

APPENDIX D - WILLIAM OCKHAM

Questions on the Second Book of Sentences (Reportatio) q.12:
Does an angel intellectually cognize things other than itself through its essence or through species?

1. - [251] That it is through its essence: This is proven, because if not, this could be for only four reasons: either because one thing cannot be the basis [ratio] of cognizing another, or because the basis of cognizing ought to be more perfect than the thing cognized, or because one basis can be of one thing only, or because one basis cannot be of an infinite number of things. Not because of the first, both because the subject is the basis of cognizing a passion, and also because the species of a thing is the basis of cognizing an absent thing. Nor because of the second, because in the absence of a more perfect object, the intellect can cognize the thing through something more imperfect, for example through species. Not because of the third, because just as it is not repugnant to one effective cause to produce many things, so (as it seems) it is not repugnant to one basis to represent many things and to be the basis of cognizing many things. Nor because of the fourth, because an infinity in the basis of cognizing can no more be inferred from its being the basis of cognizing an infinite number of things than infinity can be inferred in a cause [252] from the infinity of effects able to be produced by it. For a basis of cognizing is not a greater perfection than a basis of producing. But infinitity

in the cause cannot be inferred from an infinity of effects, because intellect can cause an infinite number of intellections and the will an infinite number of volitions. For according to Augustine (XV De trinitate ch.12 [n.21]) there is in the case of reflexive acts a progression to infinity; therefore etc.

2. - If you were to say that intellect is the partial cause with respect to its act, and likewise for will, and so an infinity doesn't follow, on the contrary I say in the same way that the basis of cognizing is the cause and partial basis of representing an infinite number of things; therefore etc.

3. - This is confirmed: For it is not more repugnant to God to concur with that basis so as to represent an infinite number of things than to concur with a second cause so as to produce an infinite number of things. But God can do the second, therefore also the first.

4. - For the opposite: Given a sufficient power and a basis of representing, [that power] can proceed to an act, unless the will impedes it. Therefore given an angelic intellect with its essence alone, without anything else, if a command of will does not impede then it it can intellectually cognize everything. But this is false; therefore etc. [253]

Question Thirteen: Does a higher angel intellectually cognize through fewer species than does a lower angel?

5. - That it does: This is proven, since according to the Philosopher (De caelo et mundo [II.12]) inasmuch as nature is

more perfect, to that extend it needs fewer things in order to operate; therefore etc.

6. - For the opposite: In every single thing, distinct cognized things require distinct bases of cognizing. Therefore a higher angel needs as many bases as does a lower angel.

7. - Here first I suppose that a species is that which precedes an act of intellectual cognition and can remain before intellections and after, even when the external thing is absent. And consequently it is distinguished from a habit, since a habit of intellect follows an act of intellectual cognition but a species precedes both act and habit.

[The Opinion of Thomas Aquinas]

8. - This being supposed, and extending the first question to both the angelic and our intellect, there is here one opinion which [254] asserts that it is necessary to posit species impressed on the intellect for it to cognize intellectually.

9. - This is proven in a number of ways. First, intellect must, in order to cognize intellectually, be brought to actuality. But this is brought about through a species that is its form. Therefore etc.

10. - Also, the power of an angel is limited, therefore for it to be able to cognize intellectually all things it must be extended and made unlimited. But this happens through a species of all things. Therefore etc.

11. - Also, every cognition is brought about through

assimilation. But intellect is not assimilated to a thing by itself, but only through a species. Therefore etc.

12. - Also, according to the Commentator, things that are caused by the same thing are assimilated. But an angel and an object are assimilated only through a species. Therefore etc.

13. - Also, it is proven that a lower angel does not intellectually cognize a higher through its own essence because that by which an intellect intellectually cognizes is more perfect than the thing intellected. Therefore if a lower were to cognize intellectually a higher through the lower's essence, then the lower's essence would be more noble than the higher's essence. This is false, therefore etc.

14. - Also, if this were so, then an intellected angel would be within the intellect of the angel seeing and intellectually cognizing. But this cannot happen through contact, as is clear of itself, nor through penetration, since in this way God alone is in everything.

15. - Also, the Commentator (XII Metaphysics t.44) [255] says that what one mover intellectually cognizes of the first mover is different from what another mover intellectually cognizes.

16. - Also, the author of the De causis says that a lower intelligence intellectually cognizes in the manner of its substance, not in the manner of a higher substance.

17. - Also, one angel is not assimilated to another through essence but through species. Therefore etc.

18. - As far as the second question [q.13], he proves that a higher angel intellectually cognizes through fewer species than a lower angel, and ones more universal. For God, who is at the limit of intelligibility, intellectually cognizes all things through one thing, namely through his essence. And every intellectual nature beyond God intellectually cognizes diverse things through diverse things. But insofar as a nature is closer to God in perfection, to that extent it intellectually cognizes through fewer things. A higher angel's nature, however, more approaches God than does a lower's; therefore etc. And he gives as an example those listening, some of whom can understand only through a complete explanation, and some through a lesser one, in proportion to as their natural capacities are more or less vigorous.

19. - This is confirmed, because architecture, on account of its perfection, requires fewer things for its practice than does a lower art. Therefore so it is in the present case.

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[The Opinion of Scotus]

20. - The Subtle Doctor holds this opinion as far as the first conclusion, and he proves it through other arguments. Look for them in John's work.¹ But he does not hold the second conclusion.

21. - This opinion, as far as the first part, cannot be

¹ Cf. Ordinatio I.3.3.1.

evidently disproven through natural reasons. Nevertheless it seems to me that the opposite side is more plausible, and this because one should not posit a plurality without necessity. But everything can be preserved without species that can be preserved with them. Therefore there is no necessity for positing them.

[On Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition]

22. - So concerning this question I first set forth several distinctions. One is that some cognitions are intuitive, and some abstractive. Intuitive is that by means of which a thing is cognized to exist when it exists, and not to exist when it does not. For when I perfectly apprehend any extremes intuitively, I can at once form the complex that the extremes are united or are not united, and [257] I can assent or dissent. For example, if I were to see intuitively a body and whiteness, the intellect can at once form the complex 'a body exists,' 'something white exists,' or 'a body is white,' and when these complexes are formed the intellect assents at once. And this is in virtue of the intuitive cognition that it has of the extremes. It is just like how, when the terms of some principle are apprehended (e.g., of this one: 'every whole,' etc.) and a complex is formed by the apprehending intellect, intellect at once assents in virtue of an apprehension of the terms.

23. - It must be known nevertheless that although intellect, while an intuitive cognition of both sense and

intellect remains with respect to some incomplexes, can form in the aforesaid way a complex from those intuitively cognized incomplexes and can assent to such a complex, nevertheless neither the formation of the complex nor an act of assenting to the complex is an intuitive cognition. For each of these cognitions is a complex cognition, and an intuitive cognition is an incomplex cognition. So if all cognitions, both complex and incomplex, were to be divided into abstractive and intuitive, then these [two] cognitions would be called abstractive cognitions, and every complex cognition would be called abstractive, whether it exists in the presence of the thing, while the intuitive cognition of the extremes remains, or in the absence of the thing, without the intuitive cognition remaining.

