind that are equally perfect can produce effects of the same kind in the same object when this is equally disposed to receive the effect. This the Philosopher shows in the seventh book of the *Topics*. Now it is certain, as experience teaches, that the intellect can have a non-complex cognition of both Socrates and whiteness, on the strength of which it cannot know evidently whether Socrates is white or not. But besides this knowledge, the intellect can have another cognition by which it is able to know evidently that Socrates is white, if he is white. Hence the intellect can have two non-complex cognitions of these things : the one cognition can cause evident knowledge of this contingent proposition ; and the other cannot, no matter how intense it is. Therefore these two cognitions are specifically distinct. . . .

The second main proof : Whenever an intelligible thing can be known only by intellect and in no way by sense, if there can be one non-complex cognition of the thing that suffices for evident knowledge of a contingent truth and another that does not suffice, then the two cognitions are specifically distinct. But acts of intellect,

tinctis ; sed intellectiones, affectiones, delectationes, tristitiae et huiusmodi sunt intelligibiles et nullo modo sensibiles, et aliqua notitia incomplexa earum sufficit ad notitiam evidentem, utrum sint vel non sint, et utrum sint in tali subiecto vel non, et aliqua notitia earundem non sufficit ; ergo etc. Minor, quantum ad primam partem, patet : Quia quilibet experitur in se quod intelligit, diligit, delectatur, tristatur ; et ista notitia, cum sit respectu contingentis, non potest accipi ex propositionibus necessariis ; ergo oportet quod accipiatur vel a notitia incomplexa terminorum vel rerum importatarum, vel ab aliqua contingente quae accipitur a notitia incomplexa terminorum vel rerum, vel erit processus in infinitum in talibus contingentibus. Tertium est impossibile, quia est ponere statum in talibus. Si detur secundum, vel ergo illa contingens habet aliquem terminum, qui potest accipi ab aliquo sensibili, vel nullum. Primum non potest dari, quia nulla est propositio de aliquo sensibili, ex qua sequatur necessario dilectionem esse in voluntate, sicut alias patebit ; et per consequens nulla est talis propositio contingens, virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci, quod iste diligit. Si detur secundum, habetur propositum, quod sola notitia incomplexa terminorum mere intelligibilium sufficit ad notitiam evidentem talis veritatis contingentis. Si detur primum, habetur propositum. Secunda pars illius minoris patet : Quia non est inconueniens, quod aliquis de aliquo intelligibili ignoret, utrum sit vel non sit, et tamen quod habeat notitiam incomplexam de illo non plus quam de aliquo sensibili. Unde si intellectus primo videret dilectionem

emotions, pleasures, griefs and the like, can be apprehended only by the intellect and not by the sense-faculty. Now some non-complex knowledge of them suffices for evident knowledge of whether they exist or not, and whether or not they exist in such and such a subject. Yet not all non-complex knowledge of them suffices for this ; therefore, etc. The first part of the minor premise is shown thus : Everyone experiences in himself that he understands, loves, is pleased, is sad. Since such knowledge concerns contingent facts, it cannot be obtained from necessary propositions. Therefore, either (1) it must be obtained from a non-complex knowledge of the terms, or the things for which the terms stand, or (2) from a contingent proposition obtained from non-complex cognition of the terms or things, or (3) we can go on *in infinitum* with such contingent propositions. The third case is impossible, since there must be an end in the series of such propositions. If the second case is assumed, then the contingent proposition either contains some term which can be obtained from a sensible object, or it does not. The first alternative cannot be admitted ; for there is no proposition about a sensible thing from which it would necessarily follow that love is occurring in the will, as will be made clear elsewhere, and consequently there is no contingent proposition in virtue of which it is evidently knowable that this man loves. If the second alternative is conceded, we have the result we wanted : that a non-complex knowledge of purely intelligible terms is sufficient for evident knowledge of such a contingent truth. The second part of the minor premise is shown thus : There is no inconsistency in the supposition that someone does not know whether a certain intelligible thing exists or does not exist, and has nevertheless a non-complex cognition of it ; this is no more inconsistent than the corresponding supposition about a certain sensible thing. If, therefore, someone's intellect should directly perceive another person's love

alterius et esset ita certus de dilectione alterius sicut de dilectione propria, non esset inconueniens quin post dilectionem eandem intelligeret et tamen ignoraret ipsam esse, quamvis esset, sicut est de aliquo sensibili primo viso et post intellecto.

Ista secunda ratio probat, quod intellectui est possibilis talis duplex cognitio, et hoc respectu mere intelligibilis. Prima autem ratio probat, quod de facto pro statu isto intellectus habet talem duplicem cognitionem, etiam respectu sensibilem. . . .

Dico igitur, quantum ad istum articulum, quod respectu incomplexi potest esse duplex notitia, quarum una potest vocari 'abstractiva' et alia 'intuitiva'. Utrum autem alii velint vocare talem notitiam incomplexam intuitivam, non curo, quia hoc solum intendo principaliter probare, quod de eadem re potest intellectus habere duplicem notitiam incomplexam specie distinctam.

Sciendum tamen, quod 'notitia abstractiva' potest accipi dupliciter: Uno modo quia est respectu alicuius abstractiva multis singularibus, et sic cognitio abstractiva non est aliud quam cognitio alicuius universalis abstrahibilis a multis, de quo dicitur post. Et si universale sit vera qualitas existens subiective in anima, sicut potest teneri probabiliter, concedendum esset, quod illud universale potest intuitive videri, et quod eadem notitia est intuitiva et abstractiva, isto modo accipiendo 'notitiam abstractivam'; et sic non distinguuntur ex opposito. Aliter accipitur 'cognitio abstractiva', secundum quod abstrahit ab existentia et non existentia et ab aliis conditionibus quae contingenter accidunt rei vel praedicantur de re.

and he were thus as certain of this other person's love as of his own love, then there would not be any difficulty about supposing that later on he could still think of this love and nevertheless not know whether it continued to exist, even though it did still exist; just as may happen with some sensible thing which is first seen and then thought of.

This second argument proves that it is possible for the intellect to have this twofold cognition and to have it about purely intelligible facts, whereas the first proves that our intellect actually has this twofold cognition in the present life, and has it even as regards sensible facts. . . .

I maintain, therefore, . . . that there are two ways of knowing something non-complex. The one can be called 'abstractive cognition', the other 'intuitive cognition'. But I am not concerned whether others wish to call this non-complex cognition 'intuitive cognition' or not. For what I intended to prove in the first instance was just that our intellect can have two specifically different non-complex cognitions of the same thing.

We must realise, however, that the term 'abstractive cognition' can be taken in two senses. In one sense it means cognition that relates to something abstracted from many singulars; and in this sense abstractive cognition is nothing else but cognition of a universal which can be abstracted from many things. We shall speak about this later. If such a universal is a true quality existing in the mind as its subject—which is a probable opinion—then it must be conceded that such a universal can be intuitively known and that the same knowledge is intuitive and also abstractive, according to this first meaning of 'abstractive'. And in this sense 'intuitive' and 'abstractive' are not contrasted.

Abstractive cognition in the second sense abstracts from existence and non-existence and from all the other conditions which contingently belong to or are predi-

Non quod aliquid cognoscatur per notitiam intuitivam, quod non cognoscitur per notitiam abstractivam, sed idem totaliter et sub omni eadem ratione cognoscitur per utramque notitiam. Sed distinguuntur per istum modum: Quia notitia intuitiva rei est talis notitia, virtute cuius potest sciri, utrum res sit vel non, ita quod, si res sit, statim intellectus iudicat eam esse et evidenter cognoscit eam esse, nisi forte impediatur propter imperfectionem illius notitiae. Et eodem modo, si esset perfecta talis notitia, per potentiam divinam conservata de re non existente, virtute illius notitiae incomplexae evidenter cognosceret illam rem non esse.

Similiter notitia intuitiva est talis, quod quando aliquae res cognoscuntur, quarum una inhaeret alteri, vel una distat loco ab altera, vel alio modo se habet ad alteram, statim virtute illius notitiae incomplexae illarum rerum scitur, si res inhaeret vel non inhaeret, si distat vel non distat, et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus, nisi illa notitia sit nimis remissa vel sit aliquod aliud impedimentum. Sicut si Sortes in rei veritate sit albus, illa notitia Sortis et albedinis, virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci quod Sortes est albus, dicitur notitia intuitiva. Et universaliter, omnis notitia incomplexa termini vel terminorum seu rei vel rerum, virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci aliqua veritas contingens, maxime de praesenti, est notitia intuitiva.

Notitia autem abstractiva est illa, virtute cuius de re contingente non potest sciri evidenter, utrum sit vel non sit. Et per istum modum notitia abstractiva abstrahit ab existentia et non-existentia, quia nec per ipsam potest

cated of a thing. This does not mean that something may be known by intuitive cognition which is not known by abstractive cognition; rather, the same thing is known fully, and under the same aspect, by either cognition. But they are distinguished in the following manner. Intuitive cognition of a thing is cognition that enables us to know whether the thing exists or does not exist, in such a way that, if the thing exists, then the intellect immediately judges that it exists and evidently knows that it exists, unless the judgment happens to be impeded through the imperfection of this cognition. And in the same way, if the divine power were to conserve a perfect intuitive cognition of a thing no longer existent, in virtue of this non-complex knowledge the intellect would know evidently that this thing does not exist.

