

Hastings Rashdall

“The Origins of the University”, Vol I, pp. 1-74

“The Student University” (Italy), Vol I., pp. 142-175

“The Faculty University” (Paris), Vol I., pp 269-334

“The ‘State’ Universities” Vol II, pp. 1-78

Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, (Oxford), New ed., F.W. Powicke and A.B. Emden, eds. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1936).

the Clarendon Press more than ten years ago. We fear that she must often have wondered whether the new edition would ever appear. Apologies for delay are always tedious and are rarely convincing. We shall offer none, but venture to hope that she will welcome our work, in spite of all its imperfections, as a tribute to the learning, and also to the memory, of a great Oxford scholar.

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS A UNIVERSITY?

Of the older works on universities in general the most important are—CHAP. I. CONRINGIUS, *De Antiquitatibus Academicis Dissertationes Septem* (ed. Heumannus, with HEUMANNI, *Bibliotheca Historica Academica*, Göttingen, 1739; and *Opera*, Brunswick, 1730, vol. v); MIDDENDORPIUS, *Academiarum Orbis Christiani Libri duo*, Cologne, 1567 (*Libri iv*, 1594; *Libri viii*, 1602); LAUNOIUS, *De Scholis Celebrioribus*, Paris, 1672.

The following may also be mentioned: HAGELGANS, *Orbis Literatus Academicus Germano-Europaeus*, Frankfurt, 1737; ITERUS, *De Honoribus Academicis Liber*, Frankfurt, 1685.

MEINERS, *Geschichte der Entstehung und Entwicklung der hohen Schulen* (Göttingen, 1802-5), long remained the only modern work on this subject as a whole, and that a completely uncritical one. SAVIGNY began the scientific investigation of the subject, in his *Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter* (Heidelberg, 2. Aufl. 1834, &c.); but he is only valuable for the Italian universities and the legal faculties. MALDEN, *On the Origin of Universities* (London, 1835), is full of blunders; more valuable contributions to university history were made by Sir William HAMILTON in his polemical articles in the *Edinburgh Review* (1831-4), reprinted in *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education, and University Reform* (London, 1852). VALLET DE VIRVILLE, *Histoire de l'instruction publique en Europe* (Paris, 1849), hardly pretends to be a serious history of the universities. The subject has naturally been the theme of many academical addresses, pamphlets, &c., but it will be enough to mention DÖLLINGER, *Die Universitäten sonst und jetzt* (Munich, 1867; *Universities Past and Present*, translated by APPLETON, Oxford, 1867).

The subject remained practically *terra incognita* till the appearance of DENIFLE's great work, *Die Entstehung der Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400* (Berlin, 1885), the first and only volume of a colossal undertaking which was never continued. I have expressed my sense of the value of this great work in the Preface.

Of the critics of Denifle the most important is GEORG KAUFMANN. His *Geschichte der Deutschen Universitäten* (Stuttgart, 1888-96) forms an interesting, well-written, and not unimportant contribution to the history of medieval universities in general. The controversy between him and DENIFLE (which was unfortunately violent) was conducted by KAUFMANN in *Göttigische Gelehrte Anzeigen* (1886, p. 97 sq.), *Zeitschrift d. Savigny-Stiftung* (VII. Germ. Abth. Heft 1, p. 124 sq.), *Historisches Jahrbuch* (x, 1888, 349-60), *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* (1889, I. i, 118 sq.); and by DENIFLE in *Hist. Jahrbuch* (x. 72-98, 361-75), *Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* (ii. 337 sq.).

LAURIE, *Lectures on the Rise and Early Constitution of Universities* (London, 1886), is a brilliantly written little book, but is unfortunately full of inaccuracies and misconceptions, old and new. MULLINGER's article on *Universities* in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (ninth edition) deserves mention as the first tolerably correct (though very brief) account of the subject which has appeared in English.

[The most suggestive contribution to the subject since 1895 is to be found

CHAP. I. in Giuseppe MANACORDA's *Storia della scuola in Italia*, vol. i; *Il medio evo*, in two parts, published in the series 'Pedagogisti ed Educatori' (Remo Sandron, editore, Milan, n.d. The preface is dated October 1913). This book, however, should be used with care, for MANACORDA's main contentions have been strongly criticized; see especially V. ROSSI's review in the *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana*, lxvi (1915), 182-99; reprinted in his *Scritti di critica letteraria*, iii, 71 sqq. Stephen D'IRSAV, *Histoire des universités françaises et étrangères des origines à nos jours*, volume i (Paris, 1933), is good within its limits, and especially useful for the development of studies.

Among other recent works may be noted Ch.-V. LANGLOIS's essay in the first series of his *Questions d'histoire et d'enseignement* (Paris, 1902); C. H. HASKINS, *The Rise of Universities* (New York, 1923), a good popular sketch. Paul SIMON's rectorial address, *Die Idee der mittelalterlichen Universität und ihre Geschichte* (Stuttgart, 1932), is thoughtful and interesting.

The subject is treated at more or less length in the general histories of education: K. A. SCHMID, *Geschichte der Erziehung vom Anfang an bis auf unsere Zeit* (Berlin, 1884-1902); Th. ZIEGLER, *Geschichte der Pädagogik mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das höhere Unterrichtswesen* (3rd ed., Munich, 1909); cf. articles in WATSON's *The Encyclopaedia and Dictionary of Education* (4 volumes, London, 1920).]

Importance of subject.

SACERDOTIUM, *Imperium*, *Studium* are brought together by a medieval writer¹ as the three mysterious powers or 'virtues', by whose harmonious co-operation the life and health of Christendom are sustained. This 'Studium' did not to him, any more than the 'Sacerdotium' or the 'Imperium' with which it is associated, represent a mere abstraction. As all priestly power had its visible head and source in the city of the Seven Hills, as all secular authority was ultimately held of the Holy Roman Empire, so could all the streams of knowledge by which the Universal Church was watered and fertilized, be ultimately traced as to their fountain-head to the great universities, especially to the University of Paris. The history of an institution which held such a place in the imagination of a medieval scholar is no mere subject of antiquarian curiosity; its origin, its development, its decay, or rather the transition to its modern form, are worthy of the same serious investigation which

¹ 'Hiis si quidem tribus, scilicet sacerdotio imperio et studio, tanquam tribus uirtutibus, uidelicet uitali naturali et animali, sancta ecclesia catholica spiritualiter uiuificatur augmentatur et regitur. Hiis etiam tribus, tanquam fundamento

pariete et tecto, eadem ecclesia quasi materialiter perficitur.' Jordan of Osnaburg, *De prerogatiua Romani Imperii*, ed. Waitz (1869), p. 70. [For the authorship of this tract see below, p. 23, where the passage is again cited.]

has been abundantly bestowed upon the Papacy and the Empire. CHAP. I.

Like the Papacy and the Empire, the university is an institution which owes not merely its primitive form and traditions, but, in a sense, its very existence to a combination of accidental circumstances; and its origin can only be understood by reference to those circumstances.¹ But the subsequent development of each of these institutions was determined by, and reveals to us, the whole bent and spiritual character of the age to whose life it became organic. The university, no less than the Roman Church and the feudal hierarchy headed by the Roman Emperor, represents an attempt to realize in concrete form an ideal of life in one of its aspects. Ideals pass into great historic forces by embodying themselves in institutions. The power of embodying its ideals in institutions was the peculiar genius of the medieval mind, as its most conspicuous defect lay in the corresponding tendency to materialize them. The institutions which the Middle Age has bequeathed to us are of greater and more imperishable value even than its cathedrals. And the university is distinctly a medieval institution—as much so as constitutional kingship, or parliaments, or trial by jury. The universities and the immediate products of their activity may be said to constitute the great achievement of the Middle Ages in the intellectual sphere. Their organization and their traditions, their studies and their exercises affected the progress and intellectual development of Europe more powerfully, or (perhaps it should be said) more exclusively, than any schools in all likelihood will ever do again. A complete history of the universities of the Middle Ages would be in fact a history of medieval thought—of the fortunes, during four centuries, of literary culture, of the whole of the

¹ [The possibility that the medieval university owed much to conscious imitation from the Arabian system of education has been urged by the Spanish scholar, J. Ribera y Tarragó. See his collected *Disertaciones y opúsculos*, i, 243 (Madrid, (1928). He lays stress upon the

rapidity of the development from the twelfth century, the mingling of papal direction with free institutions, suggesting a mingling of two types of civilization, and the grant of titles or degrees (cf. the *ichaza* or licence, *ibid.*, pp. 334-40). His argument is not convincing.]

CHAP. I. scholastic philosophy and scholastic theology, of the revived study of the civil law, of the formation and development of the canon law, of the faint, murky, cloud-wrapped dawn of modern mathematics, modern science, and modern medicine. Hardly more than a glance can be given at many of these subjects in the present work. Its paramount object will be to study the growth of the university as an institution, to trace the origin of the various universities, and to sketch the most important changes which passed over their form and their spirit during the period before us. Our attention will be for the most part confined to the parent or typical universities; no more than a slight sketch will be attempted of their derivatives or descendants. Even so, our subject is in some respects an inconveniently extended one. But if this diffusion of interest involves some sacrifice of that thoroughness in research, of that concentration of view, and that vividness of local colouring which might have been possible in a monograph on a single university, something will be gained if it becomes clear, as we compare Bologna with Paris, and Paris with Oxford or Prague, that the universities of all countries and all ages are in reality adaptations under various conditions of one and the same institution; that if we would completely understand the meaning of offices, titles, ceremonies, organizations preserved in the most modern, most practical, most unpicturesque of the institutions which now bear the name of 'university', we must go back to the earliest days of the earliest universities that ever existed, and trace the history of their chief successors through the seven centuries that intervene between the rise of Bologna or Paris, and the foundation of the new University of Strasbourg or of the new universities in England.

Meaning
of univer-
sitas.

The word *universitas* is one to which a false explanation is often assigned for polemical purposes by controversial writers, while the true explanation of it at once supplies us with a clue to the nature and historical origin of the institution itself. The notion that a university means a *universitas facultatum*—a school in which all the faculties or branches of knowledge are represented—has, indeed, long

since disappeared from the pages of professed historians; but it is still persistently foisted upon the public by writers with whom history is subordinate to what may be called intellectual edification. However imposing and stimulating may be the conception of an institution for the teaching or for the cultivation of universal knowledge, however imperative the necessity of such an institution in modern times, it is one which can gain little support from the facts of history. A glance into any collection of medieval documents reveals the fact that the word 'university' means merely a number, a plurality, an aggregate of persons. *Universitas vestra*, in a letter addressed to a body of persons, means merely 'the whole of you'; in a more technical sense it denotes a legal corporation¹ or juristic person; in Roman law (though in strictness a wider term) it is for most purposes practically the equivalent of *collegium*. At the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth centuries, we find the word applied to corporations either of masters or of students; but it long continues to be applied to other corporations as well, particularly to the then newly formed guilds and to the municipalities of towns; while as applied to scholastic guilds it is at first used interchangeably with such words as 'community' or 'college'. In the earliest period it is never used absolutely. The phrase is always 'University of Scholars', 'University of Masters and Scholars', 'University of Study', or the like. It is a mere accident that the term has gradually come to be restricted to a particular kind of guild or corporation, just as the terms 'convent', 'corps', 'congregation', 'college', have been similarly restricted to certain specific kinds of association. It is particularly important to notice that the term was generally in the Middle Ages used distinctly of the scholastic body whether of teachers or scholars, not of the place in which such a body was established, or even of its collective schools. The word used to denote the academic institution

¹ Long after the rise of the scholastic universities, *universitas* is used (absolutely) of the town corporations or guilds. Thus Boniface VIII writes 'Universitatibus et

populo dicti Regni' (Franciae). Even so vague a body as 'all faithful Christian people' is often addressed as 'Universitas vestra'.

CHAP. I. in the abstract—the schools or the town which held them—was *studium* rather than *universitas*. To be a resident in a university would be *in studio degere* or *in scolis militare*. The term which most nearly corresponds to the vague and indefinite English notion of a university as distinguished from a mere school, seminary, or private educational establishment, is not *universitas*, but *studium generale*; and *studium generale* means, not a place where all subjects are studied, but a place where students from all parts are received. As a matter of fact, very few medieval *studia* possessed all the faculties. Even Paris in the days of her highest renown possessed no faculty of civil law; while throughout the thirteenth century graduation in theology was in practice the almost exclusive privilege of Paris and the English universities.¹

Changes of meaning. The term *studium generale* does not become common till the beginning of the thirteenth century.² At that time the

¹ Though nominally shared by Naples, Toulouse, and the university of the Roman Court. Bulls for the erection of *studia generalia* usually specified the faculties in which the *Facultas ubique docendi* was granted; or it was 'in quavis licita facultate'.

² 'Universale', and more rarely 'commune', are common synonyms for 'generale'. The allusion in Guibert de Nogent (†1124), *De vita sua*, l. i, c. 4 (ed. G. Bourgin, 1907, p. 13), 'Cum nocte dormiret in cubiculo, cuius et ego memini, in quo totius nostri oppidi generale studium regebatur, . . .', is clearly a non-technical use of the word. The earliest instance of the technical expression that I have noticed is in the Chronicle of Emo in relation to Oxford, c. 1190 (*Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores*, xxiii. 467; below, vol. ii, ch. xii, § 1), where the word is 'commune'. *Studium solempne* is sometimes used as a synonym for *generale*, but occasionally it seems to be distinguished from it, meaning an important or frequented school which

was not technically 'general'. See Denifle and Chatelain, *Chartul. Univ. Paris.*, 1889, &c., ii, No. 1015, 'in nullo conventu, ubi non est studium generale aut aliud studium solempne'. See the definition in the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X of Castile, below, vol. ii, ch. vii, § 2. The Canonist 'Hostiensis' (Henricus de Segusia), writing at about the same time (†1271), discusses the limits of the privilege of dispensation from residence for the purpose of study, and lays it down: 'Hoc autem arg. potest hinc elici, quod istud intelligatur de generali, non de particulari. Et dicitur generale, quando triuivm et quadriivm, Theologia et sacri canones ibidem leguntur. Sed certe et hoc putamus ad arbitrium boni iudicis redigendum,' &c. Hostiensis, in *Decretalium Libros*, ii, Venice, 1581, f. 13. The requirement that theology should be taught is curious, since Bologna could only satisfy the test by its Friar doctors, who did not graduate at Bologna. He goes on to ask: 'Nunquid enim si propter guerram non audent ad presens ad scholas

term was a perfectly vague one, as vague and indefinable as the English term Public School or the German *Hochschule*. In the main, however, the term seems to have implied three characteristics: (1) That the school attracted or at least invited students from all parts, not merely those of a particular country or district; (2) that it was a place of higher education; that is to say, that one at least of the higher faculties—theology, law, medicine—was taught there;¹ (3) that such subjects were taught by a considerable number—at least by a plurality—of masters. Of these ideas the first was the primary and fundamental one: a *studium generale* meant a school of general resort, but in its origin the expression was a wholly popular and extra-legal one. The question whether a particular school was or was not a *studium generale* was one settled by custom or usage, not by authority. There were, however, at the beginning of the thirteenth century three *studia* to which the term was pre-eminently applied and which enjoyed a unique and transcendent prestige: they were Paris for theology and arts, Bologna for law, and Salerno for medicine. A master who had taught and been admitted to the magisterial guild in one of those places was certain of obtaining immediate recognition and permission to teach

Bononie accedere, licebit eis citra montes etiam in castris si competentem magistrum habeant studere?' A gloss declares that the laws may be read anywhere: 'talis tamen locus non habebit privilegium studii generalis, nisi ei concedatur a principe, vel consuetudine immemoriali, ut not. Bat.' &c. It was no doubt largely the necessity of defining a *studium generale* for the purpose of dispensation from residence on account of study which led to a definite and precise meaning being given to the term.

¹ [Cf. the words of Pope Innocent VI, in his *privilegium* establishing a theological faculty at Bologna (1360): 'auctoritate apostolica statu-

imus et ordinamus quod in dicta civitate deinceps existat *studium generale in eadem theologica facultate*'; Ehrle, *I più antichi statuti della facoltà teologica dell'università di Bologna* (1932), p. 3.] There are at least two instances of a *studium generale* in arts only: (1) Saragossa, which Denifle somewhat arbitrarily excludes from the category of Universities—see below, vol. ii, p. 101; (2) Erfurt, which we learn from a document of 1362 was 'populari sermone' spoken of as a *studium generale*. Since the recognition is in this case equivocal, I have considered Erfurt as founded by the Bull of 1379. See below, vol. ii, p. 248.

CHAP. I. in all other inferior studia, while these *studia* themselves would not receive masters from other schools without fresh examination. Thus to the original conception of a *studium generale* there was gradually added a vague notion of a certain ecumenical validity for the mastership which it conferred. But at the same time there was nothing to prevent any school which thought itself entitled to the designation from assuming it. In the thirteenth century many schools besides Bologna and Paris claimed the rank of *studium generale*: it was in fact—at least in Italy, where the term was most in use—assumed by any school which wanted to intimate that it gave an education equal to that of Bologna or Paris.¹ And the extension of this usage was facilitated by the fact that most of these early schools were founded by masters who had actually taught at one of these places.

The *ius* In the latter half of the thirteenth century this unrestricted *ubique* liberty of founding *studia generalia* gradually ceased; and *docendi.* the cessation brought with it an important change in the meaning of the term. It so happened that at about the same time the two great 'world-powers' of Europe conceived the idea of creating a school which was to be placed by an exercise of authority on a level with the great European centres of education. In 1224 the Emperor Frederick II founded a *studium generale* at Naples; in 1229 Gregory IX did the same at Toulouse; while in 1244 or 1245 Innocent IV established a *studium generale* in the Pontifical Court itself. These foundations would appear to have suggested the idea that the erection of new *studia generalia* was one of the papal and imperial prerogatives, like the power of creating

¹ There were many such schools in Italy during the thirteenth century, but most of them early died out. Where they maintained their ground, the later and more technical ideas about *studia generalia* were naturally applied to them, since the change in the meaning was gradual and unconscious. Out of Italy there were no doubt many schools which

de facto were as much *studia generalia* as Arezzo or Vercelli, but the name does not happen to have been applied to them: hence when the technical interpretation of *studium generale* gained ground, they lost their claims to the privileges which it conferred. Such schools were Lyons and Reims, for whose inclusion Kaufmann is urgent.

notaries public. Moreover, in order to give the graduates of Toulouse (in so far as parchment and wax could secure it) the same prestige and recognition which were enjoyed by the graduates of Paris and Bologna, a Bull was issued (in 1233) which declared that any one admitted to the mastership in that university should be freely allowed to teach in all other *studia* without any further examination. In the course of the century other cities anxious to place their schools on a level with these privileged universities applied for and obtained from Pope or Emperor Bulls constituting them *studia generalia*. The earlier of these Bulls simply confer the position of *studium generale* without further definition or confer the privileges of some specified university such as Paris or Bologna. The most prominent practical purpose of such Bulls seems at first to have been to give beneficed ecclesiastics the right of studying in them while continuing to receive the fruits of their benefices¹—a privilege limited by canonical law or custom to *studia* reputed 'general'.² But gradually the special privilege of the *ius ubique docendi* came to be regarded as the principal object of papal or imperial creation. It was usually,

¹ The first Bull for a *studium* not actually created to forward some special purpose of Pope or Emperor was that for Piacenza in 1248, which conferred the privileges of Paris and other *studia generalia*. The Bull for Rome (*studium urbis*) in 1303 confers the right to receive fruits and other privileges, but no express *ius ubique*; those for Pamiers (1295) and Perugia (1308) simply create a *studium generale*. On the other hand, Montpellier (1289) and Avignon (1303) received the *ius ubique docendi*, which gradually became the usual form.

