

APPENDIX B1 - HENRY OF GHENT

Summa of Ordinary Questions a.1 q.1: Can a human being know anything?

[Quod Non]

[f.1r] 1. - Concerning the first of these questions it is argued that a human being cannot know anything. First, on the basis of the way of knowing, as follows: Whatever a human being knows he knows from something prior and better known to him (I PostAn., I Physics). But hence a human being cannot know anything except by knowing it through something prior and better known than it, and (for the same reason) by knowing this through something else that is prior and better known than it, and so on to infinity. But by coming to knowledge in this way one can know nothing at all, according to the Philosopher in II Metaphysics. Therefore etc.

2. - Second, on the basis of the medium by which it is known, as follows: Every human intellectual cognition has its origin in the senses (I Met. and II PostAn.). But pure [syncera] truth shouldn't be sought from the bodily senses, according to Augustine (83 Quae., q.9). Therefore a human being cannot know pure truth through intellectual cognition. But one can know only by knowing pure truth, since nothing is known but the true (I PostAn.) and it is not truth unless it is pure - that is, clear [pura] of falsity - according to Augustine (83 Quae., q.1). Therefore etc.

3. - Third, those denying knowledge argued on the basis

of the same middle term as follows (as is said in IV Met.): The senses apprehend nothing concerning reality with certainty. For if something appears to one person concerning any given thing, its contrary appears to another concerning that same thing. And what appears to a given person at a given time and in a given disposition, its contrary appears to the same person at a different time and in a different disposition. Therefore since intellect apprehends nothing unless through the senses, it can apprehend nothing with certainty concerning anything at all. But there can be knowledge only by apprehending something certain and determinate, according to the Philosopher (VI Met.). Therefore etc.

4. - Fourth, their argument on the basis of the knowable is similar (IV Met.), as follows: There is knowledge only of what is fixed and stable, according to Boethius (I Arith.). But in sensible things, [f.1v] from which all human cognition mediated by the senses is taken, there is nothing fixed or stable. This is according to Augustine, who says (83 Quae., q.9) that "that which is called sensible is changed without any intervening time." Therefore etc.

5. - Fifth, on the basis of the knower. This is the argument of the Meno at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics [71a29f], by which it was denied that there is knowledge. As the Commentator says (on IX Met.): No one learns unless he knows something - so [too] according to Augustine

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(III De acad.) and the Philosopher (IX Met.). But one who knows something doesn't learn, since learning is a movement to knowing. Therefore there is no one who learns anything. But no one who has not learned anything can have organized knowledge [disciplinam], according to Augustine (ibid.). Therefore etc.

6. - Sixth, it is argued based on the same middle term, by forming the argument in another way, as follows: One learns nothing who knows nothing; but one who learns nothing can't have organized knowledge; therefore one who knows nothing can't have organized knowledge. Every human being at first knows nothing, since the human intellect, before it receives species, is like a blank slate on which nothing has been inscribed, as is said in III De anima. Therefore etc.

7. - Seventh, on the basis of the object, as follows: One who doesn't perceive the essence and quiddity of a thing, but only its image [idolum], can't know [scire] the thing. For one who has seen only a picture of Hercules doesn't know [novit] Hercules. A human being, however, perceives nothing of a thing, except only its image - i.e., a species received through the senses, which is an image of the thing and not the thing itself. For not the stone but a species of the stone is in the soul. Therefore etc.

[In Oppositum]

8. - It is argued to the contrary. First, by the argument of the Commentator (on the beginning of II Met.) as follows: Natural desire is not in vain. A human being according to the

Philosopher (I Met.) desires by nature to know. Therefore the desire of a human being to know is not in vain. But it would be in vain unless he were able to know. Therefore etc.

9. - Second, based on the same middle term, by forming the argument in another way, as follows: It is possible for what a person naturally desires to come to him, according to what Augustine says (IV Contra Julianum): 'Nor would all human beings wish by natural instinct to be blessed unless they could be.' A human being naturally desires to know. Therefore etc.

10. - Third, again from almost the same middle term, as follows: Anyone can attain the perfection to which he is naturally ordered, since otherwise [his existence] would be in vain. Knowing is the perfection of a human being to which he is naturally ordered, since one's happiness, according to the Philosopher (X Ethics), consists in speculative knowledge. Therefore etc.

11. - Fourth, as follows: The Philosopher says (III&IV Met. and II De caelo) that it is impossible for that which cannot be completed to be begun by an agent through nature or reason. For every movement has an end and a completion on account of which it exists. But according to the Philosopher (I Met.) human beings philosophized and first began to investigate prudence for the sake of knowing and understanding and escaping ignorance. Therefore it is possible for a human being to know and understand.

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12. - **Fifth**, as follows: According to Augustine (De vera relig.) one who wonders whether someone can know something doesn't wonder whether he is wondering; rather, he is certain. But he is certain only of a known truth. Therefore it is necessary for one who wonders whether he knows to concede that he knows something. But this wouldn't be so unless he were able to know something when he is able to wonder. Therefore etc.

13. - **Sixth**, in almost the same way, the Philosopher and his Commentator (IV Met.) argue as follows: One who denies that there is knowledge says with this that he is certain that there is no knowledge. But he is certain only of something that he knows. Therefore one who denies that there is knowledge and that a human being can know necessarily has to concede that there is knowledge and that a human being can know something. And this argument is similar to that argument by which the Philosopher concludes in IV Metaphysics that one who denies that there is speech must necessarily concede that there is speech.

[Reply]

14. - It should be said that I take 'to know' broadly for every certain apprehension [notitiam] by which a thing is cognized as it is, without any mistake or deception. And when the question is put forth and understood in this way it is manifest and clear - contrary to those who deny knowledge and every perception of truth - that a human being can know

something and can do so through every manner of knowing and cognizing. For someone may know something in two ways: either by the exterior testimony of another or by one's own, interior testimony.

15. - That one may know something in the first way Augustine says (Contra acad. and De trin. XV, xii [n.21]):

Let it be far from us to deny that we know what we have learned from the testimony of others. Otherwise we do not know of the ocean, nor do we know there to be the lands and cities that famous reports describe. We know of the existence neither of the people nor of the deeds of those people which we have learned about through historical reading. Finally, we don't know from what place or what people we came, since we have learned all these things through the testimony of others.

16. - But that in the second way one can know something and perceive a thing as it is is manifest from the things that we experience in ourselves and about ourselves, through both sensory and intellectual cognition. For in sensory cognition a thing is truly perceived as it is, without any deception or mistake, by a sense which during its own action of sensing its proper object is not contradicted by a truer sense or by an intellection received from a different truer sense, whether in the same or in another [person]. Nor concerning something that we perceive in this way should one be in doubt whether we perceive it as it is. Nor need one search in this matter for any further cause of certitude. For as the Philosopher says,<sup>1</sup> to seek a rational argument [rationem] [for something] about

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<sup>1</sup> Perhaps Henry is thinking of Met. iv.4, 1006a5.

which we have [f.2r] sensory information betrays a weakness of understanding. One should not seek a rational argument for the thing we possess that is more worthy than rational argument. For the test of true words is that they agree with things that are sensed. Hence it is that Augustine says (ibid.):

Let it be far from us that we doubt to be true those things that we have learned through the bodily senses. For through them we have learned of the sky and earth, and the things in them that are known by us.

Hence also Cicero, in The Academics [II,vii,19], wishing to prove against the Academics that one can know something with certainty, says the following:

Let us begin with the senses, from which judgments are so clear and certain that, if the freedom to choose one's nature were given [...], I do not see what more would be sought.[...] In my judgment truth exists in the senses more than anywhere else. And if they are healthy and in good condition and all the things are removed which oppose and impede, [...] then a glance itself engenders faith in their judgment.

Concerning faith in intellectual cognition, however, since through it one may in this way truly know something as it is, he immediately continues (ibid. [vii,21]), saying:

Or these things are of such a kind that when we say that they are perceived by the senses, then others follow<sup>2</sup> them which are not said to be perceived by the senses [...] - e.g., 'this one is white,' [hence] 'this one is old.' [...] Then greater claims follow [...], for example 'if something is a human being then it is an animal.' On the basis of claims of this sort the apprehension of things is given to us.

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<sup>2</sup> Modern editions of Cicero's Academica read 'secuntur' where the 1520 edition of the Summa has 'sequuntur'. Here I translate the passage as Henry apparently had it.

17. - Through intellectual cognition therefore, as has been said about sensory cognition already, a thing is truly perceived as it is, without any deception or falsity, by an intellection that in its proper action of intellectual cognition is not contradicted by a truer intellection - for instance, one received from a truer sense. Nor with respect to such an intellection should there be more doubt than there is with respect to the senses. Hence Augustine (*ibid.*):

Since there are two genera of things that are known, one of which the mind perceives through the bodily senses, the other through itself, those philosophers (i.e., the Academics) raised many complaints against the bodily senses, since they were utterly unable to call into doubt certain perceptions of true things that in themselves are most firm. Of this sort is 'I know that I live.' [...]

With respect to this we don't need to worry that we are deceived by some likeness of the true. For it is certain that one who is deceived lives. [...] Hence nor can an Academic say: perhaps you sleep and do not know it, and are seeing in dreams - since nor can one be mistaken in that knowledge through dreams, as it belongs to the living both to sleep and to see in a dream. Nor can that Academic say: perhaps you are crazy and don't know it, since the visions even of crazy people are similar to those of the sane. For one who is crazy lives, nor does the Academic dispute this. Therefore he who said that he lives is not deceived, nor can he be speaking falsely.

Nor concerning this should another proof be required beyond that which is used for the training of intellect, and through clear a posteriori signs, of the sort that will be set forth later.