Then, too, intuitive cognition is such that when one thing known by means of it inheres as an accident in another, or is locally distant from the other, or stands in some other relation to the other, then non-complex cognition of these things gives us an immediate knowledge whether a certain thing inheres or does not inhere in another, or whether it is distant from it or not, and so for other contingent truths; unless this cognition is too weak, or there be other impediments. For instance, if Socrates is in reality white, then knowledge of Socrates and of whiteness is called intuitive cognition, when it can be evidently known in virtue of such knowledge that Socrates is white. Generally speaking, any non-complex cognition of one or more terms or things, is an intuitive cognition, if it enables us to know a contingent truth, especially about present facts.

Abstractive cognition, on the other hand, is that knowledge by which it cannot be evidently known whether a contingent fact exists or does not exist. In this way abstractive cognition abstracts from existence and non-existence; because, in opposition to intuitive

evidenter sciri de re existente quod existit, nec de non existente quod non existit, per oppositum ad notitiam intuitivam.

Similiter, per notitiam abstractivam nulla veritas contingens, maxime de praesenti, potest evidenter cognosci, sicut de facto patet, quod quando cognoscitur Sortes et albedo sua in absentia, virtute illius notitiae incomplexae nec potest sciri, quod Sortes est vel non est, vel quod est albus vel non est albus, vel quod distat a tali loco vel non, et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus. Et tamen certum est, quod istae veritates possunt evidenter cognosci. Et omnis notitia complexa terminorum vel rerum significatarum ultimate reducitur ad notitiam incomplexam terminorum. Ergo isti termini vel res una alia notitia possunt cognosci quam sit illa, virtute cuius non possunt cognosci tales veritates contingentes. Et illa erit intuitiva. Et ista est notitia, a qua incipit notitia experimentalis: quia universaliter ille, qui potest accipere experimentum de aliqua veritate contingente et mediante illa de veritate necessaria, habet aliquam notitiam incomplexam de aliquo termino vel re, quam non habet ille, qui non potest sic experiri. Et ideo, sicut secundum Philosophum i^o *Metaphysicae* * et ii^o *Posteriorum* † scientia istorum sensibilium quae accipitur per experientiam, de qua ipse loquitur, incipit a sensu, id est a notitia intuitiva sensitiva istorum sensibilium, ita universaliter notitia scientifica istorum pure intelligibilium accepta per experientiam incipit a notitia intuitiva intellectiva istorum intelligibilium.

Est tamen advertendum, quod aliquando propter imperfectionem notitiae intuitivae, quia scilicet est valde

* cap. i (980^a, 29 sq.)

† cap. xix (100^a, 4 sqq.)

cognition, it does not enable us to know the existence of what does exist or the non-existence of what does not exist.

Likewise, through abstractive cognition no contingent truth, in particular none relating to the present, can be evidently known. This is clear from the fact that when Socrates and his whiteness are known in his absence, this non-complex knowledge does not enable us to know whether Socrates exists or does not exist, or whether he is white or is not white, and the same for other contingent truths. But yet it is certain that these truths can be evidently known. And any complex knowledge of terms, or of things signified by terms, is ultimately reduced to non-complex knowledge of terms. Hence these terms or things can be known by a cognition which is different from that which cannot give us knowledge of such contingent truths; and this will be intuitive cognition. And it is from this that empirical knowledge begins; for, generally speaking, he who is enabled by observation to know a contingent truth and, by means of this, a necessary truth, has non-complex knowledge of some term or thing which another who is unable to make this observation cannot have. And therefore, just as the knowledge of sensible facts that is obtained from experience (as the Philosopher says in the first book of the *Metaphysics* and in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*) begins with the senses, i.e. from a sense-intuition of these sensible facts, so in general the scientific knowledge of these purely intelligible facts of experience begins with an intellective intuition of these intelligible facts.

Still, it is to be noted that at times it may happen that no contingent truths, or only a few, can be known about a thing that we know intuitively, owing to the imperfec-

imperfecta et obscura vel propter aliqua impedimenta ex parte obiecti vel propter aliqua alia impedimenta, potest contingere, quod vel nullae vel paucae veritates contingentes de re sic intuitive cognita possunt cognosci.

2. *Utrum cognitio intuitiva possit esse de obiecto non-existente?*

Quod non : Quia contradictio est, quod visio sit et nihil videatur ; ergo contradictio est, quod visio sit et obiectum visum non sit.

Contra : Visio est qualitas absoluta distincta ab obiecto; ergo potest sine contradictione fieri sine obiecto.

In ista quaestione pono duas conclusiones. Prima est, quod cognitio intuitiva potest esse per potentiam divinam de obiecto non existente. Quod probo primo per articulum fidei 'Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem' quem sic intelligo : quod quilibet est divinae potentiae attribuendum quod non includit manifestam contradictionem ; sed istud fieri a Deo non includit contradictionem ; ergo etc.

Praeterea : In illo articulo fundatur illa propositio famosa theologorum : 'Quidquid Deus producit median- tibus causis secundis potest immediate sine illis pro- ducere et conservare'. Ex ista propositione arguo sic : Omnem effectum quem potest Deus mediante causa secunda potest immediate per se ; sed in notitiam intuitivam corporalem potest mediante obiecto ; ergo

tion of the intuitive cognition (it being very imperfect or very obscure), or because of some impediment on the part of the object, or some other impediment.

[*Intuitive cognition of non-existing things*]

2. *Whether intuitive cognition can be had of an object that does not exist?*

It cannot : For it is a contradiction that there should be an act of seeing and nothing be seen ; therefore it is a contradiction that there should be an act of seeing but the seen object not exist.

On the contrary : Vision is a non-relative quality distinct from the object ; without contradiction, therefore, it can occur without an object.

On this question I lay down two conclusions. First : Intuitive cognition of a non-existent object is possible by the divine power. I prove this first by the article of faith 'I believe in God the Father almighty', which I understand in the following sense : Anything is to be attributed to the divine power, when it does not contain a manifest contradiction. But that this [i.e. cognition of a non-existent object] should be produced by the power of God, does not contain a contradiction ; therefore, etc.

Again, on this article is based the famous maxim of the theologians : 'Whatever God can produce by means of secondary causes, He can directly produce and preserve without them'. From this maxim I argue thus. Every effect which God can produce by means of a secondary cause He can produce directly on His own account. God can produce intuitive sense cognition by means

potest in eam immediate per se.

Praeterea: Omnis res absoluta distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta potest per divinam potentiam existere alia re absoluta destructa; sed visio stellae in caelo, tam sensitiva quam intellectiva, est huiusmodi; ergo etc.

Et si dicis, quod secundum istam rationem sequitur, quod Deus posset videri intuitive et beatifice non exhibita sua praesentia actuali in ratione obiecti actualiter praesentis ipsi intellectui, quod falsum est et erroneum: Respondeo, quod hic non est aliqua habitudo, arguendo quod quia Deus potest facere talem visionem sine obiecto creato, a quo non dependet nisi tamquam a causa secunda, ergo Deus potest videri intuitive et beatifice non exhibita sua praesentia actuali in ratione obiecti actualiter praesentis ipsi intellectui, a quo obiecto dependet illa visio sicut a causa prima. Nam quamvis secundum doctores Deus potest facere effectus proprios causarum secundarum sine illis causis secundis, non tamen potest aliquem effectum facere sine causa prima. Unde sicut non est possibile, quod color causet effective visionem suam in oculo nisi sit actualiter praesens, ita non est possibile, quod Deus causet visionem in intellectu nisi exhibita sua actuali praesentia.

Secunda conclusio est: Quod naturaliter cognitio intuitiva non potest causari nec conservari obiecto non existente. Cuius ratio est, quia effectus realis non potest causari nec produci de non esse in esse ab illo quod nihil est; et per consequens, naturaliter loquendo, requirit tam causam producentem quam conservantem existere.

Et si dicis: Si quis videat solem et post intret obscurum

of an object; hence He can produce it directly on His own account.

Furthermore, every non-relative reality that differs in its place and its subject [of inherence] from another non-relative reality can still exist by virtue of the divine power when the other non-relative reality is destroyed. But seeing a star in the sky, whether by sense or by intellect, is such a reality; therefore, etc.

You may object that according to this argument it follows that there could be an intuitive and beatific vision of God without His actual presence as an object actually present to the intellect; which is false and erroneous. I answer that there is no logical connexion in the following way of arguing: 'Because God can make such an act of seeing without a created object (on which this act depends only as a secondary cause), therefore, there can be an intuitive and beatific vision of God without His actual presence as an object actually present to the intellect (an object on which this is dependent as its first cause)'. For though, according to the Doctors, God can make the proper effects of secondary causes without these secondary causes, nevertheless He cannot make any effect without its first cause. For this reason, just as it is not possible that a colour should, as efficient cause, cause itself to be seen in the eye unless it is actually present, so in like manner it is not possible that God should cause an act of seeing Him in the intellect unless His actual presence is given.