² Honorius III in 1219 (Decretal. Greg. IX. lib. v, tit. 5, c. 5; cf. lib. iii, tit. 5, c. 32) provided that teachers of *theology* as long as they were teaching, or students for five years, might receive their fruits, and prelates and chapters were required

to send 'docibiles' (i.e. canons) to study *theology*. There was no express limitation to *studia generalia*; but Honorius III clearly had recognized *scolae* in mind; and in 1207 Innocent III had ruled (Decretal. Greg. IX, lib. iii, tit. 4, c. 12) that the privilege of receiving the fruits of their prebends did not apply to those who 'se transferunt ad villas vel castella, in quibus nullum est vel minus competens studium literarum'. This was only intended to prevent fraud, but as time went on it could be interpreted to mean *studia* which were not general. (See the comment of Hostiensis, above, p. 6 note.)

Later, particular universities often obtained special Bulls confirming the dispensation from residence, and the right to receive all fruits except the 'daily distribution'.

CHAP. I. but not quite invariably, conferred in express terms by the original foundation-bulls; and was apparently understood to be involved in the mere act of erection even in the rare cases where it is not expressly conceded. In 1291-2 even the old archetypal universities themselves—Bologna and Paris—were formally invested with the same privilege by Bulls of Nicholas IV. From this time the notion gradually gained ground that the *ius ubique docendi* was of the essence of a *studium generale*, and that no school which did not possess this privilege could obtain it without a Bull from Emperor or Pope.¹ At the same time there were some of the older *studia*²—such as Oxford and Padua—which, without having been founded by Pope or Emperor and without having procured a subsequent recognition of their *ius ubique docendi*, had obtained a position as *studia generalia* too secure to be successfully attacked. Hence, with their habitual respect for established facts, the fourteenth-century jurists, to whom is chiefly due the formulation of the medieval ideas about universities, declared that such schools were *studia generalia* 'by custom' (*ex consuetudine*).³

The view of the fourteenth-century Italian jurists no doubt, on the whole, represents the dominant medieval theory on the subject. At the same time it is only natural

¹ The Bull for Paris is given in *Chartul. Univ. Paris*, ii, No. 578 (in Bulaeus, iii, 449, wrongly ascribed to Nicholas III); the Bologna Bull by Sarti, *De claris Archigymnasii Bononiensis Professoribus*, t. i, p. ii, Bologna, 1772, p. 59, renewed by Clement V in 1310, *Reg. Clem. V*, Rome, 1885, &c., No. 5275. In the latter case the privilege extended only to the two legal faculties. Bologna never obtained this privilege for her faculty of medicine or arts, yet this made no difference in practice to the estimation of the degrees—an illustration of the anomalies with which the matter abounds.

² Denifle holds (i. 777) that no *studium generale* arose without a

Bull after the middle of the thirteenth century. There are one or two cases where this is doubtful: they are discussed in vol. ii.

³ In some cases these prescriptive *studia generalia* assumed the right of conferring the *licentia docendi hic et ubique*. This appears to have been done by Reggio as early as 1276 (see the diploma in Tacoli, *Memorie storiche d. Reggio*, iii, 215), a circumstance which would suggest that the formula was used at Bologna before the grant of the papal Bull. In other cases, however, no such change appears to have taken place, e.g. at Oxford, if we may trust the evidence of the extant *formulae*. Padua eventually (in 1346) obtained a Bull. (See below, vol. ii, p. 15.)

to find that these ideas were less rapidly and less firmly established in countries which recognized the supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire at most in some shadowy and honorary way, and where the national Churches possessed most independence. Thus we find the Spanish kings erecting *studia generalia* without consulting Pope or Emperor. They do not, indeed, claim to confer a *ius ubique docendi*, which would be an absurd pretension on the part of a merely local sovereign. The jurists conceded to such universities all that they could possibly claim when they held them to be *studia generalia respectu regni*. If (as is insisted by Kaufmann)¹ there are instances of attempts on the part of a city

¹ Kaufmann (*Die Gesch. d. deutschen Universitäten*, i, 371-409) labours to show that the papal or imperial brief was not necessary to the legitimacy of a *studium generale* according to medieval notions—that the essential thing was recognition by the sovereign of the place. This theory is put forward in opposition to Denifle's view, which I have, in the main, adopted. Upon Kaufmann's arguments I remark: (1) That the discussions by Baldus and Bartolus in the extracts which he gives (i. 383, 384) turn not upon the question what constitutes a *studium generale*, but upon the question whether the teaching of the civil law was still restricted, as the constitution *omnem* (*Digesta*, ed. Mommsen, Berlin, 1872, i, xvi) provided, to *civitates regiae*, and what constituted a *civitas regia*. No doubt this constitution, and the claims which Bologna based upon it, powerfully contributed to the growth of the custom of applying for papal and imperial Bulls of erection and to the eventual belief in their necessity. But to say that the laws might be taught 'ex permissione eius tacita vel expressa qui est princeps' is not the same thing as to say that any 'princeps' could create a *studium generale* (in the full sense, not merely

'respectu regni'). There were scores of Italian cities (as Denifle has shown over and over again) in which law was taught by a number of state-authorized teachers which never pretended to be *studia generalia*. (2) That all passages and instances taken from the thirteenth-century writers or documents are not *ad rem*. It is admitted that at this time no Bull or Brief was thought to be necessary. But then so far *studium generale* meant merely 'a place of higher education of European or more than local repute'. And equally little is there any general notion (though such a view is undoubtedly expressed by the *Siete Partidas*) that a *studium generale* required a charter from King or sovereign-city. Undoubtedly it might have been held that it required the sovereign's 'permissio tacita', though this might have been denied by a Hildebrandine Churchman. There was no more general agreement as to the limits of the authority of Church and State than there is at the present moment between Father Denifle and Prof. Kaufmann. The fact is that this whole discussion as to the educational right of 'the State' in the Middle Ages involves something of an anachronism. I am bound to say

CHAP. I. republic to erect a *studium generale* without papal or imperial permission, if in one or two cases we even have diplomas granted by such bodies purporting to confer the *licentia ubique docendi*,¹ these are merely the exceptions which prove

that Kaufmann's treatment of the subject is far more vitiated by an infusion of ideas suggested by the *Kulturkampf*, than Denifle's is distorted by any desire to find support for those of the *Syllabus* [1895].

(3) It is useless to quote documents in which a king or town purports to erect a *studium generale* without express allusion to Emperor or Pope, unless it is shown (a) that no Bull was actually applied for, and (b) that a school actually came into existence without such Bull which was looked upon as a *studium generale*. Royal charters for the erection of a university are usually expressed in this form even where a Bull was applied for or already granted. It would be as reasonable to quote a written agreement between two persons to enter into marriage as evidence that they thought marriage would be legal without the intervention of priest or registrar. Even Denifle does not contend that it was considered lawful, or at all events possible, for the Pope to erect a university without consulting the local sovereign.

(4) The case of the Spanish universities is no exception to Denifle's view, since it is admitted that they were *studia generalia respectu regni*.

(5) Even if it could be shown that in isolated instances a city did purport to erect a *studium generale* without a Bull (after 1300), this would only show that they used the word in its older and less technical sense. In this older sense it is impossible to decide dogmatically what was a *studium generale* and what was not. It is therefore better to confine the word (in dealing with the period 1300-1500) to its technical sense of a *studium* which

possessed the *ius ubique docendi* at least *respectu regni*—even if this sense of the word was not universally accepted. As to the impossibility of a mere city (even if really sovereign) granting such a right, I have said enough. The case of the Parmese diploma merely proves the arrogance or ignorance of the scribe who copied it from some diploma or form-book of a real university, even if it was not intended to apply for a Bull.

(6) The only evidence that may possibly require some modification of Denifle's view is the language used by the imperial Bull (the Papacy at this time always assumes the necessity of a Bull) in the foundation of Siena (1357), where the Emperor treats the *studium generale* of that place as already existing. But if its position as *studium generale* was established before 1250, Denifle would admit it to be *studium generale ex consuetudine*. Although Denifle does not admit this to have been the case, the correction involves no change of principle. See below, ch. vi, § 9.

(7) It must be conceded to Kaufmann that when Denifle, while fully admitting the imperial prerogative of founding universities, insinuates (i. 384) that 'Allein gerade dieses letztere Recht war theilweise durch das Gutdünken des Papstes bedingt', the Vatican Archivist does for once get the better of the historian. For Denifle's view of the whole question, see especially *Die Entstehung, &c.*, pp. 763-91, and for his controversy with Kaufmann, the articles mentioned above, p. 1.

[We leave this characteristic note; but see the Additional Note at the end of the chapter.]

¹ As to Reggio see above, p. 10, note 3; cf. below, vol. ii, p. 6.

the rule. A claim on the part of officials or corporations chartered by a mere local authority to confer rights of teaching in universities which lay beyond their jurisdiction is too extravagant to have been seriously made, much less to have obtained general recognition.

The fluctuations of meaning which the term *studium generale* underwent in the course of the Middle Age make it no easy task in all cases to adjudicate upon the claims of particular schools to that title. In the thirteenth century we are obliged to include in the category of 'universities' all bodies which we find expressly styled *studia generalia* in medieval writers, though there were no doubt many schools (especially in parts of Europe where the term was less current) which had in point of fact quite as good claims to 'generality', in the sense in which it was then understood, as some of those to which the term is actually applied; and some of them may have been actually so called, though evidence of the fact does not happen to have come down to us.¹ But from the beginning of the fourteenth century I accept the juristic definition, and exclude from the category of universities all bodies which were not founded by Pope or Emperor. *Studia generalia respectu regni* are, however, included, but these in nearly every case sooner or later strengthened their position by a papal Bull.

A wrong impression would, however, be given of the whole matter if it were supposed that, even when the *ius ubique docendi* was most indisputably assured by papal or imperial authority, it really received the respect which juristic theories claimed for it. The great primeval universities

¹ Such as Lyons, Reims, Erfurt, &c. It is highly probable—and this must be conceded to Kaufmann—that in the thirteenth century these schools were sometimes or always called *studia generalia*. A Paris Statute of 1279 (Bulæus, iii. 447; Denifle and Chatelain, *Chartul.* i, No. 485) requires candidates for the licence in arts to have determined either at Paris or in some other

studium generale where there were not less than twelve regents: this points to the existence of many small *studia generalia*. But if we begin to include in our enumeration schools which are not expressly described as *studia generalia* or created such by Bull, it would be impossible to know where to draw the line.

CHAP. I. perhaps never recognized the doctorates conferred by the younger bodies.¹ At Paris, even Oxford degrees failed to command incorporation without fresh examination and licence, and Oxford repaid the compliment by refusing admission to Parisian doctors, the papal Bull notwithstanding.² Even in less illustrious universities the statutes provide for some preliminary test before the reception of a graduate from another university which can hardly be distinguished from the 'examination' which the papal Bulls forbade,³ since it is always implied that the university reserved the right of refusing permission to lecture and exercise other magisterial rights to any foreign graduate of whose competence it was not satisfied.⁴ It should be added

¹ When Paris complained of the rights given to the graduates of Toulouse, Gregory IX himself explained that the privileges of the new university were not intended to interfere with those of Paris. *Chartul. Univ. Paris.* i, No. 101. In granting the *ius ubique docendi* to Salamanca, Alexander IV expressly excepted Paris and Bologna. See below, vol. ii, p. 78.

² 'Qui Parisius uel alibi ubi Oxonienses a resumpcione maliciose excluduntur, nec ipsi Oxonie admittantur' (*Statuta Antiqua*, ed. S. Gibson, pp. 53, 54; see the comment in the introduction, p. cxviii and note), and Paris complains to the Pope that her *ius ubique docendi* is not respected everywhere 'ut in Anglia et apud Montem Pessulanum'. *Chartul. Univ. Paris.* ii, No. 728. Attempts were made in 1296 and 1317 to procure the *ius ubique docendi* by papal Bull. Documents in Lincoln Register (Bishop Sutton's *Memo-randa*, f. 141 b); Wood, *Hist. and Antiq. of Oxford*, ed. Gutch, i, 155; *Chartul. Univ. Paris.* ii, No. 756. As the attempt was not made at a later date, we may perhaps assume that Oxford was satisfied with its position as a *studium generale ex consuetudine*; yet Oxford never

actually conferred the *licentia ubique docendi*, nor (of course) did she confer degrees 'Apostolica auctoritate'. At Bologna we find the personal intervention of Charles II of Naples necessary to obtain recognition for Jacobus de Belvisio, who had graduated at Naples in 1298 or 1299; and even then he appears to have gone through the ceremony of promotion *de novo*. Savigny, c. xlix.

³ See e.g. Kink, *Gesch. der Univ. Wien*, ii, 167. At Angers it is expressly provided that no graduates from another university shall lecture before 'per scholasticum et doctores examinentur diligenter', but 'si repetant alia examinatione non indigent'. Rangeard, *Hist. de l'Un. d'Angers*, ii, 221.

⁴ In 1321 Orleans enacted 'quod nullus doctor extrinsecus veniens, ad actum regendi ordinarie . . . in nostra Universitate admittatur, vel ad alios actus doctorales, nisi per collationem doctorum, ut moris est, fuerit approbatus, et hic insignia receperit doctoratus'—Fournier, *Stat. et privilèges des univ. françaises* (Paris, 1890) i, No. 78. It is true that there is a 'salvo honore . . . sancte sedis apostolice'. In 1463 (*ibid.*, No. 320) we find the Pope interfering to prevent a

that in proportion as the real privileges of the mastership were restricted (as was eventually more or less the case in the majority of universities) to a limited body of salaried doctors, the ecumenical rights conferred by graduation in a *studium generale* came to possess a purely honorary value. The mastership was reduced to a universally recognized honour, but nothing more.¹

It remains to point out the relation of the term 'studium generale' to the term 'universitas'. There was originally no necessary connexion between the institution denoted by the term *universitas* and that denoted by the term *studium generale*. Societies of masters or clubs of students were formed before the term *studium generale* came into habitual use; and in a few instances such societies are known to have existed in schools which never became *studia generalia*.² The university was originally a scholastic guild whether of masters or students. Such guilds sprang into existence, like other guilds, without any express authorization of king, pope, prince, or prelate. They were spontaneous products of that instinct of association which swept like a great wave over the towns of Europe in the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.³ But in two places

'doctor bullatus', i.e. made by the Pope, from assuming the rights of a regent at Orleans. Cf. *Chartul. Univ. Paris.* ii, No. 1174.

¹ Kaufmann (i. 366 sq.) has the merit of first pointing out the very limited respect which was actually paid to these papal Bulls.

² Thus at Cremona it is provided by the town-statutes of 1387 'quod duo rectores possint eligi per scholares legum vel unus, secundum quod placuerit dictis scholaribus' (*Statuta Civ. Crem.*, Cremona, 1678, p. 135 [for the schools at Manacorda, *op. cit.* ii, 295-6]); and the privileges accorded by the town are as ample as those enjoyed by masters and scholars in *studia generalia*. So at Perugia and at Pisa (see below, ch. vi, §§ 11, 12)

before they became *studia generalia*. It should be added that a *studium privilegiatum*—even with papal privileges—was not necessarily a *studium generale*, unless the Bull expressly created it such. Thus in 1247 the Pope gave 'doctoribus et scholaribus universis Narbonne in studio commorantibus', the privilege of absence from benefices, as though they were scholars in a *studium generale*. *Reg. Innocent IV*, ed. Berger, Paris, 1884, &c., No. 2717. Fournier prints a Bull of 1329 exempting the *studium* of Arts at Gaillac from the control of the Bishop of Albi and 'rectoris et magistrorum studii Albiensis' (*loc. cit.*, No. 1573). As to Valencia, see below, vol. ii, p. 107.

³ Among general historians, no

Universi-tas and studium generale; originally distinct, afterwards synonymous.

CHAP. I. especially—Bologna and Paris—the scholastic guilds obtained a development and importance which they possessed nowhere else. And, as we shall see, nearly all the secondary *studia generalia* which arose spontaneously without papal or imperial charter, were established by secessions of masters or students from Paris or Bologna. The seceders carried with them the customs and institutions of their *alma mater*. Even in the few cases where the germs of a university or college of doctors may have originated independently of the influence of Paris and Bologna, their subsequent development was due to more or less direct and conscious imitation of the scholastic guilds of these two great schools. Thus it came about that a *universitas*, whether of masters or of students, became in practice the inseparable accompaniment of the *studium generale*—and a *universitas* of a particular and definite type formed more or less on the model of one of these great archetypal universities.¹ Thus in the later Middle Ages the term *studium generale* came practically to denote not merely a school with the *ius ubique docendi* (though this remained its legal and technical differentia), but a scholastic organization of a particular type and

one has so fully appreciated this essential fact as the learned, if unsympathetic, Church-historian Mosheim: 'They who had satisfied all the demands of this academical law, and gone through the formidable trial with applause, were solemnly invested with the dignity of professors, and were saluted masters with a certain round of ceremonies, that were used in the societies of illiterate tradesmen, when their company was augmented by a new candidate. This vulgar custom had been introduced, in the preceding century, by the professors of law in the academy of Bologna; and in this century it was transmitted to that of Paris, where it was first practised by the divinity colleges, and afterwards by the professors of physic and the

liberal arts.' *Ecclesiastical History*, trans. by Maclaine, 1826, iii. 137. This last distinction is, however, unfounded.

¹ It is clear that graduation in its stricter sense could only exist where there was a *universitas*. A *licentia docendi* of purely local validity might of course have continued to be given by *studia* which were not general, but gradually the *licentia docendi* seems usually to have disappeared with the growing employment of university graduates to teach in the smaller *studia*. This seems to me a truer mode of statement than to say (with Denifle, i. 21) that *studia particularia* could only enjoy the 'Promotionsrecht' by special papal privilege or special custom.

CHAP. I. endowed with more or less uniform privileges. By the fifteenth century the original distinction between the two terms was pretty generally lost; and *universitas* gradually became a mere synonym for *studium generale*.¹ In the following pages the term university will be used in this comprehensive sense except where it is necessary expressly to distinguish the *studium* from the *universitas* proper.

Paris and Bologna are the two archetypal—it might almost be said the only *original* universities: Paris supplied the model for the universities of masters, Bologna for the universities of students. Every later university from that day to this is in its developed form a more or less close imitation of one or the other of these two types, though in some few cases² the basis of the organization may be independent. In the case of the earlier universities the imitation was, with whatever adaptation to local circumstances, conscious and deliberate; while the most purely utilitarian of new universities retains constitutional features or usages which are only explained by the customs and institutions either of the Bologna students or of the Parisian masters at the end of the twelfth or the beginning of the thirteenth centuries. It is clear therefore that a somewhat minute study of these two typical bodies is essential to a proper understanding of the university as an institution.

The two great parent universities arose at about the same time—during the last thirty years of the twelfth century. They arose out of different sides of that wonderful deepening and broadening of the stream of human culture which may be called the Renaissance of the twelfth century. In Italy this Renaissance found its expression most conspicuously in a revival of the study of the Roman law, which started from Bologna; in France it took the form of a great outburst of dialectical and theological speculation which

¹ The way for the identification was prepared by the intermediate term *universitas studii*, which was used at first distinctly of the society, as at Perugia in 1316, afterwards more loosely.

² Chiefly some of the older French universities, such as Angers and Orleans. See below, vol. ii, ch. viii. Denifle will not admit this except in the case of Oxford, where the contention is doubtful.

Paris and Bologna the two archetypes.