24. - And so according to this way it can be granted that intuitive cognition, of both intellect and sense, is a partial cause of an abstractive cognition that is possessed in the aforesaid way. And this is the case because every effect sufficiently depends on its essential causes and nothing else, and when these are posited the effect can be posited, and when they are not the effect cannot be naturally posited, as has often [258] been said.² But that cognition by which I evidently assent to the complex 'this body is white,' whose extremes I cognize intuitively, cannot exist naturally unless each cognition remains. For when the thing is absent and the

² See, e.g., Ockham Ord. prol., q.1 (OTh I,36).

intuitive cognition is corrupted, intellect does not evidently assent that the body that had earlier been seen is white, since it doesn't know whether it exists or not. But with respect to an apprehensive cognition, through which I form the complex, an intuitive cognition, whether sensory or intellective, is not a partial cause. For every complex that can be formed with those intuitive cognitions can be formed without them, since it is formed in their absence just as it is in their presence.

25. - In this way therefore it is clear that through an intuitive cognition we judge that a thing exists when it exists, and this generally whether the intuitive cognition is caused naturally or supernaturally by God alone. For if it be naturally caused, then it cannot exist unless the objects exists, present with the right proximity. For there can be such a distance between object and power that the power cannot naturally intuit such an object. And when an object is thus present, proximate in such a way, the intellect can through an act of assenting judge in the aforesaid way that a thing exists. If however it is supernatural, if for example God were to cause in me an intuitive cognition of some object existing in Rome, I could upon having an intuitive cognition of it judge at once that the thing that I intuit and see exists, just as well as if that cognition were had naturally.

26. - [259] If you were to say that the object is not present here, nor proximate in the right way, I reply that

although an intuitive cognition can be caused naturally only when an object is present at a determinate distant, nevertheless it can supernaturally be caused. And so the differentiae that John gives between intuitive and abstractive cognition, that 'intuitive cognition is of something present and existent as it is present and existent'³ is understood of an intuitive cognition naturally caused, but not when supernaturally caused. Hence, speaking absolutely, the only presence necessarily required for an intuitive cognition is that it could terminate an intuitive act. And it is compatible with this that the object be nothing, or that it be distant by the greatest distance. And howevermuch the object intuitively cognized should be distant, I could at once in virtue of it judge that it exists if it does, in the aforesaid way. But nevertheless because an intuitive cognition is not naturally caused or conserved unless the object is proximate in the proper way, existing at a certain distance, so I cannot judge that which is naturally cognized intuitively unless the object is present.

27. - In the same way I can judge through an intuitive cognition that a thing does not exist when it does not. But that cognition cannot be natural, since such a cognition exists and is naturally conserved only when the object is present and existing. And so that natural intuitive cognition

³ Cf. Scotus Quodlibet q.13, n.8; Ordinatio I.2.2, qq.1-4.

is corrupted by the absence of the object. And if we hold that it remains after the corruption of the object, then it is supernatural [260] as far as conservation although not as far as causation. So an intuitive cognition by which I cognize that a thing does not exist when it does not must be supernatural as far as causation or conservation or as far as both. For example, if God were to cause in me an intuitive cognition of some non-existent object and were to conserve that cognition in me, I can by means of that cognition judge that the thing does not exist, since by seeing that thing intuitively, when the complex 'this object does not exist' is formed, intellect at once assents to this complex in virtue of an intuitive cognition and dissents from its opposite, so that that intuitive cognition is a partial cause of that assent, as has already been said of natural intuitive cognition. And so consequently intellect assents that what it intuits is pure nothing. As far as a supernatural conservation but not causation, an example of this would be if first an intuitive cognition of some object were caused naturally and later, when that object is destroyed, God were to conserve the intuitive cognition caused before. Then the cognition is natural as far as causation and supernatural as far as conservation. Then the same has to be said here throughout just as if that cognition were caused supernaturally. For by this cognition I can judge that a thing exists when it exists, howevermuch the object cognized is at a distance, and that it does not exist when it

does not, assuming that the object is corrupted. And thus it can be granted in a way that through a natural intuitive cognition I judge that a thing does not exist when it does not, since this can happen through a cognition naturally caused although supernaturally conserved.

28. - [261] In this way therefore it is clear that an intuitive cognition is that through which I cognize that a thing exists when it exists, and that it does not exist when it does not. But an abstractive cognition is that through which I do not judge that a thing exists when it exists and that it does not exist when it does not - and this is so whether it is natural or supernatural.

[Of Perfect and Imperfect Intuitive Cognition]

29. - But intuitive cognitions are subdivided, since some are perfect, some imperfect. A perfect intuitive cognition is that of which it has been said that it is an experiential cognition by which I cognize that a thing exists, etc. And that cognition is the cause of universal propositions, which are the principles of art and science (I Met. and II PostAn.) - i.e., it is the cause of assent to a universal proposition formed while a perfect intuitive cognition remains. An imperfect intuitive cognition, however, is that through which we judge that a thing at some time existed or did not. And this is called a recollective cognition - as, when I see some thing intuitively, a habit is generated inclining [me] to an abstractive cognition, by means of which I judge and assent

that such a thing at some time existed since I at some time saw it.

30. - And it should here be noted that while an intuitive cognition of some thing remains, I have at one and the same time an abstractive cognition of the same thing. And that abstractive cognition is a partial cause concurring with intellect so as to generate a habit inclining [me] to [262] an imperfect intuitive cognition through which I judge that the thing existed at some time. The reason for this is that a habit is always generated by acts inclining [one] to similar acts of the same species. But an intuitive cognition is not of this sort, because perfect and imperfect intuitive cognitions are of different kinds, since an intuitive imperfect cognition is unconditionally an abstractive cognition. But a perfect intuitive and an abstractive cognition are of different kinds; therefore etc. If therefore some habit is generated from a perfect intuitive cognition, that alone will incline [one] to a perfect intuitive cognition and not to an imperfect one, since they are of different kinds. Therefore if a habit inclining [one] to an imperfect intuitive cognition is generated from some cognitive act, that cognition will be abstractive and will exist at the same time as a perfect intuitive cognition. For after a perfect intuitive cognition, whether the object is destroyed or is made absent, intellect can at once consider the same thing that it had earlier seen intuitively and form the complex 'this thing at one time'

existed,' and can evidently assent - as everyone experiences in themselves.

31. - Therefore one must postulate some habit inclining [one] to this act, since because intellect can now promptly elicit that act after an intuitive cognition, while before it could not, there therefore is now something inclining intellect to this act that earlier did not exist. I call that a habit. But that habit inclining intellect in this way cannot be caused by a perfect intuitive cognition, as has been shown, nor by some abstractive cognition [263] following an intuitive cognition and that is had after the intuitive cognition - for that, ex hypothesi, is the first abstractive cognition. Therefore one must necessarily suppose that there is some abstractive cognition at the same time as the existing perfect intuitive cognition, an abstractive cognition that is along with intellect a partial cause generating that habit inclining intellect in this way.

32. - If we suppose that an intuitive cognition always and necessarily has along with itself an incomplex abstractive cognition, then an intuitive cognition will be the partial cause of that abstractive cognition, and that abstractive cognition will be a partial cause with respect to the habit inclining [intellect] to another incomplex abstractive cognition similar to that cognition from which the habit thus inclining is generated. And then, when the complex 'this thing (that this incomplex abstractive cognition is of) existed' is

formed, the intellect can in virtue of that incomplex cognition evidently assent that this thing existed. And so it ought to be understood.

33. - You might say that when the terms of the first principle are apprehended and a complex formed, intellect immediately assents to it; nor is intellect more inclined to assent after many assents than before every assent, although still from those acts of assenting [264] a habit is generated in the intellect; therefore it can happen in the same way for intuitive cognition.

