

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM OF TEACHING

1. *Nature and Need.* Freedom of teaching (*Lehrfreiheit*) is the pride of the German university. It is intimately connected with the intellectual freedom which constitutes such a marked feature of our national life. When other nations boasted of their power, their dominion, and their free institutions, the German people—whatever great cause it may have had for dissatisfaction in other respects—prided itself upon its intellectual freedom. When it was denied the privilege of free and vigorous action, it found compensation and consolation in independent thought. And this free thought had its seat especially in the universities. While thought and research were hampered by ecclesiastical and political restrictions or by the *vis inertiae* of corporative organization and the pressure of narrow-minded public opinion in the universities of other countries, which boasted of their political freedom, the German university rose to be the citadel of free thought, of thought bound by no dogmas and limited by no norms beyond those established by reason itself. Hence the pride of the German in his universities. Hence the sensitiveness on the part of wide circles to any pressure at this point. The German endures many restrictions of his personal liberty with great and, to strangers often astonishing, patience; here, however, he is, and we may say it to his credit, sensitive. The freedom of thought, research, and teaching is the jealously guarded palladium of the unwritten constitution of the German people.

“The German university,” wrote a prominent American philosopher and pedagogue, Stanley Hall, more than a decade ago, “is to-day the freest spot on earth. . . . All the old forms and laws of beliefs men had lived by were upturned and every possibility of thought was explored in quest of new,

deeper, more ineluctable foundations. But the most perfect liberty was never more triumphantly vindicated by its fruits than amidst all this ferment. Shallow, bad ideas have died and truth has always attained power. While weak men have passed through a period of confusion and perhaps some have grown indifferent and sterile, strong natures have only struck deeper root."¹

May the time never come when the German universities will have reason to blush at these words.

Freedom of teaching follows from the nature of the German university as it has developed since the eighteenth century. It is no longer, as formerly, the function of the university teacher to hand down a body of truth established by authorities, but to search after scientific knowledge by investigation, and to teach his hearers to do the same. Science, that is the fundamental principle, does not exist as a fixed and finished system. It possesses a stock of truth, but not only is this infinitely far from embracing the entire field of possible knowledge, but it is both possible and necessary to subject its title to constant criticism. In science there is no statute of limitations nor law of proscription, hence no absolute property right. It consists solely in the constant and new appropriation of old truths and the acquisition of new knowledge; it exists only as a constantly repeated attempt to solve an endless problem, in which every seemingly settled point can be again called in question by the presentation of new evidence. Hence it follows that truly scientific instruction, that is, instruction that shall lead to scientific thinking and investigation, can be conceived only as absolutely free. Instruction that is hampered is not scientific. For the academic teacher and his hearers there can be no prescribed and no proscribed thoughts. There is only one rule for instruction: to justify the truth of one's teaching by reason and the facts.

It is not to be denied that such an unlimited freedom has its dangers. I do not mean chiefly the greatly feared dangers to the established political and ecclesiastical institutions, but internal dangers to science and teaching themselves. This freedom does not give us any guarantee that what is untenable, strange, and absurd will not also claim acceptance. If the

¹ *The Pedagogical Seminary*, i., pp. 7 ff.

academic teacher possesses the freedom to present only that and all that which he himself considers true and reasonable, the possibility is, of course, not excluded that he will not only not accept new truths, because his own settled views seem more reasonable to him, but also that he will reject existing truths in order to substitute for them his own inventions, which flatter his vanity by reason of their originality. This occasionally happens in all sciences. The jealously claimed independence of thought may deteriorate into a restless passion for innovation, particularly in the fields in which the subjective element has the greatest scope, in philosophy, theology, and the mental sciences in general, which are necessarily far removed from the certainty and exactness of the mathematical-natural-scientific branches. There can be no doubt that a great many foolish opinions are offered by German professors which have their origin partly in the mere mania for contradiction and originality. So in philosophy. Every new doctent takes a pride in having his own system and in setting up something new, even though it be false and shallow, instead of "the old truth," of which Goethe once spoke. A more or less arbitrary principle is chosen, new paradoxical notions are deduced from it, and a system constructed out of them. Then pupils are enlisted and drilled in the new ideas; there is no absurdity for which, if only it appears in the form of a system, a number of pupils cannot soon be found in Germany, who proclaim it as the newest truth and call it the greatest thing of the day in newspapers and periodicals. So the creator of a new system, the founder of a new school, is born, his name gets into the "history of philosophy" and is enrolled among the immortals.¹

That is the price for freedom of teaching, not a cheap price, but it must be paid; freedom and danger cannot be separated. There would be but one protection against this danger, and that would be the acceptance of the medieval Catholic principle of

¹ Goldschmidt (*Rechtsstudium*, p. 121) shows that this phenomenon is not unknown in jurisprudence: he speaks of an "inordinate ambition to produce new or seemingly new theories; of a certain mania, especially on the part of younger scholars, to bring real or alleged thoughts into the market as quickly as possible; to expand particular, perhaps helpful, observations into monographs on general doctrines, and then again to base the big book on entirely new principles."

the restriction of teaching. This step the German university cannot take, however, without abandoning its premises, without renouncing its glorious past and its proud claim to the title of pathfinder of truth. And it may make us willing to accept the inevitable reverse of academic freedom if we remember that the free presentation of individual thoughts—however questionable their worth may be in a particular case—has more life in it and awakens more life than the prescribed presentation of transmitted thoughts.

Helmholtz once pointed out how important it was that all fields of scientific research be surrounded with an atmosphere of free thought, in which alone men might have the courage to strike out new paths to new discoveries in the land of truth. He shows that Germany won the leadership in the study of organic nature, in physiology and medicine, for other reasons than the indefatigable industry of the German scholar and his strong idealistic bent: "The crucial point is that we are more fearless of the consequences of the whole truth than any other people. In England and in France, too, there are distinguished thinkers capable of working with their full strength in the spirit of the natural-scientific method, but thus far they have almost always been compelled to yield to social and ecclesiastical prejudices, and have not been able to express their convictions openly without endangering their social influence and their efficiency."¹

2. *Boundary Disputes and Conflicts.* As a general thing freedom of teaching is the acknowledged and undisputed principle of the German universities. In most fields of research it is absolutely unimpeached; in the natural sciences and medicine, in the mathematical and philological disciplines no one would dream of imposing upon research and instruction either positive or negative prescriptions. Only at certain points is the attempt occasionally made to restrict the freedom of teaching, if not in principle, at least in practice. This is the case where scientific research comes in contact with the public authorities, the state and the church, where, in

¹ Helmholtz, *Populäre wissenschaftliche Vorträge*, Number 2, p. 210. From the address on the Aim and Progress of Natural Science, delivered at the opening of the meeting of Natural Scientists at Innsbruck, 1869.

other words, it deals with religious, political, and social affairs. Theology and philosophy, the political and social sciences, sometimes encounter such opposition and feel compelled to defend the freedom of teaching. I shall take up the different fields and say a few words about each. Let me, however, preface my statements with some general remarks.

The nature of the conflict is everywhere the same, it is the conflict between the theorist and the practical man, between the philosopher and the politician, we can also say, between the two essential phases of human nature itself, between the intellect and the will. The will, which reveals itself also in historical organisms as the will of self-preservation, demands, through its representatives, the politicians in the state and church, settled conceptions and convictions as the precondition of fixed institutions, and incontestible principles as their foundation.

The intellect, on the other hand, and its representatives, the philosophers and investigators, do not recognize anything as absolutely established, or as beyond criticism; even the principles are subject to doubt, there is no limit to criticism and the progress of new ideas. Error alone is dangerous and pernicious, never the truth. If the institutions are built upon error, they must simply be changed and placed upon new foundations.

The conflict is bound to break out again and again at this point. All sciences which investigate the foundations of historical institutions must encounter the resistance of established custom. Custom expects and demands of them that they recognize and prove its reasonableness and necessity. In case they decline, their work becomes subversive of the established order, and interference with science seems all the more permissible and justifiable because the institutions for scientific research are not only erected and supported by the political authorities, but are called to train the future officials of the state and the church. How then can they be allowed to shake the foundations of the very institutions which it is their office and function to preserve?¹

¹ This view is carried out in my *Ethics*, fifth edition, vol. ii., p. 212; English translation, pp. 698 ff. In a valuable lecture by G. Kaufmann, *Die Lehrfreiheit an den deutschen Universitäten im 19. Jahrhundert*, 1898, the most notable conflicts of the authorities with scientific freedom in the last century are discussed.

Before I attempt to mark the boundaries between these claims for the different fields of research, I should first like to call attention to one point. All the sciences which are exposed to conflict with the representatives of practical institutions, have a peculiar character; they reflect the volitional nature of the investigator, even in his scientific work. In the mathematical-natural-scientific sciences the intellect has absolute control. In the sciences, on the other hand, which have to do with human historical life, subjective and personal demands inevitably influence thought. The entire personality of the thinker and investigator is steeped in the historical life of his people. He takes an interest in things, he approaches them with feelings of love and admiration or aversion and contempt, and these feelings influence his judgment, they directly affect his judgment of value, but they are also apt to color his judgment of facts, for feelings determine our ideas and perceptions of things and their relations.

And then a final factor enters. This inner and personal interest in the world is in a certain sense an indispensable condition of research. "In order to understand the poet we must go into the poet's country." The same may be said of religion and morals, law and politics; whoever wishes to understand these things must experience them in himself. But he can directly experience them only in this or that particular form. He cannot experience religion in general, but only a particular concrete form of historical religion, and so, too, he cannot experience moral or political life in general, but only the life of a particular community to which he belongs by birth and education, rank and occupation. In order, therefore, to understand this world, he will necessarily be biased; as a mere, pure, mathematical intellect he would have absolutely no interest in it; it must be experienced in order to be understood.