Second conclusion: So far as natural causes are in question, an intuitive cognition cannot be caused or preserved if the object does not exist. The reason is this. A real effect cannot be caused, or brought from nothing into being, by that which is nothing. Hence, if we are speaking of the natural mode of causation, it requires for its existence both a productive and a preservative cause.

You may object: 'If someone sees the sun and then

locum, apparet sibi quod videat solem in eodem situ et eadem magnitudine; ergo visio solis remanet ipso absente; et eadem ratione remaneret ipso non existente: Respondeo: non manet visio solis, sed manet aliqua qualitas, puta lux impressa oculo, et illa qualitas videtur. Et si intellectus formet talem propositionem, 'Lux videtur in eodem situ, etc.', et sibi assentiat, decipitur propter illam qualitatem impressam visam.

Ad argumentum principale dico, quod contradictio est, quod visio sit et quod illud quod videtur non sit in effectu nec esse possit. Ideo contradictio est, quod chimaera videatur intuitive. Sed non est contradictio, quod illud quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra suam causam, dummodo possit esse in effectu, vel aliquando fuit in rerum natura. Et sic est in proposito. Unde Deus ab aeterno vidit omnes res factibiles, et tamen tunc nihil fuerunt.

3. *Utrum primum cognitum ab intellectu primitate generationis sit singulare?*

Quod non: Quia universale est primum et proprium obiectum intellectus; ergo primo cognoscitur primitate generationis.

Contra: Idem omnino est obiectum sensus et intellectus; sed singulare est primum obiectum sensus tali primitate; ergo etc.

Hic primo dandus est intellectus quaestionis, secundo ad quaestionem.

enters a dark room, it appears to him that he sees the sun in the same place and of the same size. Hence a sight of the sun remains, when the sun is absent; and for the same reason would remain, even if it did not exist'. To this I answer: 'No sight of the sun does remain; but there does remain a quality, viz. the light-impression in the eye, and it is this quality that is seen. And if the intellect formulates such a proposition as "Light is seen at the same place, etc." and gives its assent to it, it is deceived by this quality or impression which it sees'.

To the main argument I answer: It is a contradiction that an act of seeing should exist while that which is seen neither exists nor can exist in reality. Hence it is a contradiction that a chimera should be intuitively seen. But it is no contradiction that what is seen should be nothing actually existing outside its cause, provided only that it can exist in reality or has once been in the universe. And so it is in our case. It was thus that God from all eternity saw all things that could be made, and nevertheless they were then nothing.

[*The primacy of cognition of singular things*]

3. *Whether the singular is the first thing known, as regards the origin of cognition?*

It is not the first thing known: for the universal is the first and proper object of the intellect; and is, therefore, the first thing known, as regards the origin of cognition.

On the contrary: Both intellect and sense have the very same object; but if we are speaking of the origin of cognition, a singular thing is the first object of the sense faculty; therefore, etc.

Answer: We must first clarify the meaning of the question, and then answer it.

Circa primum sciendum, quod hic accipitur 'singulare' non pro omni illo, quod est unum numero, quia sic quaelibet res est singularis, sed accipitur pro re, quae est una numero et non est signum naturale vel voluntarium sive ad placitum commune multis, quomodo dictio scripta, conceptus et vox prolata significativa non sunt singularia, sed tantum res quae non est commune signum.

Secundo sciendum, quod non intelligitur ista quaestio de qualibet cognitione singularis, quia quaecumque cognitio universalis sic est cognitio singularis, quia nihil per talem cognitionem cognoscitur nisi singulare et singularia, tamen illa est cognitio communis. Sed intelligitur quaestio de cognitione propria et simplici singularis.

Circa secundum : Supposito quod quaestio intelligitur de cognitione propria singularis dico tunc primo : Quod singulare praedicto modo acceptum cognitione sibi propria et simplici est primo cognitum.

Quod probatur sic : Quia res extra animam, quae non est signum, tali cognitione primo intelligitur ; sed omnis res extra animam est singularis ; ergo etc.

Praeterea : Obiectum praecedit actum proprium et primum primitate generationis ; nihil autem praecedit actum talem nisi singulare ; ergo est.

Secundo dico : Quod cognitio simplex, propria singulari et prima tali primitate est cognitio intuitiva. Quod autem illa cognitio sit prima, patet : quia cognitio singularis abstractiva praesupponit intuitivam respectu eiusdem obiecti, et non e converso. Quod autem sit propria singulari, patet : quia immediate causatur a re

Concerning the first point we have to realise that here 'singular thing' does not mean everything that is numerically one ; for, in this sense, *everything* is singular. Instead we take 'singular thing' here for a thing which not only is numerically one, but in addition is not a natural or conventional sign belonging in common to many things signified. In this sense neither a written expression nor a concept nor a significant oral utterance, but only a thing which is not a common sign, is a singular thing.

Secondly, we should know that our question does not refer indiscriminately to any cognition of a singular thing. For in a sense every universal cognition is a cognition of a singular thing, since such a universal cognition gives us knowledge only of a singular thing or singular things. Our question rather refers to a proper and simple cognition of a singular thing.

On the second point : Granted that the question is taken to be about proper cognition of a singular thing, I maintain in the first place that a singular thing, taken in the above sense, is what is first known, in a cognition that is simple and proper to this singular thing.

This conclusion is proved in the following manner : What is first known by such cognition is an extra-mental thing which is not a sign ; but everything outside the mind is singular ; therefore, etc.

Furthermore, the object precedes the act which is proper to it and that comes first in order of origination ; but only a singular thing precedes such an act ; therefore, etc.

Secondly, I maintain that this cognition which is simple, proper to a singular thing, and the first to be acquired, is an intuitive cognition. That such a cognition is first, is clear ; for abstractive cognition of a singular thing presupposes an intuitive cognition of the same object, and not vice versa. The fact that it is proper to one singular thing is likewise clear ; for it is

singulari vel nata est causari, et non est nata causari ab alia re singulari, etiam eiusdem speciei ; ergo etc.

Tertio dico : Quod cognitio prima abstractiva primitate generationis et simplex non est cognitio propria singulari, sed est cognitio communis aliquando, immo semper. Primum patet : quia non habetur cognitio propria simplex de aliquo singulari pro tempore pro quo non potest haberi cognitio eius specifica ; sed quandoque ita est, sicut patet de veniente a remotis, quod causat talem sensationem, virtute cuius possum tantum iudicare, quod illud visum est ens. Manifestum est, quod in illo casu cognitio abstractiva, quam habeo primo primitate generationis, est cognitio entis et nullius inferioris, et per consequens non est conceptus specificus nec est conceptus proprius singularis. Secundum patet : quia nulla cognitio abstractiva simplex est plus similitudo unius rei singularis quam alterius respectu sibi simillimi nec causatur a re nec nata est causari ; ergo nulla talis est propria singulari, sed quaelibet est universalis.

Sed hic sunt aliqua dubia. Primum est, quia videtur quod cognitio intuitiva non sit propria, quia quaecumque intuitiva demonstratur, aequaliter assimilatur uni singulari sicut alteri simillimo, et aequaliter repraesentat unum sicut alterum ; ergo non plus videtur esse cognitio unius quam alterius.

Secundum dubium est, quia si cognitio prima abstractiva sit aliquando cognitio et conceptus entis, sicut dicis de veniente a remotis, ergo eodem modo prima intuitiva in eodem casu erit cognitio communis entis, quia impossibile est, quod eiusdem rei sint plures conceptus

immediately caused, or is of such a nature as to be so caused, by this singular thing ; it cannot naturally be caused by another singular thing, even of the same species.

Thirdly, I maintain that the abstractive cognition which is simple and comes first in order of origination is not proper to a singular thing, but is sometimes, indeed always, a cognition common to many. The first part of this thesis is shown thus : We have no proper and simple cognition of a singular thing, as long as we can get no specific knowledge of it. Now this is sometimes the case, for instance, when somebody, approaching from a distance, causes in me a sense-perception with the help of which I can judge only that what I see is an existent. In this case it is clear that my first abstractive cognition (first, that is, in order of origination) is the cognition of existence, and of nothing less general ; consequently it is not a specific concept nor a concept proper to a singular thing. The second part of the thesis is likewise clear. For no simple abstractive cognition is more a likeness of one singular thing than of another thing very similar to this thing, nor is such cognition caused by a thing or of such nature as to be caused by a thing ; therefore no such cognition is proper to a singular thing, but every such cognition is universal.

But here some doubts arise.

First : It seems that intuitive cognition is not proper knowledge. For any assigned intuitive cognition will have no more likeness to one singular thing than to another very similar one, and will represent the one as much as the other. Therefore it does not seem to be a cognition of one rather than the other.

Second doubt : If the first abstractive cognition is at times a cognition or concept of existence, as you hold in the instance of a man coming from afar, then the first intuitive cognition in such a case will also be cognition of existence in general, since it is impossible to have

simplices proprii ; sed de uno veniente a remotis possum habere unam visionem, per quam tantum iudico illud esse ens, aliam, per quam iudico illud esse animal, tertiam, per quam iudico illud esse hominem, quartam, per quam iudico illud esse Sortem ; sed illae visiones sunt alterius rationis ; ergo omnes illae non possunt esse cognitiones propriae illius singularis visi.