34. - I reply that although that habit is not postulated on account of inclination nor on account of experience, nevertheless it is postulated on account of an argument evidently leading to it. But in the case of an intuitive cognition neither experience nor an evident arguments leads to postulating a habit there; therefore etc. Or it can be said that one must postulate a habit generated by those acts on account of experience - that is, because everyone experiences that they are more and more firmly inclined to assent after a habit than before.

35. - You might also say that from a frequently elicited perfect intuitive cognition a habit can be generated as from an abstractive cognition frequently elicited; therefore one need not postulate an abstractive cognition along with an intuitive one.

36. - I reply that a habit can be generated from no

sensory or intellective intuitive cognition. For if so, that habit inclines to either an abstractive or an intuitive cognition. Not an abstractive one, for the reason already said [¶30], that they belong to different species. Nor an intuitive one, since no one experiences that he is more inclined to an intuitive cognition after such a frequently had cognition than before every intuitive cognition. For just as the first intuitive cognition cannot naturally be caused without the existence and presence of the object, so nor can any other, nor is one more inclined as a result of such a frequent cognition than in the beginning.

37. - But concerning abstractive cognition it is otherwise, since after the first intuitive cognition one has, one experiences being more [265] inclined to cognize intellectually the thing that he had seen before than he was before every intuitive cognition. But this cannot be through a habit generated from an intuitive cognition, as has been proven [¶30]; therefore it is generated from an abstractive cognition existing at the same time as the intuitive cognition. And with respect to that cognition the intuitive cognition is a partial cause, although not with respect to the habit generated by such an abstractive cognition.

38. - Alternatively it can be said that a habit is generated from an intuitive cognition as from a partial cause, and the abstractive cognition that is postulated at the same time as the intuitive can be denied. For one, because no one

experiences that at one and the same time he cognizes the same thing intuitively and abstractively, and this in speaking of an abstractive cognition of the thing in itself. Indeed one rather experiences the opposite, especially when those cognitions have some opposite characteristics. Also, because every abstractive cognition can remain after the intuitive is destroyed; but the cognition that is posited cannot remain, since then through the same cognition intellect would judge that the thing that this is a cognition of existed at some time. And so that would be an imperfect intuitive cognition, and inclining toward it a habit is postulated, generated by an abstractive cognition remaining with a perfect intuitive cognition. Therefore, as it seems, an abstractive cognition does not remain with a perfect intuitive cognition of the same thing, but from a repeated intuitive cognition a habit is generated inclining to an abstractive or imperfect intuitive cognition.

39. - If you were to say that a habit, according to the Philosopher (II Ethics [ch.1]), inclines [intellect] to acts similar to those from which it is generated, [266] and not to acts of a different character, as is so in the present case of intuitive and abstractive cognition, I reply that this is true generally when a habit is not generated from an intuitive cognition as from a partial cause. But when an intuitive cognition is a partial cause, as in the present case, then this is not true. For it appears less implausible that a habit

formed, the intellect can in virtue of that incomplex cognition evidently assent that this thing existed. And so it ought to be understood.

33. - You might say that when the terms of the first principle are apprehended and a complex formed, intellect immediately assents to it; nor is intellect more inclined to assent after many assents than before every assent, although still from those acts of assenting [264] a habit is generated in the intellect; therefore it can happen in the same way for intuitive cognition.

34. - I reply that although that habit is not postulated on account of inclination nor on account of experience, nevertheless it is postulated on account of an argument evidently leading to it. But in the case of an intuitive cognition neither experience nor an evident arguments leads to postulating a habit there; therefore etc. Or it can be said that one must postulate a habit generated by those acts on account of experience - that is, because everyone experiences that they are more and more firmly inclined to assent after a habit than before.

35. - You might also say that from a frequently elicited perfect intuitive cognition a habit can be generated as from an abstractive cognition frequently elicited; therefore one need not postulate an abstractive cognition along with an intuitive one.

36. - I reply that a habit can be generated from no

inclining [intellect] to an abstractive cognition should be generated from an intuitive cognition as from a partial cause than that an abstractive cognition generative of a habit should always remain with an intuitive cognition, since our experience shows not this, but rather the opposite.

40. - From this discussion the difference appears between perfect and imperfect intuitive cognition: for the first neither does nor can exist naturally unless the object exists, while the second can exist even if the object is destroyed.

41. - If you were to say that an imperfect intuitive cognition is unconditionally abstractive since it abstracts from the existence of the thing and therefore is not intuitive, I would reply that [such a cognition] is called intuitive inasmuch as by its means intellect can assent to some complex that concerns a difference of time - for instance that 'this existed' - just as through a perfect intuitive cognition it can judge that 'this exists.' But one has to allow some cognition in intellect through which or by means of which intellect assents neither that the object exists nor that it existed, but rather is ignorant of both. For instance, if God were to cause in me an abstractive cognition of some singular thing that I have never seen, by that means I would judge neither that that thing exists nor that it existed. Likewise, when I intellectually cognize some singular I have never seen in a concept common to it and to others, then I have of that singular an abstractive cognition, [267] although

not in it itself but in some common concept. Nevertheless through that cognition I judge neither that the aforesaid singular exists nor that it existed nor the opposite of these.

42. - Likewise perhaps that abstractive cognition postulated at the same time as the intuitive cognition is such that by its means I judge neither that the thing exists or existed, nor the opposite of these. So although that cognition through which I judge that a thing existed at some time is unconditionally abstractive, nevertheless because I assent and judge that a thing existed at some time by its means and not by means of the other two cognitions, so with respect to them it can be called an intuitive cognition, although imperfect.

[On the Basis of Intellective Cognition]

43. - The other distinction concerns the basis [ratio] of intellective cognition. For in one way it is taken for everything that precedes the act of intellective cognition, and thus every partial cause of intellection - intellect, object, even God - is called the basis of intellective cognition. In another way it is taken as distinct from the possible intellect, in such a way however that it is the efficient cause of intellection. And in this way the apprehension of a principle is the basis for cognizing the conclusion. In a third way it is taken as distinct from the possible and agent intellect, but as something that is necessarily required for intellection as prior.

[Conclusions]

44. - [268] Having seen these things, I prove some conclusions. The first conclusion is that in order to have an intuitive cognition one need not postulate anything beyond intellect and the thing cognized, and no species at all. This is proven, [i] because what is done through many is done in vain if it can be done through fewer. But through intellect and the thing seen, without any species, an intuitive cognition can be brought about; therefore etc. The assumption is proven, because when a sufficient active and passive cause are posited as proximate to each other, the effect can be posited without anything else. But an agent intellect with an object are sufficient agents with respect to that cognition, and a possible intellect is a sufficient patient; therefore etc.

45. - Also, [ii] we shouldn't claim that anything is necessarily required for some effect unless we are led to it by [a] a conclusive argument proceeding from things apprehended per se or by [b] conclusive experience. But neither of these leads to positing species; therefore etc. The assumption is proven: for [b] experience does not lead to this, since that involves an intuitive apprehension. For instance, if someone experiences that something is white he sees that whiteness exists in that thing. But no one sees a species intuitively. Therefore experience does not lead to positing species.