Hence, the institutions and their representatives conclude, since the perfect impartiality of a pure intellectual judgment is by the very nature of the case impossible here—it would be identical with indifference and inability to understand—it is a fair demand that whoever engages in scientific research, whoever wishes to instruct others, especially our future servants, concerning our nature, should be on our side and conceive and

interpret us with sympathetic interest. Let our enemies be occupied in the business of bringing our deficiencies to light, perhaps this, too, is a necessary business; but here where we desire to be understood, we need friends who will point out the good and the positive in us, and show the reason that is in us.

Such is the conflict. Let us now follow it into the particular fields and endeavor to find the principles on which to settle it.

3. *Theology and Freedom of Teaching.* Here the conflict is most likely to break out and become most acute, because the church is itself an institution of learning, and, as a church, assumes to be in possession of the truth. It formulates the truth in the dogma.

The Catholic church has created a particular ecclesiastical organ for ascertaining the truth, the infallible ministry, whose definition of the doctrine is placed beyond all criticism by the constitution of the church. The function of a teacher of theology can accordingly consist only in the scientific arrangement and proof of the truth established by the ministry in the dogma, to defend it against attacks, to strengthen the future ecclesiastics in their belief in the dogma, and to provide them with the weapons of polemics and apologetics. There is, in the very nature of the case, no room here for free research as a means of determining and developing the doctrine itself; obedience is the first duty even of the university teacher. The Catholic church has, as was already pointed out (p. 141), actually enforced this claim, and no radical conflict is therefore possible here.

In the field of Protestantism things are different. Here too, it is true, the church claims to possess the truth in the dogma, and consequently demands obedience, but without complete success. The teachers in the Protestant theological faculties assume a fundamentally different attitude: they do not aim to be servants of the church, but first of all servants of science, servants of the church only through science. The Catholic theologian bears the same relation to the dogma as the jurist to the positive law, he develops it into a conceptual system. The Protestant theologian, on the other hand, considers it his func-

tion to develop and extend the faith, in the doctrine of faith. Since the church, however, possesses, not an infallible ministry, it is true, but yet a body of doctrine fortified by creeds, we have here a constant possibility of conflict. The representatives of the church demand subordination to the doctrinal symbols as the standards of instruction, declaring that it would be absurd to demand this of the clergy if it were not likewise and especially required of their teachers at the university. The clergy, it is held, will be exposed to intolerable inner conflicts if they are abandoned to the influence of any doctrine you please at the university, and then required, upon entrance into office, to accept the church dogma as a fixed standard of faith and instruction.

The argument seems convincing, but closer examination shows it to be untenable. The office of the clergyman and that of the university teacher differ in their nature. It is one thing to edify the congregation on the basis of a presupposed common faith, another, to subject this faith itself to scientific investigation. For the latter function there can be no external standards, possessing the force of legal axioms, on Protestant ground. The Protestant churches have no organ for making dogmas and can have none. Protestantism, as has been said before, is in its origin an individualistic reaction against the institutional religion of the Roman church, a reaction supported by a powerful religious personality. It cannot deny its origin and hence is unable to create dogmas as binding norms. That was the opinion of the reformers: not human ordinances, but the word of God alone is the source and standard of faith. The "word of God" is, however, not embodied in a system of definitions and dogmas. It is, as we begin to see with increasing clearness, imbedded in a long series of writings of the most diverse contents and character, which are so many evidences of progressive historical life; or rather it is nothing but the meaning of this life itself. And therefore free scientific research is really possible here; it will aim to understand the nature, origin, development, and goal of the religious life of our civilization. Since historical life itself is not complete, religious life, which is its soul, cannot be complete but may develop into higher forms.

To the character of theological science in this field, the character of university instruction will have to correspond. It cannot be the aim, in the professional training of the Protestant clergy, to teach dogmatic proofs for the truth of the doctrine, but merely to introduce the student into this historical life and help him to understand its progressive development. The more deeply he is immersed in this stream, the better equipped will he be to act as a guardian of souls and as a spiritual adviser amid the extremely difficult and complicated relations existing in the spiritual life of our times. Not as a priest, not as an official of the church will he make his influence felt, but only as a living personality. All the more necessary is it that he become familiar with the life and thought of his age on the one hand and, on the other, that he rise above it through a deeper historical insight and through a consciousness, guided by higher ends, of that which is to come because it ought to come.

One restriction will, however, be imposed even upon the freedom of the professor of theology. He must be rooted in the soil of this historical life; he must be in sympathy with the great religious event of humanity which we call Christianity, he must experience it as the most valuable content of our life, to be realized more and more completely by us. A person who fails to do that, who sees nothing in Christianity and its literary creations, nothing but an outlived form of superstition, or who has perhaps been convinced by Nietzsche that Christianity represents the triumph of slave-morality, and is the radical curse of Western civilization, may continue to believe in his vocation as a historical-anthropological philosopher of religion or a reformer of humanity, but he cannot believe in his mission as a teacher of theology. As an honest man he will have to lay down his office, in case this conviction afterward takes possession of him, so that no one may be deceived with respect to his attitude.

And still another demand may be made of the professor of Protestant theology, that he place himself on the side of Protestantism, and do it willingly, that he be ready to build up the religious life of the community upon this basis. Whoever, instead of building, desires simply to tear down, whoever looks upon the Protestant church either as a form of apostasy from

the Catholic church that ought to be abolished, or as an obstacle to the elevation of humanity that ought to be absolutely destroyed, cannot, as an honest man, retain membership in a Protestant theological faculty. This faculty happens to occupy a definite historical position with respect to these questions, which those who enter it accept as the basis of their activity. A man who cannot tolerate the restriction will do well to keep out of the faculty and use his freedom as a citizen in laboring in the interest of his own views.

Is the theological faculty therefore without that freedom from bias in research which we are wont to regard as the precondition of membership in a university as a scientific institution? In a certain sense, yes. Its scientific work is not unbiased in the same sense as that of the medical or mathematical-natural-scientific faculty. This is due not only to its history and its position amid the social problems, but mainly to the fact already mentioned that certain judgments of value underlie its work as well as its instruction, which are not derived from scientific research, but arise out of the affirmation of historical and personal life.

Mathematics and physics can exist as unprejudiced sciences, if we except the belief in the validity of logic, simply because their objects have no connection with the heart and will, but exist merely for the intellect. On the other hand, judgments of value, posited by the will itself, which can not be proved to the intellect, form the starting point in ethics. Similarly there are in the historical sciences, in the sciences of religion and the church, law and the state, judgments of value, having axiomatic character, which cannot really be proved to the understanding, positive and negative judgments of worth which are conditioned by the historical and personal attitude of the investigator, and which succeed in influencing him in the selection as well as in the conception and treatment of the subject. An inhabitant of Sirius, coming down upon the earth, could examine, classify, and psychologically explain the different religions of the earth-dwellers with the same objectivity with which the mathematician regards his lines and angles; an earth-dweller will never be able to do it. Immersed in this historical life, he takes an emotional interest in its products; he cannot get away

from it, he cannot make a pure intellect of himself here. He can rise above blind hatred and above blind love, but he cannot eliminate these feelings altogether. And even if he could, he ought not to do so; it would mean the annihilation of his personal life.

Such subjective-personal limitations exist in all fields of knowledge which have to do with historical and personal life, and cannot be eliminated. Hence honesty demands that we admit them and that we do not plead absolute freedom from bias. To be willing to accept as fact everything that honest research considers historical fact, and likewise to be willing to accept everything that unprejudiced judgment regards as a consequence of necessary thought, and finally to be ready to recognize and accept whatever the moral judgment absolutely looks upon as a higher value and as a higher standard of value, that is the only freedom from bias to which the investigator in these fields can bind himself. But he cannot subscribe to a freedom from bias which implies absolute indifference to the objects of investigation. The desire to understand, preserve, and elevate this historical life, that is not only the permissible, but also the necessary presupposition from which the Protestant theologian, no less than the Catholic, starts out, and which his hearers have a right to expect from him.

But for the rest, no restriction is to be placed upon his freedom of investigation and instruction, as happens in the case of the Catholic theologian. This is in harmony with the nature of the German university and the essential principle of Protestantism. Faith here does not depend upon an external authority, and hence instruction cannot be based upon it. Between the creed of the church and the teaching of the theological faculties the only possible relation is one of voluntary agreement and not of absolutistic subordination, the attitude which follows from the principle of absolute doctrinal authority in the Catholic church. Of course the Catholic attitude is simpler, but the simplest is not always the best and the surest. The living organism is not simple, the mechanical object is simpler than the organic. In the state, too, absolutism is simpler than the constitutional monarchy, but it has become impossible, and the state now rests upon the voluntary, not forced, agree-

ment between two factors. A somewhat similar relation exists between theology and the church in Protestantism; they have grown up together, often in conflict, but the friction is beneficial to both.¹

Is that a menace to the faith of the future clergy? To their faith in an infallible church and in a fixed body of doctrine it undoubtedly is. But does it threaten their religious faith? Perhaps. They cannot, however, get away from doubt here, they find it everywhere, even at school; they will also find it in the parish; how can they escape from it at the university? There is nothing left but to pass through doubt to a personally experienced faith in God, the God who has revealed himself to us in Jesus, as he can reveal himself to men in a man. The more deeply one has been steeped in doubt himself, the better leader will he be for a world steeped in doubt. But if he remains fixed in doubt, if he does not reach a personal certainty, which impels him to testify and preach, it is better for him to choose another calling while there is still time. The all-important thing is that he have a personal, and not merely a prescribed official, faith. The Protestant church must make up for what it lacks in doctrinal authority by the sincerity and truthfulness of its servants.