[The Seven Errors of the Ancients]

18. - Nevertheless, against this seven errors have



endured from ancient times, based on both the senses and intellect. The Philosopher (IV Met.) refutes five of these, in particular the error of those who deny knowledge by denying this epistemic principle: for any thing, either its affirmation or negation is true, and not [both] at the same time in the same respect.

19. - The sixth error, from the Meno, denies that a human being can learn. This he refutes in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics. The seventh, from the Academics, denies perception of the true. Augustine and Cicero refute this in their books on the Academics.

20. - But as far as the others, against whose errors the Philosopher argues in Metaphysics iv, some said that all things are false, while others said that all are true. Others still said that all are true and false at the same time. But of those who said that all things are false, some based their opinion on things themselves, as for example Anaxagoras and Xenophanes,<sup>3</sup> who said that everything is mixed with everything, since they saw that everything is made from everything. And they said that that mixture is neither being nor non-being and, in a way, neither of the extremes, but rather, by denial, a medium between them. Hence they said that it would be impossible to judge something truly; rather, all judgments are false. And for this reason they said that there is not knowledge of anything, since knowledge is only of true

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<sup>3</sup> The text has here 'Xenocrates.'

things, as is said in I Posterior Analytics. These men erred by not distinguishing potential from actual being. For contraries and contradictories potentially exist at the same time, but not actually. For it is only with respect to beings in actuality that the distinction of contraries and contradictories holds and that, for instance, something is determinately this and not that. It is because of this that there is determinate truth and the knowledge that a thing is what it is and not something else.

21. - But others said that all things were false, taking their argument from the senses, as for example Democritus and Leucippus, who said that the same thing is sensed by some people as sweet, and by some as bitter, and that these groups don't differ, unless in that one group is greater and the other smaller. For those to whom it seemed sweet are many and healthy, but those to whom it seemed bitter are few and sick. Therefore nothing, as they said, is in actual truth determinately this or that. Rather, everything is neither this nor that, and for this reason nothing is true, but all things are false, and there is no knowledge at all. The cause of their error was that they judged that intellect and the senses are the same, and that knowledge is grasped by the senses. Hence when they saw that sense objects have a different disposition in the senses, and that nothing certain is sensed, they believed that nor is anything known with certainty.

22. - Connected to their opinions was the opinion of the

Academy, concerning which Augustine says that they affirmed that nothing true or certain can be perceived by human beings, but not that human beings ought to stop inquiring into the truth. They said however that either God alone knows the truth, or perhaps [also] the soul of a disembodied human being. These remarks they directed only to things that pertain to philosophy; about other things they didn't care. Their reasoning, according to what Augustine recounts, was that they said that the true can be cognized only by signs that [a] cannot have a false character [rationem falsi] - so that the true would be discerned from the false by distinct apprehensions - and [b] do not have a sign in common with the false - and so that which is true could not appear false. But it was impossible, they believed, that such signs could be found, and so they concluded that the truth, on account of a kind of darkness of nature, either didn't exist or, obscured and confused, was hidden from us. And hence Democritus, as is told in IV Metaphysics, said that 'either nothing is entirely true, or else it is not shown to us.'

23. - But others, for example Protagoras and his followers, said that all the true and the false exist simultaneously, by saying that there is not [f.2v] truth outside the soul, and that what appears outside is not anything that exists in the thing itself at the time at which it appears; instead, it exists in the one apprehending. Hence they completely denied that things have existence outside the

soul, and so they had to say that two contraries are true at the same time, not only according to different apprehending senses but also according to the same sense disposed in a different way. For what tastes sweet to one person will not taste sweet to another; and what looks sweet to one will taste to the same person like it is not sweet; and what appears to someone's eyes to be a single thing will appear to that person to be two things when the position of the eyes is changed. From this they concluded that nothing appears determinate, that nor is anything determinately true, and that hence there is absolutely no knowledge.

24. - But others, for example Heraclitus and his followers, said that all things are true and false at the same time, since they supposed that only sensible objects are beings, and that they are not determinate in their existence, but continually changed. For this reason they said that nothing about them remains the same in actual fact; rather, being and non-being belong to them at the same time and in the same respect. For movement is composed out of being and non-being, and every change is halfway [media est] between being and non-being. On this account they said in addition that one needn't reply yes or no to a question. And hence Heraclitus' at the end of his life believed that he needn't say anything, and so he only moved his finger. By this they were led to say that there is nothing of which knowledge can be acquired by

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<sup>4</sup> Sic for Cratylus; cf. Met. iv.5, 1010a12.

human beings.

25. - The opinion of the Meno and of certain of the Platonists was that no one can learn anything, and that therefore no one can know anything, as was said above in the fifth and sixth arguments [¶¶5,6]. The defect in the reasoning of these opinions will be clear shortly when we solve the arguments.

26. - But because by denying knowledge they destroyed all faith and the whole of philosophy (as the Philosopher says in IV Metaphysics), it is impossible to dispute the central claim of all these men by demonstrating that there is knowledge and that something can be known. For they deny all the principles of knowledge. The only thing that should be used against them in defense of knowledge is true and extremely well-established [probabilibus] assertions that they cannot deny. Hence it was by means of such assertions that Cicero refutes them in the Academica through three obvious absurdities that follow from their words. The first of these is taken from the knowledge of artisans, the second from acts of virtue, the third from the conduct of human affairs.

27. - The first is presented as follows [II.vii.22]:

Every artistry is based on many perceptions. If you were to take these perceptions away, how would you distinguish an artisan from one who is ignorant? [...] For what can be made through artistry if the one who is to practice the art has not perceived many things?

Hence Augustine (De vera relig.) says that common artistry is nothing other than the memory of things experienced.

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28. - The second is presented as follows [II.viii.23]:

How can that good man, who has decided to endure every torture [...] rather than neglecting his duty or faith, [...] accept every suffering unless he has assented to things that cannot be false?

29. - The third is presented as follows [II.viii.24]:

How will one dare to undertake anything or to act with assurance, for whom nothing that follows will be certain, [...] and who is ignorant of the ultimate good by which all things are reckoned?

The Philosopher gives a good example of this (IV Met. [ch.4, 1008b15-19]): someone walking (as he says) walks and does not stop, because he believes that he should be walking. And he does not, along the way, fall into a well that stands in the way, but he avoids it. For he knows that a fall into a well is bad.

30. - Therefore the arguments proving that someone can know something should be granted. But we should reply individually to the arguments for the opposite side.

[Reply to the Objections Quod Non]

31. - To the first - that all knowledge comes from something prior and better known, etc. - one ought to say that that way of acquiring knowledge should be understood only with respect to the knowledge of conclusions. For principles are cognized first, immediately, and through themselves, not through other things, since they don't have anything else better known than themselves. Therefore that infinite regress and [consequently] nothing's being known can occur to no one but those who don't distinguish something known through itself

from that which is known through another.

32. - To the second - that pure truth shouldn't be sought from the bodily senses - one ought to say that this is true everywhere and in all things, when one follows the senses' judgment. This is on account of two claims on which basis Augustine argues that certain judgment is not established in the senses. The first of these is the changeability of sensible things. The second is the fallibility of the senses themselves. But by means of an apprehension made through the senses by turning away from the senses so that a judgment is made in reason (which Augustine informs us happens especially during an inquiry into truth), pure truth should indeed be sought from the senses, to the extent that it can be discerned [a] by purely natural means through a judgment of reason in a pure, natural light, or [b] absolutely through intellect's judgment in the clarity of eternal light. Augustine speaks in these very terms of this purity in the judgment of reason following the senses, as we will see below<sup>5</sup> with regard to the two ways of discerning the truth.

33. - Therefore in one way pure truth should indeed be sought from the senses as its origin. For the senses themselves do have a most certain cognition of their proper objects, unless they are impeded by either themselves, the medium or something else. Nor does it happen, when every impediment ceases, that they err or apprehend their proper

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<sup>5</sup> See Summa 1.2 - B2, ¶14ff.

objects otherwise than as they are - although such an apprehension is not stable, because of the changeability either of the object or of the senses themselves. Hence certain truth can't be grasped for long by depending entirely on the judgment of the senses. Nevertheless, most certain truth is grasped by the senses, by abstracting that which was apprehended by undeceived senses and forming a judgment in intellect where what was apprehended remains as if without change and cannot be obscured by the verisimilar species of phantasms. And for us the most certain knowledge is of sensible things, when we can trace it back to sensory experience.

34. - Hence those letting go of the senses and thoroughly denying their judgment, deceived by sophistical arguments, frequently fell [f.3r] into the most absurd errors in thought. Take Zeno, for example, who said that nothing can be moved, and all those who said that all things are moved by one movement. Hence one should always believe a particular sense when it is not impeded, unless it is contradicted by another sense with a higher status either in the same person at a different time or in a different person at the same time, or by some superior power perceiving that the sense is impeded. For the senses are not equally well disposed in everyone or in the same person at different times, and so one should not believe equally their judgment - as is clear in someone healthy or sick. For the taste of the healthy person should be



believed more than that of the sick person, and one who sees something up close more than one who sees it from a distance, and one who sees something through a uniform medium rather than one who sees through a non-uniform medium, and so on for other dispositions of this sort.

35. - To the third - that the same thing quite often appears in different ways to the same person or to different people - one ought to say that it doesn't follow from this that no sense should be believed. For, as was said, in a case in which one [sense] is deceived, another frequently indicates the true; or in a case in which a [sense] is deceived in one disposition, that same [sense] in another disposition indicates the true. It's clear in this way how the reasoning of Democritus was deficient. For even if sensible things have a diverse disposition within a sense, nevertheless something is determinately perceived through an undeceived sense - at the time at which it is not deceived. And sensations differ not only with the paucity and multitude of sensible things, but also according to the greater and lesser status of the senses in the one sensing. The defect in the reasoning of the Academics is similarly clear. For their saying is not true: that nothing is determinately perceived through signs and that signs do not reveal the truth of reality [non verificant de re]. Rather, signs that are the proper sense objects of a given sense display what they are to the proper sense (when the sense is neither deceived nor impeded), and can bring

intellect to a determinate apprehension of a thing's truth. And hence the Academics themselves, more than others, were devoted to inquire into the truth through signs of this sort, although their view was that they could never find the truth. Their view was similar in this respect to the fact that some people run in order to grasp something which they never will grasp. (This is how the Philosopher reproves them in III Metaphysics [ch.<sup>6</sup>].) Other things pertaining to their opinion will be spelled out further in the next question.