Order of treatment

CHAP. I. found its ultimate, though not its earliest, home in Paris. The Bologna university of students, though perhaps later than the first rudimentary germ of the Parisian society of masters, completed its organization earlier. And though each type of constitution was affected in its development by the influence of the other, Bologna in all probability exerted more influence over Paris than Paris over Bologna. Bologna therefore shall be dealt with first. With regard to the derivative universities, it might seem natural to divide them into two great classes, and to deal first with the universities of students, and then with the universities of masters. When, however, we come to examine the various constitutions in detail, it will be found that it is not always possible, without a very arbitrary treatment, to assign a given university definitively either to the Bolognese or the Parisian group. Many universities were influenced both by Paris and by Bologna. For it must be remembered that, though at Bologna the student-guild eventually established complete supremacy over the magisterial body, the masters always had a college of their own, to which alone belonged the right of admitting new masters or (in the modern phrase) 'granting degrees'. There might therefore be, and in fact there were, great variations in the distribution of academic power between the magisterial college and the student-guild. Moreover, this distribution might vary at different times; so that some *studia* approximate at one period of their history to the Bolognese, at another to the Parisian type. Hence, though a classification into student-universities and master-universities would bring into prominence the curious fact that the French universities are mostly children of Bologna rather than of Paris, and that the Scottish universities are in certain points more closely affiliated to Bologna than to Paris or Oxford, I have deemed it best on the whole (after dealing with the great model-universities) to group together the universities of each country in Europe, which naturally have certain features in common, though the differences between these national varieties are often far smaller than the fundamental distinction between the student and

the magisterial type. Our own universities shall be reserved to the last, because, though belonging wholly to the magisterial type, and originally modelled on Paris, they exhibit from the first such marked constitutional peculiarities as almost to constitute a separate natural order of universities, distinct alike from the Bologna and the Parisian groups. CHAP. I.

There is, however, one great *studium generale*, older in a sense than either Paris or Bologna, which stands absolutely by itself. Its original constitution, of which, indeed, not much is known, appears to have had little resemblance to that of any other; and it never enjoyed that reproductive power which is so remarkable a characteristic of Bologna and Paris. The Medical School of Salerno did not (so far as it is known) influence the constitution even of the medical universities or the medical faculties. Such treatment as can be given to it must precede our account of Bologna. But, before entering upon the universities in detail, it will be convenient to give some general sketch of the great intellectual movement out of which in a sense all the universities, though pre-eminently that of Paris, arose, and, as an introduction to it, of the state of European education, especially in France, before the rise of the universities proper. Salerno.

Before closing this preliminary survey of our subject, it may be well to point out that the three titles, master, doctor, professor, were in the Middle Ages absolutely synonymous. At Paris and its derivative universities we find *magister* the prevailing title in the faculties of theology, medicine, and arts; the title *professor* is, however, pretty frequently, that of *doctor* more rarely, employed.¹ The teachers of law at Bologna, however, specially affected the title *doctor*; they were also called *professores* and *domini*, but not as a rule *magistri*. The same usage was transferred to Paris. In the Acts of the faculty of canon law, we find the term *doctor* habitually used. Thus, when letters are addressed 'Rectori, Magistris, Doctoribus et Scholaribus Universitatis Parisiensis',

¹ That is, after the rise of the university. At an earlier period it had been common; *Hist. lit. de la France*, ix. 81. [It again became more frequent in the fifteenth century.]

CHAP. I. the order makes it plain that the theological teachers are included in the *magistri*, while the teachers of canon law are specially designated by the *doctores*. The same distinction was observed at Oxford; but in the fifteenth century—at least in the English universities—the practice gradually arose of appropriating the title *doctor* to all the superior faculties and reserving that of *magister* for the inferior faculties of arts and grammar. In Italy the term *doctor* soon spread from the faculty of law to all the other faculties. The same was eventually the case in Germany, where the master of arts is still styled doctor of philosophy. The purely accidental character of the distinction is strikingly illustrated by the fact that in the English universities the doctor of music, who in spite of his gorgeous plumage is not a member of Convocation and only ranks above the modest bachelor of arts, enjoys that imposing prefix of *doctor*, while his superior, the teacher of arts, is confined to the (in popular estimation) humbler style of *master*. German diplomas often confer the style 'Doctor of Philosophy and Master of Arts'.¹

Additional Note to Chapter I

[Rashdall in the main accepted Denifle's conclusions on the origin of universities. Later investigation has done little to shake these conclusions. It tends to emphasize the importance of the *licentia docendi* and to strengthen the connexion between the early universities and ecclesiastical authority. It suggests that the sharp distinction between the *studium* and the *studium generale* can easily be exaggerated and that it obscures the growing control of the Pope and the bishops over the whole field of educational activity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Manacorda (*Storia della scuola in Italia*, I. i, c. vii) discusses the various views of previous writers and argues that, even in Bologna, where Denifle traced the origin of the university to the communal schools, the evidence for con-

¹ In the above chapter, I am under exceptional obligations to Denifle, and have with some reserves adopted his position; but I have put the matter in my own way, and do not hold myself responsible for his views except so far as I have actually reproduced

them. Denifle hardly recognizes sufficiently the prominence of the dispensation from residence in the earlier conception of a *studium generale*. See the Bull for Rome, cited below, vol. ii, p. 28 n., and above, p. 6, n. 2.

tinuous intervention by the ecclesiastical authority, and particularly by the Pope, is considerable. His conclusion, anticipated on p. 165, that the medieval universities were in origin 'trasformazioni delle scuole vescovili', cannot be literally accepted as a universal truth. It is true of Paris, but it cannot be established, on existing evidence, in the cases of Oxford and Montpellier, nor is it clear that, in the early twelfth century, the masters who taught at Bologna had any connexion with an episcopal school (cf. Haskins, on the *dictamen* of Albert of Samaria, c. 1111-18, in *Studies in Mediaeval Culture*, Oxford, 1929, p. 175). On the other hand, Manacorda's main contention, that the continuity of the schools, in Bologna and elsewhere, was mainly due to the oversight of the diocesan authorities who gave the licence to teach, and whose powers at this time were steadily enforced, may be accepted, although, according to one view, Montpellier provides an exception (see below, vol. ii, p. 122). It should be remembered, in this regard, that the importance of the episcopal schools, especially north of the Alps, in the twelfth century has been better realized than it was when Rashdall wrote. Until late in the century Paris was by no means the outstanding centre of higher learning in France, nor was Oxford in England. Why the schools of Paris or Oxford grew into a university, while those of Chartres and Laon, of Exeter and Lincoln did not, is a separate problem, but the groups within which the university organization developed were in the twelfth century given permanence by the *licentia docendi*, and the licence was granted by the *magiscola*, chancellor or archdeacon, as the case might be.

In the formative period the schools were fostered by the ecclesiastical authority and, like the universities into which some of them developed, depended upon this authority for the right to exercise their activity. There were exceptional cases, and these should be regarded as exceptional. In Italy the city schools began too late to be responsible for early developments; outside Italy such schools hardly existed. In the later decades of the twelfth century ecclesiastical control of education was complete.

A long series of papal decrees provided for the creation of schools under episcopal control. It begins with a letter of Eugenius II (c. 826), embodied by Gratian in his *Decretum* (pars 1, dist. xxxvii, c. 2). The control of education by the secular power in Carolingian times was first shared by, and then gave way to ecclesiastical control. By the end of the twelfth century the ecclesiastical sanction behind the licence to teach was undisputed. (The evidence for the undoubted existence of lay schools, and for the probable existence of lay masters, in the twelfth century is discussed by Manacorda in his fifth chapter; see below, p. 92, n. 1.) Pope Alexander III, in the third Lateran Council in 1179 (see *Decretals*, lib. v, tit. v, c. 1) and in various letters, emphasized the importance of the cathedral schools and laid down rules for the grant of the licence. (See Gaines Post, 'Alexander III, the *licentia docendi* and the rise of the Universities'

CHAP. I. in *Haskins Anniversary Essays*, Boston, 1929, pp. 254-77.) As Post points out, too much stress has been laid on the point that the licence was to be gratuitous; whether this injunction was observed or not is not really of great importance in the history of university development. The important matter is the continuous guidance and encouragement given by the Papacy. When, on 28 June 1219, Honorius III in a letter to Grazia, the archdeacon of Bologna, decreed 'ut nullus ulterius in civitate predicta ad docendi regimen assumatur, nisi a te obtenta licentia, examinatione praehabita diligenti', he was not initiating a new policy. Manacorda (p. 208) is probably right in urging that the novelty here is the insistence upon a careful examination, not in the application to Bologna of a general practice which had not hitherto prevailed in the schools of that city. (See his quotations from the published and unpublished *summae* of S. Raymond of Pennaforte and the other evidence cited; Post, p. 266, accepts the earlier view that Honorius III was using precedents to bring the Law School of Bologna 'within the papal system'; and see Rossi's criticism of Manacorda, noted in the bibliographical note above, p. 2.)

The papal position in the thirteenth century was defined by Clement IV, in his letter 'contra venerabilem fratrem' of 31 May 1268, addressed to James I, king of Aragon (Potthast, No. 20366; edited by Martène, *Thesaurus anecdotorum*, ii. 603; see Manacorda, *op. cit.*, p. 217 *passim*). The bishop of Maguellone had excommunicated a civilian who had, in accordance with earlier usage (cf. Post, p. 267), received the licence to teach from the king, after he had taken counsel with *iuris prudentes* in the faculty at Montpellier. The Pope rebuked the king for his rancour against the bishop and upheld the claim of the latter to grant the licence in the faculty of law as in the other faculties, in which the episcopal licence had been given *a largissimis retro temporibus*. He did not deny that it had been customary at Montpellier for the king to grant the licence to civilians: 'de licentiandis quibus doctoribus in scientiarum facultatibus aliud canonica iura diffiniunt, aliud principum sanctiones', for local custom had differed and the secular authority at one time had dealt even with matrimonial questions, when the 'censura ecclesiae non vigeat'. On the other hand, the policy of the Church has been laid down by Eugenius II and the general rule applies to new specific conditions, although the species did not exist at the time when the rule was made, just as, if new kinds of corn are grown, the old law of tithe applies to them. 'Cancellarius caput studentium, post episcopum, in quacunque legat vel doceat facultate, ab episcopo ordinatur.'

The issue in debate between Denifle and Kaufmann (above, p. 11, note) may best be considered from the historical standpoint taken by Pope Clement IV. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the *studia* were regarded as ecclesiastical foundations. In S. Thomas's words the *collegium scholasticum* was a *collegium ecclesiasticum*. But

CHAP. I. this is to be interpreted in the light of the medieval conception that the Christian *ecclesia* was synonymous with Christian society. While the *studium* belonged to the *sacerdotium* rather than to the *imperium*, it was, like both, a part of the Christian society, which acquired a dignity of its own and deserved the fostering attention of *sacerdotium* and *imperium* alike. Thus, kings founded universities in co-operation with and after gaining the approval of the Popes (cf. Lérida, below, ii. 92). Where the spirit of co-operation existed, no burning question need arise if the chancellor was appointed by the king or bishop or masters. After expounding the curious historical view that Charles the Great had transferred the 'studium philosophiae et liberalium artium' from Rome to Paris, in part recompense to the king of the western Franks for the loss of his Empire (*regnum*), a German patriot (probably Alexander of Roes, in the year 1281) concludes: 'Hiis siquidem tribus, scilicet sacerdotio imperio et studio, tamquam tribus virtutibus, videlicet vitali naturali et animali, sancta ecclesia catholica spiritualiter vivificatur augmentatur et regitur' (*De translatione imperii*, ed. H. Grundmann, Leipzig, 1930, p. 27; cf. Cecil Woolf, *Bartolus of Sassoferrato*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 239). This wider conception made any dispute about the particular rights of lay or ecclesiastical authority a matter of local or temporary interest only, so long as the Pope and lay rulers co-operated in the foundation and development of universities. (F. von Bezold, following Gebhardt, has some pertinent remarks to this effect in his review of Kaufmann's work, *Aus Mittelalter und Renaissance*, Munich, 1918, p. 226.) An early instance of co-operation is the confirmation by Alexander III of the immunity granted by the Emperor Frederick I in 1158 to the students of Bologna (below, p. 145, n.). Just as the two powers co-operated in the repression of heresy, so they co-operated in the encouragement of learning. Papal privileges for the German universities, frequently founded by lay rulers, are found throughout the Middle Ages. That the grant of the licence was regarded as an ecclesiastical act is clear from the protest against the practice entered by Marsiglio of Padua: 'conferendi licentias in disciplinis iam dicto episcopo et alteri cuicumque presbytero ac ipsorum soli collegio debeat et licite potest revocari potestas. Est enim hoc humani legislatoris aut eius auctoritate principantis officium', and again, 'nolentes enim aut dubitantes viri literati suorum magisteriorum titulos perdere, appetitu commodi et gloriae consequentis, hosque sibi episcoporum Romanorum aut aliorum auctoritate advenisse, non aliunde, credentes, votis horum assequuntur' (*Defensor Pacis*, II. xxi, ed. Previtè-Orton, Cambridge, 1928, pp. 340, 341).

That, as time went on, secular princes exercised authority over universities in virtue of their position as founders, or in the public interest, is undoubted; but it is important to distinguish action which can be construed as a deliberate interference with ecclesiastical or quasi-ecclesiastical privilege from co-operation which can be

CHAP. I. traced throughout the Middle Ages in all kinds of social activity, and which raised no controversial issues. It would not be difficult, if no regard were paid to this distinction, to show that the university of Oxford was under the control as well as the patronage of the king of England, and the more so, because the Chancellor was invested with a measure of temporal jurisdiction. Blackstone, indeed, traced the grant by the Crown of privileges to universities back to the Authenticum 'Habita' or imperial constitution of 1158 (see Strickland Gibson, 'The Great Charter of Charles I', *Bodleian Quarterly Record*, vii. 1933).]

CHAPTER II

ABELARD AND THE RENAISSANCE OF THE
TWELFTH CENTURY

For the general literary and educational history of the period with which this chapter deals, the most important authorities are the immense mass of material collected by BULAEUS in vols. i and ii of his *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, Paris, 1665; the *Histoire littéraire de la France*, par les Bénédictins de Saint-Maur, 1733, &c.;¹ JOLY, *Traité historique des écoles épiscopales et ecclésiastiques*, Paris, 1678; OZANAM, *La Civilisation chrétienne chez les Francs*, Paris, 1849; AMPÈRE, *Histoire littéraire de la France avant le douzième siècle*, Paris, 1839; MAITLAND, *The Dark Ages*, London, 1844; MAITRE (Léon), *Les Écoles épiscopales et monastiques de l'Occident*, Paris, 1866; MULLINGER, *The Schools of Charles the Great*, London, 1877 (also the Introduction to his *University of Cambridge to 1535*, Cambridge, 1873); POOLE (R. L.), *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought*, London, 1884 (ed. 2, 1920); COUSIN, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, Paris, 1836, and *Petri Abaelardi Opera*, Paris, 1849; SCHAAERSCHMIDT, *Johannes Saresberiensis*, Leipzig, 1862; DE RÉMUSAT, *Abélard*, Paris, ed. 2, 1855; COMPARETTI, *Virgilio nel Medio Evo*, Leghorn, 1872 (English trans., London, 1895), ed. 2, Florence, 1896. Among the more recent writers my greatest acknowledgements are perhaps due to Mr. Poole. I am also considerably indebted to Mr. Mullinger.

For the history of the scholastic philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages, I have used chiefly BAUR, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes*, Theil 2, Tübingen, 1842; DEUTSCH (S. M.), *Peter Abälard*, Leipzig, 1883; ERDMANN, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Berlin, 1866 (Eng. trans. by Hough, London, 1890, &c.); HAGENBACH, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Leipzig, 1840 (E.T., ed. Buch, Edinburgh, 1846-7); HAMPDEN, *The Scholastic Philosophy considered in its relation to Christian Theology*, Oxford, 1833; HAURÉAU, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, Paris, P. I, 1872, P. II, 1880; JOURDAIN (Amable), *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, Paris, 1843; JOURDAIN (Charles Bréchillet), *La Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, 1858; MAURICE, *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, vol. iii, ed. 2, 1857; MORIN, *Dictionnaire de philosophie et de théologie scolastique*, Paris, 1856; MUNK, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, Paris, 1859; PRANTL, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, Leipzig, 1870 (ed. 2, 1885); ROUSSELOT, *Études sur la philosophie dans le moyen-âge*, Paris, 1840-2; RENAN, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, Paris, 1866; WERNER, *Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters*, Vienna, 1881-3. Among these works I am most indebted to Hauréau, Erdmann, and Renan. Among general ecclesiastical historians, I need only mention my obligations to GIESELER, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, Bonn, 1827-57 (E.T., from ed. 4, Edinburgh, 1853-4).

[Since the first edition of this work was published so much has been written upon the history of medieval thought that it would be quite impossible to include, in a book devoted to the history of medieval universities or

¹ This work, with its continuation 'by members of the Institute', may here be mentioned, once for all, as an authority for many parts of my subject.

CHAP. II. institutions, a systematic bibliography. Reference may be made once for all to the latest or eleventh edition of F. UEBERWEG, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ii (ed. 11, edited by Bernhard Geyer, Berlin, 1928), and to Maurice DE WULF, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, translated E. C. MESSENGER (2 vols., London, 1926). Both contain full bibliographies. Other references will be given when required in later sections and in the footnotes.

The study of the twelfth century has been revolutionized since Rashdall wrote. The most important works are the following: J. DE GHELLINCK, *Le Mouvement théologique du xii^e siècle* (Paris, 1914); M. GRABMANN, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Freiburg i. B., vol. i, 1909, and especially vol. ii, 1911). C. H. HASKINS, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), a popular sketch, and some of the chapters in the same scholar's *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (ed. 2, Cambridge, Mass., 1927). For work on more particular subjects see the bibliographies in UEBERWEG-GEYER and DE WULF. Other references will be given in the notes, but A. CLERVAL, *Les Écoles de Chartres au moyen âge* (Chartres, 1895), and G. ROBERT, *Les Écoles et l'enseignement de la théologie pendant la première moitié du xii^e siècle* (Paris, 1909), should be mentioned here; also, as most important of all, *La Renaissance du xii^e siècle: les écoles et l'enseignement*, by G. PARÉ, A. BRUNET, and P. TREMBLAY (Paris and Ottawa, 1933), a drastic revision of Robert's book, with a suggestive preface by M.-D. CHENU. A new edition of Maître's book appeared in 1924.

It appears from a few notes made with a view to the revision of this chapter that Rashdall gave considerable attention to F. PICAVET, particularly to the *Essais sur l'histoire générale et comparée des théologies et des philosophies médiévales* (Paris, 1913).]

The Bene-
dictine
Age.

THE period which intervenes between the time of Charles the Great and the eleventh century has been called the Benedictine Age. The phrase exactly expresses its position in the history of education: it was the age, and the only age, during which European education was mainly in the hands of monks. With the progress of the barbarian invasions, the old imperial and municipal schools had everywhere disappeared: their place had been taken by the episcopal and monastic schools which the imperative needs of the Church had called into existence. In transalpine Europe, at all events, the old educational system was completely swept away, though some of its traditions for a time survived in the Christian schools by which it was supplanted.

Attitude of
the Church
towards
education.

