

APPENDIX C1 - PETER JOHN OLIVI

Questions on the Second Book of Sentences q.72: Can bodies act on the spirit and on its apprehensive and appetitive powers?

1. - [1] And it is proven first that they can. First, everything that is active, insofar as it is active, is superior to what is passive, insofar as it is so. And if that passive thing is assimilable to the form of the active thing, then it can be assimilated by that active thing. But the apprehensive powers of spirits are assimilable to their corporeal objects, for every apprehension involves the assimilation of the cognizer to the cognized. It's clear, however, that everything that is assimilable, insofar as it is so, is passive, and that a corporeal form, insofar as it is a form, implies something active. Therefore the powers of spirits, insofar as they are assimilable through cognition to corporeal forms, can be affected [pati] by them.

2. - Second, nothing co-operates with an action unless in the manner of an agent or a patient. But corporeal objects co-operate with cognitive actions of them made in the spirit. They do not co-operate in the manner of a patient, however, since actions of this sort are not received in corporeal objects. Therefore they co-operate with cognitive actions in the manner of an agent. But this is impossible, unless they bring about [agant] something [2] in the subject of these sorts of actions - i.e., in the soul's powers. Therefore, etc.

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3. - But it is proven that corporeal objects co-operate

with visual actions of themselves - not only [i] because they cannot be made without the presence of such objects, but indeed also [ii] because the aforesaid acts draw a species from the objects and are essentially diversified according to the diverse species and genera of objects, and also [iii] because from the efficacy of one simple species more than one effect cannot be elicited which are total and immediate contraries of each other or diverse in genus and species. It's clear however that one cognitive power belongs to one simple species and nevertheless has in itself cognitive acts that are contraries of each other, many in genus, and diverse in species.

4. - **Third**, to be disturbed and afflicted are not actions of the afflicted and disturbed subject, because an action (as far as it is an action) is not injurious to the agent (as far as it is an agent), since every active force (as far as it is acting) is essentially inclined to its action as to an effect similar and appropriate to it and naturally suitable for it - as in the case of one's own offspring emerging viscerally from oneself. But the spirit is afflicted and disturbed by the apprehensions of many corporeal objects. Therefore such an affliction is not an action made by the spirit itself, but rather by corporeal objects.

5. - **Fourth**, every act of the apprehensive powers is brought about sensorily or experientially as a kind of alteration coming from without to within - i.e., from the

object to the interior of the apprehensive power itself. But it is irrational to say that such an inward and ever present experience is false and fallacious. Therefore an alteration of this sort is truly brought about by an exterior object as by its exterior agent.

6. - Fifth, a great object is more easily seen or heard than a lesser one - e.g., loud thunder is more easily heard than [3] a moderate voice, and a mountain or ox is more easily seen than a particle of dust. It would be the opposite however if powers were not affected by objects, but rather extended their acts to objects. For a great or equal motive force more easily moves the less than the more moveable, and something equally moveable is more easily moved by a great agent's greater force than by a lesser agent's lesser force.

7. - Sixth, to the extent that the extended and dimensional differs from the simple and spiritual, the latter also differs from the former. Therefore for whatever reason spirit can bring about in a body species and impressions that are extended in accordance with the extension of the body's parts, for the same reason a body could produce in a spirit simple species and impressions conforming to the spirit's simplicity. But the spirit produces these in the body when it propels and moves it and its parts. For that propulsion and movement happens according to one of its parts in one of the body's parts, and in accordance with another in another.

8. - Seventh, earth and water are inferior by far to

fire, buds, plants, or animals. But this notwithstanding, the former act and can act on even the latter; therefore although body is inferior to and less noble than spirit, it does not on account of this follow that it cannot act on spirit.

9. - Eighth, Augustine says in Contra Iulianum [V,14] that original [sin] passes from body to soul not by migrating but by affecting. Therefore in this case body affects soul - that is, generates in it an affection similar to its own. Further, in the epistle to Nebridius [class.I, ep.9, n.3] he says that

I believe that every movement of the soul brings about something in the body and that it goes out all the way to our senses (that is, all the way to the sensible awareness of our senses) when the soul's movements are very great - for instance when we are angry or sad or joyful. Therefore those traces of its movement which the soul impresses on the body can remain and [4] make something like a habit, and they, when they become excited, secretly bring forth in us thoughts and dreams.

And later [n.4] he says:

And doctors affirm that bile increases through persistent anger. We become angry again, however, and easily, at the burning of bile, even when hardly any cause exist. Thus that which the mind made in the body, by its own movement, works to provoke it further.

10. - Ninth, we see that on a certain movement made in the brain sleep and wakefulness follow. Further, the choleric anger more quickly and the sanguine are more easily happy. Therefore a varying complexion and disposition of the body causes something in the soul.

11. - Tenth, that which can [act] on the complete

substance can also [act] on its power, since it is greater to be able [to act] on a substance than on its power. But the sensory soul's essence is produced by the power of a body - that is, by a seminal power or the power of the celestial bodies. Therefore [such powers] can vary the sensory soul's powers, at least accidentally. But what can be brought about by a body in the sensory powers of animals can also be brought about in our own sensory powers, since we are conformed with them in accidental variations. Therefore etc.

12. - Eleventh, it is more noble to be able to subject one's own matter to the action of an inferior agent and to be able to extract oneself therefrom than to be able [to subject] only another. Hence, according to Gregory, the blessed can through their spiritual capacity restore their glorious bodies to us as touchable, as Christ after the resurrection showed to his disciples, when he said "handle" etc. [Luke 24,39]. Therefore it belongs to the greater capacity of spirits that they can subject themselves on command to the action of bodies.

13. - Twelfth, a body can generate a simple and indivisible species in a body; therefore much more can it do this in a spirit. The first premise is proven, because just as light irradiating a wall on just its surface generates on it a superficial light having no dimension of depth, so in this way when a sphere touches another sphere at only one point, by that touch the first can [5] affect or irradiate the second at

that point alone - for the same reason that it can touch it at just that point. Moreover, to be touched is a kind of affection [passio] introduced by the one touching, on which account every physical agent (i.e., every agent by contact), when it acts, is affected [patitur]. Moreover, when an entire body is illuminated or heated, then there is heat in each of its points, both in the middle and the outside. But that which exists at a point is necessarily point-like and indivisible. Therefore etc.

14. - Thirteenth, anything is more able act like that which is suitable to it per se than to act like that which is suitable to it per accidens. But simplicity and intellectuality agree with every form per se, while extension is suitable to a form per accidens. Therefore every form is more able to generate a simple and intellectual species than an extended and sensible one. The minor is proven in two ways. First, because everything that of itself and absolutely is not a quantum and unextended is of itself and absolutely simple and intellectual. But everything that does not belong per se to the category of quantity is of this sort, since extension and divisibility are suitable per se and of themselves only to quantity. Therefore etc. Second, because the quiddity of every form is the per se object of intellect alone. For it belongs to intellect alone to know [nosse] the definitions of things or what this or that is.

15. - Fourteen, everything having parts infinitely

divisible and diminishable - e.g., a continuum and so too [et iuxta] the proportion and adequation of that continuum - is a quantum and continuous. And if something is an action taking quantity and divisibility from its object of this sort, then the essence of its parts must be taken from it. But the vision of a body is divisible and diminishable just as the body itself, for if one part of that body is subtracted then the vision of that part is subtracted and the vision of the others remains. This is because the vision of one part differs from the vision of another only insofar as one part of the thing seen differs from another. Also, the vision of one part looks at only the location of that part, so that the parts of vision are distinguished according to the diverse locations of the parts of the thing seen and are connected just as are those parts of the thing seen. Therefore the vision of a body is a quantum and continuous, just as is the body, [6] and it seems that it takes its quantity from that [body] and consequently the essence of the parts of its quantity.

[REPLY]

[Preliminary Discussion]

16. - To clarify this question three things must be noted in advance.

[I]

The first concerns the different ways of acting and being affected [patiendi]. For there are four, as far as it concerns the present. The first comes from the patient's being by

itself absolutely subject or able to be subject to the agent's active force and its action, and on the other hand the agent's force's being by itself potently and efficaciously turned or able to be turned toward the interior of the patient's passive power. As a result of the force of such a turning an action is impressed [influitur] and imposed on the patient by the agent. And in this way the sun's light acts on the present, underlying air and fire acts on wood and things that are ignited by it and a mover acts on a stone which by striking it throws far off.

17. - The second way is when a patient is so raised up by a high and noble form that it is not absolutely subjected to such an agent. Nevertheless it can, through the force of its own form predominant in it, be subjected to such an agent voluntarily. And in this way a glorified body can be subject to touch and a complete handling through the spiritual force of the blessed's glorified soul - a force which the blessed have over their glorified bodies. And in this way Christ after his resurrection displayed his body, so that it could be handled by his disciples. By this handling they were able to take and draw his flesh and hand from one place to another, here and there - something which they could not do unless Christ were, through his power, to subject his flesh to their touch.¹

18. - The third way is when the patient is not subjected

¹ Reading 'tactui' for 'tractui.'

to the agent's active force directly and immediately, but only obliquely and mediately, nor is it subjected of itself alone taken absolutely, [7] but only because it is connected to another patient firmly and strongly. And in this way some motions and the slowing down of heavy and light things are brought about contrary to their proper and absolute nature on account of the impossibility of a vacuum - for example, when water standing in a vessel punctured and open at the bottom does not exit through that hole nor descend, since the air cannot slip through any opening into the area that the air would leave if it were to descend and exit; or when a flat and polished stone standing on another which is flat and polished is violently pulled upward by a hand so that no part of it is tilted. For in this way it is impossible for it to be separated from the other stone on which it rests, since then a vacuum would be made at the midpoint [in centro medio] of the connection to the stone. This is because external air can slip into the middle only successively, as it must first slip into the first part of the space, or the intermediary connection to the stone, before it gets to the middle. In pulling the stone upward completely evenly in all respects the middle of the stone's edge is quickly pulled up just as is its circumference; and if one part of that edge is pulled before another then it is pulled at a tilt, since the part first pulled is then higher than the part not pulled. Therefore in these and similar cases a connection of bodies naturally

avoiding and preventing a vacuum retains and pulls bodies with it contrary to their absolute nature. Also, fire naturally tending upward, when it is filled with the heavy nature of iron or charcoal, tends downward with these [elements]. For the fire is moved by their weight, on account of its inseparable connection to them.