4. *Philosophy and Freedom of Teaching.* I shall add a few statements concerning the science which bears an intimate historical and material relation to theology, that is, philosophy. Its freedom to teach is likewise occasionally contested and by the same opponents who demand a binding standard for theology. From philosophy too they demand harmony with the doctrines of the church, or at least the exclusion of certain forms of thought which are condemned by the church. In the ultra-montanistic press and in the speeches of the parliaments and diets we hear the constant complaint that an "atheistic" philosophy is tolerated at our universities, which makes a business of undermining religion and corrupting the youth. The lecture rooms of the universities, it is maintained, are the nurseries of revolution, social-democracy, and anarchism, and it is futile to combat these evils outside so long as we do not

¹ Compare an excellent lecture by W. Kahl, *Bekennnissgebundenheit und Lehrfreiheit*, 1897.

attack the very seat of the disease.¹ There is also a tendency among some Protestants to make such charges and to engage in the business of alarmists.

I do not intend to investigate these charges, or to find out whether or not "atheistic" philosophy is taught at German universities. As everybody knows who has even a slight acquaintance with the history of philosophy, the characterization of a system as atheism has, ever since the trial of Socrates, been the constantly repeated and therefore somewhat hackneyed method of discrediting a philosophy with the authorities and the masses. Nor do I intend to inquire whether political discontent is the result of unorthodox thinking and political orthodoxy the result of religious orthodoxy. I simply desire to point out that the demand of freedom from bias strictly applies to philosophy, that a philosophy that has a goal set before it, which thought must reach or dare not reach, is nothing, at least not philosophy.

Philosophy is nothing but the reflection of reason upon itself, the critical examination of the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge and willing, and likewise the attempt to explain the nature of reality and its meaning. Hence it follows that it cannot accept any unproved assumptions, not even the assumptions of logic. Reason examines even these and justifies them by convincing itself that the logical principles constitute the essence of reason. The same is true of the ultimate principles underlying the judgments of value; the rational will expresses itself and its nature in them. On the other hand, the exposition and interpretation of reality is a business that is subject to constant examination and improvement all along the line, down to the principles themselves. All sciences are constantly adding new facts and views to the knowledge of the world, from which alone it follows that there can be no final and immutable philosophy, that it must always be ready to re-examine every point that seemed settled, in the light of the new facts. Moreover, the conceptions of what constitutes the meaning of life

¹ As an example of this kind of denunciatory eloquence as well as of the way in which the "pious lie" is employed, examine a little treatise written by Nic. Siegfried, *Vom Atheismus zum Anarchismus, Ein lehrreiches Bild aus dem Universitätsleben der Gegenwart*, Freiburg, 1895.

and reality are also subject to change. Hence every age is confronted with the problem to repeat the attempt of solving the great riddle of reality by the means at its disposal. The attempt will be the more successful, the more it learns from the attempts of former times; the more faithfully a philosophy utilizes the results of past thinking, the more vigorous and fruitful it will be. But one thing no philosophy can abandon without abandoning itself, the right, namely, to examine and modify all traditional conceptions when the facts or the more highly developed consciousness of its own nature demand it.

As a matter of fact, however, philosophy itself is not without its presuppositions, presuppositions which are rooted in personal and historical life. The philosophy of an earth-dweller will be different from that of an inhabitant of Sirius, that of an Englishman different from that of a Hindoo. Philosophy must be without bias only in the sense of granting absolutely no presuppositions the examination of which it does not consider permissible, nay, necessary. Whether or not there can be knowledge at all, whether or not there can be any general principles for determining values, whether or not life and reality really form a cosmos and have a meaning, there is not a single question here that cannot be put, no question that might not as such be denied as well as affirmed. In this sense philosophy is free from presuppositions, the absolutely unbiased science, because it is its function to examine the presuppositions of all the rest. Reason is here wholly dependent on itself, determined to accept nothing as true that is not grounded in reason itself. That such a science cannot permit prescriptions and restrictions to be imposed upon it, is obvious. It would, as Kant once said, "be very absurd to expect illumination from reason and yet to prescribe to it beforehand what the illumination shall be." The same thing applies to philosophical *instruction*. It ceases to be philosophical when it does not depend solely upon the consent of reason, and when it does not appeal to the independent, perfectly unbiased reason of the student. It ceases to be fruitful as soon as this is no longer the case; it will have influence only in case the student is sure to receive in the lecture the untrammelled expression of the teacher's independent convictions, based upon his best knowledge and belief. Professor comes from *profiteri*; the

word calls for an open confession of a personal conviction, in no field more than in philosophy where the subjective and personal element plays a more important part from the very nature of the science. If the teacher is obliged to hold certain views, or at least *not* to hold certain views, the student will place little weight upon the arguments presented; of course there will be arguments if once the propositions are established. What should we think of a critical-historical investigation whose results had been prescribed to it? In such a case everything would simply depend upon the teacher's lawyer-like cleverness. The same holds here: a philosophy that degrades itself by consenting merely to find arguments for a theory prescribed by external authority, sinks to the level of a sophistical art of proving everything possible, for it might have pleased the authority to prescribe the opposite view. The effectiveness of university instruction in philosophy depends upon the student's belief that truth is the sole aim and not the proof of officially prescribed and quasi-officially desired or at least permitted views. He wishes to know what are the personal convictions of a sincere and serious man with respect to the great problems of life and the world to which such a man has devoted deep and serious thought. What functionaries have been ordered to say about these things he knows well enough already.

The fear is expressed that our young men will be misled by absolutely unfettered teaching and thrown into confusion. This belief rests upon the great misconception that our students come to the university with the child-like faith in what is handed down to them in the religious instruction of the schools as settled truth. Everybody who is even slightly in touch with the actual world knows how far removed we are from such a state at present. To be sure, nothing is said of these things in the certificates which are presented for entrance; in them it is perhaps attested that the student has thoroughly familiarized himself with the tenets of the Christian religion. As a matter of fact, we meet with the most sweeping doubts, even and especially in the schools, with doubts not merely in specific doctrines of the faith, but very often with absolute scepticism, and not seldom dogmatic atheism and materialism. The higher classes in our gymnasia perhaps furnish the most numerous and

most zealous readers of the Büchners and Haeckels: the charm of these books is so great here because they have the value of forbidden fruit.

Such students are not satisfied at the universities with a new edition of an approved scholastic philosophy. They can be brought to a freer and deeper conception of the ultimate problems only by a philosophical instruction that does not ignore doubts, that has no goal prescribed for it, that considers the facts alone and listens only to reason, that is ready to accept every solution of these problems that is found necessary upon the most impartial examination. If philosophy is taught in this way at our universities by a man who is not handicapped by the suspicion which at present attaches to all prescribed or quasi-official views, he may succeed in convincing his hearers that reality does not stop where the panting wisdom of the *litterati* of materialism stops. And if he succeeded merely in arousing a feeling of reverence for reality and for the efforts which have been made by great and profound thinkers to interpret its secret, that would be something. But the freedom of teaching is the necessary precondition of all this. When only one kind of thinking is allowed, it is naturally suspected of not being able to withstand the force of argument, and whoever advocates it is at least exposed to the doubt whether he would have advocated it of his own accord and without pay. An idealistic philosophy is especially deeply interested in seeing that other schools are not deprived of the possibility of asserting themselves. Every restriction of academic freedom would encourage the suspicion that it was insincere, and rob it of its influence.

From this standpoint we are enabled to pronounce judgment upon "Catholic" philosophy, which is taught in ecclesiastical institutions and is also officially represented in some German universities. The philosophical conception of the universe which has been presented in the system of Thomas Aquinas, has of course absolutely the same rights as any other philosophy. But what gives it its peculiar position is that it is at present almost a prescribed philosophy. The recommendation of the Thomistic philosophy and the rejection of other systems, for example of Kant's, by explicit declarations of the supreme

authority, confer upon the representatives of this movement a position scarcely less exceptional in the German universities than that occupied by Catholic theologians. It would therefore now be appropriate, as was stated before, to have this philosophy presented by a member of the Catholic theological faculty.

5. *The Political and Social Sciences and Freedom of Teaching.* The representatives of the sciences which study political and social life also occasionally come in conflict with the ruling powers and are accused of "heterodoxy." There is, in reality, no real orthodoxy here. The state has no canonical dogma concerning its nature, functions, and rights, like the church. It is not an institution of learning, but a sovereign power. Nor have we an official doctrine of society and its functions. Instead, the party that happens to be in power proclaims its own doctrines as orthodox, and characterizes every doctrine antagonistic to it as false and dangerous. And so it endeavors by the power of the state to keep out or dislodge the "false doctrines," at least from public institutions of learning. The arguments which it employs are always the same. The false doctrines undermine the security of the state and society; these and the authorities representing them therefore owe it to themselves to oppose such doctrines, for the right of self-preservation is here also a duty. Least of all can false doctrines be tolerated among officials; correctness of thought is the first duty of the official, for he has to represent the authority of the state. And it is a double duty for the academic teacher. In the first place, he is himself an official, and in the second place, it is his function to train officials, which means, to instruct them in the right views of the nature and function of the state. In case he is not willing to do this, the authorities have the right and the duty to remind him of it, to censure him, and if he remains obstinate, to remove him, or at the very least to place a teacher holding the correct views by his side to avoid dangerous misunderstanding.