It is generally acknowledged that the age which immediately followed the completion of the barbarian conquests is the darkest age in the intellectual history of Europe. Whatever view may be taken of the part played by Christian theology in bringing about that rapid evanescence of intellectual light which culminated in the almost total night

of the seventh century, it is at least certain that so much of the culture of the old Roman world as survived into medieval Europe survived by virtue of its association with Christianity. The truth is that the hostility of Christian theologians to secular culture was to a very great extent merely the reflection within the sphere of theology of the political and social conditions of the time. If Gregory the Great interpreted the advance of the barbarian hosts, the slaughter and pillage which they brought in their train, as sure signs of the coming end, the events themselves were sufficiently calculated to discourage study and education apart altogether from any theological interpretation which might be put upon them. All culture that was not obviously and immediately useful was doomed to extinction. Christianity at least considerably widened the limits assigned to utility. The christianized barbarian recognized the spiritual, if he did not recognize the intellectual, needs of humanity; and some measure of intellectual cultivation was made necessary to the satisfaction of those spiritual needs by the narrowest interpretation of a religion whose principles had to be gathered from books, and whose services formed a small literature by themselves. Narrow as may have been the Churchman's educational ideal, it was only among Churchmen that an educational ideal maintained itself at all. The tendency of the Church's teaching was undoubtedly to depreciate secular, and especially literary, education—at least for the only class which still possessed education of any sort; but the grossest ignorance of the Dark Ages was not due to the strength of the ecclesiastical system but to its weakness. The improvement of education formed a prominent object with every zealous Churchman and every ecclesiastical reformer from the days of Gregory the Great to the days when the darkness passed away under the influence of the ecclesiastical revival of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. If the monastic system of Cassian retained something of the ascetic and obscurantist traditions of the Egyptian desert, the Benedictine monasticism which superseded it created almost the only homes of learning and education, and constituted by far the most

CHAP. II. powerful civilizing agency in Europe until it was superseded as an educational instrument by the growth of the universities.

Educa-
tional
reform of
Charles
the Great.

The Palace
School.

The ecclesiastical character of medieval education was in the first instance due solely to the fact that, in the general extinction of Roman civilization, the clergy were almost the only class which possessed or desired to possess even the rudiments of knowledge.¹ The intimate connexion between the Church and the school was stereotyped by the legislation of Charles the Great. A revival of education formed a prominent part of the wise and far-reaching scheme of ecclesiastical reform which originated with that monarch.² The centre of the Carolingian educational system was the Palace School, whose head, the famous Alcuin, was a sort of Minister of Education as well as the actual teacher of the young courtiers-nobles and even of the great monarch himself. But this school hardly constitutes an exception to the ecclesiastical character of the system: it was primarily intended as a nursery for the future bishops and abbots of the Frankish Empire: it was perhaps in its origin an outgrowth of the royal chapel.³ But though under Alcuin in the days of

¹ These generalizations apply in their full extent to northern Europe only. As to Italy see below, ch. iv.

² [The standard work on this subject is M. Roger, *L'Enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin* (Paris, 1905). For the *scola* in the Merovingian Palace see E. Vacandard's papers in the *Revue des questions historiques*, lxi, lxii, lxxvi. The most convenient short account of early medieval schools is Margaret Deanesly's chapter in the *Cambridge Medieval History*, v. 765-79; bibliography on pp. 934-6. See also S. D'Irsay, *op. cit.*, ch. 2.]

³ [For the training given to laity in the royal household and the episcopal *familia* in this period see Deanesly, *op. cit.*, p. 773. The cathedral and monastic schools were not intended for the laity, and

grammar schools outside these did not become common until the thirteenth century, although they are found before that time. 'As a rule the teaching of laymen and laywomen before 1300 was individual' (*ibid.*, p. 779). In a formulary of the early twelfth century we find a reference to a schoolmaster in the castle of Hugh of Gournai, recommended by the Count of Clermont, but he seems primarily to have been intended to teach the household clerks (Haskins, 'An Early Bolognese Formulary', in *Mélanges offerts à Henri Pirenne*, Brussels, 1926, p. 207). An important exception to the general conclusion that there were very few systematic educational arrangements for the benefit of the laity is the evidence for the education of merchants in the Flemish towns

Charles the Great and again under Erigena in the days of Charles the Bald, the Palace School took the lead and served as a sort of normal school to the whole Empire, a more permanently influential part of the Carolingian reform lay in the enactment that every monastery and every cathedral should have a school for the education of young clerks.¹ Of these two classes of schools by far the most important were the schools of the monasteries which now, for the first time, opened their doors to non-monastic students. Nearly all the schools which possessed more than a local importance were monastic. From the beginning of the ninth century all the more famous monasteries had two distinct schools—one of its own *oblats*, the other for outsiders.² All the enlightened ecclesiastics of the time were educated in monasteries, and most of them were monks: it was from the monasteries that the episcopal schools derived their teachers. On the other hand, it was, as we shall see, from the cathedral schools that the universities were at length developed when the intellectual enthusiasm of the Middle Age began to flow in a distinct channel from its religious enthusiasm. The cathedral schools were, of course, as ecclesiastical in their character and aims as the monastic; and this ecclesiastical character of the pre-university education should be remembered as the first of the conditions which determined, at least in northern Europe, the form of the

in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; see the interesting paper by Pirenne in *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, i. 13-26 (Jan. 1929).]

¹ [L. Maître, *Les Écoles épiscopales et monastiques en Occident avant les universités*, ed. 2 (Ligugé and Paris, 1924); Deanesly, *op. cit.*, pp. 774-9.]

² For the evidence see Joly, p. 144 sq.; Mullinger, *Schools of Charles the Great*, p. 130. [Also, in addition to the authors cited in the preceding note, U. Berlière, in the *Revue Benedictine*, vi. 499 (1889), and his later paper in the *Bulletin*

de la classe des lettres de l'académie royale de Belgique, 1921, pp. 550-72.] Sometimes this distinction between the external and internal school extended to the cathedrals. Thus at Reims: 'Praefatus denique praesul honorabilis Fulco . . . duas scholas Remis, canonicorum scilicet loci, atque ruralium clericorum, jam pene delapsas restituit, et evocato Remigio Autissiodorensi magistro, liberalium artium studii adolescentem clericos exerceri fecit, ipseque cum eis lectioni ac meditationi sapientiae operam dedit.'—Flodoardus, *Chron.*, lib. iv, c. 9 (*Patrol. Lat.* cxxxv. 289).

CHAP. II. intellectual movement out of which the universities grew and the shape of the university-system itself. In Italy and southern Europe generally, neither the education of the pre-university era nor the movement which gave rise to the universities was so predominantly ecclesiastical as was the case beyond the Alps. For the present, however, we shall confine ourselves to the countries whose educational system was most powerfully and permanently affected by the traditions of the school of Alcuin and his successors, and especially to the original home of European scholasticism, northern France.

Retrogression after Charles. Thanks to Charles the Great and the little group of learned ecclesiastics promoted by him, Europe was never again plunged into intellectual darkness quite as profound as that of the Merovingian epoch. But, as in the political, so in the intellectual world, the bright auguries which might have been drawn from the enlightened administration of the great barbarian were not destined to immediate fulfilment. The revival of intellectual life which might have been expected as the outcome of the Carolingian schools was thrown back for nearly two centuries by the political confusion consequent upon the break-up of the Frankish Empire, by the renewal of Scandinavian devastations in the north, and by the Saracen invasions in the south. But though the general level of education among the clergy throughout large parts of Europe may have sunk in the tenth century to very nearly the eighth-century level, there were always at least a few monasteries or cathedrals which kept alive a succession of comparatively well-educated ecclesiastics. It may be broadly stated that whatever knowledge was possessed by Alcuin was never allowed entirely to die out. The torch was handed on from one generation to another: the seeds of a new order of things had been sown, though it was not till the beginning of the eleventh century that even the first-fruits of harvest were reaped.¹

¹ [Rashdall was later inclined to modify the sharp distinction which he drew between the eleventh and the preceding centuries here and in the following paragraphs. Since he wrote, the intellectual history

CHAP. II. The change which began to pass over the schools of France in the eleventh century and culminated in the great intellectual Renaissance of the following age was but one effect of that general revivification of the human spirit which should be recognized as constituting an epoch in the history of European civilization not less momentous than the Reformation or the French Revolution. It is, indeed, only the absence of any clearly marked breach of political or ecclesiastical continuity that can excuse the designation by a common name of two periods so utterly dissimilar in their social, intellectual, and religious conditions, as the period before the eleventh century and the period after it. It is only the first of these periods that can with any propriety be called the Dark Age of European history: it would conduce to stamp the distinction between the two periods in the popular mind if the term 'Middle Age' were reserved for the latter.

The eleventh century forms the transition between one of the darkest and what was in many respects the brightest of all the centuries generally included in 'the Middle Age'; but in the main it belongs to the second—to the period of progress, not to the period of stagnation or retrogression. It cannot be too emphatically stated that there is no historical evidence for the theory which connects the new birth of Europe with the passing away of the fateful millennial year and with it of the awful dread of a coming end of all things.¹ Yet, although there was no breach of historical

of the ninth and tenth centuries has been investigated, notably by Traube and his pupils, and the significance of the monastic movements stimulated by the work of Benedict of Aniane and the Irish monks has been appreciated. See for the bibliographical material M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, vol. ii (Munich, 1923); and F. J. E. Raby, *Christian-Latin Poetry* (Oxford, 1927); and the same writer's *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1934). On the subject in general

see E. K. Rand, *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), C. Foligno, *Latin Thought during the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1929), M. L. W. Laistner, *Thought and Letters in Western Europe A.D. 500 to 900* (London, 1931), and D'Irsay, *op. cit.*, ch. 2. Cf. U. Berlière, *L'Ordre monastique des origines au xii^e siècle* (ed. 3, Maredsous, Lille and Paris, 1924). Rashdall noted the observations of Picavet, *Essais*, p. 14.]

¹ [For the curiously abundant literature on this subject see the long note in Hefele-Leclercq,

CHAP. II. continuity at the year 1000, the date will serve as well as any other that could be assigned to represent the turning-point of European history, separating an age of religious terror and theological pessimism from an age of hope and vigour and active religious enthusiasm. Monasticism renewed its life in the Cluniac and a century later in the Cistercian reforms. A revival of architecture heralded, as it usually does, a wider revival of art. The schools of Christendom became thronged as they were never thronged before. A passion for inquiry took the place of the old routine. The Crusades brought different parts of Europe into contact with one another and into contact with the new world of the East—with a new religion and a new philosophy, with the Arabic Aristotle, with the Arabic commentators on Aristotle, and eventually even with Aristotle in the original Greek.

Pre-existing causes of the Renaissance.

Of the complex causes of this astonishing new birth of Europe, some were no doubt in operation before the mysterious thousandth year of grace. The conversion of the Scandinavian pirates into Christian and civilized Normans was one of them. In Germany, under the enlightened rule of the Ottos, the symptoms of a better order of things may already be traced before the middle of the tenth century. To the Ottos, too, was due the regeneration of the Papacy. In Italy the very necessity of fortifying the towns against the Saracenic and Hungarian raids had begun to develop that civic life which there played so large a part in the intellectual revival. All these causes contributed to that restoration of political order, of ecclesiastical discipline, and of social tranquillity which began with the close of the tenth century. Order and peace, leisure and security are the most indispensable conditions of intellectual activity,¹ and after

Histoire des conciles, vol. iv, pt. 2 (Paris, 1911), pp. 901-3.]

¹ I do not ignore the stimulating intellectual effects of political revolutions and social upheavals; but this will not apply to such devastation as was wrought by Danes or

Saracens. When an abbey was in constant danger of pillage by Danes or robber-nobles, the monks were not likely to think much about logic or verse-making, though a modern war may interfere but little with professorial studies. [1895.]

all it is for the most part the conditions only, and not the CHAP. II. originating causes of great spiritual movements, which admit of analysis at the hands of the historian.

Whatever the causes of the change, the beginning of the eleventh century represents, as nearly as it is possible to fix it, the turning-point in the intellectual history of Europe. But it must not be supposed that the change at once manifested itself in any great 'movement' or discovery. The fact that the tide has turned reveals itself solely in the increased efficiency and wider diffusion of an education such as the Church schools had never wholly ceased to impart, at least since the time of Alcuin; in the increasing vigour of the theological controversies in which the Dark Ages had expended whatever intellectual activity they possessed; in the increased volume and more vigorous movement of that stream of theological literature which had never entirely ceased to flow. It was not, however, till the very end of the eleventh or the beginning of the following century that the improvement becomes rapid¹ and surprising; it is not till then that we trace the first beginnings of that great scholastic movement out of which grew the northern university-system. To enable the reader to appreciate the causes and the character of that movement, it is essential to give some account of the educational system which it eventually transformed. The revival of educational activity in the course of the eleventh century was, as has been said, but one side of a far wider movement—of the reawakening of the European mind from the torpor of centuries, of the triumph of order and civilization over disorder and barbarism. But the particular direction which was taken by the reawakened intellectual energies of Europe was completely determined by the

Influence of the dark-age curriculum.

¹ How rapid may be judged from the change which Guibert of Nogent (1053-1124) notices as having taken place within his own lifetime. 'Erat paulo ante id temporis, et adhuc partim sub meo tempore tanta grammaticorum charitas, ut in oppidis prope nullus, in urbibus vix

aliquis reperiri potuisset, et quos inveniri contigerat, eorum scientia tenuis erat, nec etiam moderni temporis clericulis vagantibus comparari poterat.' *De Vita Sua*, l. i, c. iv [ed. Bourgin, Paris, 1907, pp. 12, 13. Bourgin dates the autobiography 1114-17, p. xlix].

CHAP. II. character of the traditional education which it had inherited from the past.

Theological education. Of the ecclesiastical character and objects of this education enough has already been said. The end and object which the teacher set before himself was to enable the future ecclesiastic to understand and expound the canonical Scriptures, the Fathers, and other ecclesiastical writings. But beyond the elementary instruction in the Psalter and church music, we hear little of any systematic training in theology. In truth theology at this time had not yet become a system. The object of an ecclesiastical education was to enable the priest or monk to read and meditate upon the Bible and Fathers for himself: the theological writings of the times are for the most part either refutations of prevalent errors or abridgements of the patristic commentaries or treatises. What regular theological teaching there was, assumed of course a similarly positive and traditional character. But for the proper understanding of these sacred writings a certain amount of secular culture was considered to be necessary.¹ The maximum secular knowledge which the ordinary schools imparted is represented by that celebrated division of the 'Seven Arts'²

The Trivium and Quadrivium.

¹ The theory finds expression in the Capitulary of Charles the Great: 'Cum autem in sacris paginis schemata, tropi, et caetera his similia inserta inveniuntur, nulli dubium est quod ea unusquisque legens tanto citius spiritualiter intelligit, quanto prius in litterarum magisterio plenius instructus fuerit.' Pertz, *Leges*, i. 52, 53.

² The idea of the *Seven Liberal Arts* dates, according to Ozanam (*La Civilisation chrétienne*, p. 389) from Philo, *De Congressu* (ed. Mangey, IV. Erlangen, 1788, p. 148 sq.). But in any case it owed its popularity mainly to the *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* of Martianus Capella (ed. Eyssenhardt, Leipzig, 1866), in which the Seven Arts appear as the attendant Virgins of philology upon her marriage with Mercury. [The main source of this

work, written between 410 and 439, is Varro, architecture and medicine being excluded from the latter's *novem disciplinae*. P. Rajna has shown that the *effective* division of the Seven Arts into the *Trivium* and the *Quadrivium* dates from the time of Alcuin (*Studi medievali*, i (1928), 4-36. See, for the literature on the subject, Schanz, *Geschichte d. röm. Lit.*, iv. 166-70 (Munich, 1920), and for the history of the Seven Arts, D'Irsay, i. 32-8, especially the bibliographical note on p. 38, and J. Mariétan, *Problème de la classification des sciences d'Aristote à Saint Thomas* (Paris, 1901). H. Parker's article in the *English Historical Review* for 1890 requires considerable correction. The bibliographies in Manitius (vols. ii, iii) and in Ueberweg-Geyer should be consulted for particular writers.]

into the elementary *Trivium* and the more advanced *Quadrivium*. The *Trivium* consisted of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic; the *Quadrivium* of music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. What was known of these arts may be estimated from the contents of the ordinary text-books of the age—the work of three writers who, living in the dim twilight which intervened between the daylight of ancient culture and the total night of barbarism, had occupied themselves with reducing to compendiums so much as they could save or so much as they could appreciate of the intellectual treasures destined otherwise to be buried for centuries or lost for ever. These three writers were Boethius, the popularity of whose works was largely increased by his fame as a theologian and Christian martyr,¹ the Christian Cassiodorus, and the half-pagan Martianus Capella. Of the *Quadrivium* even Boethius gives but a meagre outline, the other two but the scantiest smattering.² In the Dark Ages arithmetic and astronomy found their way into the educational curriculum chiefly because they taught the means of finding Easter. Music included but a half-mystical doctrine of numbers and the rules of plain-song: under geometry Boethius gives little but a

The text-books.

The scope of some of the arts was wider than is indicated by modern usage. Rhetoric included the elements of law as well as prose and verse composition (see below, ch. iv, § 1); so 'Geometria est ars disciplinata quae omnium herbarum graminumque experimentum enuntiat: unde et medicos hac fretos geometres vocamus, id est, expertos herbarum'. Virgilius Maro (the Toulouse grammarian of the seventh century), *Epistolae*, iv, ed. Huemer, Leipzig, 1886, p. 22.

¹ [Rashdall, following Charles Jourdain in rejecting the claim of Boethius to the theological works ascribed to him, wrote 'supposititious fame'. But the evidence of a fragment of Cassiodorus, available since 1877 in H. Usener's *Anecdota Holderi* (Bonn, 1877), is

now generally accepted and the importance of Usener's work realized. See the edition of the theological tractates by H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (London, 1918). Rand now accepts the authenticity of the tract *De Fide Catholica*, which in 1901 he rejected (*Jahrbücher für klass. Phil.*, xxvi. 437 sqq.; Supplementband). It is not easy to exaggerate the influence of Boethius in late medieval thought. His definition of theological terms, his classification of the sciences, as well as his logical translations and commentaries are of great importance.]

² [D'Irsay (p. 36 n.) suggests a deliberate intention, citing Cassiodorus, 'ut simplicibus viribus famuletur etiam mundanarum peritia litterarum'.]

CHAP. II. selection of propositions from Euclid without the demonstrations. Historically speaking, the *Quadrivium* is chiefly important as supplying the skeleton outline of a wider course of study which was afterwards filled up by the discoveries or rediscoveries of the twelfth-century Renaissance. The real secular education of the Dark Ages was the *Trivium*—grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. Under grammar had long been included, not merely the technical rules of grammar as formulated by Priscian and Donatus, but all that we should include in the studies known as classical or philological—the systematic study and interpretation of the classical writers of ancient Rome. Before the age of Charles the Great, whatever secular culture survived the wreck of ancient civilization had, in spite of the frowns of the severer Christian teachers, been based upon the Latin classics. Alcuin, though certainly himself well acquainted with the principal Roman poets, in later life condemned the teaching of pagan poetry to the Christian youth; and the tendency of the age which he inaugurates was on the whole in the same direction, though the more enlightened teachers of the Dark Ages took a more liberal view, and it is probable that in practice boys continued to be taught grammatical Latin by reading a classical author, such as Virgil or Ovid;¹ and in the best schools, notably at Ferrières, under Alcuin's pupil, the Abbot Servatus Lupus, a wider study of classical literature was pursued with some enthusiasm.² Under the head of rhetoric the treatises of Cicero, such as the *Topics* (with the commentary of Boethius),

The pagan literature.

¹ See *Vita Alcuini* (*M.G.H. Scriptores*, xv. 193), where a story is told of Alcuin (when Abbot of Tours) detecting his *scholasticus* Sigulfus secretly teaching Virgil to his pupils (cf. letter to Richbod, Archbishop of Trier, in *Epistles*, ed. Dümmler, *M.G.H. Epistolae*, iv. 38, No. 13), while in Lupus, Abbot of Ferrières, we find as keen a devotee of classical literature and collector of manuscripts as any Italian scholar of the Renaissance. See his letters, *passim*, ed. Dümmler

in *M.G.H. Epistolae*, vi. 7–126. For the toleration of classics cf. Rabanus Maurus, *De Clericorum Institutione*, *Patrol. Lat.* cvii. 396.