19. - This way of acting and being affected, however - as far as what it is [quoad quid] - is likened to the drawing out of forms from matter that is made by a prior impression naturally impressed on the same matter by some agent. For that impression, as it is a kind of action or affection, is not related to a subsequent drawing out of form from matter in the way that the agent's impressing force was related to the influx of that impression. For that [impressing force] was directly turned toward [8] the subject receiving its influx, and that influx directly spreads and flows from the agent's force. But the drawing out of form from matter does not flow in this way from that impression, nor does the impression direct itself to the subject of the drawing out, so as to impress such a drawing out on it. Rather, that impression is a kind of direction and propulsion or inclination of the same subject or matter to the final terminus of that drawing out. In this connection an arrow propelled by an archer is formally and virtually inclined by that propulsion to the place to which the local motion following [subsequens] it finally runs, as to its terminus.

20. - It should be known however that just as in the case of things connected to each other there is sometimes a difference of superiority by which one is superior to another, so too in the case of movements or affections caused by such a connection there is a difference. For from a movement made in a superior a movement in an inferior is caused, as if by descending. But from the inferior a movement is caused in a superior as if by ascending. And so the movement of a superior is not subjected in this way to the movement of an inferior, when it is caused by it, in the way that the movement of an inferior is subjected to a superior, when it is caused by it.

21. - It should also be known that the mobility of matter for drawing movement out from it comes closer to the character of an active [force] than does the mere receptibility of matter for receiving the influx of something influencing it. Also, that mobility for form and movement that is natural to moveable² matter comes closer to the character of an active [force] than does the mobility for violent movement and an artificial form. And so something moveable is said to co-operate more in movement natural to it than in violent movement natural to it, since the moveable's natural relation to such movement helps more than a little in its making. So too, the moveable co-operates more in any movement, even a violent one, than in receiving an influx flowing from an

² Reading 'mobili,' with two of three mss, against the edition's 'mobilis.'

exterior agent. For it is better to have in itself such a nature from which such an action could be [received] in it and drawn out from it, than for it to be able to be only received in it but not drawn out from it. And hence forms drawn out from matter are preserved in it without the aid of an extrinsic [force] drawing them out. But forms not drawn out from matter and only [9] received in it are not preserved in it unless through the continually present act of the impressing force. On this account Avicenna says that that which draws out forms from matter is not absolutely the cause of their existence and essence, but only of their being made - that is, only of those [forms] being drawn out from matter. But the impressing force is the cause of the existence and essence of the forms which it impresses. For this reason I said in the question about seminal reasons [q.31] that because the creator gave to matter such mobility with respect to forms - in order that through the mere contact of an extrinsic mover these forms can be drawn out from matter - for that reason, I say, he as it were co-created forms of this sort in matter. For as a result of this [co-creation] they exist in matter potently and, as it were, causally.

22. - The fourth way is when an agent acts within itself, by directing its active force to an extrinsic object and in so doing also exposing and applying its passive power toward that object, as if it were going to grasp that object within itself. And in this way the immediate principle of an

apprehensive or volitional action acts within the soul's power, although this isn't so according to those who claim that the action of cognizing and intellectually apprehending is brought about immediately by the object, so that the cognitive power produces that act neither through itself nor through a habit nor through a species created earlier by the object. Rather, [they say], the cognitive power only receives the act from an object, from which [the act] is impressed on the power - just as the light of the air is impressed on it by the sun's light.

23. - The impossibility of this position will be revealed more plainly below; for now it suffices to say that however much the cognitive power is informed through a habit and a species differing from the cognitive action, it cannot advance to a cognitive action unless before this it actually tends [intendat] toward the object, so that the attention of its intention should be actually turned and directed to the object. And so, given that a species preceding the cognitive action is impressed by the object, still beyond this the power must actually tend toward and intellectually attend to [10] the object; for it is impossible that it produce in itself a cognitive act without this.

[II]

24. - The second thing that should be noted in advance is that the object, to the extent that it only terminates the cognitive power's attention and its actual cognition, does not

absolutely and properly have the character of an efficient [cause]. For the formal termination of the aforesaid attention is not some essence really different from the attention itself and is in any case not impressed or drawn out by the object, inasmuch as it is only the terminus of that attention and cognitive act. But nevertheless the object can, broadly, be numbered among the efficient causes: first, because the object, insofar as it is such a terminus or thing terminating, doesn't have the nature of a patient or a possible or potential being; rather it more has the nature of an act and an actual being. Also, because the active force of a cognitive power necessarily needs such a terminus and its termination so that it produces a cognitive act - as if the aforesaid terminus were to impress something on the cognitive force itself and on its act. Such an effecting, however, is in fact nothing other than the active force's being unable, without such a terminus and termination, to carry out its act and its being able to do this with it. Hence the intrinsic and formal termination of the active force is truly the coefficient of the force's action, since that force, taken by itself [absolute], is only a sufficient active [force] when it is sufficiently terminated by or in an object.

25. - But that an object does not in this matter strictly have the nature of an efficient is proven for three reasons in addition to the reason noted above. First, because God is not the natural and necessary agent of some created effect, nor

would it be prudent to affirm this of God; rather, with respect to every created effect God is purely a free and voluntary agent. It's clear however [11] that when an intellect of the blessed that is altogether completely and ultimately disposed and informed for producing in itself the act of the vision of God has [its] attention actually turned and fixed and fixedly terminated on God as the object, then the act of vision must naturally and necessarily follow and be effected - just as upon the light of the sun's being turned toward air which is sufficiently disposed to be illuminated, the action and effect of illumination naturally and necessarily follows. For although God could still impede the effect, by commanding that it not follow a cause which is so sufficient, nevertheless if God doesn't command this then such an effect naturally and necessarily follows such a cause.

26. - The second reason is because the person of Christ - insofar as he is a suppositum or substantive terminus both of the human nature that is substantive in him and of his formal union and coherence by which it coheres to him as to his own person while existing in it [human nature] as in his own person - the very person of Christ, I say, effects nothing in his human nature as a result of this [i.e., being such a terminus]. For if as a result of this it were to bring about something in his nature, then it would effect something in it which would not be effected by the person of the Father and the Holy Ghost, because they are not the personal and

substantive terminus of Christ's humanity. Let it not be said, however, that the person of the Son of God should make something that is not made in altogether the same way and altogether equally by the person of the Father and the Holy Ghost.

27. - The third reason is because no patient can receive an action or affection from a created force influencing it, unless the actual attention of the aforesaid force is turned and directed beforehand to the patient and is terminated in it. And nevertheless no one will say that the patient on this basis alone should strictly be called the efficient of the action or impression which it receives from such a power. And nevertheless according to the various ways in which it terminates the influencing force's attention, [12] so the influx is brought about in it in various ways. Hence the different ways of being terminated co-operate in different ways of acting and being affected.

[III]

28. - The third thing to be noted in advance is that just as some actions and affections require in advance certain forms and formal dispositions in their receptor, so that without these forms those actions or affections cannot be brought about in or received in it, so too matter is sometimes unable - either from its essence or from its forms - to lie under the action of other agents. This comes from its essence because spiritual matter is not receptive of corporeal and

extended forms, nor is corporeal matter receptive of spiritual forms. It comes from forms because the matter of a volitional power, as it is under the form of such a power, is not receptive of the cognitive power's acts and habits, nor vice versa, since volitional habits and acts can be received in the volitional power's matter only if that matter is informed by its spiritual form through which it is volitional.

29. - This is also the case with respect to the cognitive powers' habits and acts. For just as the soul can be received in its body's matter only if it is already rightly put together and organized, so too the act of seeing cannot be received in a bodily eye without the visual power and the right attention of it to the object - and the same goes for hearing with respect to the hearing power and so too for the others. For just as there is an order of priority and posteriority between matter and form, so also is there between forms. Hence those forms that are naturally last cohere more immediately with middle forms than with remote ones or with first or remote matter, insofar as it is remote. For forms cohere with matter only insofar as they are predisposed by first and intermediate forms. And this is the reason why intermediate forms are said to be material and in a sense the matter of the last forms. Also, on this account last forms are said to be received in intermediate ones [13] as if in their subjects, although strictly they are received only in matter, as it is informed by intermediate forms. Nevertheless if to be

received and to receive signify nothing other than the ordered conjunction and coherence of forms through which the earlier coheres to the last as earlier and the last coheres to the prior as later and as naturally prerequiring the prior, then in this way the prior is strictly said to receive the last and the last is strictly said to be received by the prior.

[Various Opinions on the Question]

30. - Therefore, having noted these things in advance, it should be said in reply to the question that there are three or even four opinions concerning it. First is that of Aristotle and his followers, who say that bodies and corporeal objects act on a spirit formally conjoined to a body not only through the mode of connection or in the manner of an objective terminus, but also through a simple and impressive influx. And they claim that this happens in two ways. First that bodies make an impression through their own force alone, and in this way (according to them) light impresses its species on the visual power and heat or cold on touch and sound on the auditory power and so on for the other senses, with respect to their proper objects. In the second way (according to them) bodies make an impression through the irradiation of the agent intellect's intellectual light. For they say that just as color not irradiated by light cannot impress its species on sight and so cannot be seen by it, but when it is irradiated by light it makes an impression on sight and through the species thus impressed is seen by it, so too

corporeal forms or imaginative forms (which they call phantasms) irradiated by the agent intellect's light impress their likenesses on the possible intellect, and through this the possible intellect intellectually cognizes corporeal things. For just as in the eye of a cat or an owl there is a certain corporeal light in addition to the visual power through which the colors of things are illuminated in the dark [14] so that they can impress their species on the animals' eyes and be seen by their visual power, so too (according to them) a two-fold power is necessary in the rational soul for the act of understanding. One of these powers is like the light in the eye at night, and they call this the agent intellect; the other is like the visual power of the eye, and they call this the possible intellect, since it is first in potentiality to receive the species of objects, and then once informed by them it produces in itself the act of intellectual cognition. (Although in this matter they seem to say things contrary to each other, as will be said below.)