Tertium est, quia videtur quod prima abstractiva sit propria, maxime quando obiectum est debito modo approximatum : quia per primam abstractivam possum recordari de eadem re prius visa, quod non posset fieri nisi haberem abstractivam propriam.

Quartum dubium est, quia videtur secundum iam dicta, quod conceptus generis potest abstrahi ab uno individuo, puta conceptus 'animalis', sicut patet de veniente a remotis, quando habeo talem visionem, per quam iudico illud visum esse animal.

Ad primum istorum dico, quod intuitiva est propria cognitio singularis, non propter maiorem assimilationem uni quam alteri, sed quia naturaliter ab uno et non ab altero causatur nec potest ab altero causari.

Si dicis 'Potest causari a solo Deo', verum est. Sed semper nata est talis visio causari ab uno obiecto creato et non ab alio. Et si causatur naturaliter, causatur ab uno et non ab alio, nec potest causari. Unde propter similitudinem non plus dicitur intuitiva propria cognitio singularis quam abstractiva prima, sed solum propter causalitatem, nec alia causa potest assignari.

Ad secundum dubium dico, quod aliquando illae visiones sunt eiusdem speciei et solum differunt sicut

several simple concepts of the same thing. Nevertheless, in the case of one coming from afar, I can have one look from which I judge that this is an existent, another from which I judge that this is an animal, a third one from which I judge that this is a man, and a fourth one from which I judge that this is Socrates. Yet these various looks are different in kind ; therefore, it is not possible that all of them are proper to the singular thing seen.

Third doubt : It seems that the first abstractive cognition is a proper one, especially when the object is sufficiently close, because by the first abstractive cognition I can recall the same thing as I saw before. But this could not happen, unless my abstractive cognition were proper to the thing.

Fourth doubt : According to what has been said it seems possible that the concept of a genus could be abstracted from one individual, let us say, the concept 'animal' ; as is clear from the case of one coming from a distance, when I see enough to judge that what I am seeing is an animal.

To the first doubt, I say that we have a cognition proper to one singular thing, not on account of a greater likeness to one than to another, but because this intuitive cognition is naturally caused only by the one and not by the other, and cannot be caused by the other.

If you say that it may be caused by God alone, I admit that this is true. Nevertheless, where created things are concerned, it is always of the nature of such a look to be caused by one object and not by another ; and if it is naturally caused, it can be caused only by the one object and not by the other. Therefore the reason why intuitive cognition, rather than the first abstractive cognition, is said to be proper to the singular thing, is not similarity, but only causality ; no other reason can be assigned.

To the second doubt, I say that sometimes such looks are of the same species and differ only as the more or

magis perfectum et minus perfectum in eadem specie, puta si videatur aliquod ex partibus eiusdem rationis, in quo non essent plura accidentia sensibilia, a visu, tunc per approximationem illius visibilis, puta albi, intenditur visio et fit clarior; et secundum hoc potest causari diversum et diversum iudicium, quod tale visum est ens vel corpus vel color vel albedo etc.

Si dicis: 'Illa differunt specie quae non possunt causare effectum eiusdem speciei; sed visio clara et obscura sunt huiusmodi; igitur etc.': Respondeo et dico, quod quantumcumque causae auctae et intensae, si non possunt causare effectum eiusdem speciei, differunt specie, et aliter non. Nunc autem illa visio aucta et intensa potest in omnem effectum in quem potest visio clara, et per consequens sunt eiusdem speciei. Aliquando tamen visio clara et obscura sunt alterius speciei, puta quando diversa obiecta videntur, puta si videatur scutum diversis coloribus coloratum secundum minorem et maiorem approximationem; sed illae visiones non sunt eiusdem obiecti sed diversorum.

Ad tertium dico, quod videndo aliquid habeo aliquam cognitionem abstractivam propriam; sed illa non erit simplex, sed composita ex simplicibus. Et ista notitia composita est principium recordationis, quia per hoc recordor de Sorte, quia vidi eum sic figuratum, coloratum, talis longitudinis et talis latitudinis et in tali loco, et per illud compositum recordor me vidisse Sortem. Sed circumscribas omnes conceptus simplices praeter unum, non plus recordaris de Sorte per illum quam de alio homine sibi simillimo; bene possum recordari me vidisse, sed utrum sit Sortes vel Plato, nescio. Et ideo cognitio abstractiva simplex non est propria singulari: sed composita bene potest esse propria.

Ad quartum dico, quod conceptus generis numquam

less perfect differ within the same species. For instance, if we saw something composed only of homogeneous parts, where no more than one accident, let us say whiteness, is visible, then as this thing approaches, our vision becomes stronger and clearer, and accordingly different judgments are possible, viz. that what we see is an existent, or a body, or a colour, or whiteness, etc.

You object, perhaps: 'Things which cannot cause the same specific effect differ specifically. But clear and obscure vision cannot; therefore, etc.' I answer: 'If certain causes, no matter how much they are intensified and increased, cannot cause an effect specifically the same, then they are specifically different; otherwise not. But this vision, if increased and intensified, can produce every effect that clear vision can. Consequently obscure and clear vision are of the same kind'. Sometimes, however, clear and obscure vision are specifically different: for instance, if different objects are seen, as when something like a many-coloured shield is viewed from a greater or lesser distance. But these views are not of the same object but of different objects.

To the third doubt, I say that when I see something, I do have a proper abstractive cognition; only it will not be a simple cognition, but one composed of simple cognitions. This composite knowledge is the basis of recollection; for I recall Socrates because I have seen him with such a figure, colour, height and width, and in such a place, and by putting these together I recall having once seen Socrates. But if you leave out all simple concepts except one, you cannot by means of this have memory relating to Socrates rather than any other man who is very similar to him; I can well recall having seen someone, but whether it was Socrates or Plato, I do not know. Therefore a simple abstractive cognition is not proper to a singular thing; however, a composite cognition may well be proper to one.

To the fourth doubt I answer: 'The concept of a

abstrahitur ab uno individuo. Et ad illud de veniente a remotis dico, quod iudico illud esse animal, quia prius habeo conceptum animalis, qui conceptus est genus, et ideo per illum conceptum ducor in notitiam recordativam. Unde si prius non haberem conceptum generis animalis, nihil iudicarem nisi quod illud visum est aliquid.

Et si quaeras : Quae notitia abstractiva primo habetur mediante intuitiva ? Respondeo : 'Aliquando conceptus entis tantum, aliquando conceptus generis, aliquando conceptus speciei specialissimae, secundum quod obiectum est magis vel minus remotum'. Semper tamen imprimatur conceptus entis, quia quando obiectum est debito modo approximatum, simul causatur a re extra singulari conceptus specificus et conceptus entis.

Ad principale dico, quod universale est obiectum primum primitate adaequationis, non autem primitate generationis.

De universali

4. Cum non sufficiat logico tam generalis notitia terminorum, sed oportet cognoscere magis in speciali terminos, ideo postquam de divisionibus generalibus terminorum tractatum est, de quibusdam contentis sub aliquibus illarum divisionum prosequendum est.

Est autem primo tractandum de terminis secundae intentionis, secundo de terminis primae intentionis. Dictum est autem, quod termini secundae intentionis sunt tales 'universale', 'genus', 'species', etc. Ideo de illis, quae ponuntur quinque universalia, est modo dicendum. Primo tamen dicendum est de hoc communi

¹ See Introduction above, p. xxxiii

genus is never abstracted from only one individual'. Concerning the instance of a man coming from a distance, I say that I judge him to be an animal, since I am already in the possession of the concept 'animal', a concept that is a genus ; and therefore, by means of this concept I am led to recognition. Hence, if I did not already possess the concept of the genus 'animal', I would judge only that this which is seen is something.

If you ask, which abstractive cognition is first obtained by the help of intuitive cognition, I answer : 'Sometimes only the concept 'existent', sometimes the concept of a genus, sometimes the concept of the ultimate species ; but it all depends on whether the object is more or less remote'. However, we always get an impression of the concept 'existent', because if the object is sufficiently close, a concept of the species and the concept 'existent' are simultaneously caused by the extra-mental singular thing.

To the principal objection I answer : A universal is the first object in the order of adequacy [i.e. of adequacy as object of the intellect], but not in the order of origin of cognition.

The problem of universals

4. A general knowledge of terms is not sufficient for the logician ; he must also know terms more in detail. Therefore, having dealt with the general divisions of terms [in the previous chapters of the *Summa logicae*], we must turn to some of the things that come under members of this division.

First we have to treat terms of second intention¹ ; secondly, terms of first intention. It has been said that terms of second intention are those like 'universal', 'genus', 'species', etc. Hence we must say something about those which are set up as the five predicables. But first we must speak of the general term 'universal,'

'universale', quod praedicatur de omni universali, et de 'singulari' opposito sibi.