36. - It's clear for the same reason that the assumption of Amphratus<sup>7</sup> - that things follow the appearances of the senses - is false, since a sense, whether it's true or deceived, can be derived only from the thing, since a sense is a passive power. And hence although the same thing appears in different ways to the same or different [senses], this happens only on account of the deception or impediment of some sense. And in this case one needn't believe that sense. Nor on account of this should one say that no sense is to be believed. For an undeceived sense ought to be completely believed, and which sense is such the intellect above all else has to judge on the basis of many prior experiences concerning what the senses can be deceived or impeded by.

37. - To the fourth - that all sensible things are in

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<sup>6</sup> This perhaps refers to Met. iii.1 (995a34-5).

<sup>7</sup> The standard classical and philosophical reference works mention no such person.

continuous change - one ought to say that the Heraclitians, whose argument that was, believed that only<sup>8</sup> sensible things are beings. And this was the error of all the philosophers up to the time of the Italians, since they unanimously denied that there is knowledge, on account of the changeability of natural sensible things. Perceiving their error, later philosophers asserted that there is knowledge and that something can be known of natural sensible things. But they were divided as to the way of knowing and acquiring knowledge. For Pythagoras, the first of the Italians, believed with his predecessors that through themselves the knowledge of natural things can't be had, because of their changing. But so as to save in some way the knowledge of natural things, he brought mathematical facts into nature, by putting them forth as the principles and causes of natural things both in existence and in cognition. For through their abstraction from sensible and changeable matter mathematical facts are in a certain way unchangeable.

38. - But Plato, after Pythagoras, saw that mathematical facts inhere in reality in nature. Hence, however much they are abstracted from it, mathematical facts are changed in reality with nature, nor through them can fixed knowledge of nature be had. He put forth ideal forms as the causes and principles of natural things, both in existence and cognition, entirely separate from natural things and without any change. And thus

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<sup>8</sup> Reading 'sola' for 'solum.'

through them there can be unchangeable knowledge of what is changeable.

39. - Aristotle however saw that a thing neither has existence nor can be cognized unless through something that exists in the thing [in re]. And he saw that, on account of their changing, there cannot be knowledge of singulars on the basis of themselves. Hence he claimed that universals - i.e., genera and species - are abstracted by intellect from singulars, in which they have real existence [esse secundum veritatem]. For a universal is one in many and of many. And although they are changeable as they exist in singulars, they are unchangeable as they exist in intellect. With this he claimed that fixed knowledge is had of changeable, particular, sensible, natural things through their universals existing in the intellect.

40. - But imbued with the philosophy of Plato, Augustine, if he in any way found in it things suitable to the faith, took them into his own writing. But the things he found that were adverse to the faith he interpreted in a better light to the extent that he could. And so since (as Augustine says in 83 Quaest., q.44) it seemed to be sacrilege to believe that the ideas of things are to be located outside the divine mind - ideas which it contemplates so as to establish the things it establishes - (a view which Aristotle nevertheless attributed to Plato), Augustine said that Plato located them in the divine intelligence and that they subsist there. As he says in

VIII City of God (ch.iv):

What Plato thought about these matters - that is, where he thought or believed that the end of all actions, the cause of all natures, and the light of all reasons exists - I don't believe should be rashly decided. [...] For perhaps those celebrated by fame who praise Plato above all others perceive something about God so as to find in Him the cause of subsisting, the reason for understanding and the order of living.

Hence Augustine, interpreting Plato's pronouncements more soundly than Aristotle did, claims that the principles of certain knowledge and cognition of truth consist in eternal unchangeable rules or formulations existing in God. It is by means of their participation [f.3v] that whatever pure truth is cognized in creatures is cognized through intellectual cognition. Consequently, just as by its being it is the cause of the existence of all things insofar as they exist, so too by its truth it is the cause of the cognition of all things insofar as they are true, and on this basis there can be certain and fixed knowledge of changeable things no matter how changeable they are. Accordingly, Augustine says (XII De trin.) [ch.14, n.23]

But not only in regard to sensible things located in space do intelligible and incorporeal reasons abide, apart from local space. Moreover, in regard to the motions that pass by in time, those same intelligible non-sensible reasons stand, apart from any passing of time. It belongs to few to attain these things through keenness of mind, and when one does attain them insofar as one can, the one who has attained them does not abide in them. [...] Hence a transitory thought is formed of a

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transitory thing.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless this transitory thought is committed to the memory through the training by which the mind is instructed, so that there is someplace to where a thought that is forced to pass away can return. For if the thought were not to return to memory and find what it had committed there, then like an ignorant person it would be led again just as it had already been led, and would find it where it had found it first, in that incorporeal truth. And from there it would again, as if written down, be fashioned<sup>10</sup> in memory.

But there will be more talk of this in the question immediately below.

41. - To the fifth and sixth - that one can't know because one can't learn - one ought to say that the assumption is false. For one can indeed learn, as will be clear below.<sup>11</sup> But it should be understood that to learn can be taken in two ways. In one way generally for every acquisition of knowledge de novo. In this way it needn't be the case that every learner knows something. For one learning an apprehension of first principles acquires this through no preceding apprehension. In another way, strictly, for the cognition of conclusions only, which one acquires in actuality from the preceding apprehension of principles, in which the conclusion lies hidden, in potentiality, as will be clear below. And in this

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<sup>9</sup> Modern editions add a 'non' to Augustine's text at this point, so that the sentence would read: "Hence a transitory thought is formed of a thing that is not transitory."

<sup>10</sup> Modern editions of De trinitate read 'figeretur' here. I translate this text's 'figuraretur.'

<sup>11</sup> See esp. Summa 1.6: "Can a human being acquire knowledge through another human being's teaching?"

latter way one learning knows something.

42. - To the seventh - that a human being perceives nothing of the cognizable thing except the image [idolum] alone - one ought to say that one may perceive the image of a thing in two ways. In one way, as the object of cognition. In this way it is true that one perceiving only the thing's image does not cognize the thing - e.g., someone seeing the image of Hercules printed on a wall does not thereby either see or cognize Hercules. In another way, as the basis [ratio] of cognizing, and in this way the claim is not true. For through only a species perceived of a thing the thing is truly cognized - as a stone is truly seen through its sensible species alone, received in the eye, and is truly intellectually cognized through its intelligible species alone, received in intellect.

43. - But perhaps you will say that that species is a sensible thing received by a sense, and that therefore, because it is an accident and the likeness of only an accident, it doesn't lead to cognition of the thing's quiddity [quod quid est] and substance. To this one should say that even if intellect first receives intelligible species of sensible and corporeal things as they are sensible, which [things] it first understands through those species, nevertheless secondarily, under those species of sensible things, by means of the investigation of natural reason, it conceives through itself apprehensions of non-sensible things

- quiddities of substances, for instance, and other things of the same kind which don't have their own species [proprias species] in intellect. And this is what Augustine says (IX De trin. ch.3):

That power by which we discern through the eyes, whether it is rays or something else, we are not able to discern with the eyes, but we seek with the mind, and (if it can be done) we comprehend with the mind. The mind itself, therefore, just as it collects apprehensions of corporeal things through the bodily senses, so it collects apprehensions of incorporeal things through itself.

He calls things corporeal as they are sensible, and calls incorporeal whatever is not sensible - mathematical things, for instance, and the quiddities of substances composed of matter and form, and other things of this sort. The mind, through the diligence of natural reason, assembles the apprehension of things of this sort from under the species of sensible things, on the basis of the natural connection of sensible to non-sensible things - as if by digging under the species presented to it from a sensible thing. It's in this way that the sheep by natural instinct makes an estimation through a sensory species about something not sensed - as, for instance, by imagining or seeing through a sensible species of a wolf it makes an estimation that the wolf is harmful and hostile. And hence one speaks of understanding [intelligere] - as if to read from within [ab intus legere].



APPENDIX B2 - HENRY OF GHENT

Summa of Ordinary Questions a.1 q.2: Can a human being know anything without divine illumination?

[Quod Non]

[f.3vA] 1. - With respect to the second it is argued that a human being cannot know something through natural effort alone, without special divine illumination [illustratione]. First, as follows. The Apostle says (II Cor. 3,[5]): "We are not sufficient to cognize something from us as if from us, but our sufficiency comes from God." But there is no perception of truth except through cognition. Therefore the sufficiency to perceive the truth does not belong to us unless from God. But this is the case only through a special illumination of some divine light, since everything that is perceived is perceived in a light. Therefore etc.

2. - Second, as follows. Commenting on I Corinthians 12,[3] - "No one can say 'Lord Jesus' unless in the Holy Spirit" - Ambrose says that 'the true, no matter who speaks it, comes from the Holy Spirit.' But whoever knows something true speaks it through the word of his mind. Therefore he knows it and speaks it through the Holy Spirit. But this happens only with a special illumination. Therefore etc.

3. - Third. Augustine says in Soliloquies I.[8]:

God is intelligible, as are the observable facts of the sciences. Nevertheless they differ in many ways. For the earth is visible, as is light, but the earth cannot be seen unless it is illuminated by light. And therefore with regard to those things that are passed on in the sciences - which without

any doubt everyone concedes to be most true - it ought to be believed that they cannot be intellectually cognized unless illuminated by something like their own sun.