31. - But the reason why they do not want corporeal forms to be able to impress their species on the intellect, unless they are irradiated beforehand by the agent intellect, is that the species of things, as they are received in the possible intellect, are (according to them) universal and abstracted from all particular and extended conditions. Hence nor do they, in themselves, represent anything particular or extended or located. Therefore because the forms of bodies are

material, extended, and particular, species that are immaterial, simple and universal must be abstracted from them by something immaterial, abstract and universal. And so beyond the possible intellect which is receptive of these species one must postulate an agent intellect - i.e., something abstracting these species from extended and particular forms. But in the sensory powers they claim that species are produced by objects only if these species are extended and particular and locally existing in the organs of the senses. Hence nor do they claim that first and per se they inform the soul's sensory powers, but rather the whole conjoined out of the power and its organ. And so corporeal objects suffice to generate these species without any intellectual light through which the species are abstracted from them.

32. - The second opinion³ differs from the first in claiming that bodies can by [15] themselves impress simple and spiritual species on both sense and intellect, but in such a way that the intellectual simplicity of the subject in which they are produced contributes to [confert ad] their simplicity. For any subject receives according to how it is naturally suited to receive, and not otherwise. And they claim⁴ that all of the intellect's species are particular, although some of them do not represent the particular

³ The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines, according to Bettoni (1955), p.33.

⁴ Reading 'ponunt' along with the best manuscript, instead of the edition's 'ponit.'

conditions of objects, but only their quiddity abstracted from these conditions and so to that extent taken universally.

33. - The third⁵ differs from the first two in claiming that not only intellect but also the senses, by irradiating, act on objects and abstract from them species through which they sense those objects. Aristotle does not, to be sure, say this, although he says that the eye sometimes acts on external things, in the way of other luminous bodies, as if he were saying that the eye has in itself a corporeal light through which it can illuminate, as do other luminous bodies. It is one thing however to say that the eye's corporeal light irradiates something and another to say that its spiritual visual power, which is the soul's formal power, irradiates its sensible objects and in that way abstracts spiritual or dimensional species from them.

34. - The fourth opinion is that of the blessed Augustine, who says that nothing can be produced in a spirit by a body through a direct influx, but only through the mode of connection and in the manner of an objective terminus. For in Book VI of De musica he says clearly that a body does not produce something in a spirit or soul through a direct influx. There, after he has asked whether to hear is the same as for a body to produce something in the soul, he adds:

It is always absurd to subject the soul, somehow the matter, to the body, the artisan. But it would

⁵ That of Matthew of Aquasparta, according to Bettoni, ibid.

be so subjected to a body if the body were to bring about in it some quantities. Therefore it is not the case that, when we hear, quantities are produced in the soul from the things that we cognize in sounds [ch.5, n.8].

Again, a little later:

Therefore, whatever corporeal things are thrown onto this body or hurled from outside, [16] they bring about something not in the soul but in the body itself [n.9].

Again, a little later:

The soul seems to me, when it senses in the body, not to undergo something from that [body], but to act more attentively in its affections [n.10].

Again, a little later:

When those things are applied, some of which (as I say) affect the body by contrariness, and the soul extends its more attentive actions, adapted for all places and instruments, then this is called to see or hear or smell or taste or to sense by touching. [...] I believe that the soul, when it senses, produces [exhibere] these operations for the bodily affections, and does not receive those same affections [n.10].

Again, a little later:

When it undergoes something from its same operations, it undergoes not from a body, but from itself [n.12].

Again, in Supra Genesim ad litteram Book XII, ch.16, he says:

Because every spirit is, without a doubt, superior to every body, it follows that a spiritual nature is superior to the corporeal heaven itself, not by position in space, but by the dignity of nature - even that [spiritual nature] where we experience the images of corporeal things. Thus it is that the image of a body in a spirit is superior to the body itself in its substance. Nor ought it be reasonably believed that a body brings about something in a spirit, as if a spirit were subjected to a producing body in place of matter. Therefore although we first see some body which we had not previously seen, and so its image, by which we

remember it when absent, begins to be in our spirit, nevertheless it is not the body in the spirit, but the very spirit in itself which produces, with a marvelous quickness unspeakably remote from the body's slowness, that image of the body [nn.32,33].

Again, a little later he repeats this same opinion two more times. Also, in chapter 30, he says:

When a body causes visions to be discerned, of the sort belonging to dreams or something similar, the body does not produce them nor does it have the force to form something spiritual, but the soul itself through the spirit either produces [agit] the likenesses of bodies or intuits objects. If [17] it produces them, then they are only fantasies. If however it intuits objects, then they are manifestations - i.e., brought about by good or bad spirits [ch.20] -

as he had said a little before [ch.19]. Again, in De trinitate, book X, ch.5, he says that "because the soul cannot bring within" those bodies, "as if into the region of an incorporeal nature," it pulls off the images of those things and "seizes things made in its very self from its very self."

35. - Note however that Augustine held that the soul cannot be subjected to a body's action not only on account of its intellectual form, by which it incomparably surpasses every body, but also on account of its spiritual matter, since he wants it to be superior to every corporeal form. Hence in book XIII of the Confessions, near the beginning [ch.2], he says: "The unformed spiritual is superior to there being a formed body, while the unformed corporeal is superior to there being nothing at all."

[Four Theses Supporting Augustine's Opinion]

36. - Therefore in sustaining this opinion of Augustine, which great doctors have also followed, four things must be proven and declared in order. **First** is that a body in and of itself could not [impress] something directly on a spirit. **Second** is that nor could it do this through an irradiation brought about by some apprehensive power of the soul, and further that nor could it do this on the basis of the affected subject's simplicity and intellectuality. **Third** is how something could be brought about in the soul by a body in the manner of a natural connection. **Fourth** is how an object, insofar as it terminates the attentions and acts of the soul's power, co-operates in their production and how, on this basis, acts draw a species from objects and are diversified in genus and species [18] according to the different genera and species of the objects.

[I]

37. - First therefore - namely that a body could not of itself impress its species on a spirit - is proven in this way. [1] Because of the superiority by which the intellect transcends the imaginative power, and the imaginative power the senses, the imaginative power cannot fix its attention on the intellect, as Dionysius says in De divinis nominibus, ch.1. But the transcendence of a spirit, at least an angelic and rational one, is greater than every corporeal and extended power. Therefore much less can this latter power fix its

attention on a spirit, and especially on the intellective part. But it cannot make an impression on it, unless it fixes its attention on it. Therefore it cannot make an impression on it.

38. - [2] Also, other things being equal, a higher attention is required for influencing than for receiving an influx. But a particular sense cannot, even through a prior reception, elevate and fix its attention on intellect nor even on the imagination. For when it receives something from them, this is not brought about by its elevation and fixation on them. Therefore much less can a corporeal form or power elevate and fix its attention on those things, so that it produces something in them through an influx.

39. - [3] Also, when a corporeal form (for example, light or heat) directs its virtual attention to a corporeal location and position in which there is some spirit, it is either [i] by the same attention that it attends to and influences the spirit or [ii] by another - and then, either another [iia] of the same genus and species or [iib] of a different one. If [i] in the same way, then it attends to and influences the spirit just as locally and dimensionally and just as intimately as it does a corporeal location. Thus it would not impress a simple and spiritual species on a spirit, nor, as it seems, even one numerically different. For it cannot by the same attention impress on the same position two or more species, at least not whole and complete ones. But if [iia] by another attention of

the same species, still the same absurdity follows, and beyond this another [19] - namely, that with respect to the same position and through the same line and under the same angles more than one attention and act will be had. If, however, [iib] by another attention of a different genus (i.e., by a simple and spiritual attention), then a still greater absurdity follows - namely, that a corporeal and extended form and force would toward the same location and through the same lines and angles have one attention that was simple and spiritual and another extended and corporeal.

40. - [4] Also, a species impressed on a spirit by a body would be either [i] [impressed] as far as its whole self and all of its [parts] by each of the parts of the corporeal form influencing it; or [ii] [impressed] by all [its parts] taken at once; or [iii] it will be [impressed] by one part as far as some of it, and by another as far as some more, and so on for the particular cases. But this isn't possible in any of these three ways, as I will prove. Therefore etc.

41. - [i] It is readily clear that the first way is impossible, because then the whole species would exist wholly from each of the parts, so that the whole would wholly be made many from many whole causes and according to the same species of making.

42. - [ii] The second way is also proven to be impossible. First, because we prove by experiment that when one part of an influencing and extended form is removed then

one part of the influx itself is taken away, even given that it is made in the same part or in the same point of air. For that ray or influx is taken away that flowed through a straight line from the part removed into that point of air; but the other influxes coming from other parts remain just as before. This would be impossible, however, if one and the same influx, with respect to all of it, came from all the parts taken at once. For then if one part of the influencing form were subtracted the whole influx would fail or the whole would remain; but if the whole were to remain then nothing would have flowed from the part removed.

43. - Second, because the unity or union of the parts of the form and the extended power is the same as their locational continuity. Therefore through this unity or continuity they do not rise up in order to produce some one thing by the unity of spiritual simplicity, but only by the unity of a locational concurrence and nexus.