Our answer is that if there is to be a science of the state and society, it must, like every science, spring from the free investigation of the facts. A theory of the state and society that has its results prescribed, would have no theoretical value whatever,

but at best only a technical value, namely as an instrument of government to keep itself in power. To the parties science is but one of the means of keeping themselves in power by influencing public opinion. With the truth as such the parties have nothing whatever to do; if it is for us, very well, if it is against us, away with it! That is the maxim of every party as a party, which, of course, it does not confess and cannot confess. "Science" would manifestly lose its value even as a means of power if it appeared as the dogma of the party in power. It influences the opinion of men only so long as it seems to be an independent product of the intellect. The dominant party will therefore always desire to have a form of science that is really dependent, but publicly boasts of its independence, just as it is wise for a prince who proposes to embrace Machiavellianism, according to Voltaire's witty remark, to begin by writing a book against Machiavelli.

This is the way the matter stands for the parties. For the people as a whole and the state as such, meaning by the latter the permanent embodiment of its impulse of self-preservation, which is superior to the parties, the case is different. The people really care for the knowledge of the truth, at least in so far as the proper conception of reality constitutes the basis for properly influencing reality. A party may be interested in not having the truth prevail, but a people cannot as such have an interest in the preservation of false conceptions. Its ability to live depends in no small measure upon its doing that which is necessary from a proper knowledge of the actual conditions. And hence the people and the state, in so far as the latter represents the people, can have no desire to place obstacles in the way of an honest search for truth in the field of politics and social science, either by forbidding or favoring certain views.

We might make the matter clear by Socratic inductions. Is it not true that when any one, anxious about his health, consults a physician and places himself under his care, he does not prescribe to him what shall be the result of the examination, and does not tempt him to see or to say anything not in accord with the facts, either by rewarding him for favorable statements or threatening him with punishment for unfavorable ones? If any one should act like that, we should call him a fool. And

when the master of a ship takes a pilot on board, he does not mark out for him the course to follow, but leaves him to steer the ship and turn the helm; all he does is to determine the destination of the vessel. Well, the same holds here. When a people appoints experts to produce scientific knowledge of the nature of the state and society, their historical evolution and present condition, it is foolish for it to prescribe to these men what definitions and propositions they ought to employ in order to reach their results, just as foolish as it would be to prescribe to the statistical bureau the figures to be obtained, to insist upon figures, let us say, giving favorable evidence of the progress of the population and of its wealth.

If the results of statistics were decreed by the state, all enumeration and calculation would, of course, be superfluous or rather a mere illusion for the purpose of deception. And the same thing is true of political economy and the general theory of the state; it is their function to form general conceptions adequate to explain reality as it is. If now these conceptions are decreed by authority or their formulation influenced by favor or threats, these sciences sink to the level of mere sham-battles, arranged by a party for the purpose of keeping itself in power. The people as a whole would have no interest in them, none except to get rid of them. What the people needs, if it needs doctrines at all, is incorruptible, perfectly disinterested seekers after the truth; concealment and deception can only lead to ruin. And such men it will appoint to teach. The instruction of officials and statesmen in these sciences can have no value whatever, unless it leads to the most impartial knowledge of reality, even though this knowledge should not produce satisfaction with existing institutions. To content oneself with fancies and deceptions is no wiser than to strive to enrich oneself by adding ciphers to the figures in one's account-book.

Theoretically it will not be possible to reach any other conclusion. Still there are practical difficulties. Not only is the state always represented by persons who are in some way or other influenced by party interests and party views, but even the investigators and teachers as individuals stand in some relation to the political or social parties, by reason of private

interests and personal feelings, descent and intermarriage, etc. They can at best vouch for their honest intention to see things as they are, but they cannot wholly get rid of the personal factor and the subjective character of the concepts and judgments conditioned by it. Under these circumstances the problem will always leave a remainder *in praxi*. But the principle will hold: a people is interested in the truth alone, and there can be a science of these things, only in so far as the influence of personal interests upon the results and judgment of the investigator is eliminated. If, therefore, the business of research is to be made a public function, the political powers will, so far as they represent the interests of the whole, have to observe strict neutrality towards the results of research.

Here, too, however, it will be necessary to place one restriction, if not upon the thinker, at least upon the teacher appointed by the state and supported from the funds of the people, the same restriction which we placed upon the professor of theology. Just as the latter must assume a positive relation to religion and the church in general, the former must assume a positive relation to the people and the state. A person who occupies the position of an enemy to this nation, not striving for its welfare, but for its ruin or the decline of its power, or assumes a hostile attitude towards the state as the historically developed institution of the people, aiming at its dismemberment and destruction and not at its preservation and improvement, cannot as an honest man accept an office and a commission from the hands of the people or the state. The implicit or explicit assumption is that the official desires the preservation and welfare of the community. If the pilot taken on board should use his position to steer the ship against the rocks and into shoals, he would be guilty of treachery; so would the man who used his official position to betray the interests of his people, or to drive the ship of state upon the rocks of civil war.

Or suppose that a man had been convinced by his own reflections upon the nature of the state or by the eloquence of a Tolstoi, that the state as an institution of force was an evil, and ought to be destroyed. That, too, would unfit him for the office of a teacher of political science just as it would unfit a person to be a teacher of law if he looked upon the positive law as a

foolish burden and a plague—always provided at least that the state is not inclined to abrogate itself and the law in case theory demands it. The teacher will, therefore, have to recognize that there is a reason in these things, and it will be his first task to see and to show the reason that is in them. Then he may also point out the distance between the reality and the ideal, and, if he can, the way to approximate the ideal. The man, however, who can find absolutely no reason in the state and in law, who, as a theoretical anarchist, denies the necessity of a state and a legal order, having the power to compel, not only for an ideal dream-world, but for this work-a-day world, may try to prove his theory by means of as many good arguments as he can, but he has no call to teach the political sciences at a state institution. And no state would be willing to appoint him to such an office or be able to tolerate him in it, however thoroughly he may be convinced of his vocation for it. Just as there can be such a thing as supersensitiveness, there can be supertolerance. We can neither justly demand nor reasonably expect that the state should voluntarily expose itself and its legality to whatever insults the theorists appointed by it as teachers may choose to offer. Such unlimited academic freedom would manifestly be conceivable only as an evidence of the state's absolute contempt for the professor's teaching; it would be placing it on a level with the pratings of an anarchistic demagogue which the state does not prevent because it regards them as utterly insignificant and harmless.

From this standpoint we may also judge of the state's attitude toward the academic presentation of the political and social sciences in accordance with the principles of the *social-democracy*. So long as the party advocates a theory hostile in principle to the state as such, claiming that the existing state is nothing but the product of the selfishness of the dominant parties, an institution for the oppression and exploitation of the "people," that its so-called justice is nothing but a peaceful form of gag-law, that the army is an instrument for the forcible coercion of the masses, that the goal to be sought is political power and that this is to be employed in destroying class distinctions and abolishing the state as such, the compulsory instrument for maintaining social oppression; so long as the social-democracy

advocates these theories, so long as it remains radically hostile to the state, hostile to this particular state and to the state in general, it cannot be permitted to teach the political sciences in state institutions. A state that will permit such theories to be taught, as "the results of science," in the lecture rooms of the universities established by it, and will allow the teachers of the political sciences employed by it to point out the worthlessness of the state as such, or of this particular state, as a scientifically proved fact, will be looked for in vain. The existence of such a state would simply prove that the authorities regarded the lectures of professors as harmless and insignificant, and considered it beneath their dignity to pay any attention to them. So long as the state takes the universities seriously, such a form of political science as has been described will be impossible in its institutions of learning.

This, of course, does not mean that the state should absolutely suppress all attempts to formulate such theories. Nor do I deny the need of a social-democratic party and of its criticism of existing political institutions. Though it may often shoot far beyond the mark, it has given rise to wholesome reforms in our legal and social institutions, and will continue to do so in the future, the more clearly it keeps in view, as a political party should, the most immediate positive ends and allows the ultimate ideals to take care of themselves. All I assert is this: The state cannot hand over the business of teaching the science of the state to men who show no deeper appreciation of the inner necessity of historical products, and who have no more respect for established institutions than the platforms, literature, and press of the social-democracy express. The state will permit such men to gain followers for their doctrines wherever they choose, but it cannot appoint them as the authorized leaders in the science of these things.

It is also to be added that so long as the social-democracy boasts of being a revolutionary party, expecting and aiming at the overthrow of the entire established political and legal order, no professor, be his chair what it will, can join this party without at the same time renouncing his office. The official oath includes the recognition of the existing constitution, and manifestly no state can relinquish its right of expressly demanding

or tacitly assuming such recognition from every official. No state, be it republican or monarchical or what you please, will confer an office upon a man who declares it to be his political function to destroy its very foundation. To destroy its very foundation, mind you, not to reform and improve the state, for which provision is made by the constitution itself. No one can be an officer of the state who seeks to destroy it. Not for a moment can we imagine that a social-democratic republic or whatever the future state might call itself, would assume a different attitude in this respect. Indeed, it is to be presumed that it would go much farther and be forced to go much farther in watching those under suspicion and expelling its enemies than any one of the existing states. The more firmly established a state is, the less sensitive it is to criticism; the weaker it is, the more anxious it will be to ward off attacks and to suppress public criticism. And hence the freedom of teaching would be nowhere less assured than in a place where a new revolutionary government was compelled to defend itself against reactionary movements, where law and authority were insecure and depended wholly upon public opinion, the most uncertain thing in the world.¹

The case is somewhat different with respect to the private docent. He is not an official of the state, hence his particular duties are not circumscribed by law, nor does he possess the

¹ "The more naïve a power is, the younger the party-rule, the more brutal the parliamentary system, the smaller and more exclusive the society and its interests, the more the rich *parvenu* looks upon himself and his philanthropy and legal rights as a matter of course, the worse it will be for the freedom of science if it depends upon the power of these philanthropists." In these words G. Cohn in an article in the *Lotse* (vol. i., 455 ff, 1901), discusses the dismissal of a professor of political economy from a private American university on account of offensive economic views. With this agrees what Professor Perry says of some of the recently established "State Universities" in the United States (in *Monographs on Education in the United States*, ed. by N. M. Butler, i., 277): In some states, he says, "the constant changes in the political complexion of the legislature, and the self-seeking of party-leaders, have made the universities mere shuttlecocks of public or party opinion, and not only has their development been hindered, but in some cases their usefulness deliberately crippled. Instances are not unknown where particularly able and courageous professors, who would

authority of a regularly appointed professor. The state might easily disregard his entire teaching as a private matter and ignore the fact that he presented doctrines hostile to the state. It would not thereby recognize such teachings as legitimate nor consider their presentation as desirable, it would merely tolerate them as harmless and insignificant.