46. - If you were to say that in sensory powers other than sight, both interior and exterior, there is experiential cognition that is not intuitive, I reply that in every sense that has some cognition in virtue of which it can cognize that a thing exists when it exists and that it does not exist when it does not, there is intuitive and experiential cognition. For that is an intuitive cognition through which I [269] cognize in this way that a thing exists or does not exist. And thus I grant that in every sense, both interior and exterior, there is intuitive cognition - that is, such cognition in virtue of which one can in the aforesaid way cognize that a thing exists or does not - even if it is not an ocular intuitive cognition. And in this many are deceived, for they believe that the only intuitive cognition is ocular, which is false.

47. - Nor also is there [a] an argument proceeding from things apprehended per se that leads to this. For no argument can prove that [a thing] is required unless [it proves] that it has efficacy. For every effect, according to John, sufficiently depends on its essential causes.⁴ But it cannot be demonstratively proven that something created is an efficient cause; this can be [apprehended] only through experience - through this, that is, that upon its presence the effect follows and upon its absence it does not. But now upon

⁴ See, for instance, Scotus Ordinatio I, d.3, p.3, q.2, n.414; Quodlibet q.7 nn.19-20.

the presence of an object with intellect an act of intellectual cognition follows without any species just as well as with that species; therefore etc.

48. - Also, [iii] if a species is postulated as necessarily required for an intuitive cognition as its efficient cause, then because that species could be conserved in the absence of the object, it could naturally cause an intuitive cognition in the absence of the thing, which is false and contrary to experience.

49. - The second conclusion is that to have an abstractive conclusion one must necessarily postulate some prior thing beyond object and intellect. This is proven, because every power that is now capable of some act that before it was not capable of, while the object and power remain the same now as before, has [270] something now that before it did not have. But an intellect having an intuitive apprehension is capable of an abstractive cognition, and one not having such an apprehension is not, while the object remains the same in itself after the intuitive apprehension and before. Therefore when one has an intuitive cognition something is left in intellect by reason of which it is capable of an abstractive cognition and before it was not. Therefore beyond the object and power it is necessary to postulate some other thing in order to have an abstractive cognition.

50. - Also, according to the Philosopher (II De anima

[ch.5]), when something is in essential and accidental potentiality, it has something when it is in accidental potentiality that it did not have when it was in essential potentiality. This is true in the case of a sensory power too. For after the intuitive cognition of a particular sense the imagination [phantasia] is capable, in the absence of the sensible thing, of [imagining] the thing sensed, which it was not capable of before the intuitive cognition of the particular sense. And consequently by means of an intuitive cognition of a particular sense something is left in the imaginative power that before was not there. For otherwise in the absence of the sensible thing the imagination could not have an act regarding it. Therefore it is the same way for intellect: for before an intuitive cognition it is in essential potentiality for an abstractive cognition; but when that cognition happens it is in accidental potentiality, so that it is capable of an abstractive cognition and before it was not; therefore etc. This is also clear for the separate soul, since after an intuitive cognition it is capable of some abstractive cognition [271] that before it was not. And this is on account of something left behind. Therefore it is the same way for our intellect.

51. - The third conclusion is that what is left behind is not a species but a habit. This is proven, because what is left behind from acts follows acts; a species however doesn't follow but precedes acts; therefore etc.

52. - Also, when something is in accidental potentiality with respect to cognition, one needn't posit anything other than that through which it is in accidental potentiality for eliciting an act. But if a habit is posited in intellect inclining it to some cognition, intellect is in accidental potentiality. Therefore beyond the habit one needn't posit anything else in intellect. The assumption is clear according to the Philosopher in III De anima [ch.4], where he says that intellect is in potentiality differently before learning or discovering than after. For before it is in essential potentiality and after, when through some act some habit is left behind, it is in accidental potentiality to a similar act. Therefore intellect is in accidental potentiality through a habit generated from an act. Hence one never experiences himself to be in accidental potentiality with respect to a cognition except after an intellection. For if a thousand species prior to an act of intellect were postulated, if the intellect were to have no act, one would no more be nor experience himself to be in accidental potentiality than if there were no species there. And if no species are postulated in intellect, and nevertheless if an act of intellectual cognition is postulated, at once the intellect experiences itself to be in [272] accidental potentiality with respect to another cognition. And this can be only through a habit left behind in intellect from the first act.

53. - Also, all the things that can be preserved through

a species can be preserved through a habit; therefore a habit is required and a species is superfluous. But that a habit is necessarily required in order to cognize intellectually some object is clear: For if not, and a species alone sufficed, then if the species were corrupted after many intellections I could not cognize intellectually that object the species is of any differently than I could before all these intellections - since a habit is not postulated and the species is corrupted. This conclusion seems absurd.

54. - If you were to say that through many cognitions the species is augmented, on the contrary: through such an augmentation of species intellect is always more inclined to cognize intellectually, and consequently the habit - which is postulated by everyone - would be totally superfluous. And thus either the species or the habit is postulated superfluously. Therefore since the habit is postulated by everyone and the species is not, it seems that the species is superfluous.

55. - Also, species are not posited unless on account of [i] assimilation or [ii] causation of intellection, or [iii] representation of the object, or [iv] determination of the power, or [v] union of mover and moved. On account of these especially species are postulated. But on account of none of these do species have to be postulated; therefore they should not be postulated.

56. - Not on account of [i] assimilation, since that

assimilation is either [a] in the essence and intellectual nature through which intellect is assimilated to the cognized object, or [b] an assimilation of effect to cause. Not in the first way [a], since if intellect were to cognize intellectually a substance then it would be assimilated to the object that is a substance more in its own nature than through a species that is an accident. For an accident is less assimilated [273] to a substance than is a substance to a substance. Not in the second way [b], since the assimilation of thing affected to agent happens in such a way that it receives some effect caused by the agent. But in this way intellect is sufficiently assimilated through an intellection caused by the object and received in intellect; therefore a species is not required.

57. - If you were to say that a prior species is required in order to assimilate the object affecting [agens] the intellection to the thing being affected so that it receives the intellection, on the contrary: in the same way I would say that that species received requires another prior species in order to assimilate intellect to the agent so that it receives that species that you postulate, and that species requires yet another, and so on to infinity.

58. - Also, assimilation is as much required for an intuitive apprehension as for an abstractive one; but nothing assimilating beyond the cognition is required for an intuitive apprehension; therefore nor for an abstractive one.

59. - Also, in the case of the sense of touch one needn't on account of assimilation postulate some species prior to the sensation itself of heat, therefore nor in the case of intellect. The inference is clear from a passage in III De anima [ch.8]: Just as the soul through the senses is all sensible things, so through intellect it is all intelligible things.

60. - If you were to say that in sight species are postulated, I deny this, as will be clear later.⁵

61. - Nor [iii] ought species to be postulated on account of representation, since [a] in the case of [274] an intuitive apprehension nothing representing other than the object and the act is required (as is clear above [1144-48]). Therefore nor in the case of an abstractive cognition that immediately follows an intuitive one is anything else required beyond object and act. The inference is clear, since just as an object sufficiently represents itself in one cognition, so too in another that immediately follows the intuitive one.

62. - Also, [b] the thing represented needs to be cognized in advance. Otherwise the representative would never lead to a cognition of the thing represented as to something similar. For example: a statue of Hercules would never lead me to a cognition of Hercules unless I had seen Hercules in advance. Nor can I know otherwise whether the statue is similar to him or not. But according to those positing

⁵ In Rep. III, q.3.

species, the species is something prior to every act of intellectually cognizing the object. Therefore it cannot be posited on account of the representation of the object.