Est autem primo sciendum, quod 'singulare' dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo hoc nomen 'singulare' significat omne illud quod est unum et non plura. Et isto modo tenentes quod universale est quaedam qualitas mentis praedicabilis de pluribus, non tamen pro se sed pro illis pluribus, dicere habent, quod quodlibet universale est vere et realiter singulare: quia sicut quaelibet vox, quantumcumque communis per institutionem, est vere et realiter singularis et una numero, quia est una et non plures, ita intentio animae significans plures res extra est vere et realiter singularis et una numero, quia est una et non plures, quamvis significet plures res. Aliter accipitur hoc nomen 'singulare' pro illo, quod est unum et non plura nec est natum esse signum plurium. Et sic accipiendo 'singulare', nullum universale est singulare, quia quodlibet universale natum est esse signum plurium et natum est praedicari de pluribus. Unde vocando universale aliquid quod non est unum numero, quam acceptionem multi attribuunt universali, dico quod nihil est universale, nisi forte abuteris isto vocabulo dicendo populum esse unum universale, quia non est unum sed multa; sed illud puerile esset.

Dicendum est igitur, quod quodlibet universale est una res singularis, et ideo non est universale nisi per significationem, quia est signum plurium. Et hoc est quod dicit Avicenna v^o *Metaphysicae**: 'Una forma apud intellectum est relata ad multitudinem, et secundum hunc respectum est universale, quoniam ipsum est intentio in intellectu, cuius comparatio non variatur ad quodcumque acceperis'. Et sequitur: 'Haec forma, quamvis in comparatione individuorum sit universalis,

* v. i; ed. Venet. (1508), fol. 87r^b

which is predicated of every universal, and of the term 'singular', which is opposed to it.

First we must realise that 'singular' is taken in two senses. In one sense the name 'singular' signifies whatever is one thing and not several. If it is so understood, then those who hold that a universal is a certain quality of the mind predicable of many things (but standing for these many things, not for itself) have to say that every universal is truly and really a singular. For just as every word, no matter how common it may be by convention, is truly and really singular and numerically one, since it is one thing and not many, so likewise the mental content that signifies several things outside is truly and really singular and numerically one, since it is one thing and not many things, though it signifies several things.

In another sense the name 'singular' is taken for that which is one and not several things and is not of such a nature as to be the sign of several things. If 'singular' is understood in this sense, then no universal is singular, since every universal is of such a nature as to be a sign of, and to be predicated of, several things. Hence, if a universal is that which is not numerically one—a meaning attributed by many to 'universal'—then I say that nothing is a universal, unless perhaps you wish to abuse this word by saying that a population is a universal, since it is not one but many. But that would be childish.

Hence we have to say that every universal is one singular thing. Therefore nothing is universal except by signification, by being a sign of several things. This is what Avicenna says in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*: 'One form in the intellect has reference to a multitude, and in this sense it is a universal, since the universal is a content in the intellect which is equally related to anything you take'. And later on: 'This form, though universal in reference to individuals, is nevertheless individual in reference to the particular mind in which

tamen in comparatione animae singularis in qua imprimitur, est individua; ipsa enim est una ex formis quae sunt in intellectu'. Vult dicere, quod universale est una intentio singularis ipsius animae nata praedicari de pluribus, ita quod propter hoc quod est nata praedicari de pluribus, non pro se sed pro illis pluribus, ipsa dicitur universalis; propter hoc autem quod est una forma existens realiter in intellectu, dicitur singularis. Et ita singulare primo modo dictum praedicatur de universali, non tamen secundo modo dictum, ad modum quo dicimus quod sol est causa universalis, et tamen vere est res particularis et singularis, et per consequens vere est causa singularis et particularis. Dicitur enim sol causa universalis, quia est causa plurium, scilicet omnium istorum inferiorum generabilium et corruptibilium; dicitur autem causa particularis, quia est una causa et non plures causae. Sic intentio animae dicitur universalis, quia est signum praedicabile de pluribus; dicitur autem singularis, quia est una res et non plures res.

Verumtamen sciendum, quod universale duplex est: Quoddam est universale naturaliter, quod scilicet naturaliter est signum praedicabile de pluribus ad modum proportionaliter, quo fumus naturaliter significat ignem et gemitus infirmi dolorem et risus interiorem laetitiam: et tale universale non est nisi intentio animae, ita quod nulla substantia extra animam nec aliquod accidens extra animam est tale universale. Et de tali universali loquar in sequentibus capitulis. Aliud est universale per voluntariam institutionem. Et sic vox prolata, quae est vere una qualitas, est universalis, quia scilicet est signum voluntarie institutum ad significandum plura. Unde sicut vox dicitur communis, ita potest dici universalis; sed hoc non habet ex natura rei, sed ex placito instituentium tantum.

it is impressed, for it is one of the forms in the intellect'. He wishes to say here that the universal is one particular content of the mind itself, of such a nature as to be predicated of several things; therefore, it is by the very fact that it is of such a nature as to be predicated of several things (standing not for itself, but for those many things), that it is called a 'universal'. By the fact, however, that it is one form really existing in the intellect, it is called a 'singular'. Hence 'singular' in the first sense is predicated of the universal, but not 'singular' in the second sense. In like manner, we say that the sun is a universal cause, and nevertheless it is in truth a particular and singular thing, and consequently a singular and particular cause. For the sun is called 'universal cause', because it is the cause of many things, namely of all that can be generated and corrupted here below. It is, on the other hand, called 'particular cause', because it is one cause and not several causes. Likewise the content of the soul is called 'universal', because it is a sign predicable of many; on the other hand, it is called 'singular', because it is one thing and not many things.

It must, however, be understood that there are two sorts of universal. There is one sort which is naturally universal; in other words, is a sign naturally predicable of many things, in much the same way as smoke naturally signifies fire, or a groan the pain of a sick man, or laughter an inner joy. Such a universal is nothing other than a content of the mind; and therefore no substance outside the mind and no accident outside the mind is such a universal. It is only of such a universal that I shall speak in the chapters that follow.

The other sort of universal is so by convention. In this way, an uttered word, which is really a single quality, is universal; for it is a conventional sign meant to signify many things. Therefore, just as the word is said to be common, so it can be said to be universal. But it is not so by nature, only by convention.

Quod universale non est res extra

5. Et quia non sufficit ista narrare, nisi manifesta ratione probentur, ideo pro praedictis aliquas rationes adducam necnon et auctoritatibus confirmabo.

Quod enim nullum universale sit aliqua substantia extra animam existens, evidenter probari potest.

Primo quidem sic : Nullum universale est substantia singularis et una numero. Si enim diceretur quod sic, sequeretur quod Sortes esset aliquod universale, quia non maior ratio, quod unum universale sit substantia singularis quam alia ; nulla igitur substantia singularis est aliquod universale, sed omnis substantia est una numero et singularis ; quia omnis res vel est una res et non plures, vel est plures res. Si est una et non plures, est una numero ; hoc enim ab omnibus vocatur unum numero. Si autem aliqua substantia est plures res, vel est plures res singulares vel plures res universales. Si primum detur, sequitur, quod aliqua substantia esset plures substantiae singulares, et per consequens eadem ratione aliqua substantia esset plures homines ; et tunc, quamvis universale distingueretur a particulari uno, non tamen distingueretur a particularibus. Si autem aliqua substantia esset plures res universales, accipio unam istarum rerum universalium et quaero : aut est una res et non plures, aut est plures res. Si primum detur, sequitur quod est singularis ; si secundum detur, quaero : aut est plures res singulares, aut plures res universales, et ita vel erit processus in infinitum, vel stabitur quod nulla substantia est universalis ita quod non singularis. Ex quo relinquitur, quod nulla substantia est universalis.

Item, si aliquod universale esset substantia una existens

A universal is not a thing outside the mind

5. Since it is not sufficient merely to assert this without proving it by manifest reasoning, I shall advance a few reasons for what has been said above and I shall confirm by arguments from authority.

That a universal is not a substance existing outside the mind can in the first place be evidently proved as follows : No universal is a substance that is single and numerically one. For if that were supposed, it would follow that Socrates is a universal, since there is no stronger reason for one singular substance to be a universal than for another ; therefore no singular substance is a universal, but every substance is numerically one and singular. For everything is either one thing and not many, or it is many things. If it is one and not many, it is numerically one. If, however, a substance is many things, it is either many singular things or many universal things. On the first supposition it follows that a substance would be several singular substances ; for the same reason, then, some substance would be several men ; and thus, although a universal would be distinguished from one particular thing, it would yet not be distinguished from particular things. If, however, a substance were several universal things, let us take one of these universal things and ask 'Is this one thing and not many, or is it many things?' If the first alternative is granted, then it follows that it is singular ; if the second is granted, we have to ask again 'Is it many singular or many universal things?' And thus either this will go on *in infinitum*, or we must take the stand that no substance is universal in such a way that it is not singular. Hence, the only remaining alternative is that no substance is universal.

Furthermore, if a universal were one substance exist-

in substantiis singularibus ab eis distincta, sequeretur quod posset esse sine eis, quia omnis res prior naturaliter alia potest esse sine ea per divinam potentiam; sed consequens est absurdum.

Item, si illa opinio esset vera, nullum individuum posset creari; sed aliquid individui praeexisteret, quia non totum caperet esse de nihilo, si universale quod est in eo prius fuit in alio. Propter idem etiam sequitur, quod Deus non posset unum individuum substantiae annihilare, nisi cetera individua destrueret: Quia si annihilaret aliquod individuum, destrueret totum quod est de essentia individui, et per consequens destrueret illud universale quod est in eo et in aliis, et per consequens alia non manent, cum non possint manere sine parte sua, quale ponitur illud universale.