For the faculties, however, the case would stand as follows. The bestowal of the *venia legendi* depends upon the candidate's scientific ability, without which an academic career is impossible in Germany; but with his politics the faculty has absolutely no concern. Only in case the applicant for the *venia legendi* had appeared publicly as a political partisan and agitator, would the faculty be justified in considering this point. The question might well be asked whether such partisan activity had been pursued in such a manner and to such an extent as to be no longer compatible with the candidate's function as a teacher of science. This applies equally to all parties. The scientific investigator and teacher cannot and ought not to be a partisan in the sense in which a politician can be one and is occasionally forced to be one, and I am convinced that no faculty will regard pronounced activity as a political agitator on the part of a candidate for the *venia legendi* as a recommendation. The universities are and desire to remain non-political corporations. And they will be particularly sensitive on the question of propagandism for the social-democratic party, not

not cut their scientific opinions after the prevailing political mode, have been driven from their chairs, even by outrageously underhanded methods." Enough, I think, not to make the universities particularly anxious for a change from state government, acting in accordance with formal legal principles, into an arbitrary "socialistic administration" based on universal suffrage. The way in which the ultramontanistic demagogues spy into the opinions of and hunt down university teachers who do not "wheel into line like under-officers" gives us a foretaste of what conditions would necessarily result from an administration dependent upon party-leaders and those in control of the press. A régime controlled by such elements would never appreciate or understand true science; the party rabble cannot help hating and persecuting superior minds refusing to cater and yield to its instincts; even the envy of inferiority against mental superiority makes a different procedure impossible. The university men in the social-democratic party are already beginning to feel something of this.

only in order to escape conflicts with the government, but also because of the peculiar character of this party: it is, more than any other political party, a "sect" with a "doctrine" and "correct tenets." This fact was again brought out at the recent Lübeck convention: not only the member's political action, but even his literary and scientific work is subject to the approval and disapproval of the party. This follows necessarily from the fact that the party platform contains a dogmatic system, that there is "scientific" socialism or socialistic science. There has never been "scientific" liberalism or conservatism; these parties have no "system," but merely a practical political program. The social-democracy aims to be more than a political party; it has a *doctrina fidei* to which it binds its members or attempts to bind them, for the belief in the system which has undergone so many and such rapid changes of late years, is now naturally declining in spite of the fact that the party conventions officially maintain it. When the social-democracy ceases to be a sect with an iron-clad doctrine, when it stops prating about the revolution or playing upon the double meaning of the word, when it assumes the attitude of a reform-party and aims to reform existing institutions by bringing about complete equality before the law and by elevating the moral and intellectual conditions of the lower classes, then it will no longer be possible to justify the state in treating this party differently from the others.

Opinions hardly differ on this point. On the other hand, it is a debatable question, whether membership in the social-democratic party should exclude a man from the university, even from lecturing on subjects that have nothing to do with politics. The Prussian ministry of state has affirmed the question.

In trying the case of the private docent of physics, Dr. Arons, as the highest disciplinary authority, according to the new law, it based its decision upon the general theory that membership in the social-democratic party was in itself incompatible with the position of a private docent, and furnished cause for removal, under the provisions of the new "law dealing with disciplinary measures for private docents," since "it made him unworthy of the confidence which his calling de-

manded." Sitting in judgment on the same case, as the disciplinary tribunal of the first instance, and according to the same law, the philosophical faculty of the Berlin University had not been able to convince itself of the soundness of this position. The faculty was, in my opinion, right in assuming that the private docent was not an official and hence had no special official duties towards the state, that his character as a man and as a scholar, hence also his worthiness of confidence in these respects, were not affected by his political opinions, and that therefore, in so far as these opinions did not influence his teaching, he suffered no loss of confidence in his standing as a private docent, which would have been the case with an official. Nor was the faculty able to discover any political danger to the state in the fact that a private docent of physics was an active member of the social-democratic party.

It is to be hoped that this conception will gradually triumph in the political world. The stronger a government is and the better its conscience with respect to the duty of equal justice to all, the less it will be overcome by fears of secret revolutionary movements, the less also will it feel the need of making a show of power against those of other mind. Prince Bismarck reckons among the things which should not tempt the statesman, the show of power. Purely formal success that is without material value and merely satisfies the desire for a show of power confers no glory on a government. I cannot help thinking that the victory of the ministry over Dr. Arons belongs to this category of success.

And now let me add a final word. In excluding the presentation of doctrines absolutely hostile to the state from the university, which should, of course, not be made a field of experiment for all possible and impossible notions—let us not forget that anarchism has always led to absolutism—we do not at the same time wish to exclude the criticism of existing political institutions and social conditions. I am rather of the opinion that the greatest possible scope should be given to a bold and impartial criticism. Here as in all human affairs criticism is a necessary function. When it strikes at what has outlived itself, at what is false and of evil, at what interferes with the healthy development of the whole, it is, looked at from the

standpoint of the life of the people, a highly commendable thing. And it has a place in academic instruction also. It is an inevitable function of such instruction to turn the attention of the leaders of the coming generation towards the necessary development of public institutions along the lines of justice and public welfare. The more thoroughly the first task is performed and the historical necessity of the established institutions understood, which is also the reason in things, the sooner will the second problem be solved, for reforms must depend upon the knowledge of the necessity and limitations of what already exists.

That it is impossible to escape the hostility of those whose real or supposed party-interests would be injured by a change of existing conditions, lies in the very nature of the case. They will attempt to arouse the government against the critics of the state and society, with accusations and denunciations, and their objections will also be directed against a university administration that is slow to comply with their wishes. A government that is sure of its ground, that regards itself and has a right to regard itself as the guardian of the interests of the people, will meet such accusations with the same clear conscience with which it endures accusations from the other camp.

We should not forget in this connection that it was not the men who were always satisfied that made life better and were honored after their death as the great leaders of progress. In all truly great men there has always been present a noble discontent with reality, with the existing conditions in the state and law, in church and religion, in society and education, in science and literature. To mention examples in the intellectual or academic world, I call to mind Socrates and Plato. The former was condemned as one dissatisfied with the beliefs and views, the education and political organization, of his environment; as the first of the great recluses, the latter passed through life, giving expression to his deep yearnings in his writings. I call to mind Kant and Fichte; they likewise were two great malcontents. With ardent longing they searched for perfection, which to them was possible because it ought to be. In religion and in law, in church and in state, everywhere the real is infinitely far behind the ideal, as "pure reason" necessarily

conceives it. Men of thought they were, not men of action, but thoughts are the seeds of acts. The German universities may proudly boast that never has there been among them a dearth of men of noble discontent who sowed the thoughts for future acts. May there always be such men, and may the universities always have room for such men!

To those, however, who believe that limits can be set to thought by restricting the freedom of teaching, Dahlmann makes a happy reply. "You may drive the sciences out of the universities by confining them to the propagation of traditional truths. It is by no means beyond the power of the state to transform the former seats of free culture into mere workshops, but the blow aimed at the sciences would not hurt them, for they are not unfamiliar with the wanderer's life—as much as the youths of the state. It is by no means beyond the power of the state to compel these young men to attend such universities, but it has not the power to prevent them from despising institutions which contradict all the academic traditions and ideals esteemed in our literature, and which public opinion indignantly scorns. For the places to which a noble ambition once led men of the highest culture, would then hold merely the hod-carriers of science. . . . After all our trouble we should simply have succeeded in transforming our young men into a lot of 'misfits,' and a still more obstinate lot at that. There is no help for it, we must take the dangers of the sciences along with their blessings; science is the spear that wounds, but at the same time heals."¹

6. *The Professors and Politics.* In a well known passage of the *Republic* Plato attributes to the philosophers and to them alone the ability to organize and govern the state properly. In commenting on the passage Kant dissents from Plato's conception of the relation of the philosophers to the state: "It is not to be expected that kings should philosophize and philosophers should become kings, nor is it to be desired, because the possession of power inevitably destroys the independent judgment of the reason. But in order that both parties may properly understand their functions, it is indispensable that kings or kingly peoples (those governing themselves according to the

¹ Dahlmann, *Politik*, vol. i., p. 319.

laws of equality) should not permit the class of philosophers to perish or to become mute, but should allow them to speak openly. And there need be no fears of propagandism in such a case because this class is by its very nature incapable of banding together and forming clubs."¹

Applying the terms used in our heading, this means that professors, the representatives of science, should not engage in politics, but should reflect upon the state and the law; and it is of importance that their thoughts be heard by the politicians. I regard this as the proper solution of the problem.