² Lupus Ferrarensis, *Epp.* lxiii, ciii (Dümmler, pp. 62, 91). The passages are interesting as showing that Quintilian, though little known, was not so entirely lost as is sometimes supposed. [Cf. Manitius, i. 486; ii. 713; and Webb's preface to his edition of John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*, p. xv.]

the *De Oratore* and the pseudo-Ciceronian *ad Herennium*,^{CHAP. II.} were largely read. The elements of Roman law were often added, and all schoolboys were exercised in writing prose and what passed for verse. But the heart and centre of the secular education of the time in northern Europe was the study of dialectic or logic. Here the teacher was untrammelled by the lurking uneasiness of conscience which haunted the medieval monk who loved his Virgil: there was nothing pagan about syllogisms: the rules of right reasoning were the same for Christian and for pagan alike, and were (as was thought) essential for the right comprehension and inculcation of Christian truth. Under cover of this idea teacher and pupil alike were enabled in the study of dialectic, and perhaps in dialectic only, to enjoy something of the pleasure of knowledge for its own sake. The mysteries of logic were indeed intrinsically better calculated to fascinate the intellect of the half-civilized barbarian than the elegancies of classical poetry and oratory. At all events, in this department a richer material, meagre as even that undoubtedly seems to us, was placed at his disposal than in most other branches of secular knowledge. Boethius (481–524) had translated the *De Interpretatione* and the *Categoriae* as well as the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, but in the time of Alcuin only the translations of Porphyry and the *De Interpretatione* (with the commentary of Boethius) were generally known, together with an abridgement of the *Categoriae* falsely ascribed to S. Augustine,¹ and some logical writings of Boethius. Such were the chief sources of the scholar's secular inspiration down to the eleventh century. Even Abelard knew only the *Categoriae* and the *De Interpretatione* in actual translations: the rest of the *Organon* he knew only from the Boethian *De Syllogismis Categoricis*, *De Syllogismis Hypotheticis*, *De Differentiis Topicis*, and *De Divisionibus*.²

Prominence of logic.

Knowledge of Aristotle.

¹ Hauréau, pt. i, p. 95 sq. Jourdain (*Recherches*, p. 379) treats this work as an actual translation. Some knowledge of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* was also obtainable through a collection of axioms

ascribed to Bede (Jourdain, p. 21).
² [See Abelard's own words in Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abelard*, 1836, p. 228. Geyer (*Philosophischer Jahrbuch*, xxx. 32) shows that he knew the *Sophistici Elenchi* also

Though in a sense the authority of Aristotle was supreme throughout this as well as the later medieval period, in the formation of the scholastic philosophy the influence of Plato and still more of Plotinus and the Neoplatonists upon medieval thought counted for at least as much as that of the Stagirite. The authority of Aristotle was in the first instance due to his position as a logician, and Plato was the author of no logical system that could rival that of Aristotle; while the later Middle Ages had before them in the writings of Aristotle a whole encyclopedia of subjects upon which Plato had written nothing. Of Plato's own writings none were known at any period of the Middle Ages, except the *Timaeus* in the translation by Chalcidius, the *Phaedo* and the *Meno*,¹ and even of these the circulation was not very wide—certainly not in the seed-time of the scholastic philosophy. [The immense influence which Platonism exercised upon medieval thought was mainly derived from accounts or reproductions of Platonic or Neoplatonic teaching in such Latin writers as Cicero, Apuleius, Augustine,² Macrobius, and Boethius, from the references made by Aristotle himself to his master's teaching, from Erigena's, and later translations of the pseudo-Dionysius, from the translations of Arabic writings

and quotes a non-Boethian translation of the *Prior Analytics*. For the writings of Boethius and their importance in transmitting much of the Aristotelian logic cf. Manitius, i. 26 sqq. and the references in his index. Boethius translated the *Analytics*; his translation was very little known, but the *Prior Analytics* are included in the *Heptateuchon* or manual of the Seven Arts written by the well-known *scholasticus*, Theodoric or Thierry of Chartres in the first half of the twelfth century (Clerval, *Les Écoles de Chartres*, p. 222). For the dialectical works studied at Chartres in the eleventh century see the list given by Clerval from a Chartres manuscript (*ibid.*, p. 117). On the whole question of the transmission of the *Organon*

see Haskins, *Studies in Mediaeval Science*, pp. 223-34, and the authorities there given; and below, pp. 353-62, and notes.]

¹ [Haskins, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 165-71. The prologues to the translations of the *Phaedo* and the *Meno*, made by Henricus Aristippus (1156-60), who was in the service of William I of Sicily, were discovered by Valentin Rose in 1866.] Plato was never the subject of medieval lectures.

² [The influence of Plotinus over S. Augustine was much greater than that of Plato, and Plato was known to him chiefly through Plotinus. Cf. M. Grandgeorge, *Saint Augustin et Le Néoplatonisme*, Paris, 1896.]

which were inspired by Neoplatonic influence (e.g. the *Fons vitae* of the Jew, Gebirol, or Avicbron), and from the translations of Neoplatonic works made from the Greek by William of Moerbeke in the thirteenth century.] Of Plato himself little was known besides his doctrine of ideas; but the controversy between Aristotle and Plato upon this matter supplied the Middle Ages with the great central subject—in the earlier period of its development the main subject—of its metaphysical controversies. The concentration of intellectual interest upon a single topic of ancient philosophy originated the never-ending controversy over the reality of universals.¹

Thus the whole scholastic training of the pre-university era paved the way for the absorption of the intellectual energies of entire generations by this highly speculative question, and the other speculative questions which grew out of it or were connected with it. The most stimulating and interesting morsel which the monastic teacher could place before the hungry intellect of the inquiring student was a morsel of logic. Logic was the one treasure snatched from the intellectual wreckage of a bygone civilization which he was encouraged to appropriate. The one fragment of 'the Philosopher' (as Aristotle was called in the Middle Ages) was a fragment of his logic. And at the very threshold of logic the student was encountered by this question of the reality of universals—on the face of it (as it is apt to appear to the modern mind) a dry, abstract, uninviting topic—a topic which at first sight might seem to belong rather to the theory of grammar than to logic or metaphysic. Yet no sooner does he approach it than the student finds himself led by

¹ M. Picavet declares as the result of recent studies that 'la question des universaux ne fut guère traitée que de 1080 à 1160 et elle n'eut même pas alors l'importance que lui attribuent encore la plupart des historiens' (*Essais*, p. 10). I have modified a few phrases which might suggest such an exaggeration in my first edition,

but M. Picavet recognizes that the question was revived in the later Middle Ages and its intrinsic importance for medieval and for all philosophy it would not be easy to exaggerate. [Note by Rashdall, 1921. On Platonic and Neoplatonic influences generally see Baeumker, *Der Platonismus im Mittelalter* (Munich, 1916).]

Origin of
the scho-
lastic phi-
losophy.

CHAP. II. imperceptible steps from logic into physics, and from physics into metaphysics, and from metaphysics into theology. Indeed, the solution of the most momentous questions to which the human intellect can address itself is inextricably bound up with the solution of a question which 'common sense' will undertake to clear up in five minutes, or which it will indignantly pronounce too trifling to be asked or answered. Yet he who has given his answer to it has implicitly constructed his theory of the universe.

The scholastic problem. In the introduction to the logic of Aristotle which was in the hands of every student even in the Dark Ages, the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, the question was explicitly raised in a very distinct and emphatic manner. The words in which this writer states, without resolving, the central problem of the scholastic philosophy, have played perhaps a more momentous part in the history of thought than any other passage of equal length in all literature outside the canonical Scriptures. They are worth quoting at length: 'Next, concerning genera and species, the question indeed whether they have a substantial existence, or whether they consist in bare intellectual concepts only, or whether if they have a substantial existence they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separable from the sensible properties of the things (or particulars of sense), or are only in those properties and subsisting about them, I shall forbear to determine. For a question of this kind is a very deep one and one that requires a longer investigation.'¹

The scholastic philosophy before Roscellinus. Such was the central question of the scholastic philosophy. At what period are we to say that the great debate was opened? In a sense the history of the scholastic philosophy begins with the revival of Aristotelian dialectic in the Carolingian schools, but its characteristic question about the reality of universals did not come into great prominence till

¹ 'Mox de generibus ac speciebus illud quidem, sive subsistunt sive in solis nudisque intellectibus posita sunt, sive subsistentia corporalia sunt an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in-

sensibilibus posita et circa ea constantia, dicere recusabo: altissimum enim est huiusmodi negotium et majoris egens inquisitionis.' (In trans. Boethii.)

CHAP. II. the far-reaching issues of the conflict were brought out by the teaching of the realist Johannes Scotus Erigena in the second half of the ninth century. From this time onwards there is a succession of dialecticians by whom the question is more or less distinctly raised. But the hottest battles of the long campaign do not open until we come to that great intellectual revival of the eleventh and twelfth centuries with which we are chiefly concerned. The second and by far the most brilliant period in the history of scholasticism is opened up by the teaching of the nominalist Roscellinus at the end of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth centuries. With Roscellinus we enter upon the most important period of the scholastic *philosophy*, while the scholastic *theology* can hardly be said to begin before this epoch. There had been indeed a growing tendency to apply the weapons of dialectic to the discussion of theological questions before this period. Johannes Scotus had pushed the realist argument very near to the borders of Pantheism, but he had not directly either assailed or questioned the truths of revealed religion. He was rather a somewhat unorthodox Christian Platonist or Plotinian or a belated gnostic than a dialectical theologian. A nearer anticipation of the scholastic conflicts is the controversy which broke out in the middle of the eleventh century—just before the period from which we have seen reason to date the intellectual new birth of Europe—in consequence of Berengar's attack upon the doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist; but this controversy was in the main conducted upon the basis of authority—at least in the hands of the chief defender or (since the dogma had not yet been authoritatively defined) the chief formulator of the orthodox doctrine, Lanfranc, the famous teacher of the great monastic school of Bec. It was not till the time of Lanfranc's great successor, Anselm of Aosta, that a marked change took place in the character of the theological teaching and the theological controversies of the Church's schools.¹

¹ [The John who is said to have preceded Roscellinus in his nominalism (see the anonymous *Historia francica in Recueil des historiens de France*, xi. 160, xii. 3) was probably, as Prantl thought, John

The scholastic theology grew out of the concentration upon theological study of minds whose only or chief secular culture was supplied by logic. In the intellectual torpor of the Dark Ages young ecclesiastics might be taught to think or to argue by the teacher of dialectic, and to repeat doctrinal formulae or mystical interpretations of Scripture by the teacher of theology without feeling the temptation to apply to the subject-matter of the one school the weapons which they had learned to use in the other. But when once real intellectual activity was roused, this state of things could not last much longer. And as soon as the combustible materials which had long lain side by side without mixing were brought into contact, an explosion was inevitable. Intellectual activity stimulated by dialectic, intellectual curiosity aroused by the glimpses of old-world philosophy which were afforded by the traditional education of the age, had no material on which to expend themselves, except what was supplied by the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the doctrinal system of the Church. To investigate and to interpret, to attack or defend what was found there, was the natural impulse of the cloister-bred ecclesiastic of northern Europe. At about the same period this tendency found marked expression in the writings of two great teachers—the orthodox Anselm and the heretical Roscellinus. In Anselm we are perhaps met for the first time with the spectacle of an orthodox teacher expending his utmost intellectual ingenuity in first raising and then meeting objections to the doctrine which he himself unhesitatingly accepted. With Anselm, author of the famous *Credo ut intelligam*, this effort was made entirely for the instruction of the believer: his object was to add knowledge to a pre-existing faith: reason was entirely subordinated to authority. In Roscellinus reason undertook the task of criticizing and (where it seemed needful) modifying the doctrines of the received theology.¹

the Scot; cf. Poole, *Illustrations*, pp. 99, 321, 336. Otto of Freising, on the other hand, states that Roscellinus 'sententiam vocum instituit' (*De gestis Friderici*, i. 47; cf. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, vii. 2, ed.

Webb, ii. 142, and *Metalogicon*, ii. 17, ed. Webb, p. 92). For other views on John see Ueberweg-Geyer, pp. 206, 207; Clerval, pp. 121-3; De Wulf, i. 110.]

¹ A complete account of the

From Roscellinus the speculative impulse was communicated to Abelard, in whose hands the scholastic treatment of theology attained its full development. Anselm and Roscellinus were the precursors, Abelard was the true founder of the scholastic theology. With Abelard the great scholastic movement reaches a point at which it begins to identify itself with what we may call the university movement. Most emphatically it must be asserted that universities, even in their most rudimentary form, did not exist till at least a generation after Abelard. But Abelard inaugurated the intellectual movement out of which they eventually sprang. The method of inquiry and of teaching of which he was the originator was the method which essentially characterized the teaching of the medieval universities—a method transferred by Abelard from philosophy to theology, and afterwards (in a greater or less degree) to the whole cycle of medieval studies. Even from the point of view of external organization Abelard may in a sense be said to inaugurate the university movement. Anselm was the last of the great monastic teachers. A generation later the monasteries began to shut their doors upon secular students; and their educational activity was taken up by the cathedrals and their more

The
monastic
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cathedrals.

growth of scholasticism would have to take into consideration the influence of John of Damascus, in the eighth century, who already exhibits the two changes introduced (at different periods) into Western theology by scholasticism, viz. (1) the introduction of dialectical processes, and (2) the prominence of the Aristotelian philosophy. He originates scholasticism in the Eastern Church, and was by no means without influence in the West. [See J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique*, pp. 245-67. It is not possible to revise this chapter, with its almost exclusive emphasis on dialectic, in the light of later work. The interplay of theological developments and canon law has been treated by Ghellinck,

and, more recently, by le Bras in the *Histoire des collections canoniques en Occident*, by P. Fournier and G. le Bras (Paris, 1932), ii. 314 sqq. The best introduction to the new methods of teaching, the development of the *sententias* and *summae*, and the use of sources, &c., is in *Les Écoles et l'enseignement*, edited by G. Paré and others. The following passage, concluding a discussion of the place of the Seven Arts in medieval teaching, sums up the position: 'Mais la vie est ailleurs, et, dès le XII^e siècle, mine peu à peu les vieilles catégories. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut lire Abélard, et non pas enclorre en la turbulence du chevalier de l'"art" dialectique l'esprit de la philosophie du XII^e siècle' (*op. cit.*, p. 101.)]

CHAP. II. independent secular teachers. It was the cathedral school in which Abelard had taught—the Cathedral School of Paris—which eventually developed into the earliest and greatest university of northern Europe. Abelard, though not in any strict sense the founder, was at least the intellectual progenitor of the University of Paris.

Relations
of philo-
sophy to
theology.

A slight sketch of the life and teaching of this extraordinary man will be the best introduction to the investigation of our main subject. But to appreciate Abelard's position in the history of medieval thought, it will be well to start with some clear ideas as to the relations between the old speculative problems which in the age of Abelard were being debated with a fury hitherto unknown in the history of philosophy and the new problems of the scholastic theology. We have defined the scholastic theology as the result of an attempt to apply dialectical methods to the discussion of theological problems. But it was not only philosophical methods, but philosophical conclusions, that were now imported into the schools of theology. At this period it was in the main the question of the reality of universals that troubled the traditional repose of the theological schools: at a later date, as we shall see, the whole of the Aristotelian philosophy was re-imported into the schools of Europe, and demanded that its relations with theology should be adjusted. At present we need only deal with the theological bearings of the great problem raised by the earlier scholasticism. The modification of theological doctrine by ancient philosophy was, indeed, no new thing in the history of Christian thought. Philosophy had just begun to colour the expression of Christian doctrine before the close of the New Testament canon: in the hands of the Fathers it entered into its substance. It was, indeed, largely the discrepancies between the traditional Augustinian theology based upon a Platonic philosophy and the conclusions to which more independent thinkers were led by the study of Aristotle that created many of the problems with which the scholastic theologian was confronted. But none of the recognized answers to the great scholastic problem was without its theological difficulties. Without an apprecia-

tion of the theological bearing of the questions at issue between medieval realism and medieval nominalism, the inner history of the movement of which the universities were originally the outgrowth and afterwards became the organs, nay, it is no exaggeration to say the whole ecclesiastical history of the Middle Ages, will be unintelligible. Unless we see clearly the theological rocks on which the combatants on either side were alternately in danger of being wrecked, we shall be unable to understand either the alarm with which the rise of scholastic theology in the twelfth century was regarded by old-fashioned and conservative Churchmen, or the way in which now one, now another, metaphysical position was proscribed in the interests of orthodoxy.

Theo-
logical
difficulties
of different
philoso-
phical
positions.

In the first place, the dialectician who maintained (with Scotus) that reality belonged only to the idea or universal while the particulars are mere phantasms, was liable to be confronted with this line of argument. If the reality which the class-name 'Table' stands for is the immaterial self-subsistent idea of a table, the name principle must clearly be applied to the class-name 'Man'. The real thing in man must then be the humanity which is shared alike by Socrates, by Plato, and by every other individual man: individuality thus belongs merely to the phenomenal world, to the seeming and the transitory. What then, the realist was liable to be asked, becomes of the immortality of the soul? One step more and the personality of God disappears with the personality of man. If the reality of the individual is constituted merely by its participation in the essence of the species, must not the reality of the species in like manner be absorbed into that of the genus, and the reality of the genus into that of the more comprehensive genus in which it is embraced, and so on? The *summum genus* would thus appear to be ultimately the only reality: all substances become mere forms or modes of the being of the one substance: all material things and all individual minds must be regarded as essentially and fundamentally one: mind and matter alike are reduced to modes of the One, the Absolute Being. There are, of course, innumerable ways of evading the consequences of the realistic

Realism.

CHAP. II. premisses: one dialectician or another might stop here or there in the chain of argument. But in proportion as his mind was logical, in proportion to the clearness and fearlessness of his intellect, pantheistic—or at least what we now call absolutist—tendencies were sure to become apparent. All realism *which starts with denying the reality of the particular* is essentially (as M. Hauréau has said of more than one scholastic system) an 'undeveloped Spinozism'.¹

Nominal-
ism. On the other hand, the opposite extreme of nominalism, the theory which declared that universals are mere sounds (*merae voces*) and that predication has to do with nothing but names, is a doctrine whose sceptical tendency lies upon the surface. In Roscellinus the heretical tendency of the doctrine became immediately evident [however little that thinker intended to push his speculative conclusions to the denial of the traditional theology]. Starting with the assumption that only the individual was real and that intellectual relations had no existence, he required the theologian to choose between [the doctrine that the three Persons were but names for one and the same being, so that it would be as true to say of the Father as of the Son that he was incarnate], and the admission that the Persons of the Holy Trinity are 'tres res', himself [accepting the latter alternative which his opponents not unnaturally described as tritheistic]. The same rigorous logic was applied to the doctrine of the real presence in the Eucharist. But, even apart from its application to particular dogmas, the destructive tendency of a doctrine which declared the particular, the isolated, unrelated atom to be the only reality was sufficient to alarm the medieval theologian at first sight: his instinct was right in rejecting a doctrine of which the sensationalistic scepticism of Hume or the crudest modern materialism is but an illogical attenuation. Strange as it may appear, nominalism was to have its fleeting triumph even within the pale of the Church; but when it was first broached, it was heresy.

¹ In attributing this tendency to realism in general, M. Hauréau (who writes from a strongly nominalist point of view) omits what seems to me to be the necessary qualification. There is a realism which does not deny that the particular is real, though it may be there is no such thing as a particular apart from universal relations.