Item, tale universale non posset poni aliquid totaliter extra essentiam individui, igitur esset de essentia individui, et per consequens individuum componeretur ex universalibus, et ita individuum non esset magis singulare quam universale.

Item, sequitur quod aliquid de essentia Christi esset miserum et damnatum: Quia illa natura communis existens realiter in Christo realiter existit in Iuda et est damnata; igitur in Christo et in damnato, quia in Iuda. Hoc autem absurdum est.

Aliae autem rationes multae possent adduci, quas causa brevitatis pertranseo.

Et eandem conclusionem confirmo per auctoritates. . . .

Ex quibus aliisque multis patet, quod universale est intentio animae nata praedicari de multis. Quod ratione

ing in singular things and distinct from them, it would follow that it could exist apart from them; for every thing naturally prior to another thing can exist apart from it by the power of God. But this consequence is absurd.

Furthermore, if that opinion were true, no individual could be created, but something of the individual would pre-exist; for it would not get its entire being from nothing, if the universal in it has existed before in another individual. For the same reason it would follow that God could not annihilate one individual of a substance, if He did not destroy the other individuals. For if He annihilated one individual, He would destroy the whole of the essence of the individual, and consequently he would destroy that universal which is in it and in others; consequently, the other individuals do not remain, since they cannot remain without a part of themselves, such as the universal is held to be.

Furthermore, we could not assume such a universal to be something entirely extrinsic to the essence of an individual; therefore, it would be of the essence of the individual, and consequently the individual would be composed of universals; and thus the individual would not be more singular than universal.

Furthermore, it follows that something of the essence of Christ would be miserable and damned; since that common nature which really exists in Christ, really exists in Judas also and is damned. Therefore, something is both in Christ and in one who is damned, namely in Judas. That, however, is absurd.

Still other reasons could be advanced which I pass over for the sake of brevity.

The same conclusion I will now confirm by authorities. . . .

From these and many other texts it is clear that a universal is a mental content of such nature as to be predicated of many things. This can also be confirmed

etiam confirmari potest. Nam omne universale secundum omnes est de multis praedicabile; sed sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum natum est praedicari et non substantia aliqua; ergo sola intentio animae vel signum voluntarie institutum est universale. Sed nunc non utor 'universali' pro signo voluntarie instituto, sed pro illo quod naturaliter est universale. Quod autem substantia non sit nata praedicari patet: Quia si sic, sequitur, quod propositio componeretur ex substantiis particularibus, et per consequens subiectum esset Romae et praedicatum in Anglia, quod absurdum est.

Item, propositio non est nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; ergo partes eius non sunt nisi in mente vel in voce vel in scripto; huiusmodi autem non sunt substantiae particulares. Constat igitur, quod nulla propositio ex substantiis componi potest; componitur autem propositio ex universalibus; universalia igitur non sunt substantiae ullo modo.

Opinio Scoti de universalibus et reprobatio eius

6. Quamvis multis sit perspicuum, quod universale non sit aliqua substantia extra animam existens in individuis distincta realiter ab eis, videtur tamen aliquibus quod universale est aliquo modo extra animam in individuis, non quidem distinctum realiter ab eis, sed tantum distinctum formaliter ab eisdem. Unde dicunt, quod in Sorte est natura humana, quae contrahitur ad Sortem per unam differentiam individualem, quae ab illa natura non distinguitur realiter sed formaliter. Unde non sunt duae res, una tamen non est formaliter alia.

Sed ista opinio omnino improbabilis mihi videtur. Probo: Quia in creaturis numquam potest esse aliqua distinctio qualiscumque extra animam, nisi ubi res

by reason. All agree that every universal is predicable of things. But only a mental content or conventional sign, not a substance, is of such nature as to be predicated. Consequently, only a mental content or a conventional sign is a universal. However, at present I am not using 'universal' for a conventional sign, but for that which is naturally a universal. Moreover, it is clear that no substance is of such nature as to be predicated; for if that were true, it would follow that a proposition would be composed of particular substances, and consequently that the subject could be in Rome and the predicate in England. That is absurd.

Furthermore, a proposition is either in the mind or in spoken or written words. Consequently, its parts are either in the mind or in speech or in writing. Such things, however, are not particular substances. Therefore, it is established that no proposition can be composed of substances; but a proposition is composed of universals; hence universals are in no way substances.

Scotus's opinion on universals and its refutation

6. Although it is clear to many that a universal is not a substance existing outside the mind in individuals and really distinct from them, still some are of the opinion that a universal does in some manner exist outside the mind in individuals, although not really but only formally distinct from them. Hence they say that in Socrates there is human nature, which is 'contracted to' Socrates by an individual difference which is not really but only formally distinct from this nature. Hence the nature and the individual difference are not two things, although the one is not formally the other.

However, this opinion appears to me wholly untenable. Proof: In creatures no extra-mental distinction of any kind is possible except where distinct things

distinctae sunt. Si ergo inter istam naturam et istam differentiam sit qualiscumque distinctio, oportet quod sint res realiter distinctae. Assumptum probo per formam syllogisticam sic: Ista natura est distincta formaliter ab ista natura; haec differentia individualis est distincta formaliter ab hac natura; ergo haec differentia individualis non est haec natura.

Item, eadem res non est communis et propria; sed secundum eos differentia individualis est propria, universale autem est commune; ergo differentia individualis non est communis; ergo nullum universale et differentia individualis sunt eadem res.

Item, eidem rei creatae non possunt convenire opposita; commune autem et proprium sunt opposita; ergo eadem res non est communis et propria; quod tamen sequitur, si differentia individualis et natura communis essent eadem res.

Item, si natura communis esset eadem realiter cum differentia individuali, ergo tot essent realiter naturae communes, quot sunt differentiae individuales, et per consequens nullum eorum esset commune, sed quodlibet esset proprium differentiae, cui est eadem realiter.

Item, quaelibet res seipsa vel per aliquid sibi intrinsicum distinguitur a quocumque distinguitur; sed alia est humanitas Sortis et alia Platonis; ergo seipsis distinguuntur, non ergo per differentias additas.

Item, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, quaecumque differunt specie, differunt numero; sed natura hominis et asini specie distinguuntur seipsis; ergo seipsis distinguuntur numero; ergo seipsa quaelibet illarum est una numero.

Item, illud quod per nullam potentiam potest competere pluribus, per nullam potentiam est praedicabile de

exist. If, therefore, some kind of distinction exists between this nature and this difference, it is necessary that they be really distinct things. I prove the minor premise in syllogistic form as follows: This nature is not formally distinct from itself; this individual difference is formally distinct from this nature; therefore this individual difference is not this nature.

Furthermore, the same thing is not common and proper; however, according to them, the individual is proper, but the universal is common; therefore the individual difference is not common; consequently no universal is the same thing as the individual difference.

Furthermore, opposites cannot belong to the same created thing; 'common' and 'proper' are opposites; therefore the same thing is not common and proper, as would follow if individual difference and common nature were the same thing.

Furthermore, if common nature were really the same as the individual difference, then there would be in reality as many common natures as there are individual differences, and hence none of them would be common, but each one would be proper to the difference with which it is really identical.

Furthermore, everything which is distinguished from something else is distinguished either of itself or by some thing intrinsic to itself; but the humanity of Plato is one thing and the humanity of Socrates another; therefore they are distinguished of themselves; therefore *not* by having differences added to them.

Furthermore, according to Aristotle, things specifically different are also numerically different; but the nature of a man and the nature of a donkey are of themselves specifically different; therefore, of themselves, they are numerically different; consequently, each of these natures is on its own account numerically one.

Furthermore, what no power can cause to belong to several things no power can make predicable of several

pluribus ; sed talis natura, si sit eadem realiter cum differentia individuali, per nullam potentiam potest convenire pluribus, quia nullo modo potest competere alteri individuo ; ergo per nullam potentiam potest esse praedicabile de pluribus, et per consequens per nullam potentiam potest esse universale.

Item, accipio illam differentiam individualem et naturam quam contrahit, et quaero : aut inter ea est maior distinctio quam inter duo individua, aut minor ? Non maior, quia non differunt realiter ; individua autem differunt realiter. Nec minor, quia tunc essent eiusdem rationis, sicut duo individua sunt eiusdem rationis ; et per consequens, si unum est de se unum numero, et reliquum erit de se unum numero.

Item, quaero : aut natura est differentia individualis, aut non ? Si sic, arguo syllogistice sic : Haec differentia individualis est propria et non communis ; haec differentia individualis est natura ; ergo natura est propria et non communis, quod est intentum. Similiter arguo syllogistice sic : Haec differentia individualis non est distincta formaliter a differentia individuali ; haec differentia individualis est natura ; ergo natura non est distincta formaliter a differentia individuali. Si autem detur, quod haec differentia individualis non est natura, habetur propositum ; nam sequitur : Differentia individualis non est natura, ergo differentia individualis non est realiter natura, quia ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis, sic arguendo : Differentia individualis est realiter natura, ergo differentia individualis est natura. Consequentia patet : quia a determinabili sumpto cum determinatione non distrahente nec mi-

things ; now no power can make such a nature, if it is really the same as the individual difference, belong to several things, because in no manner can [something really identified with one individual] belong to another individual ; therefore, no power can make it predicabile of several things, and consequently no power can make it universal.