63. - Also, if it were posited for the sake of representation, this is only because a distant object cannot act at a distance. But this is false, as will be clear later.⁶ For if a distant object could not act on intellect by causing an intellection unless it were to cause a species beforehand - since the object must be present either in itself or in another to the thing affected - therefore in the same way the distant object cannot cause [275] a species in intellect unless something prior to the species is postulated through which the object is present to intellect so as to cause that species. And likewise before that one would have to postulate another, and so on to infinity. Therefore if a distant object can cause a species in intellect without something prior through which it is present, then in the same way it can immediately cause an intellection without any prior representing species.⁷

64. - Nor [ii] ought species to be postulated on account of the causation of intellection. According to them, something corporeal and material cannot act on something spiritual, and so such a species has to be postulated in intellect. But, on

⁶ See Rep. III, q.2.

⁷ One manuscript has written in the margin here: "This is the strongest reason for denying species."

the contrary, just as something corporeal and material cannot be a partial immediate cause with respect to an intellection that is received in something spiritual - since [it is received] in the possible intellect, and that is a spiritual quality - so nor can something material be the partial cause concurring with agent intellect to produce a species, which is spiritual, in the possible intellect, which is also spiritual. Or, just as you postulate that something corporeal can be a partial cause of causing a species in something spiritual, so I postulate that something corporeal is a partial cause of causing an intellection in something spiritual.

65. - If you were to say that an intellectual nature requires something material in order to produce a species, so I would say with respect to intellection.

66. - Nor [iv] ought species to be postulated on account of the determination of the power, since every passive power is sufficiently determined [276] by a sufficient agent, especially when the very power itself is active. But object and intellect are a sufficient agent, as was proven [1144-47]. Therefore etc.

67. - Nor [v] ought species to be postulated on account of the union of object with power as mover and moved. For then in the same way I would argue that before that species one has to postulate another, since for an object to be able to cause a first species in intellect it is required that it be united to it, just as a union is required for it to cause an

intellection. But this will be through another species, and so on to infinity.

68. - So therefore it is clear that habits should be postulated on account of experience, and not species.

[Reply to the First Question]

69. - Now that we have seen these things, I say to the first question, speaking of a natural intuitive cognition, that an angel (and our intellect) intellectually cognizes things other than itself not through species of those things nor through its own essence, but through the essences of the things intellectually cognized. And this holds inasmuch as 'per' means the condition of an efficient cause, so that the basis of intellectually cognizing, as it is distinguished from the power, is the very essence of the cognized thing. This is proven, because that is the cause of another which [i] when it is postulated then the other can be postulated while every other thing is excluded, and [ii] when it is not postulated then the other cannot naturally be postulated. But when the presence of the thing itself along with an angelic (or our) intellect is postulated, without any other prior thing (habit or species), then intellect can intuitively cognize that thing. Therefore such a thing is the cause of that cognition. But it cannot be unless it is the efficient cause; therefore etc.

70. - [277] But in speaking of an abstractive apprehension, we speak either of that which always follows the

intuitive, or of that which one has after the corruption of the intuitive. If we speak in the first way, then an object and an intellect and an intuitive cognition are required for that apprehension as partial causes. This is proven as before [¶69], since 'that which, when it is postulated,' etc. If we speak in the second way, then intellect is required for the apprehension along with a habit generated from an abstractive cognition elicited at the same time as the intuitive one. And an object is not required for that second [kind of] abstractive cognition as a partial cause, since the cognition can be had even if the object is annihilated. Each of these abstractive apprehensions are incomplex. And the second [kind] is the partial cause of a complex apprehension by which I judge that a thing existed at some time.

71. - That such a habit exists in an angel, however, cannot be proven by natural reason, but through the fact that we experience such a habit in ourselves. And an angel can by natural means can have two kinds of cognition - intuitive and abstractive - and so it is likely that a similar habit ought to be postulated in angels - whether it is postulated as infused or acquired. And it is likely that it is an acquired habit.

[Reply to the Second Question]

72. - To the second question, if it is understood of species speaking strictly, then in this way a higher angel does not intellectually cognize through more or fewer, since

it cognizes through none. Nevertheless if by species one means bases of cognizing, then a higher angel does not in this way intellectually cognize through universal species (that is, through concepts of things), but it intellectually cognizes through diverse bases - [278] i.e., diverse cognized thing. And this in speaking of an intuitive cognition had naturally, since in this way the basis of cognizing, as distinguished from the power, is the object.

73. - This is proven, because when any two things are so related that one can be intuitively cognized when the other is not, they are cognized by distinct bases. But an angel can cognize one thing intuitively and not another, because God can destroy one and conserve the other. And consequently an angel can see one intuitively and not the other. Therefore since in the case of an intuitive cognition the basis of cognizing is the thing cognized, speaking naturally, it follows that there is as much distinction among the bases of cognizing as there is among the things cognized.

74. - If however we speak of the basis of cognizing in an incomplex abstractive cognition, taking the basis of cognizing as distinct from the power, then in this way there can be many bases of cognizing with respect to many things, and one basis with respect to many. The first is clear, since the basis of cognizing so taken, both in us and in an angel, is a habit, not the object nor a species. Then [one argues] thus: When two things are so related that one can frequently be cognized

while the other is not cognized, a habit can be had inclining [intellect] to the cognition of one and not the other, since a habit is generated from acts. And if the other later were frequently cognized, another habit can then be generated with respect to it. And as many as can separately be cognized frequently in this way, that many cognitive habits can be generated with respect to them. Therefore etc.

75. - The second is proven, because of the things with respect to which there is or can be the same act, there is or can be with respect to them the same habit. This is clear, since a habit is generated from acts so that [279] there is as much a distinction in habits as there is in acts. But there can be the same act with respect to many things. For example, when I intellectually cognize a proposition having distinct extremes, I intellectually cognize the subject and predicate at the same time, and this by one act, and consequently [I cognize] many things. Therefore etc. And likewise by one act I intellectually cognize an entire discussion and all the propositions of it. Therefore etc.

76. - If you were to say that I intellectually cognize many and one because [I cognize] many terms insofar as they are combined in one proposition, on the contrary: When I intellectually cognize the proposition 'Socrates is not Plato,' I intellectually cognize the terms. What, I ask, is that which terminates the act of intellectual cognition? It is something either [i] absolute or [ii] relational. If [i]

absolute then since there are two here and there is no greater reason why one should be intellectually cognized than the other - Socrates, for instance, rather than Plato - either each is intellectually cognized as it is distinct from the other or neither. If [ii] something relational terminates the act then, since a relation is not intellectually cognized without the extremes, therefore by intellectually cognizing that relation I intellectually cognize the distinct extremes. And thus the conclusion is reached.

77. - So I say that just as in the first grasp [apprehensione] or formation of a complex I have one act with respect to the subject and another with respect to the predicate and a third with respect to the copula, so too after the first formation - by means of an inclining habit - I can through numerically one act intellectually cognize those three, so that those three - or three absolute concepts - are the termini of that intellection, instead of some real relation or a relation of reason. And as a result of that act's being frequently elicited, numerically one habit can be generated.

78. - You might say that in the first apprehension, according to you, there are three acts with respect to the complex, and from them are generated three habits inclining [intellect] [280] to three acts of a formally different character. For with respect to subject and predicate acts can be of a different character. Therefore by means of those

habits a numerically singular act cannot be elicited with respect to the complex. Instead there will necessarily be three acts.