The scholars cannot and should not engage in politics. They cannot do it if they have developed their capacities in accordance with the demands of their calling. Scientific research is their business, and scientific research calls for a constant examination of thoughts and theories to the end of harmonizing them with the facts. Hence these thinkers are bound to develop a habit of *theoretical indifference* with respect to the opposing sides, a readiness to pursue any other path in case it promises to lead to a theory more in accordance with the facts. Now every form of practical activity, and practical politics particularly, demands above everything else a determination to follow *one* path, the path that one has chosen. That this path should be the best and the most direct path is not so important as that one should not waver between two paths. But such very resoluteness of will is weakened by long continued theoretical activity; the latter is apt to produce a certain indecision, a kind of *aboulia*, a tendency to doubt, not only before the decision has been rendered, but even afterwards. The thinker is too much accustomed to look at every question from all sides, to see the justice of the other side, to return to the starting point in order to discover whether an error may not have crept into the argument somewhere. All these qualities are virtues in the theorist, but they are defects in the practical politician who must possess the courage of conviction, of consistency, yes, of onesidedness. New conceptions may be formed; the truth is in no hurry. Not so with reality; the opportunity for action comes, and when you have embraced it, you must go on. The thought that you

¹ *Zum ewigen Frieden*, Hartenstein's edition, vol. vi., p. 436.

ought to have acted otherwise, has a disturbing and paralyzing effect. Hence it is not the men of strong theoretical tendencies who produce the great crises in history and reform institutions; it is the men of strong will, the Luthers and the Bismarcks, who stand at the portals of new epochs. At the entrance of modern scientific development we find men like Erasmus, Galileo, and Lessing, men who possessed courage and force, no doubt, only not the courage and force of action.

Political activity, on the other hand, produces a habit that would prove fatal to the theorist, the habit of *opportunism*. The practical politician is necessarily an opportunist. Whenever the object is to realize practical ends, it will always be necessary to reckon with conditions, to adapt oneself to circumstances, to make compromises, to hold principles merely as movable axioms. All these things would be absolutely condemned in the theorist; he has to deal not with the creation of conditions, but with the creation of concepts, not with reality, but with the truth. Hence he must be an *intransigent*.

An investigator who permits circumstances to influence him in his theories, who allows conditions, be they material or personal, to induce him to abandon his principles or to yield any of their consequences, who makes compromises for the sake of peace, in short, who acts like a politician, loses all claim to consideration. We desire to know from him what is true and a necessity of thought, not what happens to be permitted or seems to be opportune at the present time or in this particular place. To be sure, the investigator's views and convictions, too, may change, only the change must have been brought about by reasons alone, and not by conditions and motives.

This is one phase of the question. Theory unfits one for politics, politics unfits one for theory. The other phase of the question, which Kant emphasizes no less than the other in the passage quoted, is this. The formation of philosophical concepts concerning the state and law is doubtless necessary, and politicians do not act wisely in ignoring these concepts. The business of philosophy is, according to Kant, to deduce rational ideas from principles, by which the value of the actual institutions is to be measured and according to which they are to

be shaped; as, for example, the idea of a perfect legal state, the idea of a perfect legal union of all the states, from which eternal peace would follow. They are goals which the practical men must ever keep in mind, and which must help to direct their course.

The belief in the possibility of a philosophical deduction of right is not so strong in our century, the historical century, as it was during the age of natural rights. And yet it may be asserted that theory has not lost its influence upon practice even in our age. At the beginning of the century the practical politicians came under the influence of the Kantian philosophy, under the influence of the liberalistic theory of rights and its conceptions of a legal state, a state with its freedom limited by law and all its citizens equal before the law. At the end of the century a new theory exercised an important influence upon the practical politicians and legislation, the social-political theory, which assigns to the state not only the function to ensure formal equality before the law, but the further function to care for the socially weak by protective measures against the superior force of private capital as well as by institutions directly aiming at their welfare. Had it not been for the new theory, practice would scarcely have made such important advances as have been made in German legislation during the last two decades. Besides, it ought also to be remembered that the unification of the German Empire by Bismarck was prepared by the theorists, particularly by the historians, who introduced the idea of national unity into the flesh and blood of the people.

The proper relation then is this: It is the business of the theorist to devote himself to reflection and to create necessary thoughts, concepts and laws of that which is, and ideas of that which ought to be, remembering always that philosophical or conceptual thought and historical knowledge must go hand in hand. It is the business of the practical man to turn the existing institutions in the direction of the ideal, always keeping his gaze fixed upon reality, however, and carefully considering what can be realized. The theorists, as it were, represent the self-consciousness of the people in its highest form, while the practical men represent the united will of the people, which

realizes the idea by action, in opposition to the thousand obstacles of the moment. Science as such has no bias. But reality, and, above all, history, certainly has a bias, and this bias the investigator who impartially devotes himself to reflection, can recognize, much more surely than the practical politician who is steeped in the interests and conflicts of the moment. Of course, nothing can hinder the theorist from making the recognized bias or the goal at which reality is aiming, his own, and passionately pursuing it; think of men like Plato and Fichte. But it is not wise to transfer to the philosopher also the business of realizing the ideal politically. The power to see things near at hand and the power to see them afar do not dwell in the same eye. What once happened to Thales, the Milesian, when with gaze fixed upon the sky and the stars he failed to see the well at his feet, might happen to the philosopher in politics. Nor would Plato's experiences in Sicily seem to invite imitation, any more than the experiences of the scholars assembled at St. Paul's church in 1818.

Hence the Kantian separation of the politicians and the philosophers will have to be accepted. The Platonic arrangement is impossible, impossible on account of the difference in the functions of the two. The man whose mission it is to listen to the deep and quiet thoughts that slumber in the soul of the people, cannot be placed in the noisy turmoil of everyday politics; and, conversely, the man whose business it is to put his shoulder to the wheel ought not to have too delicate a nervous system, yes, perhaps not even too sensitive a conscience; and his capacity to make use of all sorts and conditions of men ought not to be restricted by an all too delicate moral taste. But it is important nevertheless "that kings and nations should not permit the class of philosophers to perish or to become mute, but should allow them to speak out openly."

7. *The University's Duty With Respect to Political Education and Public Life.* In the discussions of the *lex Arons* the dismissal of Arons was also demanded on the plea that the university ought to cultivate patriotism. In the sense intended, the university cannot recognize this as its function. It is not a training school, its students are not minors; it is an institution

for scientific research and scientific instruction, and such instruction it offers to foreigners as well as natives. In so far as it becomes immersed in the spiritual essence of the German people and deepens the knowledge of its historical life, we may of course confidently hope that the university will arouse feelings of love and devotion for the German character, and perhaps also help to destroy some objectionable features of the present age. And this will most likely affect both natives and foreigners. Perhaps we may say that the love which the German people inspires abroad is in a great measure owing to the universities. If the universities should also contribute to a knowledge of the evils and false tendencies of the present, and, on the other hand, help us to discover the forces necessary to free us from these evils, that, too, would mean something for the political education of our people, for the generation which is now receiving its impress from our universities will in a few decades direct events.

At the same time the universities must never forget that the things which they are called upon to cultivate transcend the boundaries of countries and nations. Truth and science are by their very nature possessions of mankind, and they are created and constantly augmented by the coöperation of all peoples participating in the intellectual life of humanity. The men who serve science form something like a Masonic brotherhood, as Lessing conceived Free Masonry; unhampered by what separates nations, sects, and classes, it is their vocation to exemplify and represent the universal human element against the narrow aspirations of particular groups. We feel more keenly than was felt in Lessing's day that the universal can be expressed concretely only in the particular, that the wealth of human nature depends upon the manifoldness of national forms. But we shall not forget Lessing's wise words that there are limits beyond which patriotism as well as confessionalism ceases to be a virtue. Supersensitive nationalism has become a very serious menace to all the nations of Europe; they are in danger of losing their appreciation of human values. In its exaggerated form nationalism, like sectarianism, destroys the moral as well as the logical conscience: just and unjust, good and bad, true and false lose their meanings; what we call des-

picable and inhuman when others do it, we, in the same breath, advise our own country to do to a foreign people.

This is really the greatest work the universities can perform for public life; all of them together can serve as a kind of *public conscience* in domestic and foreign politics. The politicians who have their eyes fixed upon the most immediate goals are too apt to lose the standard of what is morally possible or impossible. Goethe's words, that the man in action is always without conscience, are doubly true of the man of political action. He is not working for his own good, but for the good of the whole; and what is not allowable to attain this end? Hence we need a tribunal that is not called upon to act, but represents and emphasizes the moral judgment. This would really be the function of the church, but the church is, actively and passively, too deeply immersed in the struggle for power. Hence, in Germany at least, the universities have taken up this work. Engaged in contemplation, they are less exposed to the temptation of power, to partisanship and party hatred, and for that very reason it is their mission to measure the acts of power by the ideal.

At a momentous period of our history, the German university proved true to its vocation to be the conscience of the country. I have in mind the seven professors of Göttingen who protested against the violation of the constitution by a despotic king and refused to pay homage to him. Dahlmann, the author of the protest, when commanded to withdraw the document under threat of punishment, declined to do so on the ground that this was not a case of disobedience, but "a defense against an illegal demand. But even this voice of necessity would not have been raised, had not those remained silent whose duty it was to act and to speak. By taking sides with the power aiming to destroy the basal law of the state, the ministers of state have forced the subjects to speak the truth in accordance with the dictates of their conscience." He concludes: "Shall we in future teach it as the basal law of the land that what pleases the supreme power is the law? I wish to leave the country as an honest man and not to sell to my students falsehood and deception as the truth. Until then I was conscious of not having violated the duty of obedience

either by deed or by word, and I shall remain faithful to my duty: but I cannot recognize a duty of slavery."¹

I cannot refrain from quoting the words of another one of these seven excellent men. J. Grimm in speaking of his dismissal once solemnly and beautifully expressed the idea that the German universities were the conscience of the people: "So long as their sterling and excellent organization remains what it is, the German universities will be extremely sensitive to everything good or bad that happens in the country. If it were otherwise, they would cease to serve their purpose. The frank and healthy minds of the young demand that their teachers shall at all times reduce every question concerning important relations of life and the state to their purest and most moral terms, and shall answer them openly and honestly. Here hypocrisy is impossible, and the influence of right and virtue upon the unbiased minds of the hearers is so strong that they instinctively submit to it and are disgusted by every kind of perversion. It is impossible to keep from them one's independent teaching, fettered by inner conviction alone, concerning the nature, conditions, and consequences of good government."²

The presupposition of such service, I repeat, is that the universities be not dragged into the political controversies of the day as participants and accomplices. Such a proceeding would destroy their impartiality and objectivity. Just as the judiciary is isolated against political influences, for the sake of justice, which is thereby recognized as a supreme good, higher than all temporary political ends, investigators and teachers should be isolated against the same influences, for the sake of conscience and truth, which is a no less supreme and eternal good, higher than all the temporal interests of politics.