It might seem that the cautious dialectician who wished to keep on good terms with the Bishops and the theologians must fall back upon the peripatetic view which acknowledged the reality of the universals while it denied that the universal had any reality apart from the particulars. And the logical position of the most orthodox dialecticians who immediately followed Scotus was in the main of a peripatetic cast, while they fenced themselves off against the attacks of the ever-watchful theologian by drawing a sharp line between the province of theology and that of philosophy. But tendencies were at work which by the time of Abelard had resulted in making realism the orthodox philosophy of the Church's schools. The pantheistic tone of Erigena's own writings was, indeed, too obvious to escape notice. Nevertheless, this same Erigena contributed largely by his translation of the pseudo-Dionysian treatises *De hierarchiâ coelesti* and *De nominibus divinis* to a modification in the philosophical attitude of the orthodox theology. The mingled mysticism and sacerdotalism of these works, further recommended in France by the identification of their author with S. Denis of Paris, was so attractive to the medieval mind that the current theology became largely coloured by the Neoplatonic ideas which had given so much offence in the original writings of their translator. Moreover, since the time of Erigena a change had passed over the sacramental teaching of the Church, which was destined eventually to make some form of realism almost essential to the dialectician who aimed at giving a philosophical explanation of the doctrines which he accepted as a theologian.

First revealed perhaps by a chance word or two of the Platonist Justin, the belief in a physical though mysterious and vaguely conceived change in the consecrated elements in the Eucharist had found some support among later Fathers, though a more spiritual view was upheld by theologians of as great or greater authority, such as S. Augustine and Pope Gelasius. Both in the popular and in the clerical mind the growth of the belief kept pace with the decay of education, the advance of sacerdotal pretension, the deepening paganism

CHAP. II.
Yet realism more or less necessary to orthodoxy.

Realism and sacramentalism.

CHAP. II. of popular religion. The belief in an actual transformation of the consecrated elements into the very body and blood of Christ was perhaps for the first time fully and formally promulgated in the writings of Paschasius Radbertus (†853) about the middle of the ninth century. Though strongly opposed by Rabanus, Ratramnus, and others, the dogma now took firm hold of the popular imagination. In the darkness of the succeeding age of ignorance it became the very central truth of popular orthodoxy. The first indication of the reawakening of the European mind after its long slumber is the denial of the popular superstition by Berengar of Tours. When conservative theologians like Lanfranc attempted a scientific defence of the popular creed, the necessity of more accurate definition was felt. Berengar's attack rested upon a nominalistic basis: with Lanfranc began the attempt to defend and at the same time to sublimate the coarse materialism of the current doctrine¹ by introducing the realistic distinction between the substance—the impalpable universal which was held to inhere in every particular included under it—and the accidents or sensible properties which came into existence when the pure form clothed itself in matter. Thus was gradually built up the fully developed doctrine of *transubstantiation*.² The substances of the bread and wine were changed, it was held, by the act of the priest into the substance of the body and blood of Christ, while the sensible appearances, which had been the accidents of the bread and wine, remained the same.

¹ Thus Berengar was compelled at a synod of Rome in A.D. 1059 to declare that the body and blood of Christ '*sensualiter, non solum sacramento, sed in veritate manibus sacerdotum tractari et frangi et fidelium dentibus atteri*'. (Mansi, *SS. Conciliorum Ampliss. Collectio*, xix, Venice, 1774, c. 900.)

It will be seen that the doctrine of transubstantiation was originally a refinement upon a stronger and coarser identification of the Eucharistic elements with the body and blood of Christ.

² According to Gieseler, the word transubstantiation first occurs in Damiani (†1072), *Expositio canonis Missae* (*Patrol. Lat.* cxlv. 883). [But this work is now not regarded as Damiani's. On the history of the use of the word see Herzog-Hauck, *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, xx (1908), 57 (including a criticism of Denifle), and Ghellinck, 'Eucharistie au xiii^e siècle en occident' in Vacant and Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. v.]

Thus realism bespoke the favour of the theologian by supplying a much-needed philosophical dress for his cherished doctrine. However jealously he might defend the claims of authority against reason, in his exposition of theological doctrine Anselm leant to the same side. In fact, from this time forward, though reactionary theologians declaimed against all philosophy, the tendency to introduce dialectical distinctions and methods of argument into theology became more and more irresistible; and in whatever proportion this was done, the philosophy which was made use of among the orthodox was sure to be of a more or less realistic cast.

The outburst of pure, unadulterated, extravagant nominalism in Roscellinus—nominalism as crude as the realism of William of Champeaux—was the first wholly new idea which had moved upon the surface of philosophic thought since the time of Johannes Scotus, afterwards known as Erigena.¹ But Scotus is a solitary genius emerging from the dead level of traditional education and passing away without founding a school or inspiring a successor. Roscellinus, by his doctrine that universals are mere sounds (*flatus vocis*), supplied that powerful shock to established beliefs and modes of thought in which great speculative movements usually have their origin. His teaching awoke the schools of Europe to a consciousness of the speculative issues of the logical question which they had been languidly discussing since the time of Alcuin, as well as to the speculative possibilities of the dialectical weapons whose use they had long made it their chief business to teach. In Abelard—at once the pupil, the successor, and the antagonist of Roscellinus—this consciousness of the power of thought, which now began to take the place of the timid dialectic and conventional theology of the Dark Ages, found its fullest and most brilliant exponent.

Peter Abelard was a Breton, born at the village of Palais near Nantes in 1079. It is a sign of the change which was coming over the face of Europe that the eldest son of a

¹ [For Roscellinus (born at Compiègne, c. 1050) see Picavet, *Roscellin, philosophe et théologien* (Paris, ed. 2, 1911) and the works cited in De Wulf, i. 114; also Ueberweg-Geyer, pp. 206-9.]

CHAP. II. seigneur, himself destined to the profession of arms, should be given the education of a clerk. The boy soon discovered so ardent a zeal for knowledge that he was content to be disinherited rather than abandon his studious life. After the fashion of the age, he wandered from one school to another,¹ and it was in the course of these early wanderings that he was for a time the pupil of the great nominalist Roscellinus.² At last, at about the age of twenty, he was attracted by the fame of William of Champeaux to the Cathedral School of Paris. His new master had done more than any one else to formulate that realistic doctrine which was more and more assuming the position of an orthodox or official philosophy. His teaching, if we may accept Abelard's interpretation of it, was the very quintessence of crude, uncompromising realism. He maintained that the whole thing, i.e. the idea represented by each specific or generic name, was 'essentially' present in each individual of the genus or species. His brilliant pupil, imbued with at least the critical side of Roscellinus's doctrine, ventured, with a presumption which shocked an age disposed to apply the principles of feudal loyalty to the warfare of the schools, openly to combat the principles of his teacher.³ At

Collision
with
William
of Cham-
peaux.

¹ 'Proinde diversas disputando perambulans provincias, ubicunque huius artis (sc. Dialecticae) vigere studium audieram, Peripateticorum aemulator factus sum.' Ep. i, c. 1. For the facts of Abelard's life I may refer to his autobiography or *Historia Calamitatum* which stands as the first of his letters, and to Rémusat's most interesting Life. [For recent work on Abelard see Manitius, *Gesch. d. latein. Literatur*, iii (1931), 105-12, Ueberweg-Geyer, pp. 214-26, 702-3, De Wulf, i. 161-6, and J. G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge, 1932); cf. C. Ottaviano, *Pietro Abelardo* (Rome, 1932). Interesting studies will be found in the works of Grabmann and Ghellinck, in E. Gilson, *Études de philosophie médiévale* (Strasbourg, 1921), pp. 20-9, and, with excellent biblio-

graphical notes, in G. Paré, &c., *Les Écoles et l'enseignement*, pp. 275-312. The most important advance in the study of Abelard has been due to Geyer's new edition of his philosophical works, including the rediscovered glosses on Porphyry, in the *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, xxi, parts 1-4 (Münster, 1919-33; in progress). For recent discussion on Abelard's so-called rationalism see below, pp. 59-60, note.]

² The fact, though stated by Otto of Freising (*De Gestis Frid.* i, c. 47), was formerly doubted, but is put beyond dispute by the letter from Roscellinus to his pupil published by Cousin, *Opp.* ii. 792-803.

³ 'Primo ei acceptus, postmodum gravissimus extitit, cum nonnullas . . . eius sententias refellere conarer,

CHAP. II. what was then accounted an unusually early age, long before the completion of the ordinary period of study, the ambitious and self-confident youth became anxious to set up as an independent teacher. But in France education was the monopoly of the Church. No one could teach, at least in the neighbourhood of any recognized school, without the permission of its duly appointed head; and William was naturally not disposed to admit so presumptuous a pupil to a participation in his privileges. At Paris Abelard could not venture to defy the established custom: he succeeded, however, in establishing himself as a master at Melun without opposition, if not with the assent of the ecclesiastical authorities of the place. As his fame spread, he ventured to move nearer Paris, to Corbeil. An illness compelled him to retire for some years to his native Brittany, whither he was followed by many of his enthusiastic disciples. Disgusted at the success of his conceited pupil, the old master became more than ever convinced of the vanity of secular knowledge¹—a suspicion which often haunted the teacher of the old school even while he was spending his life in imparting it. When Abelard returned to Paris, he found that the famous Archdeacon of Paris, the 'Column of the Doctors' as he was called, had retired from his preferment to the little chapel of S. Victor which grew into the famous abbey of that name.² But the passion for dialectic had invaded even this new retreat of mystical and sanctified learning, and William was persuaded to resume his lectures for the benefit of the canons of his house as well as of outsiders. Professing a desire to learn rhetoric, but more probably thirsting for fresh laurels, Abelard placed himself again under the instruction of his former master. The old conflicts were resumed. Abelard contended that if the whole 'thing', i.e. the whole of the universal, were

et ratiocinari contra eum saepius aggredere et nonnunquam superior in disputando viderer.' *Hist. calamitatum*, c. 2.

¹ Abelard as usual assigns a more sinister motive: 'ut quo religiosior crederetur, ad maiorem praelationis

gradum promoveretur, sicut in proximo contigit.' *Ibid.*

² As to the early history of this House [see Fourier-Bonnard, *Histoire de l'abbaye royale et de l'ordre des chanoines réguliers de Saint-Victor de Paris* (Paris, 1904)].

CHAP. II. 'essentially' present in each individual of the genus or species, none of it was left to be present in any other individual at the same time. [Crude indeed must have been a realism which could be refuted by such an argument; yet so formidable did it seem], if we may trust to its author's account of the matter, that the master was obliged to retract and amend his formula by substituting the vaguer 'indifferently'¹ for the more definite 'essentially'. This retraction gave the death-blow to what was left of the older schoolman's reputation. The distinction which Abelard gained by the encounter was such that William's successor in the schools of Notre Dame offered to resign in his favour and to sit at the feet of the young master. Abelard was therefore duly installed in the Cathedral School. But the cowl had not made a genuine 'religious' of the ex-Archdeacon, and he succeeded in procuring the removal of the master who had lent Abelard his chair, and the substitution of a jealous rival in his place. Abelard was thus obliged to retire once more to Melun. But now William also retired for a time with his disciples into the country—as Abelard suggests, to convince sceptical critics of the reality of his 'conversion'. Abelard thereupon ventured to set up his chair, not indeed within the walls of the city, but in the precincts of Ste Geneviève on the southern bank of the Seine. The immunities of this church, at that time in the hands of a chapter of secular canons, enabled it to offer an asylum to masters who were excluded from teaching by the cathedral authorities; and henceforth the 'Mountain' of Ste Geneviève became and long remained the head-quarters of philosophical teaching in Paris. [William returned once more to Paris, but according to his rivals lost nearly all his pupils and gave up

Abelard at
Ste Gene-
viève.

¹ *Hist. cal.*, c. 2. Such is no doubt the right reading. (See Cousin, *Œuvres inéd.*, p. cxvii.) [It is confirmed by William's *Sententiae*, edited by G. Lefèvre, *Les Variations de Guillaume de Champeaux* (Lille, 1898). For William and the literature on him see Ueberweg-Geyer, pp. 206, 210-11, 701-2; De Wulf, i. 149, 156. The term

indifferenter was taken not directly from the translation of the *Topics*, but from Boethius on the *De Interpretatione*. The gloss on Porphyry shows that in his later teaching Abelard, while attacking their realistic use, availed himself of the conceptions of indifference and of its development 'status'.]

teaching altogether. Abelard's private affairs compelled him to return to Brittany for a time: when he returned the old scholastic had become a bishop.] CHAP. II.

Abelard had hitherto been a teacher of dialectic and grammar, or, as we should express it, of logic and latin. But no sooner had the promotion of William of Champeaux to the see of Châlons (in 1113) left him without a rival in this field than he became ambitious of attaining distinction as a theologian. With this view he put himself under the instruction of the most famous theological master of his day—Anselm of Laon.¹ The great philosopher was not, however, long content to be a student in his new faculty under an aged master of whose powers he appears to have formed the lowest possible estimate.² He soon ceased to attend lectures regularly, and at length, in the course of conversation with some of his fellow students, freely expressed his surprise that educated men should not be able to study the Scriptures for themselves without any other aid than the text and the gloss. The unheard-of doctrine was received with derision, and Abelard was jestingly challenged to make the attempt. He took the students at their word, and offered, if they would

Studies
theology
under
Anselm of
Laon.

¹ [On Anselm of Laon and the literature see De Wulf, i. 199 sq.; Ueberweg-Geyer, p. 700. His *Sententiae* have been edited by F. Bliemetzrieder in the *Beiträge*, xviii. 2-3 (Münster, 1919). Their systematic arrangement is now regarded as a stage of some significance in the development of scholastic method; see especially Grabmann, ii. 136 sq. On the fame of the School of Laon under Anselm and his brother Ralph, and on Anselm's glosses on scripture, see the authorities cited by Poole, *Illustrations of Medieval Thought*, pp. 112, 135 n. Anselm's authorship of the *glossa interlinearia* found in medieval Bibles cannot be literally accepted, although his glosses, e.g. of the Pauline Epistles, largely influenced the interlinear. His glosses, in their turn influenced

especially by Remi of Auxerre, were the basis of his systematic *Sententiae* or systematic tabulation of scriptural doctrine from the patristic sources compiled by commentators in previous centuries. Hence Anselm helped to prepare the way for the Lombard. See Hans Glunz, *History of the Vulgate in England* (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 201-11, 317, &c.; cf. G. Paré, &c., *Les Écoles et l'enseignement*, pp. 231, 248-9.]

² 'Accessi igitur ad hunc senem, cui magis longaevis usus quam ingenium vel memoria nomen comparaverat. Ad quem si quis de aliqua quaestione pulsandum accederet incertus, redibat incertior.' *Hist. cal.*, c. 3. He afterwards compares him to the barren fig-tree of the Gospel.

CHAP. II. provide him with one of the usual commentaries, to begin lecturing on the most difficult book of the Bible that they might choose, the very next day. They pitched upon the book of Ezekiel. Abelard fulfilled his promise. The attempt was at first regarded as a mere piece of braggadocio, but after a few lectures, the reports of those who came attracted a large audience, and Abelard became almost as formidable a rival to Anselm as he had been to William of Champeaux. Abelard had, however, 'incepted' or begun to teach in defiance of all established custom without any authorization; and he was compelled to give up lecturing in Laon.

Abelard
at Paris.

He returned to Paris, and was now allowed to lecture without interruption as a duly authorized master in the schools of Notre Dame; and his fame as a theologian soon equalled that which he had won in earlier days as a philosopher. Abelard had reached the zenith of his glory; and now began his rapid and terrible downfall—a moral downfall which prepared the way for his undeserved persecutions, and gave some colour to the arguments of men to whom that spirit of rationalism which Abelard represented seemed a direct inspiration of the Evil One. It is, however, surprising how little his treacherous crime seems to have shocked the men who professed such a holy horror of his theological enormities.¹ The tragic story of Abelard—of his connexion with his pupil Heloise and the terrible revenge by which it was terminated—is too well known to need repetition, and does not directly concern us here. Nor need we follow the pathetic story of the quarrels with his abbot as a monk of S. Denis—where the whole convent was roused to fury against him by his denial of their founder's identity with Dionysius the companion of S. Paul—of his hermit life near Nogent at the oratory of the Paraclete built for him with their own hands by his faithful disciples, of his troubled career as abbot of the poor, remote and unruly Breton monastery of S. Gildas de Rhuys, of his half-imprisonment, half-retirement at Cluny. This part of his life belongs rather to the general ecclesiastical history of the

¹ [He is, however, reproached with the incident by Roscellinus (Cousin, *Petri Abailardi Opera*, ii. 801.)]

time than to the history of universities. All through his later years S. Bernard was preaching a crusade against him: he was almost as much done to death by S. Bernard as if he had died at the stake.¹ CHAP. II.

It is unnecessary for us to estimate the exact extent of Abelard's heresy. As has been already pointed out, nominalism had become associated in Berengar with the denial of transubstantiation, and in Roscellinus with heretical views of the Holy Trinity. As to the Eucharist, Abelard's position amounted to a somewhat mystical form of transubstantiation;² but comparatively little was made of this point against him. From the tritheism of Roscellinus he most emphatically dissociated himself: Roscellinus, indeed, was one of his accusers at the Council of Soissons. His teaching on the Trinity is not essentially different from the doctrine of the 'Master of the Sentences' solemnly affirmed by a general council: in its general tone and spirit it is substantially (certain metaphysical technicalities apart) the teaching of S. Thomas Aquinas.³ One of the passages to which most

Abelard's
heresies.

¹ But see Denifle in *Archiv*, i. 595, note 1. It is probable that in Ep. 189 the Saint does not hesitate to incur the 'venial sin' of lying to accomplish the object of his pious zeal, by representing that the appeal to the Holy See was made after the condemnation; whereas from his own statement it appears that it was before. Cf. Rémusat, i. 223. [The order of the proceedings at Sens is too obscure to warrant this judgement. See Poole, *Illustrations*, ed. 2, p. 143 note, and the bibliographical notes in Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles*, v. i. 754 and *passim*.]

² If we may trust the so-called *Epitome Theologiae Christianae* as containing Abelard's teaching, though probably not his work (*Opera*, ed. Cousin, ii. 578). See also the 'Capitula errorum' in Bernard (*Patrol. Lat.* clxxxii. 1052). Large extracts from Walter of S. Victor's

polemic against Abelard are printed by Bulaeus (ii. 404).

³ The explanation of the 'tres personae' as 'tres proprietates', i.e. Potentia, Sapientia, and Bonitas or (as Aquinas said) Amor, which together form the one 'substantia' or 'essentia' of God. The main distinction of Aquinas's position is that he recognizes 'tres substantiae' or even 'tres res' (for which poor Roscellinus suffered so much), though adhering to the one 'essentia', and admitting that 'substantia' may be used in the sense of 'essentia'. Yet Innocent III in the Lateran Council of 1215 issued a decree, permanently embodied in the canon law (Decret. Greg. IX, lib. i, tit. i, c. 2), in favour of Peter the Lombard's doctrine (attacked by the Abbot Joachim) that the three Persons form 'una substantia, essentia, ac natura divina', and even 'una res'.