79. - My reply is that, assuming that there are three acts in the aforesaid manner, nevertheless the act terminated at the copula or at the concept of the copula is not terminated there absolutely, but is terminated at the same time at the subject and predicate. So acts terminated only at the subject and predicate are incomplex. But an act terminated at the copula is complex inasmuch as it is terminated immediately at the whole complex. And this is called composition or division, and that one act generates a habit inclining [intellect] to similar acts with respect to the whole complex. Hence if that third act were terminated only at the concept of the copula, then the argument made above would have plausibility.

80. - If you ask whether in the first formation of a complex there are necessarily three acts, I say no. Since regardless of whether a complex is formed by means of an intuitive cognition or an abstractive incomplex cognition (and this regardless of whether the extremes of the complex are distinct or not), only two things are required: one by which I intellectually cognize the extremes alone, and another by which I intellectually cognize the copula with the extremes. For if by one act I were intellectually to cognize intuitively several extremes distinct in species - for instance, if at the

same time I were to see whiteness and blackness by a single act of intellective cognition^a - and then I were to form the complex 'white is not black' by means of that [281] intuitive cognition, then in this case I have only two kinds of acts: an intuitive one terminated at whiteness and blackness and another complex one, by which whiteness is denied of blackness, which is terminated negatively at the copula and the extremes. And I have only those two.

81. - Likewise, if while that intuitive cognition remains I intellectually cognize abstractively the same extremes with an incomplex cognition, then I have one incomplex act terminated at those extremes that I intuitively cognize. And if then by means of that act I were to form in the aforesaid way the complex 'white is not black,' then I have another act terminated negatively at the concept of the copula, and along with this at the extremes. And if these two acts suffice when the extremes of the complex are really distinct, much more will those two acts suffice when they are really the same.

[Doubts about the Reply]

82. - Against this there are many doubts. First, it seems that intellect cannot have an intuitive apprehension with respect to singulars, since intellect abstracts from material

^a "videam albedinem et nigredinem unico actu intelligendi..." It would be understandable for Ockham to speak of intellectually cognizing colors, as he (unlike Aquinas) holds that intellect can apprehend particulars (see ¶182,91-95 below). But it's odd that he speaks of seeing colors through a single act of intellective cognition.

conditions - for instance, from existence here and now. But neither a singular nor an intuitive cognition abstracts from the aforesaid conditions. Therefore etc.

83. - Also, that which puts intellect in error ought not to be postulated of intellect. But intuitive apprehension is of this sort. This is clear, because if a thing is destroyed and an intuitive cognition remains, then through that I judge that the thing exists when it does not. Therefore etc.

84. - Also, that a singular is not intellectually cognized intuitively or abstractively is proven, because when several things are totally alike, whatever is a likeness [282] of one is a likeness of the other. For example, if one takes many whitenesses of the same degree, whatever is similar to one is similar to another. But an intellection is a likeness of the object, and intellect intellectually cognizes through that through which it is assimilated to the object. But this is through intellection, not through species (according to the things said above). Therefore if one takes many totally alike individuals (e.g., many angels of the same species or intellectual souls), then for the reason that the intellection through which I intellectually cognize one is the likeness of one, it is also a likeness of all the others that are totally alike, because they are totally alike. Therefore through such an intellection I intellectually cognize either every singular or none (speaking always of those totally alike). But not every one, as is clear of itself; therefore none is

intellectively cognized in itself, neither intuitively nor abstractively.

85. - Also, against what is said of perfect and imperfect intuitive cognition [¶¶29-42]: For according to that it seems that there is no abstractive cognition absolutely in intellect, since there is none such that through it I could not intellectively cognize that a thing existed at some time.

86. - Also, against habits and not species being postulated in intellect: For the sensory part, although it has intuitive cognition, nevertheless receives species beforehand; therefore likewise the intellect. The inference is clear, since "just as sense to sensible things, so intellect is to intelligible things."

87. - Also, it is said in III De anima in many places that the intellective part is receptive of species, and that the soul is the locus of species, and [283] that not the stone but the species of the stone is in the soul, and that intellect is all intelligible things just as the senses are all sensible things.

88. - Also, intellect is in essential potentiality to the cognition not only of complexes but of incomplexes. But what reduces intellect from essential to accidental potentiality cannot be a habit. For one, because [a habit] presupposes an act, and consequently presupposes an intellect reduced from essential potentiality. Further, because a habit exists only

* Aristotle, De anima iii.4 (429a15-18).

with respect to complexes. Consequently if a habit could reduce intellect from essential to accidental potentiality with respect to a complex cognition, nevertheless it could not with respect to an incomplex cognition, with respect to which a habit is not postulated.

89. - Also, through the same argument by which you prove that habits and not species are in intellect, it can be proven that they are in the imagination [phantasia]. For we do not experience that we are in accidental potentiality to imagining if we have not beforehand imagined. Therefore a habit inclining [the imagination] to similar acts is left behind from that act of imagining. This is contrary to the Philosopher, De somno et vigilia [ch.2], who says that in the absence of things the images of things remain.

90. - Also, if so, then intellect by intellectually cognizing would not need phantasms. For when something is in accidental potentiality it does not need an extrinsic mover for it to go into act. If therefore such a habit were in intellect and not species then the conclusion follows, since the phantasm is an extrinsic mover. Therefore etc. [284]

[Solution of the Doubts]

91. - In reply to the first of these [¶82] I say that intellect first intellectually cognizes the singular intuitively. For one, because intellect intellectually cognizes intuitively what is in the thing. But nothing is such unless it is singular. Further, because this pertains to a

lower power (namely, to the senses) and belongs to its perfection; therefore etc.

92. - Also, that which cognizes something as it is here and in this place, in this and in this now and so on for the other circumstances, cognizes more perfectly and is of a more perfect nature than that which does not so cognize. Therefore if the senses cognize in this way and not intellect, intellect would be less perfect than the senses. So I say that intellect cognizes intuitively the singular as here and now and according to all the conditions according to which the senses cognize and also according to more. Hence an angel and a human being know more perfectly where and when this body is moved, and so for the other material conditions, than does any sentient power.

93. - If you were to say that the senses require a determinate place for the object along a straight line and a determinate proximity, while the intellect does not, to the contrary: According to one¹⁰ the senses can intuitively cognize an absent and non-existent thing. Therefore without contradiction a thing can be seen without location (at least through divine power) and so intellect can. And just as the senses cannot naturally see [285] an object unless it is proximate in a determinate manner and located along a direct line, so nor can intellect naturally intuit a thing grasped by

¹⁰ The editors cite Peter Aureol, I Sent. prooem., sec.2 art.3 nn.80-87.

means of sight, unless it is proximate in a determinate way (and in the same way as it is to the sense). For intellect naturally intuits nothing unless by means of a sense existing in its actuality, although supernaturally it can, as can the senses.

94. - So I say that to have a material cognition can be understood in two ways. In one way that someone has a cognition that completes matter extensively, like a material form. And it's in this way that the senses have a material cognition and a cognition that is here and now, since corporeal vision is extended through the whole [visual] organ - the composite of matter and form - and thus it has existence here and now. And in that way intellect abstracts from material conditions, since intellection exists subjectively in the intellect, not extensively in some composite or corporeal organ. And it's in this way that we can understand the common expression about those material conditions - that the 'intellect abstracts,' etc. In another way someone can have a material cognition because he cognizes matter or a material object. And in this way the divine, angelic and human intellect have material cognitions, since they intellectually cognize not only material things but even matter. And the senses cannot cognize matter. For because matter is a positive thing, it would be remarkable if it could not be apprehended by any power.