Viewed from this standpoint, it seems like a happy accident of fate, that the German universities should for many hundred years have enjoyed the good fortune of dwelling apart from the great world, far from courts and society, power and wealth. V. A. Huber has emphasized this point in a notable comparison between the German and English universities, for whose value as educational institutions for the leading classes he

¹ A. Springer, *F. Chr. Dahlmann*, 1870, vol. i., p. 431.

² J. Grimm, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. i., p. 36.

has the greatest respect. "The English scholars live too much in and for the world, so that it is hardly possible for them to develop that species of almost monomaniacal love for the subject of their investigations. Their standard is an entirely different one; it is not derived from the subject itself, but from the opinion of the circle to which they belong." In England the universities are parts of the political system, the scholars are enmeshed in the views and judgments of the governing class of society. The German universities dwell in their own world, outside of politics, and their highest achievements are in science. "It is our part, our glory, and our task among the historical nations of the earth," though not the only one, it is to be hoped, he adds, "that the German mind alone has hitherto achieved the highest pinnacles of science, impelled by the ferment of philosophy, and the old loyalty to and love of truth for its own sake, which are so characteristic of the German spirit." The cause for this fact he seeks particularly in the unique combination of defiance and diffidence, the genuine and precious jewel we call our spirit (*Gemüth*); but he believes that external conditions have also played their part: "our poverty and narrowness, the contempt or at least indifference of the world, our isolation, in short, so many joys and sorrows known among us." He is a little afraid of the future. "Will not the favor which science, in the persons of some of its representatives, is beginning to find in the eyes of the authorities, deprive it eventually of its dearest treasure, of its innocence, as it were? It is easy enough to see in France what happens when scholars are made courtiers, councillors of the state, etc."¹

It is easy to see what this man would think of the most recent development of the German university system, the accumulation of large incomes, the adoption of the customs of fashionable society, the extent to which titles and decorations are bestowed, and similar things. He would hardly regard them as means of increasing the inner dignity and power of the professors, perhaps he would look upon them as means of making them more dependent upon the powers of this world, thus exposing the German university to the danger of becoming untrue to its purpose.

¹ V. A. Huber, *Die englischen Universitäten*, vol. ii., p. 500.

BOOK IV

STUDENTS AND ACADEMIC STUDY

CHAPTER I

MORALS

I SHALL discuss in this chapter two conceptions which play a great role in the life and sentiments of the student, the conceptions of *freedom* and *honor*.

1. *Academic Freedom, its Significance, and its Dangers.* The period spent at college is a period full of great significance for one's entire life; we may compare it with the germinating period of spring, upon the outcome of which the richness of the harvest depends.

The college days at present fall in the period of transition from youth to manhood. The training received at home and in the school comes to an end; the period of self-education begins. The new problem now is to form the inner man and to give his life a content by means of his own reason and power. In what way this is to be accomplished will depend on the individual's future calling in life. Whoever devotes himself to university study expects to enter the ruling class of society. He also assumes the duty to justify his right to enter it; he alone who has the moral insight and energy to act as a guide for others on the path of duty and truth, has a right to enter the ranks of the leaders. This fixes the goal at which such study should aim: independent scientific knowledge in some large sphere of life, and a character strong in virtue and efficiency.

Freedom is the precondition of self-education and culture. Freedom from outward compulsion is therefore the symbol of student days, the much vaunted academic freedom.

Indeed, the student days are the days of the greatest and most complete freedom from outward compulsion that life affords. Before and after this period we are surrounded with duties and restrictions of all kinds; the student is free to devote himself

wholly to his task of forming himself into an independent personality. He leaves the parental home and orders his outward life to suit himself; he disposes of his income as he chooses, he selects his associates and his friends. In the same way he disposes of his time. The pupil in the high school has a definite amount of work assigned to him every day; the university student selects his field of study, his university, his teachers, and the lectures to be taken. And he also assumes an independent mental attitude towards what the teacher offers him. The pupil has to learn and assimilate what is assigned to him; the student does not "learn" but "studies," he assumes an independent, critical attitude towards what he hears or reads. He can, if he chooses, stay away from the lectures altogether; no one is going to call him to account for that, no one is going to ask him why he is doing it or how he is spending his time, at least no one is officially charged to do such a thing. Such absolute freedom is never experienced again. Later in life a man's time is taken up with his calling and office, his family and society, and the many duties and troubles of the daily routine. The student belongs to himself, he is responsible to nobody and for nobody but himself.

To this great freedom the bright glamor which rests upon academic life is due. With his heart filled with hopes and expectations, the pupil looks forward to this period; with longing the man looks back upon the golden days of freedom, from the narrow surroundings of his later life.

Responsibility is the correlate of this freedom. The less of external compulsion there is, the more imperative is the duty of self-control. Whoever confounds freedom with licence, misunderstands its meaning; it is given to the individual not that he may do as he pleases, but that he may learn to govern himself.

This task is not an easy one; the danger of missing the right road is not small. Many do not know what to do at first with such unusual and excessive freedom, indeed it actually becomes a burden to them. They do not know exactly what to do with their time; they try one thing, then another; glance into this science and then into that one; pick up one piece of work, then another, only to drop it again. We ought not to judge of this

attitude too harshly. Not infrequently such a state of vacillation is due to an instinctive desire to come into touch with things and men; the time is not lost if the nature of the student is broadened and he gradually succeeds in discovering what is suited to him. I shall later mention some of the ways in which he may learn to get his bearings in his helplessness. Sensible older fellow-students who have gone through the same experience and have found themselves, are the most accessible and perhaps also the best advisers. Moreover, the universities are doing more than they have done in the past to lend a helping hand during the earlier semesters by offering exercises for beginners.

Others are encouraged by such freedom and the difficulty of making a start, to abandon themselves, for the time being, to the present, and to taste the joys and pleasures of student life in an indiscriminate and aimless sort of fashion. That too may be pardoned; such a loosening of the reins is often the natural reaction against the overexertions of the last year at school. In case new and vigorous impulses for work spring up after a moderate period of rest and abandon, the brain may lie fallow for a while with good hygienic effects; and the experience too will not be without its value, teaching that it is not possible to ground one's life and happiness upon the love of pleasure.

The danger becomes more acute when, accustoming himself to a life without work and duties, the student gradually sinks into a state of listless inertia, which, occasionally interrupted by good resolutions and futile attempts to carry them out, finally degenerates into a kind of chronic exhaustion of the will. It is a danger to which the more indolent natures are exposed in our system. The suddenness of the transition from the long, rigid curriculum of the school to the absolute freedom of a course of study wholly left, for a series of years, to the individual's own judgment and energy, helps to magnify the danger. And then the feelings of discontent and weariness which are inseparably connected with a life of idleness lead to the use of the various narcotics by means of which human beings seek to disguise the inner emptiness of their lives. Fichte has described this phenomenon: "Laziness is the source of all vices. To enjoy as much as possible and to do as little work as possible, that is the

problem of the depraved nature, and the many attempts which are made to solve it are the vices of the same."¹

Persons of livelier and more energetic temperament may, however, purposely disregard the rational way of looking at things as Philistinism, and fall into that free and easy "transvaluation of all values" which has always found expression in student-poetry. They are not always fellows of inferior quality who consume their powers and waste their youth in such student exuberance or, as we now-a-days say, "supermanhood." After they have again come to their senses, the past seems like a curious intoxication to them. Nor are those lacking who never succeed in getting back to the sober view of life and go to pieces in consequence.

It is worthy of note, by the way, that Plato, who understood the human soul, already observed this phenomenon. He describes it in the eighth book of the *Republic*, in the place where he draws a parallel between the revolution in the soul of a youngster whose father has brought him up in a vulgar and miserly way, and who for the first time goes out into life and freedom, and the transition from the oligarchical régime to democratic freedom. At first, when the youth gets into the company of loose, unbridled fellows, the "drones' honey" tastes sweet to him, but the habits and conceptions acquired in the parental home still have influence over him; he is ashamed, the spirit of reverence enters his soul and order is restored. But his passions rise again, call to help desires which are like them, and secretly making common cause with them, bring the will to subjection. "At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul which they perceive to be void of all fair accomplishments and pursuits and of every true word, which are the best guardians and sentinels in the minds of men dear to the gods. False and boastful words and conceits grow up instead of them, and take the same position in him. And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters and takes up his abode there in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the Messieurs Vain Conceit shut

¹ *Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten*, fifth lecture, *Works*, vol. vi., p. 343. See also an essay by Tolstoi, *Why Human Beings Use Narcotics?*

the gate of the king's fastness; they will not allow the new ally to pass. And if ambassadors, venerable for their age, come and parley, they refuse to listen to them; there is a battle and they win; then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them. They affirm temperance to be unmanliness, and her also they contemptuously eject; and they pretend that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness; and with a company of vain appetites at their heels, they drive them beyond the border. And when they have made a sweep of the soul of him who is now in their power, and is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array, having garlands on their heads, with a great company, while they hymn their praises and call them by sweet names; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence courage. In this way the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures."¹

Thus these transformers of all values.