But that additional thing which is like the sun can only be the divine light, according to what Augustine says in the same passage:

Just as there are three things in this sun that may be observed - that it exists, that it shines, and that it illuminates - so also in that most secret God [f.4r] are there such things: that it exists, that it intellectually cognizes, and that it makes other things be intellectually cognized.

Therefore etc.

4. - Fourth. Augustine (II De sermone domini in monte [9,32]) says that [for]

every rational soul, even if blinded by cupidity when it thinks and reasons, whatever is true in it through reasoning should not be attributed to it but to that light of truth by which it is touched, even if lightly.

But that light belongs only to a special divine illumination.

Therefore etc.

5. - Fifth. Augustine (XII Confessions [25,35]) says that if we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true, then where (I ask) do we see it? I at any rate don't see it in you, nor you in me, but we both see it in that unchanging truth which is above our minds.

But we see nothing in that truth unless through a special divine illumination, since it exceeds our nature's limits.

Therefore etc.

[In opposition]

6. - It is argued to the contrary. First, Augustine (I De

acad. [ch.5]) says that "no way that better leads to the truth is found than diligent inquisition into the truth." But inquisition would be in vain unless through it a human being could attain the truth without a special divine illumination. Therefore etc.

7. - Second, the Philosopher says at the beginning of the Metaphysics that "All human beings naturally desire to know." But they desire naturally only things that they can know through nature. Therefore human beings can know something through nature. But for this a special divine illumination is not required. Therefore etc.

[Reply]

[Knowing the True]

8. - [4rB] One ought to reply to this by taking all cognizables that are related to each other in order such that the last is always suited to be cognized through the preceding one. If a cognition of the first of those could be attained through intellect by purely natural means without any special divine illumination, then similarly a cognition of all the later ones could be attained in the same way. For if a human being by purely natural means without any special divine illumination could attain a cognition of the first speculative principles, then similarly that person by purely natural means without any special divine illumination could attain the cognition of all the conclusions following from those principles. For although the cognition of principles is a kind

of illumination toward cognizing conclusions, nevertheless if a human being could attain such a cognition by purely natural means then no special divine illumination is implied in cognizing conclusions through it. But if in the case of some cognizables ordered to each other the first of them cannot be attained by a human being by purely natural means, but only through a special divine illumination, then similarly neither can any of those that come later. For the later ones are not cognized, unless in the concept [ratione] of the first. But now it is undoubtedly true that in the case of some cognizables the first of them cannot be cognized or known by purely natural means, but only by a special divine illumination, as in the case of those that are per se and unconditionally believable. And so in such cases it ought to be granted unconditionally and absolutely that it is not possible for a human being to know something by purely natural means, but only by a special divine illumination. This will be determined below accordingly.

9. - But some want to extend this way of knowing to everything knowable by saying that nothing true can be known by a human being by purely natural means, without a special divine illumination infused by some supernatural light. And they believe this to be Augustine's view in all his books, wherever he claims that whoever sees something true sees it in the first truth, or in the eternal rules, or in the eternal light. In this respect he says in XI De civ. dei, ch.10, that

It is not inappropriately said that the soul is illuminated by the incorporeal light of God's simple wisdom, just as a body of air is illuminated by a bodily light.

Those speaking in this way greatly degrade the status and perfection of the created intellect. For matched with every natural thing that is perfect in its form there ought to be some natural action or operation that is proper to it and through which by purely natural means it can attain the good natural to it - as is clear in the case of all other natural things. Accordingly, Damascene says (I Sententiae) that 'Of things whose natures are different, their operations are also different. For it is impossible for a substance to lack its natural operation.' And in the Liber de duplici natura et voluntate Christi, ch.4: 'It is impossible for a nature to be established outside of those things that are natural proper characteristics for it - e.g., living, rational, voluntary. For he who doesn't reason is not a human being, since a human being is not made that doesn't reason, whether well or badly.' Therefore since knowing and intellectually cognizing above all else are intellect's proper operation (as is said in I De anima), if knowing is not possible for someone by purely natural means, then nor is any operation at all, and hence to this extent such a person would be inferior to all creatures, which is absurd. For according to what the Philosopher says (II De caelo et mundo [ch.12]), a thing that is good through a complete and whole goodness does not lack any operation by which it is good, and it is the first cause of all that by

which every other thing receives its goodness. And hence [every other thing] needs the proper operation through which it is moved to it [the first cause] so as to participate in its divine existence insofar as it can. For all things desire it, and whatever they do according to nature they do because of it.

10. - Perhaps it will be said here in defense of the aforesaid opinion that it is indeed true that knowing and intellectually cognizing the true is the proper and natural operation of intellect and the human soul through which it acquires its goodness. But for that one needs a special illumination because of that act's eminence and status - even though other things carry out their actions by purely natural means, on account of the imperfection of those actions. Hence it is not absurd that one thing should need more things in order to carry out a more perfect action when another thing needs less in order to carry out a less perfect action.

11. - To say this is utterly absurd, and takes away much from the status of the rational soul. For if [f.4v] other inferior things were capable by purely natural means of some operation corresponding and proportional to their nature, it would be absurd to deny this to the rational soul. The result would be not just that it is not capable by purely natural means of an eminent operation exceeding its nature, but also that it would not even be capable of some operation agreeing and proportional to its nature. And it is greatly absurd that

God would have made the human soul among natural things and not have prepared for it the natural instruments by which it would have been capable of any natural operation suited to it, since he prepared those instruments for other inferior things. For God, even more than nature, does not do anything in vain or fail to provide some thing with what is necessary for it. But the proper natural operation of the human soul is nothing other than knowing or cognizing. Therefore one ought to concede absolutely that a human being through its soul without any special divine illumination can know or cognize something, and do so by purely natural means. For saying the contrary takes away much from the status of the soul and of human nature.

12. - (I say 'by purely natural means' not so as to exclude the general influence of the first intelligence - which is the first agent in every intellectual and cognitive action. Just as the first mover moves in every movement of every natural thing, so too that general influence helping in cognition does not stand in the way of that cognition's being said to be made by purely natural means. For a human being has that influence assisting him while he cognizes all the things he cognizes naturally, and for this reason it should be said that he attains by purely natural means the cognition of all the other posterior things that he attains through that influence.)

13. - Therefore if we take 'to know' broadly for every

certain apprehension of a thing, so that it even includes sensory cognition, then (as was said in the preceding question) to the extent that [the knowledge] comes from the senses and sensory cognition, it is clear that we ought to say unconditionally and absolutely that one may know and cognize something with a certain sensory cognition - as was shown in the preceding question. Further - and this pertains to this question - this may happen by purely natural means, since the sensible objects of the senses change [inmutant] the senses through a certain pure natural necessity. Also, through that natural necessity all posterior sensible things change both the exterior and interior senses.

[Knowing the Truth]

14. - [4vC] To the extent however that [the knowledge] comes from intellect and intellective cognition - whose cognizing is, strictly, called knowing - a distinction must be made. For although according to Augustine (83 Quaest.) nothing is known unless it is true, nevertheless it is one thing to know of a creature what is true in respect to it, and it is another to know its truth. Consequently, there is one cognition by which a thing is cognized, another by which its truth is cognized. For every cognitive power grasping through its apprehension a thing just as it has existence in itself outside the cognizer grasps what is true in it. But one does not through this grasp its truth. For the senses even in brutes grasps well enough concerning a thing what is true in



it - e.g., a true human being, true wood, a true stone, and especially the proper object with respect to which it is true of necessity. But still they grasp or cognizes the truth of no thing, because they cannot judge regarding any thing what it is in actual truth - e.g., concerning a human being, that it is a true human being, or concerning a color, that it is a true color.

15. - Therefore through an intellective cognition of a created thing one can have two kinds of cognitions. One, by which someone precisely knows<sup>1</sup> or cognizes through a simple understanding that which a thing is. The other, by which someone knows and cognizes through a compounding and dividing understanding the truth of the thing itself. In the case of the first cognition our intellect entirely follows the senses, nor is there any concept in intellect that did not exist beforehand in the senses. And so, insofar as it is of this sort, such an intellection can indeed be true - by conceiving or cognizing the thing as it is - just as can the sense that it is following. But it doesn't conceive or intellectually cognize the thing's very truth through a certain judgment by perceiving concerning it what it is - e.g., that it is a true human being or a true color.

16. - There are two reasons for this, one on the part of intellect itself, the other on the part of the intelligible. On the part of intellect the reason is that intellect does not

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<sup>1</sup> Reading 'scitur' for 'sci.'

conceive the truth by a simple understanding, but only by composition and division, as the Philosopher claims (VI Met.) and as will have to be declared below. Hence just as a sense is called true in comprehending a thing as it is, but not in comprehending its truth, so too a simple understanding following a true sense is called true in comprehending a thing as it is, but not in comprehending its truth. On the part of the intelligible, on the other hand, the reason is that the intention of the thing by which it is that which it is and the intention by which it is called true are two different things, even though - since every being is true and vice versa - these intentions exist at the same time in every thing and are convertible with each other. For as the first proposition of the Liber de causis says, the first of created things is existence, and so the first intention comprehensible through intellect is the conception [ratio] of being, which one can intellectually cognize without cognizing any other intention concerning being. This is because it includes none of the others in itself, and it is included in all the others. For although the intention of being is intellectually cognized only under the conception of the true, which is per se the object of intellect, it is nevertheless not the case that in the conception of intellectually cognizing being the true is the object of intellect as is being. For the conception of the true is the conception of intelligibility in everything. But the object is true being, or true good, and so on for the

other intentions of things. [4vD] Hence, because the intention of being is included in all the other intentions of things, both universal and particular - for what is not being is nothing - thus the Commentator on the first proposition of the Liber de causis claims that existence is characterized by a more vehement adherence to a thing than the other intentions that are in it.