44. - Third, because each part of the influencing form having its own position [20] distinct from or extrinsic to others has some immediate influx, in connection with which it also has its own attention through one direct line on the patient, and another one through another line, and so on for the particular cases. And hence each part impresses its own rays through its own lines drawn forth from it alone as from their base. These [rays], if they run together with others to the same point of the affected subject, proceed and radiate

outward through various lines and rays, so that what was on the right side of the first triangle or first pyramid running together to that point is afterwards on the left side of the second pyramid begun at that point. From this it is clear that each part's own influx or ray is distinct in this way through its partial essence from the rays of the other parts - just as one part of the influencing thing is distinct through its partial essence from the thing's other parts.

45. - Fourth, because an influxed species directly and immediately draws its whole essence from its own, immediate influencer, so that its influencer is the foundational [radicalis] and original basis of the influxed species. Therefore if all the parts of the influencer, taken at once, directly and immediately impress that whole species, then each, taken with the others, will be the direct and immediate basis of the whole species, and nothing will be in the species which would not basically, directly, and immediately flow and be derived from each part, taken with the others. This is impossible and perhaps in reality the same as to say that the whole would wholly flow from each [part].

46. - Fifth, because the influxed species represents its influencer by what it draws from it. But it is not in accordance with something belonging to itself that the cognitive species of a body's parts wholly represents every part of the body seen or the sound heard. Rather, if one part of the thing seen were subtracted, then one part of the vision

and the visual species is subtracted. Also, just as one part is seen or heard as it is partially distinct from the others and is located in another position, and as it is less than its whole, so a species must represent that part through something belonging to itself, as it is visually and spatially distinct from others, and [21] so on for the particular cases. But it is impossible that the particulars of these be brought about by that [species] through it itself entirely or through its whole representative force taken wholly. Moreover, as it would flow from all as they are taken only indistinctly, so it could represent none as distinct from another.

47. - [iii] The third way however - namely that it is by one part as far as some of it and by another as far as some more - is proven to be impossible. First, because then the species existing in the spirit would have parts, as if made continuous in this way with the parts of the extended form from which they are immediately impressed - just as the parts of an extended species impressed on a body are made continuous with them. From this it follows that the former would be spatial and extended just like the latter - or at least just like those [species] that flow from many parts in each point of air. And if each part of the influencer were to influence the spirit perpendicularly through a perpendicular attention, then the species impressed on it under the same dimensional attention will be made continuous with its original base.

48. - Second, because the parts of a species impressed on

a spirit in this way cannot have extended continuity or any locational union with each other, nor by impressing can the extended form impressing those [species] give to them the continuity of a spiritual, non-extended, non-spatial union. Therefore no part of the species will be united to another or made continuous by any union. From this it follows that infinitely many simple and indivisible [parts of the species] exist there, actually distinct. Indeed it also follows that nor are they simple, nor extended, nor indivisible, nor composed out of the always divisible in the way that a continuum is.

49. - [5] Further, in support of the principal thesis:⁶ Every influx is related by analogy to its influencing [cause] in such a way that its impressed essence is incomparably deficient from the impressing essence. On this account no substantial form can influence a substantial form, nor can any form that is habitually or fixedly and originally founded in its subject influence another [form] similarly and equally founded in the subject, although through its influxes it could draw out from the subject substantial and habitual forms [22] that are equal to it. This is true to such an extent however that even the divine essence cannot influence another essence distinct from itself, without its being infinitely deficient from its [the divine essence's] entity. Therefore every

⁶ I.e., the thesis that a body cannot by itself impress its species on a spirit (§37).

species impressed by a body or corporeal form is infinitely deficient from the entity and nobility of the corporeal form by which it is impressed. Therefore every species impressed on a spirit by a body would be infinitely more common and defective in essence than is the corporeal form itself. One has to assert the opposite of this, because the species of a spirit is living, cognitive and affective, or at least simple and spiritual, and is the informative act of the matter and subject incomparably transcending every body.

50. - [6] Also, matter or any sort of passive power that is, by its essence, appropriate only to a form infinitely transcending every body and every corporeal form, is altogether unsubjected and unsubjectible to any action or corporeal force. And this is the case not only because of its more noble form, but also because of its essence. But every passive material power that is simple and spiritual is of this sort. Therefore etc.

51. - [7] Also, simplicity and spirituality, by their nature, incomparably exceed corporeal extension and quantity. Therefore the essential simplicity and spirituality of the passive power of spirits incomparably exceeds every extension and quantity of anything corporeal. Therefore it is impossible that it be subject or subjectible to any extended force or its action.

52. - [8] Also, an influx immediately drawing its whole essence from its influencer is no less noble or vigorous with

respect to that attention by which it attends to its influencer more immediately and closely than it is with respect to that by which it is not so immediately and closely related to it. But nothing impressed immediately by a body draws spiritual simplicity and vitality with respect to that attention by which it is joined most immediately to the influencing body or by which it attends most immediately to it as to its origin [radicem] [23] and its original influencer. Therefore much less does it have spiritual and vital simplicity with respect to that attention by which, as if receding from the influencer, it is terminated and received in its subject.

53. - [9] Also, the simplicity, vitality, and spirituality or incorporeality of a species impressed on a spirit is so essential to that species that it does not seem to imply diverse essences - as if simplicity, incorporeality and vitality were kinds of essences added on top of that species' essence. Therefore from the same thing from which the essence of the species is impressed, its simplicity, incorporeality and vitality are impressed. It is absurd however to say that life is a kind of immediate influx of the non-living, simplicity an influx of the extended, incorporeality of the corporeal, cognitive of the non-cognitive, and so on for others.

54. - [10] Also, on whatever basis sound or heat impresses its species on a spirit, on that same basis local

motion and its impulse impose their species on a spirit. Also, on whatever basis they influence the spirit's cognitive powers, on that same basis they influence its substance, as it is moveable to various places, and even to a greater degree, to the extent that the spirit's ability to move to various places is inferior to the moveability of its powers with respect to cognitive and affective acts. Therefore a separate spirit existing in a vessel [vase] or in some corporeal place could through the contact of some body be violently pushed and expelled from that place to another place. This, among the learned, is utterly absurd.

55. - [11] Also, when the subject of some influx is of itself able to be moved to some terminus to which the influx inclines [it], then that terminus is naturally suited to be drawn out of the subject through such an influx - unless the influx is too weak in its species. But cognitive and volitional powers are able to be moved to some habits, toward which cognitive and affective acts and influxes incline and, considered in themselves, impel. Therefore these sorts of habits could have been brought forth from subjected powers through these [influxes]. If therefore [24] influxes of this sort are impressed [influxi] by a body, it follows that that body could through its influxes bring forth in and of a spirit habits that are cognitive, volitional, opiniative and creditive - both true and false - and it also follows that through contrary influxes they corrupt earlier habits and draw

out contrary habits. This no one of sane mind grants.

56. - [12] Also, a species through which a cognition is formally brought about represents an object so that, insofar as it represents it in this way, it is related more as the expresser than as the expressed. But, to the contrary, every impressed likeness, insofar as it is such, is a kind of expression flowing from the influencer, through which it does not entirely express itself as it is, but rather quite defectively - in the way, that is, in which the source is represented in its analogue. Hence seeing a ray of the sun impressed on the ground or air is very different from seeing the sun by fixing one's sight on the sun itself. Therefore the cognitive species through which the object is expressed and cognized is not impressed by the object, insofar as it is the object.

57. - [13] Also, the influx brought about by a body in a spirit is either [i] a cognitive action or [ii] an effective principle of such an action, or [iii] an action exciting the power to a cognitive act. But [i] the first option, namely that it itself is a cognitive action, cannot be advanced. First, because seeing is spoken of as to see actively, rather than as passively to be seen. Second, because we expressly sense that our acts of seeing or cognizing go forth or are produced by our intrinsic [powers], and [we sense] this intrinsically. Third, because in order to bring about and receive in us such an action from an object the virtual

attention of our active force and our actual intention actually tending toward the object would not need to be directed. Instead, it would suffice for its merely passive power, insofar as it is passive and material, to assist the object influencing it. The contrary of this we continually experience in ourselves. Fourth, because nothing in its ultimate and actual nature has the nature of a cognitive and vital act in such a way as does [25] a cognitive act. Therefore its effective principle ought to be most outstanding in the genus of cognitive and vital principles. Fifth, because the immediate influx and the passive power within which it is intimately, potently and predominantly influenced is attained by its immediate influencer. It is plain however that cognitive and appetitive acts are in the heart of the cognitive and appetitive power's interior. Therefore if they are influenced by a corporeal force, then that corporeal force potently and predominantly attains the heart of the soul's or spirit's powers. This is utterly absurd. Sixth, because then a body acting on and impressing cognitive acts would cognize through those subjected things or the subjective termini of their very acts more than [the body] would be cognized by the subject of those acts through them. Seventh, because according to this the action of a higher power - for example, an intellective one - would be influenced by the act of an lower power, since exterior objects do not enter higher powers and their acts unless through the intermediate acts of lower

powers. It is absurd however to say that the act of touching or sensing impresses on intellect an act of intellectual cognition, or that the act of intellectual cognition imposes on the will an act of willing.

58. - [ii] The second as well - namely that an influx sent from a body into a spirit is the effective principle of an act of cognizing - cannot stand, not only because of all the reasons set out above, but also because the spiritual, internal and immediate principle of an act of cognizing must, with respect to the foundational [radicalem] and principal existence of cognitive and vital things, be higher and more vital, foundational, and intimate to the spirit than is the act of cognizing itself. For just as that act exceeds its internal principle with respect to the ultimate nature of an actual apprehension [notitiae], so its source exceeds its act with respect to the foundational nature of being and with respect to the causal power of being a source [principiandi]. Therefore it is no less impossible for the internal and immediate source of the act of cognizing to be impressed by a body or by some bodily power than for the act itself of cognizing to be impressed immediately by a corporeal power.