I mention still another danger of freedom; the degeneration of youthful exuberance into spiritual unbridledness and unrestraint. Goethe describes it in the second part of *Faust*: the *scholar* of the first part, who has become a *baccalaureus*, typifies it in perfect form. He is making up for his former bashfulness by the most licentious kind of talk; he at once introduces himself to us as "freed from all restraints of narrow Philistine thoughts"; he feels it as the noblest calling of youth to put old age to death:

Dass nicht, wie bisher, im Moder
Das Lebendige, wie ein Todter
Sich verkümmre, sich verderbe,
Und am Leben selber sterbe.

Who will not think of Nietzsche, the *Unzeitgemässe*, who felt the call to brush away the mould of German educational Philistinism and the rubbish of academic life, who afterwards in the *Götzendämmerung* applies the hammer to all the heroes of the past, and then, with derisive laughter, breaks them all into

¹ Jowett's translation of Plato, vol. ii., *Republic*, book viii.

pieces, the empty and hollow forms? And following in his wake we see the whole swarm of false geniuses, who, without a spark of the master's genius, imitate his unrestraint, hoping to enter with him into the temple of immortality.

Goethe contemplates this phenomenon with thorough equanimity.

Doch sind wir auch mit diesem nicht gefährdet;
In wenig Jahren wird es anders sein,
Wenn sich der Most auch ganz absurd gebärdet,
Es giebt zuletzt doch noch 'nen Wein.

It is true the fermentation of the student days evaporates, not infrequently with astonishing rapidity; but the wine is in consequence often not the best. Of many it may be said:

Verflogen ist der Spiritus,
Das Pflagma ist geblieben.

It is enough to have suggested the false and deceptive notions of freedom. True freedom, however, we insist, is that alone which Plato contrasts with the unbridledness of desires; the rule of the divine part of the soul over the lusts and desires, the feelings and passions of the "irrational" part. The purpose of academic freedom is to achieve this inner freedom in the battle with oneself and one's environment.

2. *Honor.* Next to freedom in the student's estimation of life's ideals stands honor. In what does it consist, in what does he glory?

Honor in the objective sense is the estimate in which the individual is held by his fellows, hence, in this case, by his fellow students. On what does high esteem depend in this sphere? Essentially on three things, in my opinion: courage, independence, and veracity.

Courage is the first. Cowardice is a fatal reproach to a student. The ability to defend his honor if necessary, even with a weapon in his hand, is a demand which his fellows make, first and foremost. The man, the man in the making, demands of himself, and the demand is made on him, that he be ready to stand up for himself and everything he holds dear. A man without courage, a man who is not ready to risk his life for a cause that is worth it, does not deserve the name of a man. By

which is not meant, we hope, a contentious spirit or, worse still, a love of brawling which tries to pick quarrels with everybody simply in order to furnish a proof of courage; real love of honor demands the respect of others' honor no less than the defense of one's own.

Nor should it be forgotten that courage, manliness (*ἀνδρεία*) in the full sense of the term, implies not only the power to resist danger and harm, but also pleasure and desire. To be a slave to pleasure is no less degrading than to be a slave to fear. Courage in the full sense is the manly sovereignty of the will over the nature-side of our being. This applies especially to the control of the sexual appetites. Here also a battle is to be fought and an honor to be defended, the honor of the spiritual self in the battle against the natural impulses, the triumph of which results in every kind of degradation and forces the individual into the most disgraceful society.¹

Independence is the second quality. I mean independence of will and judgment with regard to the demands of honor: the independence to follow one's own convictions of what is right and good and proper, not to bow to opinion because it is the dominating opinion, or to might because it has the power. It is plain that the student's sense of honor also aims at this. For we will surely be permitted to interpret thus the demand of academic youths to be measured by their own standards, as well as their cheerful and exuberant disregard of all kinds of conventional requirements of public opinion and society. And society makes these concessions as "following necessarily from the premises"; if the pupil is to become a man of independent thought and action during these years, he cannot be hemmed in by narrow barriers, he must have room to try to regulate his life himself and to rely upon his own judgment. The life of the student is, therefore, in the words of E. M. Arndt, "a life of poetic freedom and equality, a self-sufficient and self-controlled life without compulsion and without sin, in which the spiritual world stretches out immeasurably before him, and in which every exuberant pleasure or every youthful act of daring

¹ I call attention to a lecture by the physiologist, A. Herzen (Lausanne): *Wissenschaft und Sittlichkeit* (German translation, Leipzig, 1900).

is not confronted by a toll-bar and a watchman to drive him with staffs and pikes into the path of common custom and common virtue."

It will be an excellent thing if the fruit of these years is a proud and independent mind which bows in reverence to what is good and great, and refuses to honor and imitate what is base, even when it appears in the form of might.

To be sure, I cannot wholly rid myself of the fear that the age of "material politics," the traces of which are everywhere recognizable in the life of the German people, has also found favor and influence with the studying youth; they, too, have learned to esteem wealth and ostentation, to value outer appearances and conventional forms, to ape the customs of high society and to develop a mania for "correctness." I confess, the Philistine solicitude with which many circles insist upon what they call "good form," seems to me less in keeping with student ideals than the excessive indifference in these matters, which was formerly not uncommon among students. It at least showed courage on their part to apply their own standards as against prevailing custom. The all too ready acquiescence in the demands of talmi-elegance for "correctness" does not allow us to expect much independence of judgment and character later on, and when all these things are purchased at the price of privation and distress at home, this compliance with opinion becomes disgraceful servitude, nay, a thoroughly dishonorable frame of mind. "Cheerful poverty," on the other hand, is a proud affair; the ability to be surpassed by others in outward show, without feeling envy and without loss of pride, is really an evidence of a noble mind. Goethe's lines express it:

Ich bin ein armer Mann,
Schätze mich nicht gering;
Die Armut ist ein ehrlich Ding,
Wer mit umgehen kann.

And connected with this is the ability to judge a man according to his inner worth, independently of wealth and rank. The aforesaid talmi-elegance usually goes hand in hand with plebeian arrogance towards plain people and with pliant submissiveness to power and wealth. In this respect also the German student

possessed a higher sense of freedom in the first half of the nineteenth century than is often the case now. We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world; the man who first uttered these words had the right to say them. But among those who speak them after him are, I fear, only too many who are afraid of everything in the world but God, who are afraid of society and public opinion, of money and rank, of everybody who may at some time be useful to them or harmful to them; yes, of every man of the people, even though he can do nothing but turn up his nose.

A word on making debts may not be out of place. I mean the frivolous making of debts which is the result of living beyond one's means. Debts mean a loss of freedom and honor; these are given in pawn to the lender. But whoever makes debts without the intention of paying back is at heart a thief. E. M. Arndt tells us somewhere in his *Wanderungen und Wandlungen mit dem Freiherrn von Stein* that von Stein did not think much of a niece of his whose extravagance had led her into debt: "Like his friend Niebuhr, he looked upon wise, old-fashioned customs and economy as an essential part of civic virtue; with the old Persians he believed that a man in debt would at last necessarily become a liar and a slave of men still worse than himself."

Finally the third point; veracity and frankness are among the things on which honor depends. Indeed, it is felt by the student's sense of honor that falsehood and breach of faith are, next to cowardice, the most disgraceful reproach. And frankness, too, may be reckoned among the qualities which youth esteems; the quick, frank word, the opinion spoken right out, even when it hurts, is preferred to a too cautious, calculating nature enveloped in a diplomatic coating. There is an instinctive feeling that openness and straightforwardness have value for a community which aims to make independent men of its members through free self-government.

But a still higher relation to the truth is demanded of the student: when he enters the university he theoretically places himself in the service of the truth. To seek for it and appropriate it is the first duty, to apply it and make it fruitful if he can, the further task of every one who considers

himself worthy to be counted among the *clerus* of the nation. Love of truth and courage of conviction would then be the qualities peculiar to the disciple of science; love of truth: pleasure in investigation and work, the impulse to woo and battle for truth; and courage to tell the truth: the will to stand up for the truth even when no one wants it, even when it arouses hatred and enmity and brings one contempt and derision.

Let Fichte express this thought with his impressive pathos: "It is a refreshing, soul-stirring thought which every one among you can have who is worthy of his vocation: To me, too, in my sphere, the civilization of my age and the following ages is entrusted. . . . I am called to bear witness to the truth; my life and my fortunes amount to nothing, the effects of my life amount to infinitely much. I am a priest of the truth; I am in her service; I have bound myself to do and to dare and to suffer everything for her. Should I be persecuted and hated for her sake, should I even die in her service, what should I be doing that is remarkable, what should I be doing further than what I simply had to do?"

"I frankly confess, in the position in which Providence has placed me I should like to contribute something to diffuse among men a manlier mode of thought, a stronger sense of dignity and worth, a more ardent zeal to fulfill their mission, be the danger what it may, wherever the German language extends and farther, if I could; so that when you will have left these halls and will have been scattered over the entire land, I shall know you to be men, in whatever parts of the world you may live, men whose chosen friend is truth; who receive her when she is driven out by the whole world; who publicly protect her when she is slandered and calumniated; who for her sake cheerfully endure the slyly disguised hatred of the great, the shallow smiles of the foolish, and the pitying shrugs of the narrowminded."¹

That would be honor in the true and noble sense of the word—to deem oneself worthy of a great task and to prove oneself worthy of it. The applause of the multitude and the honor achieved by outward show and money, will always have their lovers, only they ought not to be found among the spiritually free, not among students.

¹ *Bestimmung des Gelehrten*, fourth lecture.