17. - But after the intention of being the more proximate intentions in the thing are those universal intentions, which are the one, the true, and the good. Their proximity is ordered, and in various ways, since [f.5r] any thing existing under the intention of being can be considered in three ways. First insofar as it has determinate existence in its nature by which through its form it is in itself undivided, but divided from every other thing. In this way the intention of the one is suited to it. For every thing is one in this respect, that in itself it is formally undivided, but divided from every other thing. For one, as the Philosopher says (III Met.), is something existing of itself [per se] and solitary. Second insofar as a thing possesses in its existence what the exemplar to which it is [directed] represents concerning it. In this way the intention of the true is suited to it. For each thing is true insofar as it contains in itself what its exemplar represents. Third however insofar as a thing is suited to its end, to which it is [directed]. In this way the intention of the good is suited to it. For every thing is good

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insofar as it looks toward an end that is good.

18. - Therefore, since the true implies an intention of the thing in respect to its exemplar, which is not first but secondary (for being implies the first and absolute intention of the thing), that which is being and true in the thing can indeed be apprehended by intellect without its apprehending the intention of its truth. For the intention of the truth in the thing can be apprehended only by apprehending its conformity to its exemplar. The intention of being, on the other hand, is apprehended in the thing in isolation [absoluta], without any real relation [respectu]. But in a second cognition, by which the truth of the thing itself is known or cognized (without which it is not a complete human cognition of the thing), the cognition and judgment of intellect altogether exceed the cognition and judgment of the senses, since (as has been said) intellect cognizes something's truth only by compounding and dividing, which a sense cannot do. Hence such an intellection can cognize something that a sense cannot, nor can even an intellection that is an understanding of simples. This [second cognition] is the grasping by a certain judgment concerning a thing that in actual truth it is such or such - e.g., a true human being or a true color, and things of this sort.

19. - Therefore concerning this way of knowing and cognizing something through intellect, by which the thing's truth is known (which is knowing in the strict sense),

uncertainty still remains as to whether by purely natural means a human being can know anything without any special divine illumination. [5rE] And one should say - as has been said already - that a thing's truth can be cognized only through a cognition of the conformity of the cognized thing to its exemplar. For according to what Augustine says (De vera relig. [XXXVI.66]), "true things are true [...] insofar as they are similar to the One Principle." And Anselm (De veritate [VII]): "Truth is the conformity of a thing to its most true exemplar" and (ibid.) "What is, truly is, insofar as it is what is there." So, accordingly, there are two kinds of exemplars of a thing; and a thing's truth has two ways of being cognized by a human being, with respect to two exemplars. For there are, according to what Plato shows in I Timaeus [27D-29A], two exemplars: one kind made and constructed, the other perpetual and immutable. The first exemplar of a thing is its universal species existing within the soul, through which the soul acquires an apprehension of all its individual instantiations [supposita]. This exemplar is caused by the thing. The second exemplar is the divine art containing the ideal formulations of all things. Plato says that God established the world in accordance with [ad] this exemplar, just as an artisan builds a house according to [ad] an exemplar of the artistry in his mind, but not according to [ad] the first exemplar.

## [Two Ways of Knowing Created Exemplars]

20. - One should know therefore that in looking [aspiciendo] to the first exemplar a human being can look in two ways. In one way as to a cognized object described outside the cognizer - e.g., by looking to an image of a human being depicted on a wall in order to cognize a human being. In the other way as to the basis [rationem] of cognizing described in the cognizer, as the species of sensible things are described in the senses and the species of intelligible things in the intellect. In the first way it is impossible to cognize a thing's truth by looking to its exemplar. Rather, one can have concerning it just an imaginary apprehension, of whatever sort the imaginative power happened to be able to have formed for itself. Hence someone would be surprised if the human being of whom he had an image but whom he had never seen were to appear to him, as Augustine says (VIII De trin. ch.2<sup>2</sup>). Also, through this imaginary apprehension taken from a depicted image, if the one of whom it was an image were to be named to someone,<sup>3</sup> then he could come to an estimative judgment of the person of whom it was an image, if that person were to appear to him. At that point he could for the first time, on the basis of the thing itself seen in its own form, cognize its truth, and on

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<sup>2</sup> The reference is probably to De trin. VIII,4,7. Augustine's point there is that the mental pictures we form of people we haven't seen are unlikely to resemble the person. Hence if we were actually to see that person, we would be surprised by his or her appearance.

<sup>3</sup> Or, perhaps, 'named by someone.'

that basis judge concerning its image<sup>4</sup> whether it is a true image corresponding to the person seen. It was in this way, one reads, that the Queen of Candace<sup>5</sup> had an image of Alexander depicted for her before she ever saw him, and she recognized him immediately when she saw him, even though he pretended to be someone else.

21. - In the second way therefore - that is, by looking to the exemplar taken from the [thing] itself, as the basis of cognizing in the cognizer himself - the truth of the thing itself can indeed in some way be cognized by forming a mental concept of the thing conforming to that exemplar. In this way Aristotle claimed that the knowledge of things and the cognition of truth is acquired by human beings by purely natural means - and this concerning natural, changeable things. And he claimed that such an exemplar is acquired from things through the senses as the first principle of art and knowledge, according to what he says in the beginning of the Metaphysics [981a5-7]: "Art is brought about when by the experience of intellect on the basis of many things one universal thesis [acceptio] is made from many similar cases." And in II PostAn. [ch.19, 100a4-8]:

It is from the senses, of course, that memory is

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<sup>4</sup> 'imagine' for 'imaginne.'

<sup>5</sup>. Candace was the hereditary name for the queen of Meroë, in ancient Egypt. Suidas mentions a Candace who was taken prisoner by Alexander. A later Candace is referred to at Acts 8,27. But I haven't found the source for the story Henry describes.

produced, and from a memory produced often, experience. From experience however - a universal existing in the soul - one [is produced] beyond the many. This is the principle of art and knowledge.

Corresponding to this is what Augustine says (XI De trin.,

ch.3): If the species of the body which is corporeally sensed is taken away, its likeness remains in the memory. Through this the will turns the mind's keenness back so that it is formed intrinsically from that, just as it was formed extrinsically from a sensible corporeal object.

And hence, as he says in book VIII, ch.5:

[f.5v] We think according to generic or specific apprehensions, whether innate by nature or gathered from experience, of things that we have not seen.

Hence through the universal apprehension that we have within ourselves, acquired of diverse species of animal, we cognize with respect to anything that appears to us whether it is an animal or not, and through the specific apprehension of a donkey we cognize with respect to anything that appears to us whether it is a donkey or not.

22. - But it is altogether impossible that through such an exemplar acquired in us an altogether certain and infallible apprehension of the truth may be had. There are three reasons for this, the first of which is taken from the thing concerning which an exemplar of this sort is abstracted, the second from the soul in which the exemplar of this sort is received, the third from the exemplar itself which is received from the thing in the soul.

23. - The first reason is that such an exemplar, because



it is abstracted from a changeable thing, necessarily has some of the characteristics of a changeable thing. Hence, since natural things are more changeable than mathematical things, the Philosopher claimed that we can have certitude of knowledge of mathematical things greater than that of natural things through their universal species, and this can be only because of the changeability of the species themselves existing within the soul. Hence Augustine, taking up this cause of the incertitude of the knowledge of natural things taken from sensibles, says in his Eighty-three Questions (q.9) that pure truth shouldn't be sought from the bodily senses and that we are warned for our own sake to turn away from this world and to God - that is, to the truth which is understood and grasped in the inner mind, and which always remains and is of the same nature - and to make this turn with all haste.

24. - The second reason is that the human soul, since it is changeable and suffers error, can be rectified by nothing that is equally or more changeable than the soul so as not to be bent by error and [so as to] persist in the rectitude of truth. Therefore every exemplar that the soul receives from natural things, since it is of an inferior grade of nature than the soul, is necessarily equally or more changeable than the soul. It therefore cannot rectify the soul so that it persists in infallible truth. This is the argument of Augustine (De vera relig. [30,56]) proving through this that the unchangeable truth through which the soul has certain

knowledge is above the soul. He says that

the law of all the arts, since it is utterly unchangeable (though the human mind, to which it has been granted to see such a law, can suffer the changeability of error) is, clearly enough, the law above our mind which is called the truth,

which alone suffices to straighten our changeable and bendable mind in infallible cognition. The mind does not have the ability to judge this law, but through it it judges everything else. For the mind is more able to judge anything inferior to itself than it is able through that [inferior thing] to judge another, as he concludes in the same passage.

25. - The third reason is that an exemplar of this sort, since it is an intention and species of a sensible thing abstracted from a phantasm, has a likeness with the false just as with the true. Hence insofar as the species is concerned, [truth] cannot be distinguished [from the false]. For it is through the same images of sensible things that [a] we judge in sleep and in madness that the images are the things themselves, and [b] we judge concerning the things themselves when awake and healthy. But pure truth is perceived only by discerning it from what is false. Therefore it is impossible through such an exemplar to have certain knowledge and a certain apprehension of the truth. Hence if certain knowledge of the truth is to be possessed the mind must turn away from the senses and sensible things and from every intention, no matter how universal and abstracted from the senses, and turn to the unchangeable truth existing above the mind. This truth

does not have an image of the false from which it cannot be discerned, as Augustine says in Eighty-three Questions (q.9), where he discusses this reasoning.

26. - [5vF] In this way therefore it is clear that truth is of two sorts and that there are two ways of knowing the truth, as Augustine suggests in the retractation of what he says in I Soliloquies - "God, you willed that only the pure know what is true" - when he says [Retract. 4.2]:

It can be replied that many people, even the impure, know many true things. For nor was it defined here what the true is which only the pure can know, and what it is to know.