95. - [286] And when he says that the Commentator (I

Physics and III De anima) says that matter is not intelligible,¹¹ I say that matter impedes the intellection by which something is intellected and intellective. For nothing can intellectually cognize unless abstracted from matter so that it does not need a corporeal organ in order to cognize intellectually.

96. - To the other [183] it is said that "an intuitive cognition naturally had is impressed by the object and conserved just as light from the sun. So it does not make intellect err,"¹² although an intuitive cognition supernaturally caused puts the intellect in error.

97. - To the contrary: He says¹³ that there can naturally be an intuitive apprehension with respect to non-existents - I mean a sensory one. Therefore it is not contrary to the nature of an intuitive apprehension for it to be impressed and conserved by a non-being. And if this can be so for a sensory one, then so too for an intellective one. The inference is proven by him,¹⁴ since intuitive apprehensions, both intellective and sensory, are always joined together when had naturally.

98. - So I say that an intuitive cognition is that by which, when existent, I judge that [287] a thing exists when

¹¹ Here Ockham responds to an argument not given above.

¹² Peter Aureol, I Sent., proem., sec.2 art.4 n.120.

¹³ Aureol, ibid., art.3 nn.80-87.

¹⁴ Aureol, ibid., art.4 n.121.

it does and that it does not exist when it does not, in the way said above [¶¶22-28], and this whether it is caused naturally or supernaturally. For when I have an intuitive apprehension, in whatever way, I can form at once the complex 'this thing exists' or 'this thing does not exist,' and in virtue of the intuitive cognition assent to the complex if the thing exists or dissent if it does not, as has been said above. And thus in no way does it put the intellect in error.

99. - To the other [¶84] I say that it is just as valid against those who postulate species in either intellect or imagination as it is against me. This is especially so if [the species] were postulated to be caused by God, since through that [species] intellect is no more assimilated to one totally alike singular than to another. Therefore because it is the source of intellective cognition - just as if it were caused naturally - [that species] is the source of intellectually cognizing either every singular or none. For because it is produced by no singular, it does not determine for itself any.

100. - I say then that intellection is a likeness of the object just as is a species (if postulated), and is no more the likeness of one than another. And so likeness is not the precise cause of why one thing is intellectually cognized and not another. This can be made clear by an example, as the cases of cognizibility and univocal causation are alike. For a univocal cause causes through assimilation, and so it is univocal because the effect is assimilated to it. Nevertheless

it is not on account of assimilation that it is determinately produced by one univocal cause and not by another. For if we take two [288] equally intense heats, and one produces a third heat, that third is assimilated to the one just as much as to the other and equally to both. But nevertheless it is produced by one alone. Therefore assimilation is not the cause of why one causes and not the other. It is the same way in the present case. For although in the case proposed the intellect is equally assimilated to all the individuals, nevertheless it can determinately cognize one and not another. But this is not on account of assimilation; rather, the cause is that every naturally producible effect determines for itself, by its nature, that it should be produced by one efficient cause and not by another - just as it determines for itself that it be produced in one matter and not in another. For if not, it would follow that the same effect would be produced by different agents at one and the same time in two materials, which is impossible.

101. - The initial assumption is clear. For say that there were two agents here (e.g., two heats equally intense) and two materials of the same character and equally disposed and approximated to one heat as to the other throughout, and this in the same instant. (This is indeed possible.) Then from the fact that, according to you, the heat to be produced determines for itself neither of those agents by which it would be produced, it follows that either [i] that heat is

produced in the two materials at one and the same time by both or else [ii] neither produces heat, even though each is a natural agent proximate to the affected thing and in no respect impeded. For because the effect no more determines for itself one than the other, and each material is equally approximated to each [agent], it follows that either the same effect would be produced by the same agent in each material, or in none. Each is implausible. Therefore the effect must determine for itself one agent and not another of the same character, so that it can be produced by the one and not [289] the other.

102. - Therefore it is the same way in the present case. Even if the intention or species (if postulated) were equally assimilated to many individuals, nevertheless by its nature it determines for itself that it leads the intellect to the cognition of that object by which it is partially caused. For it so determines for itself to be caused by that object that it cannot be caused by any other. And so it leads to the cognition of the one in such a way that it does not lead to the cognition of another.

103. - You might say that that intention can be caused immediately and totally by God. And then through that intention the intellect would no more intellectually cognize one totally alike singular than another, since it would be assimilated to one just as much as to another. Nor does causality make it the intention of one and not another, since

it is caused immediately by none but God alone.

104. - I reply that every intention of a creature caused by God can be partially caused by a creature, even if it is not in fact so caused. And so through that intention one cognizes the singular by which the intention would determinately be caused if it were caused by a creature. But one singular is of this sort and not another; therefore etc.

105. - If you were to say that in the first and this second book it was often said that numerically the same effect can be produced by two total causes, and consequently determines neither for itself, [290] the contrary of which is said here, then look [elsewhere] for my reply.¹⁵

106. - You might say, as far as the example given of two heats, [291] that the heat produced, although it does not determine a certain agent of the same character, nevertheless it determines for itself a certain matter in which it can be produced, so that it is not produced in another. And thus it does not follow that numerically the same heat would be produced by two agents in two matters, but that one heat is produced by two agents in one matter which it determines for itself, and another heat by the same agents in another matter which this other heat also determines for itself.

107. - I reply that from the fact that matters are of the same character, there doesn't seem to be a reason why an effect would determine for itself one matter more than

¹⁵ Rep. IV.12 (OTh VII,248-50).

another, since matter is equally unlimited and indeterminate to one form or another. Nor can some reason be assigned for why an effect would determine for itself a matter but that that reason equally concludes that it determines for itself a certain agent. And so that was taken as evident in the argument.

108. - To the next [¶85] I say that in intellect there can be an abstractive cognition through which I judge neither that the thing exists, nor that it does not, nor that it did exist, as has been determined above [¶¶41-2]. So here I'll pass over it.

109. - To the next, concerning the sensory part [¶86], my answer will be clear elsewhere.¹⁶

110. - To all the authorities of the Philosopher [¶87], I say that he takes [292] species for an act or a habit. This is clear, because the Commentator never refers to species, but where the Philosopher mentions species he always refers to form, and he takes form for an intention or habit. And when Aristotle says that "the soul is the locus of species," this is true, because it is the subject of intentions and habits.

111. - You might say that the Philosopher says that "it is the locus of species, not the whole [soul] but the intellective [part]."¹⁷ But sense is the subject of its acts just as is intellect; therefore intellect is the locus of

¹⁶ Rep. III, q.3.

¹⁷ De anima iii.4 (429a27-8).

species differently than in the above way.

112. - I reply that this is true. It is a locus or subject differently than the senses, because it receives intentions not only of things that are sensed by one sense, but also those that are sensed by every sense. For it can intellectually cognize the sensibles of all the senses, but not so sense.

113. - If you were to say that common sensibles are apprehended by every sense, I responded to this above, in the question on movement.¹⁸

114. - Likewise, intellect is a subject of intentions differently than sense is a subject of sensations, because sensations are extended in the senses, but not intentions in intellect.