59. - [26] [iii] The third as well - namely, that an influx sent from a body into a spirit is⁷ an action exciting the cognitive power to a cognitive act or to its turning itself to the object and intending toward it - cannot be

⁷ Omitting non.

maintained. First, because either the soul notices that excitation or exciting action or it does not. If it does not, then it does not seem that through it the soul would be excited or would awake to the act of cognizing or to turning itself to act. If it does, then the power was already turned and attentive to sensing that excitation. Also, according to this, that excitation would be a kind of object of the cognitive power, nor would it excite the power unless as a result of being cognized by it. Second, because the cognitive power cannot move and turn itself to its objects nor to its cognitive acts, because it belongs to the will's power alone to move itself and other powers. But if the action impressed by the body were to turn and move the powers to their objects, then it would not only have an excessively great command over the powers of spirits, but also it would further follow that corporeal objects would act on the powers before the powers were turned to them. The contrary of this is widely held. Third, because an exciting influx of this sort could not be other than a kind of likeness of that influencer. But the likenesses of things existing in the cognitive powers are either cognitive acts or the sources of such acts or memory species, which take the place of an object. These co-operate with the act of cognition only when the cognitive power is actually turned to them and attends and tends toward them.

60. - But perhaps you will object that one sleeping is awakened from sleep by a strong contact or sound; therefore

that contact or sound removed the power's unconsciousness and the aversion of its attention, and made the sensory power alert and turned its attention to itself. In response to this it should be said that the attentions of the sensory powers are not so totally unconscious nor retracted inward by sleep so as necessarily not to have [the ability] to notice and sense some object vehemently pressing upon and offering itself to the senses. [27] Nor is it unable to form in itself a passive sense from the object's terminative force so that through its vehemence the power's entire unconsciousness would be expelled and the power would be called back to an alert state and attention. Lest however you believe that greater difficulty is inherent in this position than in its contrary, notice that an affection brought about in a sense by contact or sound could hardly be sensed or noticed by sensing unless the power's attention was naturally turned to the affection beforehand. Also, an affection cannot be impressed on the soul's powers unless the power has been made open [patula] to its acting and influencing by a previous attention.

[II]

61. - After these, therefore, the second principal thesis must be proven, namely that a body cannot influence a spirit through the irradiation of an agent intellect or another cognitive power. [1] For that irradiation exists formally either in the intellective power alone or in its corporeal forms, in the way in which light from the sun influencing the

air exists formally in the air rather than in the sun. If, however, it exists only in the irradiating power, then corporeal powers are not by this rendered more actual and potent for impressing on the power intellectual or cognitive species higher than the corporeal forms themselves - just as nor is color that is not formally irradiated by a light rendered more actual by this for impressing its species on the eye or in the air. But if this irradiation exists formally in irradiated forms and in their matter, then it will be extended, just as the forms themselves, or it would have been whole in each of their parts, as the soul is in each part of a body. This shouldn't be proposed. Further, in whatever way it were to exist there, it would have to be proportionate to its subject's receptivity and consequently be just as inferior there to the forms existing in the intellective power as its matter would be inferior to the matter or material receptivity of the intellective power.

62. - [2] Also, species impressed by [28] forms irradiated in this way are more immediately impressed either by the irradiated forms or by an irradiation adjoined to them. But if by the forms themselves, then they would not transcend the nature of the influencing forms, but would rather be analogously deficient from the entity of the forms. But if they were to flow from the irradiation itself, then they would be species representative of that irradiation rather than of those forms.

63. - [3] Also, just as light and color differ, so the species or likeness of light differs from the species of color. Therefore irradiated light itself impresses one species, and another form subjected to this irradiation impresses another, and the things impressed differ only as far as do the things impressing them.

64. - [4] Also, species will be generated from forms irradiated in this way either [a] as from the matter out of which they will be made, or else [b] only as from an efficient cause. If [a] as from matter, then since all matter out of which something is generated remains in the thing generated and is part of the matter and constitutive of the thing generated, and since the thing generated is drawn out from it through a kind of transmutation and movement and nothing else, in such a way that such matter would have to lose its prior form and acquire another new one, and the thing generated would have to be composed out of that matter and this new form, therefore the forms from which the species would be produced would have to be a material and integral part of the species generated, and so on for the other aforesaid conditions, all of which are far too absurd. But if [b] species were produced solely from these as from an efficient cause, then at least the species generated by them would not be higher or more intellectual or more universal than would be the irradiated forms themselves, insofar as they are irradiated and insofar as they are effective and influencing

of species of this sort. But corporeal forms irradiated in this way did not lose their extension or corporeality, nor their prior specific nature, nor their corporeal matter in which they earlier existed. Therefore etc.

65. - [5] Also, every action of a cognitive power which is not a cognition is incomparably inferior to every action which [29] is itself a cognition. But the irradiation preceding an act of cognition is not itself a cognition. Therefore it is incomparably inferior to that. From this it follows that the intellect carrying out this irradiation, insofar as it is such, is inferior to the possible intellect, insofar as it is actually cognizing. It follows as well that a cognitive action and its immediate cause are far higher than every such irradiation.

66. - Note also that those five arguments set forth immediately above prove similarly and just as well that imaginary species,^a as irradiated by the agent intellect, do not impress on the intellect species that are intellectual, intellective and particular, and these arguments prove much more that they do not impress universals - although it was proven abundantly beyond this elsewhere that it is impossible that there be any universal species, and that, assuming that there were, their subject would have to be no less universal than them. The Catholic faith, however, and its sane and correct understanding, abhors real universality in anything

^a I.e., phantasms.

created. But it will be demonstrated below how one needn't, on account of the act of intellectually cognizing universals or particulars, posit an intellect irradiating imaginary or corporeal forms.

67. - It is easy to prove however that, on account of the subject's simplicity and spirituality, a body cannot impress on a spirit a simple, intellectual, living, spiritual, and cognitive species. For it is clear that a subject, inasmuch as it is a subject or inasmuch as it is receiving, is not an agent, and especially, inasmuch as it is receiving, is not the agent of that which it receives.

68. - Also, it is clear that an agent, inasmuch as it is an agent, receives nothing formal or active from its patient, inasmuch as it is such. Therefore a body, inasmuch as it is pressing [fluens] a species on a spirit, receives or acquires no active force of simplicity and spirituality from the spirit, inasmuch as the latter is only a patient [30] receiving a species impressed by a body.

69. - Also, the simplicity and spirituality of species is brought about by some agent. Therefore either the species or the body needs these things, and whichever needs them, it needs them either by impressing them or by drawing them from some matter. But given either of these, it is impossible that they should be produced by the simplicity of their subject, inasmuch as it is a subject.

70. - Also, the simplicity and intellectuality of species

either [a] does not or [b] does add something in reality [realiter] distinct from the species' essence. If [a] it does not, then that which impresses the essence of the species impresses its simplicity and intellectuality, by the very thing by which it impresses the essence. And, vice versa, that which impresses its simplicity eo ipso impresses its essence. If [b] it does add something, then many absurdities follow, since the simplicity will be a kind of simple essence and will be a kind of likeness of what impresses it. Also, the very essence of the species, if it does not have extended or spatial parts, is of itself simple without something else added to it. If however it does have such parts, then it will not be able to receive spiritual simplicity. Also, because the spiritual is general and a general character for all spiritual things, just as the corporeal is for all corporeal things, and the same goes for the simple with respect to all simple things and for the composite with respect to all composite things, it is clear that it is thus absurd to say that spirituality and simplicity are accidental or essences added onto spiritual and simple things themselves - just as it is absurd to say that corporeality is accidental or added onto bodies themselves or that composition is added onto the whole composite itself. Also, because essentially living forms are formally and essentially a kind of life, it is absurd to say that the nature of living or life is accidental to them or that it is another essence added onto them.

[III]

71. - Therefore after this the third principal thesis must be set forth - how, that is, in the way of natural connection something can be brought about by a body on [31] a soul. Strictly, there are four [modes] with respect to which [quoad] this is brought about: first, with respect to mode of existing; second, with respect to a habit or with respect to a manner of being habituated [modum se habendi]; third, with respect to the actual attention of the powers to the objects; fourth, with respect to local change or movement.

72. - There is however beyond this a fifth mode with respect to souls drawn or able to be drawn from corporeal matter. For because corporeal matter is moveable by some corporeal force so as to draw a soul's form from it, for that reason the drawing of the soul itself is able to be caused by its matter's aforesaid motive force. This ought not however to be proposed in the case of something having in itself matter and spiritual subsistence and which can be corrupted or generated by no created cause. But this fifth mode is not applicable to this question, since here we are inquiring into actions and affections received and effected in a soul as in a subject; the soul's generation and corruption however is not in the soul as in a subject, but only as in a terminus, although it is in its corporeal matter as in a subject.

73. - Therefore [a natural connection] is brought about first with respect to mode of existing - as when upon the

corruption of the human body's proper harmony the union of soul with body is dissolved and as a result of this the soul has a separate mode of existing. It is also brought about when in a body better or worse disposed the soul exists better or worse (or more strongly or weakly). It is also brought about when in an infant body the soul has a more limited mode of existing, and in a virile and perfect body it has a more expansive mode of existing.

74. - In the second way however [a natural connection] is brought about with respect to a habit - as when the original and habitual corruption of concupiscence is caused by an original and corrupt disposition of the body. For the aforesaid habitual corruption is not an action or act of concupiscence, since it exists only when we actually apprehend a concupiscible object. [32] Nor need some corrupt act necessarily and naturally be elicited from the soul's power when there is no distorted, corrupt habit. For otherwise the corruptness of that act would be turned back to the founder of the very soul's nature, and it could be said that the nature of its essence was essentially corrupt and essentially determined and necessitated to produce a corrupt act. Also, the aforesaid corrupt habit is not made by the soul, since it does not cause in itself an unnatural habit unless through some action that is intermediate and different from the habit made by it, nor does it cause in itself a corrupt habit unless through a corrupt action. This [action], if it is not free or

freely made, proceeds from another corrupt habit, as was said a little earlier. Further, in this way a habitual affection [affectio] of our taste to this or that flavor or food is brought about, caused by a varying complexion or disposition of the body. And hence this is often changed or varied with the body's varying disposition, so that according to one disposition something tastes good, while according to another it tastes bad. For sometimes we are so disposed and affected that sweet things taste bad to us and bitter or sour things taste good. Also, on account of varying dispositions of the brain and hearing, certain kinds of singing that sound good to some habitually sound bad to others, on account of a contrary disposition. And the same is the case for odors and visible and touchable things.