It is also clear that if a human being can cognize certain knowledge and infallible truth, this is not possible for that person by looking to an exemplar abstracted from a thing through the senses, no matter how much it is purified and made universal.

#### [The Academics]

27. - On this account the first Academics, imitating the claim of Plato (since the Academics are the same as the Platonists, as Augustine says in the epistle [n.118] to Dioscorus) denied that anything is known at all, in opposition to the Stoics, who claimed only that there are sensible things in the world. The Academics' argument was based on their understanding of the apprehension of pure truth: they claimed that every apprehension of pure truth concerning anything can be had only by looking to the second exemplar. [5vG] Nevertheless they were well aware that some sort of knowledge

of truth could be perceived through the senses and, mediated by the senses, through intellect. But they judged this wasn't worthy of being called knowledge, according to what Augustine says (III De acad. [11,26]):

There are those who confess that all the things that the bodily senses attain can result in opinion. But they deny that it can result in knowledge, which they want to be confined to the intelligence and to dwell in the mind, remote from the senses.

Indeed, as he says in book II [ch.5], nothing seemed to them more shameful than to believe, and they concluded that nothing can be perceived, so that a wise man should always approve of nothing, but should follow that which appears probable and likely. It was for this reason that they didn't distinguish a certain apprehension by which what is true in the thing is perceived either through the senses or intellect, from an apprehension by which the truth of the thing itself is known. Nor even in this regard did they distinguish that some apprehensions of the truth<sup>6</sup> are clear and pure, while others are imaginary and obscured by phantasms and images of things. But as was seen from their words, they denied unconditionally that something can be known.

28. - And so the later Academics, holding to the words of their [predecessors'] position, but ignoring their intent, completely denied all knowledge and perception of the truth - not only as related to the intellect's perception of the

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<sup>6</sup> Reading 'veritatis' for 'veritat.'

apprehension that pertains to wisdom, and of things pertaining to philosophy, but even as related to the senses' perception, [f.6r] as has been set forth in the preceding question. But those first Academics denied all knowledge and apprehension of the truth unconditionally, at least verbally, in order opportunely to conceal for a while, until a suitable time, the true opinion of Plato about the apprehension of pure truth.

29. - [6rH] The third group of Academics made this public, according to what Augustine says (II De acad. [ch.10]):

They seem to me to have wanted this in order both to hide their position from the slow and to signify it to the vigilant. [...] For the Academics had certain knowledge of the truth and did not wish rashly to reveal it to the ignorant or to impure souls.

And as he says in book III [ch.17]:

What did it please such great men [...] to do so that it would not seem that knowledge of the truth falls to anyone? Listen a little more attentively, not to what I know, but to what I think. [...] Plato was the wisest and most erudite man of his day, [...] and it is certain that he felt that there were two worlds, one intelligible, in which truth itself resides, the other this sensible world [...] made to the image of the first. And he also held that the truth, as if polished and brightened, [comes] from the intelligible world into that soul that knows itself. But concerning this [world] not knowledge but opinion can be generated in the souls of fools. [...] These and other views of this sort seem to have been preserved among his successors as much as they could, and to have been guarded as secrets. For these theories are not easily perceived except by those who cleanse themselves from all faults and restore themselves to another more human condition. And whoever knows these

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'Quae' for 'qua.'

theories, and is willing to teach them to all other men, grievously sins.<sup>a</sup> [...]

For this reason when Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, [claimed that] nothing at all exists beyond this sensible world and nothing in it is acted upon except by a body (for he took God to be fire), it seems to me that Arcesilas, when that evil was widely spreading, very prudently and usefully concealed thoroughly the knowledge of the Academics and buried it as if it were gold to be found by posterity. Therefore since people are rather prone to rush into false opinions, and, through familiarity with bodies, they very readily but dangerously believe that all things are corporeal, that most ingenious man resolved to unlearn those whose bad education distressed him, rather than to teach those whom he did not consider teachable.

For, as Augustine says in the epistle [n.118] to Dioscorus,

Although the Epicureans said that the bodily senses are never deceived, but the Stoics conceded that they sometimes are deceived, nevertheless both proposed a rule for comprehending the truth at the sensory level. With those groups contradicting each other, who would listen to the Platonists [...] if it were said by them not only that [a] there is something that cannot be perceived by bodily touch, smell, or taste, nor by the ears or eyes, nor can be thought of by any imagination, but also that [b] that alone truly exists and that alone truly can be perceived that is unchangeable and sempeternal, and that [c] it is perceived only by the intelligence through which the truth, however it can be attained, is attained? Therefore since the Platonists believed such things, which they did not teach to human beings devoted to the flesh, nor were they of such authority among the people as to persuade them to believe until their minds were led to that state in which they were captured, they chose to conceal their view and to defame those who boasted that they had discovered what is true. For those people had located that discovery of the true in the bodily senses.

"From this," as Augustine says (III De acad. [ch.17]), "all those things were born which are attributed to the new

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<sup>a</sup> Augustine's text here reads 'does not grievously sin.'

Academy." For the new Academics, not knowing that mystery, said that the old Academy had utterly denied knowledge, and thus cruelly disgraced those with whom later ones resolutely remained.

For Carneades first gave up that impudence of deceiving, by which he saw that Arcesilas had been greatly defamed. [...] Because of this Carneades is said to have been the leader and founder of the third Academy. [...] Next, finally, Antiochus, who was already a pupil of Philo, began to open the gates to the retreating enemy, as it were, and to call the laws and the Academy back to the authority of Plato. And although that had been previously tried by Metrodorus, who is said to have been the first to confess that it was not directly pleasing to the Academics that nothing can be comprehended, but that it was necessary to have taken up a weapon of this sort against the Stoics. [...] After these times however, with all the stubborn-ness and arrogance having died off, Plato's countenance - the cleanest and brightest in philosophy once the clouds of error had been dispersed - shined forth, especially in Plotinus - so much so that Plato was believed to have lived again in him [ibid. ch.17-18].

[Two Ways of Knowing the Eternal Exemplar]

30. - Therefore pure truth, as was said, cannot be conceived except in an eternal exemplar. [6rI] But it should be noticed that pure truth can be known by looking to this exemplar in two ways. In one way by looking to it as by looking to an object cognized in it, i.e., by seeing what is exemplified. For one properly verifies [bene probat] the image who intuits the exemplar, as Augustine says (III De acad. [ch.18,40]). In another way by looking to that exemplar as merely the basis [ratio] of cognizing. In the first way we cognize that an image of Hercules is his true image by seeing

Hercules. And in so doing, by noticing the correspondence of the image to the exemplar, we know that it is a true image of him. In this way the truth of anything made to an exemplar is perfectly cognized when its exemplar is seen. And so since every creature is a kind of image of a divine exemplar, the truth of every creature is cognized most truly and completely with respect to its quiddity [in eo quod quid est] by seeing uncovered the divine essence. In accordance with this Augustine says (XI De civ. dei) that

those holy angels, through the very presence of the unchangeable truth, know a creature better there, in the art by which it has been made, than in the creature itself.

Not only is the image suited to be cognized through an exemplar a priori, but also vice versa the exemplar through the image a posteriori, and thus Augustine says that one learns through creatures to cognize the character of the art of the divine exemplar. As he says in the second book on John,<sup>9</sup>

Human beings notice an amazing piece of work and are amazed at the plan of the maker. They are astounded by what they [f.6v] see, and love what they do not see. [...] If therefore the plan of men is praised on the basis of some great piece of work, do you want to see how great the plan of God is [...] - i.e., the Word of God? Notice this piece of work, the world. See the things that are made through the Word, and cognize how great it is.<sup>10</sup>

Hence through this world, from a collected apprehension of all

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<sup>9</sup>. In Iohannis evangelium tractatus tract.1 par.9. The text here wrongly refers to 'secundo libro super Iob.'

<sup>10</sup> Reading, after Augustine's text, 'sit' for 'fit.'



creatures that is like one complete image of the divine art (however complete it could be in creatures), the philosophers claimed that a complete cognition of God is possessed (to the extent that it could be possessed by purely natural means), as will be seen below. But a human being cannot by purely natural means attain such a cognition of the divine exemplar without a special illumination, nor (in this life) even by the light of communal grace. Accordingly, Augustine says in I De fide catholica,<sup>11</sup> speaking to God,

'you can be called essence and species and form. And it is that which is. All other things, however, are not that which they are. This most truly can say "I am who I am." This is so great and so much that with respect to the vision of it the human mind in this life dares to enjoy for itself nothing. For you reserve this reward for your chosen alone, in a remuneration to come.'

Accordingly, it is said about it [I Tim. 6,16]: "He inhabits inaccessible light, which<sup>12</sup> no men have seen nor can see" - in this life, that is. But afterwards it will be seen. And it is true that it cannot be seen in this life - unless through the gift of a special grace by which a human being is seized and drawn away from the senses. In this way Moses and Paul saw God in this life in his essence, as Augustine says to Paulina (De videndo deum [Epistle n.147]), and in this way blessed Benedict saw the whole world in one ray, as Gregory says in IV

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<sup>11</sup>. Not listed in the Retractations. Migne (PL 39, p.2175ff) prints sermon n.233 under this title, but this passage doesn't appear in the first book of that sermon.

<sup>12</sup> Reading, with this edition, 'quam.' The Vulgate text has 'quem.'

Dialo. For a human being cannot attain to seeing the exemplar of His divine nature by purely natural means without a special divine illumination, nor to knowing any truth in creatures by looking to this nature.