CHAP. II. exception was taken at Soissons turned out, on further inspection, to be a citation from S. Augustine himself. The charge of Sabellianism at one council is sufficiently refuted by the charge of Arianism founded upon precisely the same expressions at another. What may perhaps be thought his most indefensible heresy, the doctrine known as nihilianism, which may be construed into an obscuration of the real humanity of Christ, was shared by his disciple Peter the Lombard, the 'Master of the Sentences', the author of the accredited medieval text-book of theology.¹ His view of redemption, one of his most damnable heresies in the eyes of S. Bernard, was partly shared by no less a person than S. Anselm.² Twice Abelard was condemned; the first time in 1121 at the Synod of Soissons,³ afterwards by the Prelates

¹ Alexander III directed the Archbishop of Sens to condemn certain propositions of the Lombard, among others the doctrine of nihilianism, i.e. the 'quod Christus secundum quod est homo non est aliquid' (Bulaeus, ii. 403; *Chartul. Univ. Paris.*, Introd., No. 3. Cf. *Sententiarum*, lib. iii, dist. 10). Again, in 1177 the Archbishop of Reims is directed to condemn the doctrine, 'convocatis magistris scholarum Parisiensium et Remensium et aliarum circumpositarum civitatum' (*Chartul.*, Introd., No. 9). The Pope had once taught the doctrine himself (Denifle, *Archiv*, i. 617). The historical explanation of nihilianism is that it was a reaction from the 'adoptionism' of a preceding age. Though the medieval Church formally repudiated the Lombard's teaching, the Christology of both medieval and modern Churches received from this time an Apollinarian taint from which they have never completely emancipated themselves. This was, however, due far more to the turn given to the doctrine by the Lombard than to the much more rational form which it assumes in Abelard. See the valuable chapter in Dorner,

Hist. of the Development of the Doct. of the Person of Christ, Eng. trans. by Simon, div. 2, vol. i, p. 309 sq.

² His denial that the death of Christ was a price paid to the Devil for the redemption of man from his just dominion (though Anselm held a theory of satisfaction which Abelard rejects). Cf. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, i, c. vii. (*Patrol. Lat.* clviii. 367 sq.), with Bernard, *ibid.* clxxxii. 1063 sq. For the theological teaching of Abelard see Deutsch, p. 192 sq. [Also C. C. J. Webb, *Studies in the History of Natural Theology* (Oxford, 1915); H. Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (London, 1919); and the elaborate essay of J. Cottaux in the *Revue d'hist. ecclésiastique*, xxviii (1932), 247-95, 788-828.]

³ The actual work condemned on this occasion, the *Tractatus de unitate et trinitate divina*, was discovered and edited by Dr. Remigius Stölzle of Würzburg (Freiburg i. B. 1891); the *Theologia Christiana* is now seen to be a revised form of this treatise with a few highly significant omissions and much amplification, especially in the way of apology.

of France—aroused against him by his indefatigable enemy S. Bernard—at Sens in 1141.¹ On the first occasion Abelard had to submit to the humiliation of burning his book with his own hands, and was imprisoned in a monastery; on the second, after the condemnation had been confirmed by the Pope, he was again sentenced to imprisonment in a monastery, though upon the intercession of Peter the Venerable, the good Abbot of Cluny, he was allowed a more honourable retirement in that illustrious house.

In the estimation of men like Bernard and Norbert, the real grievance against Abelard was not this or that particular error, but the whole tone, spirit, and method of his theological teaching.² He had presumed to endeavour to understand, to explain the mystery of the Trinity: he had dared to bring all things in heaven and earth to the test of reason.³ For his conservative opponents that was heresy enough: to accept the doctrines of the Church because they were rational was hardly less offensive than to reject them as irrational. The well-known story of the proceedings at Sens, when drowsy bishops woke up from their slumbers at each pause of the reader's voice to mutter 'namus', 'namus'⁴ against theological positions which they were incapable of understanding, has become the typical illustration of the methods by which

His rationalism the real cause of offence.

¹ Not 1140, as has been shown by Deutsch in his pamphlet *Die Synode von Sens 1141*, Berlin, 1880, p. 50 sq.; though Vacandard defends 1140 (*Rev. des ques. hist.*, vol. I, 1891, p. 235).

² Cf. the words of S. Bernard: 'Irridetur simplicium fides, eviscerantur arcana Dei, quaestiones de altissimis rebus temerarie ventilantur, insultatur Patribus, quod eas magis sopiendas quam solvendas censuerint.' (Ep. 188, *Patrol. Lat.* clxxxii. 353.) And again: 'Nihil videt per speculum et in aenigmate, sed facie ad faciem omnia intuetur.' (Ep. 192, *ibid.*, c. 358.)

³ Bernard, *Opera*, *ibid.* clxxxii. 359 sq., 539 sq.

⁴ 'Inter haec sonat lector, stertit

auditor. Alius cubito innititur, ut det oculis suis somnum, alius super molle cervical dormitionem palpebris suis molitur, alius super genua caput reclinans dormitat. Cum itaque lector in Petri satis [? scriptis] aliquod reperiret spinetum, surdis exclamabat auribus Pontificum: *Damnatis? Tunc quidam vix ad extremam syllabam expergefacti, somnolenta voce, capite pendulo, Damnamus, aiebant. Alii vero damnantium tumultu excitati, decapitata prima syllaba, namus inquit.*' Berengarius Scholasticus, *Apologeticus pro magistro*, ap. Bulaeum, ii. 183; Abael. *Opp.* ii. 773, 774. The writer is of course a partisan.

CHAP. II. an intolerant ecclesiastical imbecility has sometimes endeavoured to stifle theological inquiry. But the Council of Sens was no fair representative even of the Church of the twelfth century. It is evident that the intellect of the age was with Abelard; and the heresy of one generation became the orthodoxy of the next.

Abelard and the Lombard. It is from one point of view little more than an accident that the odour of heresy still cleaves to the name of Abelard, while Peter the Lombard lived to be Bishop of Paris, to be consulted by a Pope on a question of theology, and to see his 'Sentences' already becoming the very canon of orthodoxy for all succeeding ages. Not only had the Lombard shared Abelard's most serious deviation from Catholic teaching: he had adopted from his persecuted master that dialectical treatment of theology—that system of fully and freely stating difficulties before attempting their solution—which had given so much umbrage to Bernard and the obscurantists. By opponents of the next generation, such as Walter of S. Victor, Peter the Lombard is classed with Abelard and two other victims of Bernard's theological malice among the 'sophists' and enemies of the faith—the four 'Labyrinths' of France.¹ So far, it was the principle soon to be embodied in the University of Paris which was condemned at Soissons and which triumphed when the new university became recognized as the first school of the Church, and its most illustrious teachers as Saints and accredited 'Doctors of the Church'. From another point of view we must pronounce that the estimate which orthodox opinion has formed of the relative position of Abelard and the Lombard is amply justified. From this point of view Abelard was a confessor in a losing cause. In Abelard we must recognize incomparably the greatest intellect of the Middle Ages, one of the great minds which mark a period in the world's intellectual history:

¹ Walter of S. Victor wrote a treatise 'Contra manifestas et damnatas etiam in conciliis haereses, quas Sophistae Abelardus, Lombardus, Petrus Pictavinus, et Gilbertus Porretanus libris Sententiarum suarum acunt, limant, roborant'; in which he declares them, 'dum ineffabilia Trinitatis et Incarnationis scholastica levitate tractarent, multas haereses olim vomuisse.' Bulaeus, ii. 402. Cf. p. 200.

rum suarum acunt, limant, roborant'; in which he declares them, 'dum ineffabilia Trinitatis et Incarnationis scholastica levitate tractarent, multas haereses olim vomuisse.' Bulaeus, ii. 402. Cf. p. 200.

in the Lombard we descend from the mountain to the plain. CHAP. II. Not only did the nominalism of which Abelard was the champion long remain under the ban of the Church, but the spirit of free inquiry, for the moment associated with nominalism, was crushed with it. Abelard, a Christian thinker to the very heart's core (however irredeemable the selfishness and overweening vanity of his youth), was at the same time the representative of the principle of free, though reverent, inquiry in matters of religion and individual loyalty to truth. To say that Abelard anticipated the spirit of Protestant theology would be scant praise. He was not of course altogether exempt from the traditionalism of his age: still at times a note of criticism may be discerned in his methods of exegetical and historical discussion.¹ And on such subjects as the Holy Trinity, the Atonement,² and the doctrine of Grace, we should have to come down to very recent times indeed for more enlightened attempts at the philosophical presentation of Christian doctrine.

Peter the Lombard inherited the form but not the spirit of Abelard's theological methods.³ The attempt to appeal Peter the Lombard.

¹ The whole principle of sixteenth-century Protestantism is contained in the declaration that the 'ecclesiastici doctores' are to be read 'non cum credendi necessitate, sed cum iudicandi libertate'—a principle which he does not extend to the canonical scriptures, though even there he recognizes (with Jerome) the possibility that 'aut codex mendosus est, aut interpret erravit'. *Sic et Non* (*Civ. inéd.*, p. 14). [On the other hand, Abelard was not alone in the view that some authorities had more weight than others, and that the authority of Scripture was supreme. Cf. for the previous period G. Robert, *Les Écoles et l'enseignement de la théologie* (1909), pp. 155, 161-6. On the authority of the fathers see Glunz, *op. cit.*, *passim*.]

² I cannot forbear to quote one of the 'blasphemies' against which

Bernard exhausts the resources of his pious scurrility: 'Puto ergo quod consilium et causa incarnationis fuit, ut mundum luce suae sapientiae illuminaret, et ad amorem suum accenderet.' Bernard, *Opera, Patrol. Lat.* clxxxii. 1050, 1051). For the Saint's reply see *ibid.*, c. 1062 sq.

³ [In several respects Rashdall unduly emphasized the unique quality of Abelard. In the first place his rationalism was by no means so far-reaching as is here represented. Like S. Anselm he regarded reason as the servant of faith. See especially Poole's correction from Balliol College MS. 296 of Cousin's text of the *Introductio ad theologiam* (*Illustrations of Med. Thought*, 2nd ed., 1920, p. 180 note, and on the main issue, pp. 138-41). Cf. Gilson, *Études*, pp. 20-7, and especially Cottaux in

CHAP. II. from recent tradition to the ancient Fathers, and from the ancient Fathers to Scripture and to reason, is abandoned. With the Master of the Sentences scholasticism ceases to wear the aspect of a revolt against authority. There remains, indeed, a deep conviction of the necessity for a rationalization of Christian doctrine, and the method of boldly stating and attempting to answer the most formidable objections to received opinions; but, with the Lombard, theology returns to her earlier habit of unquestioning submission to patristic and ecclesiastical authority when once the balance of authority has been determined. It is the object of the 'Sententiae' to collect and harmonize the opinions of the Fathers upon every point of Christian theology, and to extract from their scattered and sometimes conflicting *dicta* a precise and explicit answer to every question which the dialectical activity of the age had suggested. Of the scholastic theology which henceforth expressed itself chiefly in the form of lectures and comments upon the 'Sentences', Abelard is unquestionably the father; but the child only partially reproduced the intellectual characteristics of its parent. It was from Abelard's 'Theologia' that the Lombard derived the idea of reducing theology from a chaotic literature to a philosophical system: it was in Abelard's audacious 'Sic et Non' that he found a precedent for the marshalling of argument against argument and authority against authority; but in the 'Sentences' the critical attitude of Abelard is exchanged for the more modest attempt to harmonize the apparently conflicting authorities by the aid

the essay mentioned above (p. 56 n.), e.g. p. 824, 'la théologie n'atteint que du vraisemblable, c'est-à-dire une représentation contingente de la réalité'. In the second place, the method of *Sic et Non* was not original in Abelard, whose work, here as elsewhere, was a masterly comprehension and appropriation of existing tendencies. (See below, p. 128 n.) Lastly, the intellectual life of the twelfth century, both before and after Abelard, was much more active and vigorous than Rash-

dall represents. Perhaps the most striking text is the analysis given by John of Salisbury in the *Historia Pontificalis* (ed. Poole, pp. 16-41) of the position of Gilbert of La Porrée during his conflict with S. Bernard; but the whole history of the twelfth-century renaissance, in theology as in literature and science, as elaborated in recent works, brings the great figure of Abelard into clearer relations with his time.]

of subtle distinction and ingenious inference. If (as was CHAP. II. undoubtedly the case¹) the Lombard's object was to appease the raging sea of theological speculation and disputation on which his lot was cast, he succeeded singularly ill; but the publication of the 'Sentences' did largely tend to that gradual limitation of the controversial area which accompanied the eventual triumph of the scholastic method throughout the Western Church. In the generation after Abelard, and still more emphatically in the thirteenth century, the philosophy and philosophical theology against which Bernard had arrayed all the ecclesiastical chivalry of Europe finally triumphed over the mystical or positive teaching of the monasteries. Were S. Bernard at this moment to revisit the banks of the Seine, he would be nearly as much shocked at the 'solvuntur objecta' of S. Sulpice as he would be at the philosophical speculations of the now secularized Sorbonne.² But the triumph of scholasticism was a 'Cadmeian victory':

¹ See the Prologue to the *Sententiae*. [The Lombard's relation to and dependence upon his environment have been much discussed since Rashdall wrote. See especially the works of Ghellinck and Grabmann, and, for the development of the *Sententiae* on a scriptural basis, Glunz, *The Vulgate in England*. From a formal point of view the Lombard probably owed as much to Abelard's despised master, Anselm of Laon, as to Abelard himself.]

² How offensive the new theology still seemed to old-fashioned Churchmen up to the very end of the twelfth century may be judged from the letters of Stephen, Bishop of Tournai, who complains that nowadays 'discipuli solis novitibus applaudunt, et magistri glorie potius invigilant quam doctrine. Novas recentesque summulas et commentaria firmantia super theologia passim conscribunt, quibus auditores suos demulceant, detineant, decipiant, quasi nondum

suffecerint sanctorum opuscula Patrum, quos eodem spiritu sacram Scripturam legimus exposuisse, quo eam composuisse credimus apostolos et prophetas . . . Disputatur publice contra sacras constitutiones, de incomprehensibilitate; de incarnatione Verbi verbosa caro et sanguis irreverenter litigat; individua Trinitas in trivis secatur et disceperitur; ut tot iam sint errores quot doctores, tot scandala quot auditoria, tot blasphemie quot platee.' Edit. J. Desilve (1893), pp. 344, 345; *Chartul. Univ. Paris.*, Introd., No. 48. Such is the way in which orthodox and conservative Churchmen greeted the introduction of the theology now taught in every Roman Catholic seminary. Even Gregory IX in 1228 writes in much the same strain to warn the theologians of Paris 'quatinus . . . sine fermento mundane scientie doceatis theologiam puritatem, non adulterantes verbum Dei philosophorum figmentis'; *Chartul. Univ. Paris.* i, No. 59.

CHAP. II. it cost the vanquished hardly more than the victors. If the University of Paris was born of the spirit of which Abelard is the foremost representative, every increase of her material splendour and ecclesiastical importance was bought by some fresh departure from that principle of free inquiry which it is the highest function of a university to enshrine.¹

Growth
of the
Parisian
schools.

The career of Abelard at Paris just coincided with the first steps in the rapid rise to commercial and political importance of the ancient stronghold of the Counts of Paris. The military strength of the Island-city was the principal instrument in the rapid aggrandizement of the descendants of Hugh Capet. The increasing importance of the place had already (as we have seen) lent fame to its schools before the wandering Breton scholar of twenty appeared for the first time in the cloisters of Notre Dame. The renown of Abelard drew crowds of students from the remotest parts of Europe;² it is said that twenty of his pupils became cardinals and more than fifty of them bishops.³ He attracted to himself all the newborn enthusiasm for learning which was everywhere springing up, and which itself resulted from the operation of vaster forces than the genius of the greatest of its representatives. Though crowds of enthusiastic disciples followed their per-

¹ S. Bernard puts his case against Abelard in a nutshell when he says, 'Ita omnia usurpat sibi humanum ingenium, fidei nil reservans . . . et quidquid sibi non invenit pervium, id putat nihilum, credere dedignatur.' Ep. 188 *Patrol. Lat.* clxxxii. 353). In judging of Bernard's attitude towards Abelard, we must remember that, as Otto of Freising has it, the good man was 'tam ex Christianae religionis fervore zelotypus, quam ex habitudinali mansuetudine quodammodo credulus'. (*Gest. Frid.* i. 47, ap. *M.G.H., Scriptores*, xx. 376.)

² 'Roma suos tibi docendos transmittibat alumnos: . . . Anglorum turbam juvenum mare . . . non terrebat . . . Remota Britannia (probably Brittany) sua ani-

malia erudienda destinabat. Andegavenses eorum edomita feritate tibi famulabantur in suis. Pictavi, Vuscones et Hiberi; Normania, Flandria, Theutonicus et Suevius tuum calere ingenium, laudare et praedicare assidue studebat.' Letter of Fulc, Prior of Deuil, to Abelard, in Cousin, *Abailardi Opp.* i. 703, 704 (for 'calere' read 'colere').

³ *Hist. Lit.* ix. 85. [The ascendancy of Paris, as 'the centre of European thought and culture', is exaggerated in this eloquent paragraph. To say nothing of literary and scientific activity elsewhere, e.g. in Sicily, the school of Chartres was probably as influential as that of Paris for some years after the death of Abelard.]

CHAP. II. secuted master from one retreat to another—even when he sought to bury himself like an anchorite in the desert—it was at Paris that his teaching began and at Paris that his largest audiences were gathered. The stream of pilgrim scholars which set in towards Paris in the days of Abelard flowed continuously for at least a century and a half, when its volume began to be somewhat abated by the growth of daughter-universities in other parts of Europe. Had Paris been no more than a mere ecclesiastical city clustering round some ancient sanctuary, the fame which Abelard had won for its schools might have passed away like the scholastic fame of Tours or of Chartres. But the process was already beginning by which the successors of the Counts of Paris were to become the real Kings of France; and one of the effects of this movement was to make Paris incomparably the greatest and most important city of Transalpine Europe. This increase of political and commercial importance had a decisive influence in constituting the city the permanent head-quarters of the movement which Abelard had inaugurated. The university, the corporation of masters (as we have so often to remark), existed as yet hardly even in germ; but from the days of Abelard Paris was as decidedly the centre of European thought and culture as Athens in the days of Pericles, or Florence in the days of Lorenzo de' Medici.

In order to understand the character of that mighty stirring of the human spirit which Abelard represents, it is essential to form as accurate a conception as possible of the nature and subject-matter of the teaching which awakened so much enthusiasm. There is the broadest distinction between the culture of the twelfth century and the culture of the thirteenth century. Though the former period was the epoch of the highest or at all events of the most varied intellectual activity which the schools of the Middle Ages ever knew, the greater part of the books which were to absorb all the energies of the universities for the three following centuries were not yet known in Western Christendom. The Renaissance of the twelfth century began, like the more brilliant but not more real Renaissance of the fifteenth, with a revived interest in a

Character
of the
twelfth-
century
Renaissance.

CHAP. II. literature which had never passed into total oblivion: like that later Renaissance, it culminated in the rediscovery of a literature which had been practically lost, or at least buried, for centuries. Abelard belongs to the first half of this movement. Of the works of Aristotle he knew little more than had been known to Alcuin or Erigena.¹ It was not till the generation after Abelard that the whole of the *Organon*, in old or new translations, was generally known in northern Europe.² By the time of John of Salisbury, the new logic (as it was called) took the foremost place among the acknowledged text-books of the schools. Abelard concentrated his attention upon the old question of the schools—the question of the reality of universals. And on this subject he did little more than continue with more moderation and more common sense the polemic inaugurated by Roscellinus against the crudities of a realism which understood the Aristotelian doctrine of the priority of the universal as a priority in order of time.³ He may be said to have formulated the position which in modern times would be described as conceptualism, though in the Middle Ages this position was always looked upon as a form of nominalism. This teaching had the stimulating effect of all teaching which clears away time-honoured cobwebs, however little the reformer may discern the truth which lies buried beneath the rubbish. And with

Abelard's
logical
position.

¹ See above, p. 37, n. 2.