Furthermore, I take this individual difference and the nature that it 'contracts' and ask 'Is the distinction greater or less than between two individuals ?' It is not greater, since they do not differ really ; whereas individuals do differ really. Nor is it less, for then the two things said to be distinct would fall under the same concept, just as two individuals fall under the same concept. Consequently, if the one is numerically one on its own account, the other will also be so on its own account.

Furthermore, I ask 'Is the nature the individual difference, or is it not ?' If it is, then I shall argue in syllogistic form as follows : This individual difference is proper and not common, this individual difference is the nature ; consequently the nature is proper and not common, which is what we intended to prove. Likewise I argue in syllogistic form as follows : This individual difference is not formally distinct from this individual difference ; this individual difference is the nature ; therefore, this nature is not formally distinct from the individual difference. If, however, the other alternative is granted, namely 'This individual difference is not the nature', our thesis is admitted, since this therefore follows : The individual difference is not the nature, therefore the individual difference is not really the nature. For from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent follows, by this argument : The individual difference is really the nature, therefore the individual difference is the nature. The inference is clear, since it is a valid inference to argue from a determinable as qualified by a determination which does not

nuate ad determinabile per se sumptum est consequentia bona. 'Realiter' autem non est determinatio distrahens nec diminuens. Ergo sequitur : Differentia individualis est realiter natura, ergo differentia individualis est natura.

Dicendum est ergo, quod in creaturis nulla est talis distinctio formalis ; sed quaecumque in creaturis sunt distincta, realiter sunt distincta et sunt res distinctae, si utrumque illorum sit vera res. Unde sicut in creaturis tales modi arguendi numquam negari debent : Hoc est A, hoc est B, ergo B est A, nec tales : Hoc non est A, hoc est B, ergo B non est A, ita numquam debent negari in creaturis, quin, quandocumque contradictoria verificantur de aliquibus, illa sunt distincta, nisi aliqua determinatio vel aliquod syncategorema sit causa talis verificationis, quod in propositio poni non debet.

Et ideo debemus dicere cum Philosopho, quod in substantia particulari nihil est substantiale penitus, nisi forma particularis et materia particularis vel aliquod compositum ex talibus. Et ideo non est imaginandum, quod in Sorte sit humanitas vel natura humana distincta a Sorte quocumque modo, cui addatur una differentia individualis contrahens illam naturam. Sed quidquid imaginabile substantiale existens in Sorte, vel est materia particularis vel forma particularis vel aliquod compositum ex his. Et ideo omnis essentia et quidditas et quidquid est substantiae, si sit realiter extra animam, vel est simpliciter absolute materia vel forma vel compositum ex his vel substantia immaterialis abstracta secundum doctrinam Peripateticorum.

¹ [This saving clause means that e.g., we cannot infer validly : A dead man is in animate, ergo some man is inanimate.—Tr.]

cancel or diminish it,¹ to the determinable without the qualification. 'Really', however, is not a cancelling or diminishing determination, hence this follows : The individual difference is really the nature, therefore the individual difference is the nature.

Therefore it must be said that in creatures there is no such formal distinction ; but whatever in creatures is distinct, is really distinct, and constitutes a distinct thing, if each of the two things distinguished is truly a thing. Just as in creatures we must never deny the validity of such modes of arguing as 'This is A, this is B, consequently a B is A', or 'This is not A, this is B, consequently a B is not A', so also as regards creatures whenever contradictory predicates are true of certain things, we must not deny that the things are distinct ; unless of course some determination or some syncategorematic term should be what causes this to be true, as should not be assumed in our present case.

Therefore we must say with the Philosopher that in a particular substance nothing whatsoever is substantial except the particular form and the particular matter or a compound of matter and form. Hence we must not imagine that in Socrates we have human nature or humanity distinct in any way from Socrates, to which is added an individual difference that 'contracts' this nature. But any imaginable substantial reality that exists in Socrates is either the particular matter or the particular form or a compound of the two. Therefore every essence and quiddity and everything substantial, if it really exists outside the mind, is either simply and absolutely matter or form, or a compound of them, or it is a separate immaterial substance, according to the teachings of the Peripatetics.

7. * Ideo potest aliter dici. Et dico, † quod universale non est aliquid reale habens esse subiectivum, nec in anima nec extra animam, sed tantum habet esse obiectivum in anima, et est quoddam fictum habens esse tale in esse obiectivo, quale habet res extra in esse subiectivo. Et dico ‡ per istum modum: Quod intellectus videns aliquam rem extra animam fingit consimilem rem in mente, ita quod si haberet virtutem productivam, sicut habet virtutem fictivam, talem rem in esse subiectivo numero distinctam a priori produceret extra; et esset consimiliter proportionaliter, sicut est de artifice. Sicut enim artifex videns domum vel aedificium aliquod extra fingit in anima sua consimilem domum et postea consimilem producit extra et est solo numero distincta a priori, ita in proposito illud fictum in mente ex visione alicuius rei extra esset unum exemplar; ita enim, sicut domus ficta, si fingens haberet virtutem productivam realem, est exemplar ipsi artifice, ita illud fictum esset exemplar respectu sic fingentis. Et illud potest vocari universale, quia est exemplar et indifferenter respiciens omnia singularia extra; et propter istam similitudinem in esse obiectivo potest supponere pro rebus quae habent consimile esse extra intellectum. Et ita isto modo universale non est per generationem sed per abstractionem, quae non est nisi fictio quaedam.

* *Prima redactio: mutationes secundae redactionis inventiuntur in notis.*

† Et dico probabiliter *Sec. red.*

‡ Et dico hoc *Sec. red.*

¹ Ockham's first opinion, later abandoned

[*A universal is a thought-object*¹]

7. Another theory [different from those opinions concerning the nature of universals previously criticised by Ockham] could be advanced. I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject [of inherence], either inside or outside the mind, but that it has being only as a thought-object in the mind. It is a kind of mental picture which as a thought-object has a being similar to that which the thing outside the mind has in its real existence. What I mean is this: The intellect, seeing a thing outside the mind, forms in the mind a picture resembling it, in such a way that if the mind had the power to produce as it has the power to picture, it would produce by this act a real outside thing which would be only numerically distinct from the former real thing. The case would be similar, analogously speaking, to the activity of an artist. For just as the artist who sees a house or building outside the mind first pictures in the mind a similar house and later produces a similar house in reality which is only numerically distinct from the first, so in our case the picture in the mind that we get from seeing something outside would act as a pattern. For just as the imagined house would be a pattern for the architect, if he who imagines it had the power to produce it in reality, so likewise the other picture would be a pattern for him who forms it. And this can be called a universal, because it is a pattern and relates indifferently to all the singular things outside the mind. Because of the similarity between its being as a thought-object and the being of like things outside the mind, it can stand for such things. And in this way a universal is not the result of generation, but of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing.

Primo ostendam,* quod est aliquid in anima habens tantum esse obiectivum sine esse subiectivo.

Hoc primo patet : Quia secundum philosophos ens primaria divisione dividitur in ens in anima et extra animam ; et ens extra animam dividitur in decem praedicamenta. Tunc quaero : Quomodo hic accipitur 'ens in anima' ? Aut pro illo quod tantum habet esse obiectivum, et habetur propositum. Aut pro illo quod habet esse subiectivum, et hoc non est possibile : quia illud quod habet verum esse subiectivum in anima continetur sub ente, quod praecise dividitur in decem praedicamenta, quia sub qualitate ; intellectio enim et universaliter omne accidens informans animam est vera qualitas sicut calor vel albedo, et ita non continetur sub illo membro, quod dividitur contra ens quod dividitur in decem praedicamenta.

Praeterea : Figmenta habent esse in anima, et non subiectivum, quia tunc essent verae res, et ita chimaera et hircocervus et huiusmodi essent verae res ; ergo sunt aliqua quae tantum habent esse obiectivum.

Similiter : Propositiones, syllogismi et huiusmodi, de quibus est Logica, non habent esse subiectivum, ergo tantum habent esse obiectivum, ita quod eorum esse est eorum cognosci ; ergo sunt talia entia habentia tantum esse obiectivum.

Similiter : Artificialia in mente artificis non videntur habere esse subiectivum, sicut nec creaturae in mente divina ante creationem.

Similiter : Respectus rationis communiter ponuntur a doctoribus. Tunc quaero : Aut tantum habent esse subiectivum, et tunc erunt verae res et reales ; aut tantum esse obiectivum, et habetur propositum.

* Igitur faciam aliqua argumenta ad probandum *Sec. red.*

I shall first show that something exists in the mind whose being is that of an object of thought only, without inhering in the mind as an independent subject.