31. - But if pure truth were known by looking to the divine exemplar as by looking to the basis [rationem] of cognizing, this would be the way Plato claimed that all truth is cognized - by looking to an eternal exemplar - according to what Augustine says in the epistle [n.118] to Dioscorus, adducing in this matter the authority of Cicero:

Notice this: how Plato is quite clearly and in many ways shown by Cicero not with a human wisdom, but with an evidently divine one (from which the human is in a way directed), with that same unchangeable wisdom which remains ever the same, to have established the truth, the end of the good, the causes of things, and the security of reasoning. Note too that those who were attacked by the Platonists, under the name of the Epicureans and the Stoics, were the ones who placed the end of the good, the causes of things, and the security of reasoning within the nature of either body or mind.

These errors remained,

whether they concerned ethics or the nature of things or the character of investigating the truth, [...] up until the Christian era. But now we see that they have been quieted. [...] From this it is understood that philosophers themselves, even those of the Platonic school, after changing the few things that Christian teaching refutes, must bend their devout necks to Christ, the one unconquerable King. [...] He commands, and what they had feared even to utter is believed.

Augustine therefore pursued this view of Plato, according to what he says in the end of De acad. [ch.20]:

[6vK] It is doubtful to no one that we are impelled to learn by two weights: authority and reason. It

is therefore certain to me never to depart at all from the authority of Christ, for I do not find anything more powerful. But that which can be obtained by the most subtle reasoning (for I am now so affected that I desire to apprehend what is true not only by believing, but also by understanding), and which is not repugnant to our religion, I am confident for now that I will find in Plato.

And this is the thesis that he maintains in all his books, and that we hold with him, saying that no certain and infallible apprehension of pure truth can be had from anything except by looking to the exemplar of uncreated truth and light. Hence those alone prevail in recognizing certain truth who prevail in viewing it in that exemplar, which not everyone prevails in doing, as Augustine says (VIII De trin. ch.6). But few prevail through keenness of wit in transcending all changeable things and in judging changeable things through immutable rules, concerning which no one judges and without which no one judges with certainty, as he says in II De lib. arb., ch.12. For this reason he says (IX De trin. [ch.6]) that

When we rightly approve or disapprove of something we are clearly shown within ourselves to approve or disapprove of, through altogether different rules that unchangeably remain above our mind, the forms of corporeal things drawn up through the senses and somehow infused into memory. And from these forms, things that are not seen are thought, by means of a shaped [ficto] phantasm, either otherwise than as they are or by chance as they are.

And ibid. [IX.6-7]:

When I recall to mind a beautiful and evenly curving arch which I saw in Carthage, something announced to my mind through the eyes and transfused to memory makes an imagined appearance. But with my mind I conceive something else, according to which that work pleases me. And on this basis if it were unpleasant I would amend it.

And so we judge of these things according to that [other thing], and discern it through the rational mind's intuition. But we touch things present to the bodily senses,<sup>13</sup> or we recollect images, fixed in memory, of absent things, or we imagine such things of similar ones. [...] We do this in one way by shaping in the mind images of corporeal things or, through the body, seeing corporeal things, and in another way by grasping through a simple intellection the characteristics and the ineffably beautiful art of such shapes above the mind's eye. In that art therefore in which all temporal things have been made, we look through the mind's sight to the form according to which we exist, and according to which either in us or in bodies something is brought about with a true and right character. [f.7r] And conceived out of this we have as a word within us a truthful apprehension of things, and by speaking internally we produce it.

This is the case not only with respect to corporeal things of this sort, but also with respect to incorporeal things, according to what Augustine says in the epistle [n.13] to Nebridius.

That comes into the mind which we call intellection, and it is made in us in two ways: either intrinsically, by the mind and reason itself per se, or by a suggestion from the senses. We understand that of these two ways, God must be consulted [for] the first way - that is, concerning what is within us. But [for] the second way, concerning what is reported by the body and senses, God must still be consulted.

And in this way, with respect to all the things [universis] that we intellectually cognize, we consult the truth internally present to the mind itself, as he says in De magistro. It is with respect to this truth that everything glimmers that shines forth to the rational mind, as Augustine

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<sup>13</sup> Following Augustine's text, I'm supplying 'sensu' here, which is required syntactically.

says (IV Soli. ch.14). But how this is done will be declared in the question coming next.

[The Divine Impression]

32. - [7rL] For now however the reason for this (which will be declared more in the next question) is that in order for a concept in us of the truth of an external thing to be true by the pure truth, the soul must, insofar as it is informed by the truth, be similar to the truth of the external thing. For truth is a kind of adequation of thing and intellect. Therefore since, as Augustine says (II De libero arbitrio), the soul by itself is changeable from truth to falsity, hence it is not, as it is by itself, informed by the truth of any thing. But no informable thing can form itself, since no thing can give that which it does not have. Therefore it must be informed by some other pure truth concerning the thing. But this cannot be brought about through some exemplar taken from the thing itself, as was shown earlier. Therefore it is necessary for it to be formed by an exemplar of the unchangeable truth, as Augustine claims (ibid.). And hence he says (De vera relig.) that just as all things that are true are true by his truth, so too they are like his likeness. It is necessary therefore for that uncreated truth to impress itself on our concept and to transform our concept according to its character. And in this way it informs our mind with an express truth of the thing through the likeness that the thing itself has within the first truth. Accordingly, Augustine says

(XI De trin. [ch.5]): "Indeed, this is fully expressive of that, when no nature is interposed between them." And he declares through a metaphor how this expression is brought about when he says (XIV De trin. [ch.15])

Where are those rules written by which what is just and what unjust is recognized, if not in the book of that light that is called the truth? It is from here that every just law is taken down and transferred onto the human heart - not by changing location but as if by an impression. In just this way an image passes from a ring into the wax without leaving the ring.

And this is the information of that light by which, inasmuch as it shines, a human being is made truthful in intellect. And inasmuch as one is bathed by it he is made just in affections. Augustine, accordingly, says (On John, sermon 39 [n.8]) of the first that

Your eye was made to take part in this light. Is it closed? Then you have not diminished this light. Is it open? Then you have not enlarged it. [...] But if the soul is truthful then the truth is within God, and in it the soul takes part. If the soul had not taken part in it then every human being is deceitful.

But concerning the second he says in a certain sermon [n.341] concerning the exposition of the Sacred Scripture that

In the case of God everything that is said is that very thing. For nor in God are power, prudence, strength, justice and purity different, [...] since these belong to souls that the light somehow fills and affects by its qualities. In the same way, when that visible light rises, if it were taken away then there would be one color for all bodies - which ought rather to be called no color. But when, having been brought forward, it illuminates bodies, although it is of one sort it nevertheless casts a varying lustre upon the different qualities of bodies. Therefore those affections belong to souls, and they are indeed affected by a light not itself

affected and are formed by that which is not formed.

33. - Therefore, as has been said, the complete information of truth is possessed only from a likeness of the truth concerning a cognizable thing impressed on the mind by that first exemplar and truth. For anything else impressed by any exemplar abstracted from the thing itself is incomplete, obscure and foggy, and hence through it no certain judgment concerning the truth of a thing can be had. On this account Augustine compares the first [sort of exemplar] and judgment through it to the clear air above the clouds, and the second and the judgment through it to the foggy and obscure air beneath the clouds. Thus he says (IX De trin. ch.6):

It is clear that judgment from above of the truth and of his justice, based on the most incorruptible rules, is firm, even if it is covered by a cloud, as it were, of corporeal images. [...] But it makes a difference whether I am under or in that gloom as someone shut off from the clear heavens, or whether, as may happen in the highest mountains, I am among both, enjoying the free air and beholding both the clearest air above and the densest clouds below.

And one should know that the aforesaid way of cognizing the truth is common both to the apprehension of principles, as above in argument three of this question, and to the apprehension of conclusions, as is clear from everything already brought forth. And hence through this way of acquiring an apprehension of the truth of the true arts habits are generated in us. These are stored away in memory so that from them we again form similar concepts: with respect to habits of

both principles and conclusions. We understand Augustine accordingly (IX De trin. [ch.7]):

[f.7v] In that eternal truth [...] we perceive things seen by the mind, and conceived out of this we have as a word within us a truthful apprehension of things.<sup>14</sup>

This is conceived in the habit of memory, so that the intelligence, returning to it, again forms a word and has this [word] through certain knowledge, even of changeable things. Accordingly, Augustine says (XII De trin. [ch.14, n.23]): "Not only in regard to sensible things located in space..." and so forth, as quoted above in the solution to the fourth argument in the preceding question [B1, ¶40].

34. - This therefore is a truer way of acquiring knowledge and an apprehension of the truth than what Aristotle defended, from only the experience of the senses (if, that is, Aristotle thought in this way and did not concur with Plato on this matter). But on the contrary (and this is more truly believed), even if he opposed Plato in his way of speaking by concealing the divine doctrine of his teacher, as did other earlier Academics, nevertheless Aristotle held the same opinion as Plato regarding the apprehension of truth. He seems to have implied this when, speaking of the cognition of truth, he says in II Metaphysics that that which is most true is the cause of the truth of what exists later, and that hence any

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<sup>14</sup> In ¶31 above, at the beginning of f.7r, Henry quotes this passage at greater length. Oddly, there are several significant variances between the De trinitate text as he cites it here and there. This may be the fault of our edition.



thing's disposition in existence is its disposition in truth. On this account Augustine says in the end of De acad. [iii,19]:

But, as regards erudition and doctrine and morality by which one counsels the soul, there has been no lack of very sharp and skillful men who teach in their disputations that Aristotle and Plato harmonize with each other in such a way that to the unskilled and less attentive they seem to dissent, [...] disagreeing on many points. But nevertheless the teaching of the truest philosophy is, as I believe, clear. For it is not the philosophy of this world - which our religion [...] detests - but of another intelligible world, to which that most acute reasoning would never lead souls blinded by the manifold darkness of error. [...] It would never lead, that is, unless the highest God were to bend - through a certain global [populari] clemency - the divine intellect's authority down even to the human body. [...] Souls, aroused not only by divine precepts but also by divine deeds, would be able to return to themselves [...] even without a clash of dispositions.