75. - [A natural connection] is brought about in the third way with respect to a power's actual attentions, and this in two ways (as is explained at more length in the question on the impediment of the use of free choice⁹). In one way it is brought about with respect to a particular and determinate attention to this or that object - as when someone with his hand directs¹⁰ his or my eye to this book. For with that, the visual power is turned to the book, and with that an attention to the book is given to it. A general and indeterminate attention, however, is given to the alert when

⁹ II Sent. q.59 (II, 546ff).

¹⁰ Reading 'gerat' for 'girat.'

they are awoken from sleep, which is taken away from them by sleep.

76. - [33] The fourth way is with respect to local movement. For by the fact that someone moves my body from one place to another, by that fact the soul is moved with its body from place to place. For it cannot be said that the soul is moved then in this way per accidens, as a song is seen per accidens when the person singing, as he is colored, is seen. For vision in no way reaches the song itself, but only its subject. But when the soul changes place along with the body, then that change truly is in the soul, and is brought about in the soul by the body's local motion through just the natural connection of the soul with the body. And this happens likewise when with the extension and dilation or rarefaction of corporeal matter its form - e.g., heat, light, odor, taste, etc. - is dilated or extended.

77. - Some however add another way - namely, when the action of one power follows the action of another, as when the act of seeing is followed by the act of judging in the common sense and by the act of cognizing or observing [advertendi] in the intellect, or when the enjoyment of a lower appetite is followed by enjoyment in a higher. But according to others the action of one power is never immediately caused by another, since then it would not be an action but only an affection [passio] or motion of that power in which it was brought about by another power and by its action. It's in this connection

that the turning of sight and intellect to their objects is brought about by the will and its willing. For sight's turning is not its action, but only an affection or passive motion. Therefore it ought rather to be said that the act of a higher power follows the act of a lower as its object, so that the higher act is caused by the lower as by an object terminating a higher act and the first attention of a higher power. But still the natural connection of the powers is the cause of why the lower power's act is the terminal and connatural object [34] of the higher.

78. - It could also be said beyond this that a certain attractive affection caused by the lower power's act precedes the higher power's action. When however the lower is moved by the higher, then a certain forceful [impulsiva] affection and impression made by the higher power's act naturally goes before the lower's action. And indeed this second [act] must be posited in the lower power, since it does not have the higher's act for an object. But in the higher power this need not always be supposed in this way, since this could have been brought about in the other way proposed earlier. Or, on behalf of the prior way, it can be said that just as the sharpness of a sword is the result of the back and forth movement given to its matter, so - since the matter of the soul's powers is all the same - the action of one is like a kind of motion of its matter common to each power, through which another power is, as it were, joined to its act. For these sorts of reciprocal

motions of powers are possible in actions and objects connected to each other. And according to this the first [explanation] perhaps speaks the truth.

79. - Further, it should be known that the patient itself co-operates with the agent through a connection, not only in the manner of something receptive, nor only in the manner of something moveable, but also through its formal inclination and union to that to which it is connected. This inclination is equivalent to an impulse or influx made in the moveable by the mover. For on this account the movement in that other part is brought about only on the impulse and movement of the thing connected to it, without another impulse and influx given to it.

80. - Further it should be known that the connection of a spirit to a body on account of which the movement or disposition of one overflows to another consists principally in the formal union of [a] a spirit to a body as to its matter and [b] a body to the spirit as to its form. This union cannot be given to a rational spirit unless by the creator. But secondarily this connection consists in many powers of the soul running together in the same spiritual matter of the soul itself. In both cases however the identity [35] of matter is the cause of why some effect in the soul should follow an impression directly made in the body, as if the first impression made in a body were a kind of motion of the soul itself. For it is a motion of the soul to the extent that it

is a motion of its corporeal matter.

81. - If however you were to object, just as it was objected above against an influx, that either the whole motion of the soul is caused [i] by each part of the corporeal motion or [ii] by none or [iii] one of its parts is caused by one and another by another, it should be said that that manner of arguing has a proper place in the case of impressions, since they flow directly from the essence of the influencing form. And so it must be that what immediately flows from one part of the influencing [form] would not flow immediately from another. But in the case of things that are drawn from the subject's moveability through a first impulse, it need not be the case that from one part of the impulse one part of the drawing out is made, and from another another. Rather sometimes when many impulses are impressed on a ship by many men one and the same movement of the whole ship is brought about, so that each co-operates in the whole movement of the ship and no one is the whole cause of that motion, but rather everyone taken together. For the movement following a single impulse does not follow that or any other one, unless because that which it follows has a certain degree of intensity and greatness.

[IV]

82. - But concerning the fourth principal thesis - namely, how an object, insofar as it terminates the attentions and acts of powers, co-operates in their specific production -

it should be known that the object, insofar as it is such a terminus, has the nature of a terminus that is fixive, penetrative, presentative, signative or configurative, and representative or cognitive. For a cognitive act and attention is fixed on an object and intentionally has it absorbed [imbibitum] within itself. On this account a cognitive act is called an apprehension of and apprehensive extension [tentio] to the object. Through this extension and absorption the act is intimately conformed and configured to the object; also, the object itself presents or exhibits itself as present to [36] the cognitive attention and through an act configured to it [there] is a kind of representation of it. For just as the actual irradiation of a spherical or square vessel is made spherical or square by the mere fact that light generates it in conformity to the figure of its receiver and container, so, since a cognitive force generates a cognitive act with a certain informative absorption of the act to the object, and with a certain ensigned and visceral extension to the object, thus because it is produced in this way it is made the very likeness and ensigned expression of the object.

83. - And from this it follows that the simple essence of a cognitive act has in itself two noble characteristics. The first of these is, as it were, fundamental to the second, and the second is, as it were, the differential determination of the first. For because the cognitive action comes from the cognitive principle's spiritual light, it belongs to the

action to be a kind of light and, as it were, a kind of ray analogously similar to the principle from which it flows. But from the fact that it is of such an object or is fixed on or has such an object as a terminus, it belongs to the action to be its expressive vision or cognition or highly similar image. And this characteristic is related to the first just as the articulation of a word is related to its general character, according to which it is a sound.

84. - But if the object were to impress this second characteristic, and if the cognitive force (whatever that may be) were to impress the first, then there would necessarily be two distinct essences of distinct genera and species. There would also be two actions brought about by two principles of distinct genera. Also, when the cognitive force were to see itself, then this two-fold influence and action would come from it, for the first would come from it insofar as it is seeing, and the second would come from it insofar as it is seen. Supposing therefore that these two characteristics are not two really distinct essences, but only one, then both are brought about by a cognitive force as by an agent, and again both are brought about by an object as by something terminating. For the first characteristic of the aforesaid act can as little be brought about without an object as can the second. But an object-cause can be properly placed in the genus of final cause, or, if you wish to call it by its more proper name, it would be called a terminative cause. For just

as a material cause [37] truly has the character of a cause with respect to what is drawn from it or received in it, although it is not properly its efficient cause, so a terminative cause truly has the character of a cause, although it is not properly the efficient cause of the action terminated in it.

85. - It should further be known that because the cognitive act of an individual object is terminated at it, insofar as it is this individual and not another, so it is of the essence of such an act that it be the proper likeness of this individual insofar as it is of this one, and that it is not the likeness of other individuals of the same species, insofar as they individually differ from it. Therefore this act represents the individual character and proper quality [proprietatem] of its object not because it exists in corporeal matter or because it flows from a corporeal form limited to here and now, as the Aristotelians say, but rather because it is terminated at the individual object, insofar as it is individual, and this in the aforesaid way. But the memory species left by such an act has this [determination to an individual] from the act itself by which it has been caused and which it expresses, as that act is or was terminated in such an object. For I ask the aforesaid whether a species impressed on the eye by this or that body or stone could be preserved in the eye by the divine power, when that stone is destroyed or absent. And certainly they will say yes, if they

are Catholic and faithful to God. And when this is granted, I ask whether that species will represent only that stone and its individual proper qualities, wherever the eye is led. If they say yes, then that species still has in itself some character and appropriation through which it represents that individual and not another. And no other reason for this can be given but that its representation is essentially related to that stone as to a proper object, present or absent, although that by which it is related [to it] as present [38] greatly differs from that by which it is related [to it] as absent - as will be touched upon in the following questions.

86. - It should be known beyond this that because the aforesaid dual causes concur in a cognitive act, we therefore sense through experience two natures in that act, as if opposed. For to the extent that the act goes out from an internal cognitive principle, we sense that it is our action and a kind of acting of ours going out from us and, as it were, extending to an object and tending toward it. But to the extent that it is brought about by an object as by something terminating, it seems to us to be a kind of affection driven into us, as it were, by an object and with that object, as if the object itself were impressed and penetrated inside our power. And it is on the basis of this second experience that almost everyone was moved who said that cognitive and even affective acts are impressed and imposed by their immediate objects - not paying attention to the first experience with

its fundamental characteristics, touched on above and to be touched on more fully in the following questions, nor paying attention to how each experience can be preserved and verified through the concurrence of the dual causes and the causality already mentioned.

87. - On this basis the falsity is clear of the kind of argument that Aristotle gives in II De anima [417a7ff], where he says that [i] when an agent sufficiently actualized to act and a patient sufficiently disposed for being affected are present to each other, action always and necessarily follows - for instance, when something combustive and something combustible are present to each other, combustion is always brought about; but [ii] if a cognitive action is not [brought about] by an object nor by something impressed by that object, but is [brought about] by the cognizer alone, then the agent and the recipient of the act of cognizing are always present to each other, since that action is brought about and received in the cognizer himself; therefore [iii] every cognition of any object will always exist in actuality in the one cognizing.