This is clear from the following : According to the philosophers, existence is primarily divided into existence in the mind and existence outside the mind, the latter being subdivided into the ten categories. If this is admitted, then I ask 'What is understood here by "existence in the mind"?' It means either existence as a thought-object, and then we have our intended thesis, or it means existence as in a subject. The latter, however, is not possible ; for, whatever exists truly in the mind as a subject, is contained under existence that is divided into the ten categories, since it falls under quality. For an act of intellect, and indeed in general every accident or form of the mind, is a true quality, like heat or whiteness, and hence does not fall under the division of existence that is set over against existence in the ten categories. [Consequently the main distinction of the philosophers would be futile.]

Furthermore, fictions have being in the mind, but they do not exist independently, because in that case they would be real things and so a chimera and a goat-stag and so on would be real things. So some things exist only as thought-objects.

Likewise, propositions, syllogisms, and other similar objects of logic do not exist independently ; therefore they exist only as thought-objects, so that their being consists in being known. Consequently, there are beings which exist only as thought-objects.

Again, works of art do not seem to inhere in the mind of the craftsman as independent subjects any more than the creatures did in the divine mind before creation.

Likewise, conceptual relations are commonly admitted by the [scholastic] doctors. If this is conceded, then I ask 'Do they exist only in a subject?' In that case they will be genuine things and real relations. Or do they

Similiter : Secundum istos aliter opinantes 'ens' dicitur conceptum univocum et tamen nullam aliam rem.

Similiter : Omnes quasi distinguunt intentiones secundas ab intentionibus primis, non vocando intentiones secundas aliquales reales qualitates in anima ; ergo cum non sint realiter extra, non possunt esse nisi obiective in anima.*

Secundo dico, † quod illud fictum est illud, quod primo et immediate denominatur ab intentione universalitatis et habet rationem obiecti, et est illud quod immediate terminat actum intelligendi, quando nullum singulare intelligitur, quod quidem, quoniam est tale in esse obiectivo quale est singulare in esse subiectivo, ideo ex natura sua potest supponere pro ipsis singularibus, quorum est aliquo modo similitudo. . . .

Dico ergo, ‡ quod sicut vox est universalis et genus et species, sed tantum per institutionem, ita conceptus sic fictus et abstractus a rebus singularibus praecognitis est universalis ex natura sua. . . .

8. Alia posset esse opinio, quod passio animae est ipse actus intelligendi. Et quia ista opinio videtur mihi probabilior de omnibus opinionibus, quae ponunt istas passiones animae esse subiective et realiter in anima tamquam verae qualitates ipsius, ideo circa istam opinionem primo ponam modum ponendi probabiliorum. . . .

Dico ergo, quod qui vult tenere praedictam opinionem,

* probabiliter *add. Sec. red.* † Diceret ista opinio *Sec. red.*

‡ Posset ergo dici *Sec. red.*

¹ Second opinion, finally held by Ockham

exist only as thought-objects? In that case we have our intended thesis.

Again, according to those who think differently, the term 'being' means a univocal concept, and nevertheless does not mean a distinct reality.

Likewise, practically all men distinguish second intentions from first intentions, and they do not call the second intentions real qualities of the mind. Since they are not in reality outside the mind, they can only exist as thought-objects in the mind.

Secondly, I maintain that this mental picture is what is primarily and immediately meant by the concept 'universal', and has the nature of a thought-object, and is that which is the immediate term of an act of intellection having no singular object. This mental picture, in the manner of being that a thought-object has, is just whatever the corresponding singular is, in the manner of being proper to a subject ; and so by its very nature it can stand for the singulars of which it is in a way a likeness. . . .

I maintain, therefore, that just as a spoken word is universal and is a genus or a species, but only by convention, in the same way the concept thus mentally fashioned and abstracted from singular things previously known is universal by its nature. . . .

[*A universal is an act of the intellect*¹]

8. There could be another opinion, according to which a concept is the same as the act of knowing. This opinion appears to me to be the more probable one among all the opinions which assume that these concepts really exist in the soul as a subject, like true qualities of the soul ; so I shall first explain this opinion in its more probable form.

I maintain, then, that somebody wishing to hold this

potest supponere quod intellectus apprehendens rem singularem elicit unam cognitionem in se, quae est tantum illius singularis, quae vocatur passio animae, potens ex natura sua supponere pro illa re singulari, ita quod sicut ex institutione haec vox 'Sortes' supponit pro illa re quam significat, ita quod audiens istam vocem 'Sortes currit' non concipit ex ea, quod haec vox 'Sortes', quam audit, currit, sed quod res significata per illam vocem currit, ita qui videret vel intelligeret aliquid affirmari de illa intellectione singularis rei, non conciperet illam intellectionem esse talem vel talem, sed conciperet ipsam rem, cuius est, esse talem vel talem, ita quod, sicut vox ex institutione supponit pro illa re, ita ipsa intellectio ex natura sua sine omni institutione supponit pro re, cuius est.

Sed praeter istam intellectionem illius rei singularis format sibi intellectus alias intellectiones, quae non magis sunt istius rei quam alterius. Sicut haec vox 'homo' non magis significat Sortem quam Platonem, ideo non magis supponit pro Sorte quam Platone, ita esset de tali intellectione, quod non magis intelligitur per eam Sortes quam Plato et sic de omnibus aliis hominibus. Et ita etiam esset aliqua intellectio, per quam non magis intelligeretur hoc animal quam illud animal, et sic de aliis.

Breviter igitur, ipsae intellectiones animae vocantur passiones animae, et supponunt ex natura sua pro ipsis rebus extra vel pro aliis rebus in anima, sicut voces supponunt pro rebus ex institutione. . . .

. . . Tali intellectione confusa intelliguntur res singulares extra. Sicut habere intellectionem hominis confusam non est aliud quam habere unam cognitionem, qua non magis intelligitur unus homo quam alius, et tamen quod tali cognitione magis cognoscitur sive intelligitur homo

opinion may assume that the intellect apprehending a singular thing performs within itself a cognition of this singular only. This cognition is called a state of mind, and it is capable of standing for this singular thing by its very nature. Hence, just as the spoken word 'Socrates' stands by convention for the thing it signifies, so that one who hears this utterance, 'Socrates is running', does not conceive that this word, 'Socrates', which he hears, is running, but rather that the thing signified by this word is running; so likewise one who knew or understood that something was affirmatively predicated of this cognition of a singular thing would not think that the cognition was such and such, but would conceive that the thing to which the cognition refers is such and such. Hence, just as the spoken word stands by convention for a thing, so the act of intellect, by its very nature, and without any convention, stands for the thing to which it refers.

Beside this intellectual grasp of a singular thing the intellect also forms other acts which do not refer more to one thing than to another. For instance, just as the spoken word 'man' does not signify Socrates more than Plato, and hence does not stand more for Socrates than Plato, so it would be with an act of intellect which does not relate to Socrates any more than to Plato or any other man. And in like manner there would be also a knowledge whereby this animal is not more known than that animal; and so with other notions.

To sum up: The mind's own intellectual acts are called states of mind. By their nature they stand for the actual things outside the mind or for other things in the mind, just as the spoken words stand for them by convention. . . .

. . . By such a common or confused intellection, singular things outside the mind are known. For instance, to say that we have a confused intellection of man, means that we have a cognition by which we do not understand one man rather than another, but that by such a cognition we have cognition of a man

quam asinus. Et hoc non est aliud quam quod talis cognitio aliquo modo assimilationis magis assimilatur homini quam asino, et non magis isti homini quam illi. Et secundum istud videtur consequenter dicendum, quod tali cognitione confusa possunt infinita cognosci. Nec magis videtur hoc esse inopinabile quam quod eadem dilectione vel desiderio possunt infinita diligere vel desiderari. Sed hoc secundum non videtur inopinabile; nam potest aliquis diligere omnes partes alicuius continui, quae sunt infinitae, vel potest appetere quod omnes partes continui durent in esse; et cum non appeteretur esse tali appetitu nisi aliqua pars continui, et non magis una quam alia, oportet quod omnes appetantur, quae tamen sunt infinitae. Similiter potest aliquis appetere esse omnibus hominibus, qui possunt esse, qui tamen sunt infiniti, quia infiniti possunt generari. Sic igitur posset dici, quod eadem cognitio potest esse infinitorum, non tamen erit cognitio propria alicui illorum; nec illa cognitione potest unum discerni ab alio, et hoc propter aliquam similitudinem specialem istius cognitionis ad individua illa et non ad alia.

rather than a donkey. And this amounts to saying that such a cognition, by some kind of assimilation, bears a greater resemblance to a man than to a donkey, but does not resemble one man rather than another. In consequence of the aforesaid, it seems necessary to say that an infinity of objects can be known by such a confused cognition. Still this seems no more untenable than that an infinity of objects can be liked or desired by the same act of liking or desiring. Yet the latter does not seem to be untenable. For a man may like all the parts of a continuous thing, which are infinite in number, or he may desire that all these parts remain in existence. Now in such a case, what was desired would simply be a part of the continuous thing, but not one part rather than another; therefore all parts must be desired; these parts, however, are infinite in number. Likewise, somebody can desire the existence of all men who can exist. Now these are infinite in number, since an infinity of men can be generated.

And so it could be said that one and the same cognition refers to an infinite number of singulars without being a cognition proper to any one of them, and this is so because of some specific likeness between these individuals that does not exist between others. However, no singular thing can be distinguished from another by such a cognition.