For as he says in the epistle [n.118] to Dioscorus,

From the beginning of the Christian era, faith in invisible and eternal things was announced, through miraculous visible things, for the purpose of salvation for human beings who could neither see nor think about anything beyond the corporeal.

In this way therefore one who, with mind transcendent, understands something of pure truth understands it in aspects [rationibus] of the first truth. But, as Augustine says (De videndo deum [epistle n.147, ch.42]), "Indeed this is difficult. For from the custom of a carnal life, the turmoil of phantasms rushes into our inner eyes." These phantasms, as he says (III De acad. [ch.6]), "when we hold the truth and have it almost in our hands, they strain to deceive and delude us in the custom of corporeal things." Therefore, as he says

(De vid. deum [ch.29])

Let he who is not able pray and act so that he is worthy of being able. Nor let him strive after a human disputant so as to read what he does not read. But let him strive after God the Saviour so as to be capable of what he is not capable.

By purely natural means therefore, excluding all divine illumination, a human being can in no way know the clear truth.

[The Original Question]

35. - [7vM] But nevertheless the question still remains whether by purely natural means one can know it [the clear truth]. For if a human being by purely natural means can attain some [degree of truth], and through this attain the illumination of divine light, and through this know the pure truth, then it ought to be said that by purely natural means one can know the pure truth, although one cannot know it without that illumination. In the same way, if by purely natural means one can attain the first principles of the sciences, and through them know other things, then he is said to know them by purely natural means, even though he could not know them without the first principles. But if one could not by purely natural means attain that illumination, then nor through that should he be said to know the clear truth by purely natural means, as was said in the beginning of this solution [¶8]. Now however, it is the case that a human being cannot by purely natural means attain the rules of the eternal light, so as to see in them the pure truth of things. For

although purely natural things attain these rules - which is indeed true, for a rational soul is so created as to be immediately informed by the first truth (as has already been said) - nevertheless natural things cannot act on their own so as to attain them. Rather, God offers these to whomever he wishes, and from whomever he wishes he takes them away. For it is not by any natural necessity that these rules bestow themselves so that a human being sees the truth in them - as is the case for corporeal light, so that one sees colors in it, but as is not the case for the bare divine essence itself. For as Augustine concludes (De videndo deum [ch.37]), "If he wishes, he is seen; if not, he is not seen."

36. - And hence God sometimes bestows the eternal rules on bad people, with the result that in these rules they see many truths that the good cannot see since foreknowledge of the eternal rules is not bestowed on them. Accordingly, Augustine says (IV De trin. [ch.15]) that

there are some who could pass the mind's keenness beyond all creatures and reach, in however small an amount, the light of the unchangeable truth. But they derided Christians, living on faith alone, who could not yet do so.

Sometimes also he takes these same rules away from them and allows them to fall into error. Accordingly, in reference to Job 36,[32] - "In his hands He hides the light" - Gregory says (XXVII Moralia) that [f.8r]

'Monstrous are those who praise themselves with boastful thoughts. But from them the light is hidden, since the cognition of truth is too much denegated by the arrogance in their thoughts.'

But it is granted to all others for their salvation to behold [the light], as Augustine says (I Soli).

37. - It should be said absolutely, therefore, that there is nothing concerning which a human being can have pure truth by acquiring an apprehension of it through merely natural means. Such truth can be had only through the divine light's illumination. Consequently even when someone of a purely natural constitution attains this light, nevertheless he cannot naturally, by purely natural means, attain it. Rather, He bestows it, through free will, to whomever He wishes.

**[Reply to the Preliminary Arguments:**

**To the Arguments Quod Non]**

38. - [8rN] Something should be said in reply to the individual arguments. Since therefore it is argued that our sufficiency in cognizing comes from God [¶1], one should say that this is true in so far as he is specially illuminating the cognition of pure truth. But in the case of every other cognition of thought this is true only as the result of a universal moving, as has already been said. And this suffices with respect to the intention of the apostle against those who said that the origin of faith comes from us. He argues there against them. For if the origin of cognition comes not from us, but from God, as from the first mover in the case of every action, natural and cognitive, then much less is the origin of faith from us. Nor nevertheless is the apostle's intention contrary to this: that the origin of cognition comes more from

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us than does the origin of faith. For the origin of faith requires a special illumination. But this isn't so for the origin of cognition - unless it is a cognition of pure truth, as has been said.

39. - [8r0] To the second - that no one can say 'Lord Jesus' etc. - one should say that this is true with respect to the complete word for which the will's consensus is required. For there is a complete word when the delighted will rests in that which the mind has apprehended. Hence Augustine says (IX De trin.) that the complete word is apprehension with love. Hence just as the will on the basis of its own natural faculty cannot rise up into the good without the help of a special grace, so too nor can it rise up to speak such a word. Nevertheless it doesn't follow that one couldn't speak a simple word of non-pure truth without any special illumination of the Holy Spirit. Hence the Gloss says that the apostle properly referred there to speaking this word - signifying the speaker's will and intellect. And someone can speak such [a word] - concerning those things that belong to pure faith - only from faith. Hence it is said (Mat. 7,[21]), concerning speaking another simple [word], "Not everyone who says Lord, Lord...."

40. - [8rP] To the third - that the observable facts of the sciences cannot be understood unless they are illuminated by something else like their own sun - one should say that this is true of pure truth and entirely infallible

apprehensions. But in another way these facts can be understood in the light of a natural light, as was said above.

On this account Augustine says (XII De trin. [ch.15])

It should be believed that the nature of the intelligible mind has been established so as to see in a kind of sui generis incorporeal light those things that are, by the disposition of the creator, placed under intelligible things in the natural order, just as the bodily eye sees things that lie near it in this corporeal light which it has been created to receive and to which it is matched.

41. - [8rQ] To the fourth - that whatever the soul thinks of or reasons about should be attributed to that light by which it is touched - one should say that this is true concerning those things that it thinks of or reasons about in cognizing the clear truth. Otherwise this needn't be true, as has been said.

42. - [8rR] One should reply in the same way to the fifth and last. Or one should say that our seeing the true in the first truth can be either as in that which is the object first seen, or as in that which is only the basis [ratio] of seeing - as will be set forth in the following question. In the first way every truth is seen in the first truth, just as every good in the first good. For whoever sees this true thing or that true thing sees the true unconditionally in the universal, which is God, just as one who sees this good or that good in the universal sees the good unconditionally, which is God - as Augustine says (VIII De trin.) and will be set forth below.

But in the second way only the pure<sup>15</sup> truth is seen in the first truth, as has been said. And one should note these two ways of cognizing the true, good, beautiful, etc., which belong to the nobility in God and agree with creatures. For Augustine speaks of these things in various places - sometimes in one way saying that the good, beautiful, true and so forth are not cognized in creatures, unless through the true, beautiful and good in the creator. But sometimes Augustine speaks in another way. All his assessments concerning this subject however converge on one of these two ways.

[To the Arguments in Opposition]

43. - [8rS] The two arguments in opposition [116-7] do indeed prove that some truth can be known and cognized by a human being without a special divine illumination. Nevertheless they do not prove that pure truth can be known. Or, if we wish, we can say (and perhaps this is better) that a human being by purely natural means without any illumination of an assisting divine light or exemplar can cognize through intellect, by following the senses, only that which is true of a thing - as was said above. But intellect discerns what is true more clearly than do the senses, because intellect grasps more subtly and is more infused with the substance of the receivable [object] than are the senses, which perceive exterior things only according to their superficial aspects, as Avicenna says (XII Met.). And because one cannot at all -

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<sup>15</sup> Reading 'syncera' for 'syncere.'

neither to a lesser or greater extent - perceive the truth itself of a thing without the illumination of the divine exemplar, an exemplar abstracted from the thing is not sufficient to do this on its own. But the concept of a thing must be determined through the divine exemplar to the exemplar taken from the thing. Hence if one were to see in that concept the clear and pure truth, then the intellect would be more clearly illuminated by the divine exemplar. And if one were to see in some way, however slight, then the intellect would also be slightly [f.8v] illuminated by it. And if it were illuminated by it in no way, then in no way would it see the truth itself.

44. - Consequently we say that according to the common course of this life, although the presentation of an exemplar of this sort may be given up for no reason, nor are the soul's natural means so ordered that by their natural operation they can attain it, nevertheless it is, as far as God is concerned, presented equally to all men. Hence each is illuminated by it according to his disposition and capacity - unless someone by displaying great malice merits that it be taken away from him altogether. He consequently would not see any truth with the mind, but would be completely made a fool of in the case of everything cognizable, so that for any given thing he would not see the truth in it, but would dissipate into the error which he merits. And hence, according to the conclusion of Augustine, no truth is entirely seen except in the first



truth; and it is natural to a rational creature that it can by purely natural means attain only to the cognition of that which is true of a thing, and not beyond to the cognition of the truth itself, unless through the divine exemplar's illumination. And, as has been said above, this is because of the eminence of the act of intellectually cognizing that truth.

45. - In this way, in reply to the first argument in opposition - that unless a human being by purely natural means could attain a cognition of the truth, investigating it would be in vain - one should say that without that illumination a human being would not succeed in investigating it, inasmuch as one is [not] able, by investigating, to arrive at an apprehension of the truth by purely natural means. But with the rational soul existing as it does, created in its natural state, he would succeed only with the help of that illumination.

46. - [8vT] To the second - that a human being naturally desires to know; therefore he can know by purely natural means - one should say that this is true. But not in this way, that through the truth itself by purely natural means he sees, as has been said. For by his natural appetite a human being does indeed desire to know even those things that must be cognized supernaturally. And these cannot be attained through a common illumination from the divine exemplar without a more special illumination - as will be said below.