88. - The [i] major and [ii] minor of this argument are false or ambiguous [duplex] and so their ambiguity should be distinguished. For if its attention to the object is not included under the heading of agent, [39] nor is its being terminated by the object or in the object, then the major and minor are false. For although a cognition does not come from

an object as from an agent strictly so called, it does nevertheless come from it as the terminative [object] of the active attention and its act. And so to that extent a cognition is from an object as from an agent broadly so called, and so the object's presence is needed there, and in addition the attention's fixation on it. And in addition to this, with respect to free acts, the premises are false, as has been shown sufficiently in the question on free choice. Nor is it like the case of something combustive and combustible: for one, because no object other than the combustible is needed there; also, because the combustive agent's attention to the combustible is not varied or lacking when they are present to one another, in the way that when a power and object are present to one another the cognitive power is able not to have its attention fixed on the object; also, because the combustive agent is not free, nor is combustion a free action, in the way that the action of a free will is free.

[Solution to the Objections]

89. - From the aforesaid the solution to the objections is clear. To the first it should be said that although everything passive is inferior to everything active on the basis of its first genus, nevertheless this is not so on the basis of its species. Hence although spiritual matter is inferior to every form and every active thing with respect to

the general character of matter or being able to be affected,¹¹ it is not inferior as far as its specific character, by which it is spiritual and simple. Further, matter, as it is informed and elevated by an exceedingly powerful form, is higher than many forms. Also, a cognitive power is not assimilable to a corporeal form through some corporeal likeness impressed by it, but only through its own acts or through species caused by acts of this sort or given by God.

90. - [40] To the second it should be said that the first [premise] is false, unless 'agent' is taken broadly for something that co-operates in the manner of something that terminates - just as [it is taken] strictly for agents whose presence is no less needed for the production of a cognitive act than is the presence of the act's own efficient [cause].

91. - But to that which is added about the specific diversity of acts following the specific diversity of objects, the reply is clear from the aforesaid. For just as they are caused by an object as by its terminus terminating them, so they draw from it a species conformed to the object, and in this way they draw distinct species from distinct objects. But since the formal and intrinsic character of that act by which it is formally terminated in such an object comes from that cognizer effectively and as an influx, just as it is terminatively in that object and from that object, so too that

¹¹ Reading 'passibilis' for 'possibilis.'

very thing that the act draws terminatively from the object it draws effectively and as an influx from the cognizer himself.

92. - But when it is said that from the influence of one species alone the influxes of distinct species cannot be brought about, it should be said that this is not true when those influencing [forces] co-operate with distinct objective termini in distinct terminative manners. Nor, beyond this, is this true unqualifiedly when that influencing [force] can influence distinct subjects having distinct ways of being affected and of receiving its influx. For this reason the impulse by which an angel impels itself to a place differs in species from that by which it impels a body. And perhaps for this reason colors of the rainbow belong to distinct species. For a ray of the sun's being split up and received in different ways in the various parts of a cloud or of its moist precipitation is the cause of why a ray in different subjects belongs to different species either really or apparently - that is, either according to itself or relative to our observation. For sometimes the real diversity of species or colors is not in the light seen by us, but only relative to our sight. For that variety is in reality made in our act of seeing, as is clear when the same light of a lamp sometimes seems to us to be nearly dark or obscure smoke, but sometimes nearly green, sometimes nearly red, sometimes nearly yellow or gold, and sometimes just a bright flame.

93. - [41] Also, in reply to what is alleged concerning

the contrariety of acts, it should be said that cognitions that are brought to bear on contrary objects are not always contrary even though they are specifically diverse; rather, the apprehension of one contrary includes in itself as it were the apprehension of the other. But when cognitions are brought to bear on contrary objects or on the same object in contrary ways, then they are contraries - for example, when the same thing in the same respect and for the same time is believed to be white and black, or is believed to exist and not to exist. In this way, however, one of the contrary acts is false and erroneous, and solely by reason of its falsity is contrary to the true act. Its falsity however sometimes proceeds from a deformed emotion [affectus] distorting or misleadingly twisting intellect and its judgment, and sometimes from a defect of an intellect unable to discern the object's truth. It is not however impossible or absurd for a power that is free or freely moveable by a free power to be able to be moved to the same object in distinct and contrary ways or sometimes, as a result of its natural defect or [the defect] of things concurring and co-operating in its act, to act defectively and so to bring about a defective act opposed to a perfect act.

94. - To the third it should be said that an action brought about within an agent can afflict that agent as a result of four kinds of causes. First, because it is brought about by the agent itself in a way that is defective, as well as unnatural and inappropriate for the agent. This happens

whether the defective way of acting comes from a defect of the agent or from something else often concurring in the production of its act. For an active power often, for its part, needs the right disposition [habitu] and attention and, if it is organic, needs the proper disposition of the organ. It also needs many other aids, a defect or disturbance to which makes an act defective, disturbed and, consequently, disturbing of that in which it is received.

95. - The second kind of cause occurs as a result of the disproportionality of the object terminating and, in the way mentioned above, penetrating (as it were) [42] into that agent or cognizer. For as a result of this a certain disproportionality follows in that act, through which [the act] is sometimes so disproportionate to the agent itself that it perturbs and dissipates its calm and proportional state. (Here I call a state a certain accidental mode of existing and of attending and of being disposed, which sometimes is complete and at rest and sometimes incomplete and disquieted.)

96. - The third kind of cause occurs as a result of an action hurting through its excess or disturbance the material and corruptible organ of the agent's own power, from which there results in the power an improper manner of existing and of being disposed in that organ and consequently an improper manner of further acting.

97. - The fourth kind of cause is the repugnance of the object to some natural or unnatural affection [affectionem] of

the agent, on which account that affection cannot harmoniously and peacefully adhere to the object; rather, it flees and recoils from it in horror and, since it cannot at will repel it from itself, it is through a strong discontent hurt or sad. As far as this way, however, I dealt with it more fully in the question on the punitive torture of damned spirits by the fire of hell. For without this fourth way the three first ways perhaps do not suffice to cause joy or sadness, as was shown in more detail there. If nevertheless they do suffice without this fourth one, that is fine with me, since it is not contrary to the opinion that we sustain here. In the aforesaid ways however action does not afflict the agent insofar as it is an action, but insofar as it is an affection [passio] or is introducing an affection, or insofar as it is defective and badly ordered or disproportional, or insofar as it exhibits, represents, and terminatively impresses and imbeds a displeasing object to a natural or unnatural affection [affectioni]. But although an agent, insofar as it is an agent, is inclined to its own action as to something suitable to it, it is nonetheless not inclined insofar as [43] it defectively or disproportionately acts and brings about a disproportionate action.

98. - The reply to the fourth is clear from what was said above, since the sense of that experience does not come from the fact that the object, as an influx, brings about the cognitive act, but from the fact that it is terminated in it

in the manner of something terminating and, as it were, penetrating.

99. - To the fifth it should be said that a greater object is more easily heard, seen, or sensed because it has a greater force terminating the cognitive attention and act, and because, as in itself it is more active and thriving, so it more vehemently and actively offers itself to that attention and act. Also, since our senses have a slight attention with respect to a slight object, and with respect to a greater and equally near object they have a more extensive one, thus the act of sensing elicited from such a more extensive attention is virtually greater and more extensive and consequently more evident to the one sensing. And hence sometimes [this act] fills as it were the entire capacity of the sensory power, and sometimes it nearly exceeds it. Also, it is not always true that a greater object is more easily seen than a lesser one, but only when the greater according to all its circumstances is situated [se habet] more proportionally and actively than is the lesser object with respect to such a cognitive power and its attention and act. Otherwise our intellect would more easily see God or angels than these lower things, and our eyes could more easily see a glorified body or ^{the} highest heaven or the entire earth than a single fire or fruit near to it.

100. - In addition, the proof of the minor added on there is wrong in two ways. First, because the object is not related as the moveable to the active force of cognizing or to its

act, and thus groundlessly and falsely is the greater object taken there for the greater moveable, and the lesser for the lesser. Hence it ought rather to be said that just as one casting an arrow at a slight mark [44] and terminus does not so easily hit it as one casting it at a great and lofty mark and terminus, so too one casting one's visual and auditory attention to a great and highly visible object more easily and unchangeably sees or hears it than something less grand and visible. It is wrong secondly, because it is not unconditionally and absolutely always true that a greater or equal power always moves more easily anything less moveable, since we grasp and take in hand with more difficulty an imperceptible and impalpable atom than a single fruit. Therefore this [claim] should be understood [only] when a motive power is greater or more able to move more easily something less moveable, so that the greatness of the motive power always implies a greater dominance over the moveable and its movement.

101. - The reply to the sixth is clear from the aforesaid. For it is one thing for the active power's attention to be inclined to what is under it and under its capability, in a way that is not repugnant to its nature. It is another for it to be elevated above its capability, in a way repugnant to its nature. But when a spirit impels a body, then the spirit is inclined to what is inferior to it, and is inclined by an attention that is simple and spiritual and

consequently conformed to the nature of that spirit. If however a body were to influence a spirit, then it would be elevated above its powers and this would happen through a visual attention that is repugnant to its corporeal nature. Also, as was said above, it is not contrary to the nature of an influx that it be analogously deficient compared to its influencer; but it is contrary to its nature that it transcend its influencer.

102. - To the seventh it should be said that every body agrees [convenit] with every other body in extension and locational position of parts, insofar as it is of itself divisible, and also in extensional and locational attention. For all things act under such an attention and otherwise cannot act. They also agree in the specific quiddity of matter and so, as far as the matter is concerned, [45] they are interchangeable with each other. Hence Augustine, in book VII Super Genesim ad litteram [ch.12], says that it is of course not incredible that every body can be changed into every other body, but it is absurd to say that every body can be changed into a soul. And so it is not correct that if the body of a more lowly form can act on the body of a more noble form, then it could likewise act on a spirit. Moreover, to argue like this - 'a certain superiority does not take away the possibility of being affected by an inferior; therefore no superiority takes this away' - is to argue by fallacy of the consequent.