115. - To the next [¶88] I say that a habit should be postulated in the same way with respect to an incomplex as with respect to a complex, and on account of the same cause. But as for when this is and when it is not, one must return to experience. For when someone inclined to cognize intellectually either an incomplex or a complex is more inclined after a frequently [293] elicited act concerning such a thing than before, then a habit should be postulated with respect to that. And when one is not more inclined, then a habit should not be postulated. Hence just as not every incomplex apprehension generates an incomplex habit, so nor

¹⁸ Rep. II q.7 (OTh V;125).

does every complex apprehension generate a complex habit. For example, an intuitive cognition (imagining in the above way [¶30] an intuitive and abstractive cognition that exist at the same time) does not generate an incomplex habit, even though it is an incomplex apprehension. And this is because no one experiences that he is more inclined to cognize something intuitively after a frequently had intuition than before. And it is the same way for a complex cognition through which I judge that a thing exists by means of an intuitive cognition as a partial cause. For that cognition, although it is abstractive (as has been said above [¶23]) and a complex apprehension, nevertheless does not generate a habit. And this is because no one experiences that he is more inclined to judge that a thing exists or does not exist by means of that intuitive cognition after a frequently elicited judgment than before every judgment. For one can never judge in this way that a thing exists or does not exist unless through a present and existent intuitive cognition. And when that cognition is had and a complex is formed, in the way frequently said [¶22], then intellect can at once judge and assent, always with equal ease. Hence in the case of such habits, in order to see whether they ought to be postulated, and when and when not, one has to return to experience in the aforesaid way.

116. - [294] To the next [¶89], whether a habit or species should be postulated in the senses, this will be clear

elsewhere.¹⁹

117. - To the next [¶90], I say that it concludes against those postulating species just as much as against me. Hence just as they say that beyond species the act of intellectual cognition does not require an extrinsic mover, so I say that beyond a habit no other extrinsic mover is required as a partial cause with respect to the act of intellectual cognition - neither a phantasm, nor something in the senses. And this is so in the case of abstractive cognition, although perhaps it is the opposite in the case of intuitive cognition. And so no such conversion to the phantasms as to a partial cause is required in cognition. Nevertheless for something to be in accidental potentiality for intellectual cognition the proper complexion and disposition of the body and all the powers is required, and consequently also of the imagination. And if it doesn't have such a disposition then it cannot intellectually cognize, as is clear in the case of the young and the mentally ill. And so it is in this way that the phantasm is required for intellection, and not otherwise. And perhaps some corporeal complexion can be a necessarily required partial cause of an act of intellectual cognition.

[To Thomas's Arguments on the First Question]

118. - In reply to the arguments on the first opinion: I say in reply to the first [¶9] that he first says that that through which intellect intellectually cognizes is an inhering

¹⁹ Rep. III, q.3.

form. And later he says the opposite, since he says that [295] whether it is inhering or subsisting does not bear on whether it is a source of action.²⁰ Likewise, according to him, the divine essence is seen through its very self and not through a species,²¹ and nevertheless the divine essence is not a form inhering in intellect. So I say that the argument does not go through, since that by which intellect intellectually cognizes as a partial cause can be subsisting (e.g., in the case of an intuitive intellection of a substance), and it can be inhering in another but not in the one intellectually cognizing - as is clear in the case of an intuitive cognition of whiteness. And it can be inhering in intellect, and nevertheless be not a species but a habit. So the argument proves nothing.

119. - To the next [¶10] I say that an object suffices for an angel's intuitive cognition, and for an abstractive cognition a habit suffices. And through these cognitions everything can be intellectually cognized without any species.

120. - To the next [¶11] I say that no prior assimilation through species is required before the act of intellectual cognition. Rather, the assimilation suffices that is brought about through an act of intellectual cognition, which is [itself] a likeness of the thing cognized. [296] For according to Augustine (V De trinitate [ch.12-14]), when something is

²⁰ Cf. Aquinas ST 1a 56.1c.

²¹ Cf. Aquinas ST 1a 12.2c.

intellectively cognized as it is in itself, then the intellection will be entirely like the thing, and no other likeness is required beyond that intellection.

121. - To the next [¶12] I say that according to him things that are caused by the same agent are assimilated. But an angel's essence and the thing that it intellectually cognizes are caused by the same agent, God, and therefore are assimilated. Therefore an angel is assimilated to other things through its essence.

122. - If it were said that something cannot be assimilated to different things through the same thing, this is false. For God through his perfectly simple essence is assimilated to everything that he intellectually cognizes outside of himself.

123. - To the next [¶13] I say that if the argument were carried through correctly, it would conclude that a species (if postulated) would be more noble than both a higher angel, if a lower angel intellectually cognizes a higher, and the angel intellectually cognizing. Each of these is false, since a species (if it were to exist) is an accidental perfection. And it is the same way for a habit, which is an accidental perfection and is a partial source with respect to an act of intellectually cognizing a substance.

124. - To the next [¶14] I say that there is no form within intellect that is a source by which the intellect intellectually cognizes. But there is indeed some form in it -

namely a habit - which is partially a source by which.

125. - To the Commentator [¶15] I say that he does not mean that in the intellectually cognized mover there is some distinction and that something is intellectually cognized [297] by one mover and something else by another. Rather, he means that one thing comes from the first mover in the case of one mover and another thing in the case of another.

126. - To the next [¶16] I grant that the essence of an angel does not suffice for cognizing things other than itself, since in an intuitive cognition the objects concur as partial causes and distinct bases of cognizing. Nevertheless an angel does indeed intellectually cognize all other things through its essence as through a partial cause, because it cognizes through its intellect, which is in no way distinct from its essence.

127. - To the next [¶17] it is clear what should be said through the solution to the third argument [¶120].

[To Thomas's Arguments on the Second Question]

128. - To the arguments on the second question: I say to the first [¶18] that a greater or lesser closeness to God does not show that something needs fewer things for cognizing, in the case of either intuitive or abstractive cognition. But it does show that a nature closer to God in being with respect to one and the same thing has a more perfect cognition than a more remote nature. For it has a more perfect intellect, which is the principal cause, although it is partial with respect to

an act of intellectual cognition. And when he says that a boy cannot understand without great explanation that which another conceives at once, this does not show that the boy needs more things for acquiring knowledge than does another. But either it shows that many habits are acquired by those older that are not by the boy, or [298] it shows a goodness of complexion in one more than another. And so on the basis of one principle one person can derive more conclusions than another. And that a more complete nature does not entail fewer bases of cognizing is clear from an obvious example: for a human being is something more perfect than fire, and nevertheless needs more things to act than does fire.

129. - And when he speaks of architecture, etc. [¶19], I say that it needs fewer things than a lower science, since it does not deal with those things that a lower science deals with, nor does it consider them.

[.....]²²

[310] [To the Principal Arguments]

130. - To the principal argument on the first question [¶1], I say that an angel cannot intellectually cognize things other than itself through its essence, so that its essence is the total cause, functioning as the object, and does not operate along with any other basis, neither in itself nor in a habit. For one thing cannot be intellectually cognized

²² I omit Ockham's response to Scotus's arguments on the first question. Ockham gives his responses without saying what Scotus's initial arguments were (OTh V;298-310).

through another. And when you argue through subjects and passions, I say that the subject does not lead to an incomplex cognition of the passion, as I said in the prologue.²³ Nevertheless one thing outside the soul can be cognized through a thing in the soul (i.e., through a habit) so that that can be a partial cause with respect to a cognition of it.

131. - The response to the other is clear through the aforesaid.

²³ Ord. I, prol., q.9 (OTh I,240-44).