² [The new logic was known to Thierry of Chartres and Otto of Freising. Gilbert of La Porrée, a rather close contemporary of Abelard, refers to the *Prior Analytics*, as Abelard does. It is probable that the version of Boethius was rediscovered and in general use, in spite of the translations of James of Venice (c. 1128). On the whole subject see the important paper of Haskins, 'Versions of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics' in *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science*, pp. 223-41.]

³ His logical position is fairly expressed by the following sentences: 'Clarum itaque ex supradictis arbi-

tror esse, res aliquas non esse ea, quae a propositionibus dicuntur . . . Non itaque propositiones res aliquas designant simpliciter quemadmodum nomina. Imo qualiter sese ad invicem habeant, utrum scilicet sibi convenient annon, proponunt . . . ; et est profecto ita in re, sicut dicit vera propositio, sed non est res aliqua, quod dicit; unde quasi quidam rerum modus habendi se per propositiones exprimitur, non res aliqua designantur' (*Dialect. ap. Œuv. inéd.*, p. 245). 'Aliud enim in nomine Socratis quam in nomine hominis vel caeteris intelligitur; sed non est alia res unius nominis quod Socrati inhaeret quam alterius' (*ibid.*, p. 248).

[62] THE TWELFTH-CENTURY RENAISSANCE 65
the cobwebs in which the older dialecticians had been im- CHAP. II.
meshed there disappeared also the caution and timidity which, since the time of Erigena, had characterized their attitude towards theology. The weapon of dialectic was now freely applied to the problem of revealed as well as of natural religion: the boundaries which had hitherto divided philosophy and theology were broken down: the sovereignty of reason was proclaimed.

But it was not only as the clear-headed logician, the bold and independent moral philosopher,¹ and the daring theologian that Abelard cast such a spell over the student of his generation. Anticipating the sixteenth century in his advocacy of the rights of private judgement, Abelard (though less than some of his contemporaries) anticipated it also in his enthusiasm for the study of classical literature. He was at least one, if not the most prominent, of the little band of scholars who imparted fresh vigour to the teaching of grammar as well as to philosophy and theology. Though he was not (as has sometimes been supposed) a Greek scholar, Virgil and Ovid, Seneca and parts of Cicero were as familiar to him as Boethius and Augustine; and even the great classical law-texts were included among the subjects which divided the attention of this many-sided teacher.² Abelard was an orator and a stylist as well as a logician and dialectical theologian; and, even on the subjects of the old

His many-
sidedness.

¹ The *Scito te ipsum* is an original treatise on moral philosophy, more valuable and interesting perhaps than anything which the Middle Ages produced after the recovery of the Nicomachean Ethics.

² When and where Abelard appeared in the character of a teacher of law we do not know, but the traditional story about him in this capacity by Odofredus is, except in the different sequel of the boast, so exactly parallel to the story of his relations to Anselm of Laon that it may conveniently be given here. Odofredus remarks, *Com. in Cod.* iii, tit. 39, l. 5 (Lugd. 1550, iii, f.

184 b): 'In lege ista . . . fuit deceptus quidam qui magnus philosophus putabatur: et dicitur quod fuit quidam qui vocabatur magister Petrus Baiardi . . . et valde deridebat legistas, et iactabat se quod nulla lex esset in corpore iure (*sic*) quantumcunque esset difficilis in litera quin in ea poneret casum et de ea traheret sanum intellectum. Unde una die fuit sibi ostensa a quodam ista lex, et tunc ipse dixit: Nescio quid velit dicere ista lex, unde derisus fuit.' I owe the reference to Chiappelli, *Lo Studio Bolognese*, p. 82.

CHAP. II. traditional curriculum, his lectures no doubt owed their popularity as much to the attractiveness of the manner¹ as to the novelty of the matter.

Breadth of twelfth-century studies. There was no one among Abelard's immediate successors who united the same variety of gifts to the same extraordinary charm of voice and manner; but there is hardly any period in the history of the schools of France when so many famous masters were teaching at the same time, and certainly no period in which their teaching extended over so varied a field as in the middle of the twelfth century. The subsequent predominance of an all-absorbing scholasticism has almost thrown into oblivion the fact that for about half a century classical Latin was taught—not merely to young boys, but to advanced students—with almost as much thoroughness in at least one school of medieval France, as it was afterwards taught in the universities of the Reformation, or in the Jesuit colleges of the Counter-reformation.

Studies of John of Salisbury. The Englishman, John of Salisbury, has left us a full and complete account of his education in France between 1137 and 1149.² He is indeed the typical scholar of the period. In those days there was no regular curriculum of studies. Scholars wandered from school to school, and from subject to subject, at their pleasure. They were no more bound to spend a fixed number of years upon any one branch of knowledge than the students at Rhodes or at Athens in the days of Cicero. John of Salisbury's studies extended over a period of twelve years, though during part of the time he was engaged in teaching privately as well as in attending the public lectures of eminent masters. First he went

¹ Cf. the words of Heloise: 'Duo autem . . . tibi specialiter in-erant, quibus feminarum quarumlibet animos statim allicere poterat; dictandi videlicet et cantandi gratia; quae caeteros minime philosophos assecutos esse novimus.' Abael. Ep. 2, *Opera*, i. 76. Abelard's Latin hymns are printed in *loc. cit.*, p. 295, and he appears also to have composed vernacular songs. Another side of Abelard as a lecturer

is brought out by Otto of Freising: 'Inde magistrum induens Parisius venit, plurimum in inventionum subtilitate non solum ad philosophiam necessarium, sed et pro commovendis ad iocos hominum animis utilium valens.' *De Gestis Frid.* i. 48 (*M.G.H., Scriptores*, xx. 377).

² *Metalogicon*, ii. 10 (ed. Webb, pp. 77-83).

to Paris, and applied himself to the study of logic. Abelard had just managed to escape from his uncongenial retreat at S. Gildas, and had resumed his lectures at Ste Geneviève, where for a short time John was able to sit at his feet. The departure of Abelard (S. Bernard was no doubt upon his track) compelled him to fall back upon the teaching of the orthodox realistic dialecticians, Alberic of Reims and Robert of Melun, the last an Englishman and afterwards Bishop of Hereford. After two years he left Paris, and spent three years under the famous 'grammarian' William of Conches, at Chartres. At Chartres too he went on to the *Quadrivium* under the learned Richard l'Evêque, and (at a later date) studied both dialectic and theology under Gilbert of La Porrée, the first logician of the day, afterwards Bishop of Poitiers, 'the one man whom saint Bernard of Clairvaux unsuccessfully charged with heresy'.¹ Afterwards he returned to Paris, and heard theology under Robert Pullus and Simon of Poissy. The order and varieties of these studies present the strongest contrast to the fashions of the next century, with its strict distinction of 'faculties' and invariable succession of studies, which reduced 'grammar' to a mere schoolboy preparation for dialectic, and practically compelled the student to abandon for ever each subject in the course when he had heard the regulation lectures upon it.

Among these varied studies what really interested our author most were the classical, or, as they were then called, grammatical lectures. He has left us a very full and highly interesting account of the teaching of William of Conches.²

Twelfth-century humanism: Method of Bernard of Chartres.

¹ Poole, p. 133. [For William of Conches and his predecessor, Bernard of Chartres (who is to be distinguished from Bernard Silvester), see Poole, 'The Masters of the Schools at Paris and Chartres in John of Salisbury's Time' (*English Hist. Rev.* xxxv. 1920, 321-42); also his *Illustrations*, ed. 2, ch. iv; and the works of Clerval, G. Robert, Haskins, &c. William's encyclopaedic interests are brought out by Duhem, and by Thorndike,

History of Magic and Experimental Science, ii. 50 sqq. On the range of classical authors known in the twelfth century and the attitude to humanism, see, besides Haskins, the prolegomena to C. C. J. Webb's edition of the *Policraticus*, § 5, and Robert's interesting book, especially in the new edition, as re-written by G. Paré, &c.]

² *Metalogicon*, i. 24 (ed. Webb, pp. 53-8). [Clerval (p. 225) has given a good summary of the

CHAP. II. This teacher followed a method invented by his master, Bernard of Chartres, and based on the recommendations of Quintilian, a method which bears a striking resemblance to that most thoroughgoing application of the principle of classical education which gained such a marvellous popularity in later days for the schools of the Jesuits. The lectures (or at least the course of reading recommended) covered pretty well the whole field of classical Latin.¹ After questions on parsing, scansion, construction, and the grammatical figures or 'oratorical tropes' illustrated in the passage read, the lecturer noticed the 'varieties of phraseology' occurring therein, and pointed out the 'different ways in which this or that may be expressed'—in short subjected the whole diction of the author to an elaborate and exhaustive analysis with the view of stamping it upon the memory of his audience. He then proceeded to comment on or explain the subject-matter,

chapter, and brings out the distinction between the evening lesson, in which the real teaching was done, and the morning résumé and repetition. The *declinatio* or exposition was followed, in this evening exercise, by the *collatio* or conference, which was to have a great future. For both see especially Robert, pp. 50-61. Robert argues from John of Salisbury's studies that the masters in the schools had, both in grammar and in logic, an elementary and also an advanced class.] The whole chapter in the *Metalogicon* throws a most interesting light on the schools of the period—would that we had an equally full and graphic account of the schools of any later period in the Middle Ages!

¹ Peter of Blois, Archdeacon of Bath, John of Salisbury's pupil, tells us that he read 'praeter caeteros libros qui celebres sunt in scholis', 'Trogus Pompeius, Josephus (translated), Suetonius, Hegesippus, Q. Curtius, Cornelius Tacitus, and T. Livius, besides the Latin poets. (Ep. 101, *Patrol. Lat.* ccvii. 314;

Chartul. Univ. Paris. Introd., No. 25. This list, however, seems to be taken from John of Salisbury, *Policraticus*, viii. 18, ed. Webb, ii. 364, who does not explicitly say that he had read them, and must be looked upon with some suspicion, since John makes Suetonius and Tranquillus into two distinct authors.) The only modern author whom John's pupils were encouraged to read was Hildebert of Lavardin, Bishop of Le Mans (1096-1125), Archbishop of Tours (1125-33). 'Profuit mihi quod Epistolas Hildeberti Cenomanensis Episcopi styli elegantia et suavi urbanitate praecipuas firmare et corde tenus reddere adolescentulus compellebar.' Peter of Blois, *loc. cit.* The compliment seems to be well merited and supplies another illustration of the classical taste of Abelard's generation. (See his *Epp.* ap. *Patrol. Lat.* clxxi. 141 sq.) [On Hildebert in general see A. Dieudonné, *Hildebert de Lavardin*, Paris, 1898, and Manitius, iii. 853 sq. and *passim*.]

enlarging upon any incidental allusions to physical science or any ethical questions touched on by the author. The next morning the pupils were required, under the severest penalties, to repeat what they had been taught on the preceding day; and there was daily practice in Latin prose and verse composition in imitation of specified classical models, and frequent conversation or discussion among the pupils on a given subject, with a view to the acquisition of fluency and elegance of diction.

The Latinity of the great writers of this intermediate period—of Abelard's letters, and still more of Hildebert of Tours, and John of Salisbury—though Latin was to them too much of a living language to permit of a dilettante Ciceronianism, was often more classical than the Latinity of the African Fathers. A revival of serious study had raised their style out of the barbarism of ignorance; and even in their logical and philosophical writings it was as yet but little disfigured by the barbarism of the new scholastic terminology. A combination of circumstances narrowed the culture and the education of the succeeding age. Even in the heyday of the twelfth-century Renaissance, the humanists (if one may so call them) were in a minority, just as they were in the days of Erasmus and Reuchlin. John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon* was largely written to vindicate the claims of 'grammar' or humane letters. His writings are full of lamentation over the prevailing passion for frivolous, subtle, and sophistical disputation. Fully as he appreciated the value of logic as an instrument of education, he recognized, as his contemporaries for the most part did not recognize, the intellectual barrenness of logical training for minds ignorant of everything besides logic.¹ All his reflections on education—which may be almost said to amount to a treatise on the subject—imply that he is the advocate of a losing cause. The humanists of the sixteenth century had a battle to fight,

¹ 'Expertus itaque sum, quod sterilis, nec ad fructum philosophiae liquido colligi potest, quia, sicut dialectica alias expedit disciplinas, sic, si sola fuerit, jacet exsanguis et fecundat animam, si aliunde non concipit.' *Metalogicon*, ii. 10 (ed. Webb, pp. 82, 83).

CHAP. II. but the opposing cause was then no longer intellectually formidable; the world was sick of syllogisms. In the twelfth century the scholastic philosophy was in its vigorous youth; a majority of the best intellects of the age were devoted to its pursuit; the humanists themselves were philosophers too. The revived classicism of that day was not crushed by an opposing obscurantism such as vainly attempted to resist the humanism of the Reformation period; it was simply crowded out in the 'conflict of studies'.

The new Aristotle. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, in consequence of the opening up of communications with the East—through intercourse with the Moors in Spain, through the conquest of Constantinople, through the Crusades, through the travels of enterprising scholars—the whole of the works of Aristotle were gradually making their way into the Western world. Some became known in translations direct from the Greek: more in Latin versions of older Syriac or Arabic translations. And now the authority which Aristotle had long enjoyed as a logician—nay, it may almost be said the authority of logic itself—communicated itself in a manner to all that he wrote. Aristotle was accepted as a well-nigh final authority upon metaphysics, upon moral philosophy, and with far more disastrous results upon natural science. The awakened intellect of Europe busied itself with expounding, analysing, and debating the new treasures unfolded before its eyes, and the classics dropped again, for the mass of students whose readings was bounded by the prescribed curriculum of the universities, into the obscurity from which they had for a brief period emerged. Not only did bad translations of a writer whom the best translator would perhaps have found it impossible to clothe in a dress of elegant Latinity take the foremost place in education, but the eagerness to drink of what seemed the fountain of all wisdom, and to reach the more and more coveted honours of the mastership in arts or philosophy, reduced to a minimum the time that could be bestowed upon the mere acquisition of the language. As soon as the student had learnt the rules of grammar and the vocabulary of the conversa-

Decadence
of classical
studies.

CHAP. II. tional Latin in ordinary use, he hastened to acquire the subtle but unliterary jargon which would enable him to hold his own in the arena of the schools.¹ The humanists who wrote towards the close of the twelfth century are full of complaints at the increasing neglect of grammatical and historical training and the undisciplined rawness of the young philosophers. At times, indeed, their chief grievance is that the study of law is destroying all liberal education. This last tendency the discovery of the new Aristotle at the beginning of the thirteenth century did something to arrest, but the fresh vigour thus imparted to speculation only added to the growing contempt for classical study and for all literature as such. For the attainment of the mastership in the liberal arts, logic and philosophy were the essential requisites; and at that early period in the history of the examination-system it was soon found that the establishment of a prescribed curriculum of studies and the offer of a premium to those who pursue it is fatal to all subjects excluded therefrom.

The new Aristotle in fact proved simply so much additional fuel thrown upon the all-consuming dialectical fire of

The new
Aristotle:
gain and
loss.

¹ 'Sufficiebat ad uictoriam uerbosus clamor; et qui undecumque aliquid inferebat, ad propositi perueniebat metam. Poete historiographi habebantur infames, et si quis incumbere laboribus antiquorum, notabatur, et non modo asello Archadie tardior, sed obtusior plumbo uel lapide, omnibus erat in risum. Suis enim aut magistri sui quisque incumbere inuentis. Nec hoc tamen diu licitum, cum ipsi auditores in breui coerrantium impetu urgerentur, ut et ipsi, sprete his que a doctoribus suis audierant, cuderent et conderent nouas sectas. Fiebant ergo summi repente philosophi; nam qui illiteratus accesserat, fere non morabatur in scolis ulterius quam eo curriculo temporis, quo auium pulli plumescunt. Itaque recentes magistri e scolis . . . sicut pari tempore morabantur, sic pariter auolabant. . . . Solam "con-

uenientiam" siue "rationem" loquebantur. . . . Impossibile credebatur "conuenienter" et ad "rationis" normam dicere quicquam, aut facere, nisi "conuenientia" et "rationis" mentio expressim esset inserta. Sed nec argumentum fieri licitum, nisi praemisso nomine argumenti. Ex arte et de arte agere idem erat.' John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, i. 3 (ed. Webb, pp. 11, 12). Cf. the extremely interesting preface to the *Speculum Ecclesiae* of Giraldus Cambrensis (written c. 1220, in old age), ed. Brewer, *Opera*, iv, 1873, p. 3 sq.; for Wood's account of the un mutilated passage (*Hist. and Antiq. Univ. Oxon.*, i. 56) see below, p. 293 n. [On the Sophists and Utilitarians or Cornificians, attacked by John of Salisbury, see Robert, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-76.]

CHAP. II. the philosophical schools. While it enormously widened the range of study, it did nothing to improve its method. The psychology, the metaphysics, and the theology which the enlarged Aristotle of the thirteenth century made possible was certainly a more nutritious intellectual diet than the mere endless, purposeless logic-chopping which John of Salisbury had denounced. It must not be too hastily assumed that Europe would have gained more from an earlier Renaissance than it gained from the scholasticism of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But advance in one direction had to be bought by retrogression in another. Freshness, originality, style, culture, solidity—such as we find in the great writers of the twelfth century—all these were crushed beneath the dead weight of a semi-authoritative literature of barbaric translations. A comparison of John of Salisbury's account of his education in the first half of the twelfth century with the earliest university statute at the beginning of the next century enables us to trace the startling rapidity of this decline in literary culture.¹ Grammar is prescribed as one of the subjects of examination, but grammar is represented solely by the works of Priscian and Donatus. Rhetoric receives hardly more than a complimentary recognition: the classics are not taken up at all. The student's whole attention is concentrated upon logic and Aristotle. Boys in grammar schools might still learn their grammar by construing Ovid or 'Cato',² but henceforth the poets, the historians, the orators of ancient Rome were considered unworthy of the attention of ripe students of fourteen or sixteen in the university schools.³

¹ Bulaeus, iii. 82; *Chartul.* i, No. 20.

² The work commonly styled 'Dionysii Catonis Disticha de moribus ad filium', a work of unknown origin which served as the universal Delectus of the Middle Ages. [See Manitius, iii. 713 and Index; Haskins, *Studies in Mediaeval Science*, p. 317 and note.]

³ [The most significant contri-

butions to this difficult subject are L. J. Paetow's *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with special reference to Grammar and Rhetoric* (Champaign, Illinois, 1910); and his edition of 'Two Medieval Satires on the University of Paris', *La Bataille des VII ars of Henri d'Andeli, and the Morale Scola-rium of John of Garland* (Berkeley, California, 1927). Paetow, while

he shows that academic protests were raised, agrees on the whole with Rashdall's view. John Garland's protest (1241) against the *Doctrinale* and the *Grecismus* (see below, p. 443) is especially important. It should be mentioned, on the other hand, that the exclusion of the classics from the arts course and the inclusion of the new works on grammar, &c., do not prove that the love and study of the classics which undoubtedly continued in the thirteenth century were not fostered by members of the university. Apart from the evidence which comes from Orleans and Toulouse, it is impossible to suppose that the classical learning of the

time was maintained without some guidance from the masters in the schools. This subject, which Rashdall had to neglect, still awaits adequate treatment. The reader will find general guidance in E. Faral, *Les Arts poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1923), E. K. Rand, 'The Classics in the Thirteenth Century' (*Speculum*, iv (1929), 249-69), and B. L. Ullman, 'A project for a new edition of Vincent of Beauvais' (*ibid.* viii (1933), 312-26); cf. also Ullman's papers 'Classical Authors in Mediaeval Florilegia', reprinted from *Classical Philology*, xxiii-vii (1928-32).]