103. - To the eighth it should be said that original [sin] passes by affecting - not through an influx but in the manner of a natural connection, as has been shown above [¶74].

104. - Through this the reply to the ninth is clear.

105. - To the tenth it should be said that in the way in which what generates the sensory soul of brutes can [act] on its substance, it can also [act] on its power - namely, by drawing both from matter. But it does not follow from this that just as it can draw both from corporeal matter, so it could directly influence both when already drawn out. The reason for this is that it draws out both by influencing corporeal matter alone, and it does this through a corporeal influx and attention. But it could not directly influence a soul's power when already drawn out except through a spiritual influx and attention, which would not be immediately directed and inclined to corporeal matter, but first and foremost [prius et potius] to the soul's simple power and substance. And as a result of this the reason is clear why generating a cognitive act in the soul of brutes would be greater and loftier than drawing that soul from corporeal matter, unless perhaps the opinion is true of those who say that the souls of brutes can be made by God alone.

106. - But perhaps it will be objected that the action and habits of the cognitive power of brutes exist only in its corporeal matter, [46] since the soul of brutes has no matter other than corporeal. And as a result of this it seems that

they could be influenced by a corporeal power. But it should be said in reply to this that a cognitive action and its habits naturally cohere to the substantial form of the soul and the cognitive power before they cohere to its matter. For they can be received in matter - especially corporeal [matter] - only through a preceding intermediate form of the soul and its power. Nor is matter - especially corporeal [matter] - receptive of them in any other way. And so a power influencing acts and habits of this sort must have the attention directly turned and elevated over the soul's substantial form and cognitive power - as over the first and immediate subject of its influx. And I take 'subject' here broadly for everything which lies under some form, even if it does not lie under it as matter of itself entirely unformed. It is clear from this however that it is not entirely a similar situation with respect to acts and habits of the sensory [soul] of brutes and of us, since just as our [sensory soul] is founded principally in spiritual matter more than corporeal matter, so too is this the case for its habits and acts, at least those which it can carry out and possess after its separation from the body.

107. - To the eleventh it should be said that when matter is of itself subjectible to the action of such an agent, and its actual subjection and reception does not diminish the form and the person belonging to that matter, nor is it incompatible for the matter to co-exist with its form, then it is more noble for that person to be able to subject his matter

to that action than not to be able. And so it is with the glorious bodies of the blessed. But when the contrary of all these has to be postulated, then it would be not only ignoble to be able to do this, but indeed altogether impossible. And so it is in this case.

108. - To the twelfth it should be said that the first premise is false, at least speaking of a species that is simple through spiritual simplicity, which is entirely different from spatial and point-like simplicity, and far higher than it. For a species that is simple in this way can be made to exist first and immediately only in a power or nature that is simple [47] and spiritual, and it can be impressed by an agent only through a simple and spiritual attention. But a point-like species - if one is to postulate this - is located and situated in a certain, situated place beyond which it is not extended. And it is influenced by a body through a point-like and linear attention. But a species that is simple through spiritual simplicity could not immediately inform a body or be impressed on it by a body or a spirit, as will be shown more fully in the following questions - although this might be clear enough from the aforesaid.

109. - Further, it can be said that no species or form can be point-like. And first, for the reason that every continuum and every part of it is always divisible in infinitum, nor is it composed out of points or point-like

[parts]. Second, because a point-like part of a form could exist only in a point-like part of corporeal matter. A heap of corporeal matter however is not composed out of point-like parts, or out of indivisible atoms, even according to Aristotle. And if it were composed out of them, then necessarily an infinite number of point-like parts would actually exist in it. Third, because, as was proven elsewhere, a point does not imply anything beyond the parts of the line to which it belongs, but is only their intrinsic termination or finish. And so the point of an extended form is nothing other than its finish and a part of it. Those however who postulate that a point-like species is generated from one whole body and is representing the whole do not intend to say that it is only the finish of an extended species, but rather that it is a certain species of the whole body complete in itself.

110. - Therefore in response to the point-like contact of spheres it should be said that by the name 'contact' is understood only the coherence or coassistance of two bodies by which they cohere or coassist with each other externally, so that the formal coherence of one does not inhere formally to the other. Therefore that coherence can be considered either [i] with respect to the subject [48] in which it exists; [ii] with respect to the extrinsic terminus toward which it exists; [iii] with respect to its whole coherence and existence; or [iv] with respect to some end or medium of it. With respect to

the first two modes of the above distinction the extended and total location or 'where' and the arrangement of its subject are the same. For through the same 'where' or through the same location through which a body exists in this place it coheres and can cohere with everything immediately surrounding that place. But in the second two modes these are the same: some point-like terminus or point-like union or point-like termination either of that location or of the parts of spheres located through it and cohering in that alone [which is] exactly similar to the point of another sphere. For just as many parts of a sphere surround on all sides the same point-like middle [medium] and are contained in it and through it, so all those [parts] are joined in the same [middle] to another similar point of another sphere. Nor is this [the case] here any more than when two long tables are superficially joined to each other, so that the middle of one [end] is joined to the middle of another [end] and the termini to the termini. For the juncture of point-like middles of this sort and of the termini is the same as the point-like middles and the point-like termini of each surface's locations.

111. - But in reply to what is said - that to be touched is a kind of affection [passio] introduced by the one touching and that just as a sphere can touch a sphere at a point, so it can irradiate it at a point - it should be said that to be touched, taken in the aforesaid way, does not imply any affection of the thing touched, but only that the extrinsic

terminus of the thing touched coheres to the other body. Nevertheless it is true that in bodies which right after that contact impress their actions to themselves in return there is some affection adjoined to the aforesaid touch. But that cannot be point-like, since it cannot in this way be one in each of the parts of the matter continuous with that point, as that point-like continuity of all those parts can be one. Therefore that [49] irradiation brought about by the parts of the sphere concurring at the same point and brought about in the parts of the other sphere concurring at a similar point must be extended, just as are those parts of the body informed by it.

112. - But perhaps against this an objection will be made concerning the superficial irradiation of a wall, on the basis of which no part seems to be irradiated in its deep or dense [parts] but only in its superficial [parts], from which it seems likewise that the parts of a sphere could be irradiated in a point-like fashion by another sphere in just its point-like terminus. Two responses are made to this. For some say that an irradiation which seems to be on the surface of the wall is not in it as in a subject, but only in the air adhering to it. But it goes against this response that according to it the color of a wall is not through such an irradiation made more active so as to generate the species of its color in the air, nor through such an irradiation is it made visible or more visible. There is therefore another

response, that the irradiation of a wall attains something of its density or depth - at least some minimum invisible to us - and likewise attains the color of the wall. Otherwise no part of the color would be made bright and visible through it [the irradiation], since every part of the color has some density or depth, just as the part of the matter that it informs.

113. - But in reply to that which is added - namely, that in every lit or hot point there is light and heat - it can be said in one way that simpliciter it is false, and in another way that secundum quid it is true - in the way, that is, in which a thing exists secundum quid in its terminus. Or this can be said inasmuch as the point-like terminus of light or heat or of a lit or hot [point] does not imply anything located outside it, but rather within it.

114. - To the thirteenth it should be said that the minor is false, whether quantity is an accident of corporeal forms or not. For some things are accidents, to whose genus their subject is so related that it is impossible for it [the subject] to exist, even miraculously, without another accident of that genus. [50] And this is obviously clear in the case of position or 'where' [ubi]. For no body can be made without any local position, although one could be made without this or that position. And the same is the case for all intrinsic and accidental unions and transpositions of the parts of homogeneous bodies - for example, of water, air, earth, or wax. For it is impossible that they should exist without one

of these accidental unions, although they could exist without this or that one. Therefore a genus opposed to the genus of such accidents can in no way be suited per se to such subjects. And so it is in this case. Given that quantity in accordance with everything that it implies [secundum totum illud quod dicit] is an accident, still much more is it [so] if quantity according to some [aspect] of it is sometimes something essential to form or matter that is extended or numbered. In both ways however the major of the [first] subproof above is false. For given that bodies are not of themselves and absolutely quanta in such a way that quantity is their very essence, still nevertheless they are of themselves so quantified that by no means can their essences be made or exist except with some quantity. For the limitation by which they are limited to the genus of quantity or to quantity in general is completely essential to every body.

115. - In reply to the second subproof it should be said that not everything intelligible is intellectual. Otherwise no quantitative extension would be intelligible or intellectually cognized by us. Also, since it is established that everything intellectual is incorporeal and belongs to a genus different from any body (even if the body were point-like), it is clear that it is impossible for any species or quiddity of bodies or bodily things to be something intellectual. And I speak of these as they remain in the genus of bodies. For God could convert every body into a spirit, but not in such a way that

they would at the same time be in the genus or species of bodies. But how quantity or the extension of bodies implies something accidental and [51] something essential to the essences of forms and extended matter has been touched on in enough detail elsewhere.

116. - In addition, the quiddity of sensible things is in a way cognized by the senses, for to see a light is the same as to see the entity of light. But quiddity is said to be cognized by intellect alone to the extent that by the name 'quiddity' we are accustomed to signify the essence of a thing, as it is taken unconditionally and as it is common to all its individuals or as it is taken as a definition or definitive, intelligibly indicating what this or that is.

117. - To the fourteenth it should be said that the first premise is false in speaking of a corporeal quantum or continuum, although it is true in speaking generally both of corporeal quantity and of spiritual quantity or magnitude. Indeed in these cases one has to posit a certain ordered union of the corporeal parts; quantity of this sort, both intensive and extensive, is found both in acts and in habits of the soul. Extension however I call the dilation or diffusion of a cognitive act over many parts of an object, for it is more dilated to the extent that it sees more parts at once.

118. - But that which is added, that it draws this extension from the object, is true as from a terminative [cause], but not as from an efficient taken strictly. Hence

also in the same way it draws its essence from the object as from a terminative [cause] -but not as from some influx or something drawing it out through a preceding influx.