

Second, the word 'thing' is a technical term for Abelard, Scotus, and Ockham, and so is not available to the translator to serve as a neutral "fill"-word. The same goes for 'entity', which in the text from Scotus appears to mean not just anything that is a reality but rather what anything that is a reality *does*. (See S (34).) In the translation of their texts, I have avoided these terms except where (a) they are explicitly present in the Latin, (b) the context makes it plain that their technical use in the translation does not distort the overall sense, or else (c) where the context is obviously not a technical one at all, and there is no danger of the terms' being taken in a wrong sense. (I have been less scrupulous in the texts of Porphyry and Boethius, where the words are not such technical terms.) For "fill"-words, I have had to resort to 'item', 'factor', 'feature', and the like. For example, "really distinct through some features intrinsic to them." The result is sometimes less than graceful. On the other hand, the words 'something', 'everything', 'nothing', etc., should be regarded as neutral terms that do *not* imply "thing" in the technical sense.

'Differ' likewise has a technical sense, particularly in the later texts. Items that differ agree in some higher genus. To "differ" is not the same as being "diverse"; the categories are diverse from one another, but do not differ from one another since they are the highest genera. I have observed this terminological convention throughout, except in passages where the terms are obviously not being used rigorously. See P (39)-(41).

I have not found a satisfactory translation for '*fictum*' as used by Ockham. 'Fiction' implies falsehood, which is not always appropriate. So does 'figment', which also has the disadvantage of meaning an *impossible* object for Ockham (*e. g.*, a vacuum). 'Contrivance' and 'fabrication', while they convey the right idea, are simply too fancy for regular use. I have resolved just to leave '*fictum*' untranslated in Ockham's text, and to let its meaning be fixed by the context. For the verb '*fingere*', the root of '*fictum*', I have generally used 'to contrive' or 'to fashion'. Readers should be aware of this etymological connection when they see 'contrive' or 'fashion' in the context of the *fictum*-theory.

'*Ratio*' is a notorious problem. I have not tried to translate it consistently on all occurrences, and have used 'reason', 'notion', 'aspect', or other words as seemed best for the occasion.

Finally, I have translated forms of '*plures*' as 'several' (*i. e.*, two or more) and of '*multi*' as 'many'. The reader should not take 'several' as implying a great number. ('A plurality of, although correct for '*plures*', was too awkward for regular use.)

Porphyry the Phoenician, the Pupil of Plotinus of Lycopolis

Isagoge

(1) Since, Chrysaorius,¹ to teach about Aristotle's *Categories* it is necessary to know what genus and difference are, as well as species, property, and accident, and since reflection on these things is useful for giving definitions, and in general for matters pertaining to division and demonstration, therefore I shall give you a brief account and shall try in a few words, as in the manner of an introduction, to go over what our elders said about these things. I shall abstain from deeper enquiries and aim, as appropriate, at the simpler ones.

(2) For example, I shall beg off saying anything about (a) whether genera and species are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone, (b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and (c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. Such business is profound, and requires another, greater investigation. Instead I shall now try to show you how the ancients, the Peripatetics among them most of all, interpreted genus and species and the other matters before us in a more logical fashion.

On genus

(3) It seems that neither 'genus' nor 'species' is said in a single sense. For (a) the collection of things related somehow to one thing and to one another is called a "genus." In accordance with this meaning, the Heraclids are called a genus because of their being derived from one person—that is to say, from Heracles²—and because of the multitude of people who somehow have a kinship to one another derived from him and are called by a name that separates them from other genera.

(4) (b) In another sense too the origin of each person's birth, whether the one who begot him or the place in which he was born, is called his "genus." For in this way we say that Orestes has his genus from Tantalus, but Hyllus

1. A Roman senator and student of Porphyry's.

2. One sense of the Greek *genos* is "race, descendant of."

from Heracles, and again that Pindar is Theban by genus, but Plato Athenian.³ For the country is a kind of origin of each person's birth, just as his father is.

(5) This latter sense of the word seems to be a common one. For those who come down from the race of Heracles are called Heraclids,⁴ and those from Cecrops, together with their kin, are called Cecropids.⁵

(6) The origin of each person's birth was above called a "genus," and after these the multitude of things that come from one origin, like the Heraclids. Dividing that group off and separating them from others, we said the whole collection of Heraclids is a genus.

(7) (c) In yet another way, that to which a species is subordinated is called a "genus." Perhaps this is said because of the similarity with the former senses. For such a genus is also a kind of *origin* for the things under it, and seems also to *include* the whole multitude contained under it.

(8) Now although 'genus' is said in these three ways, discussion among philosophers concerns the third. They describe this sense and set it out by saying that a genus is what is predicated, with respect to what the thing is, of several things differing in species. For example, animal. For among predicates, some are said of one thing only, for example individuals like 'Socrates', and 'he' and 'this'. Others are said of several things, such as genera, species, differences, properties, and common accidents, although not accidents that are proper to something.⁶

(9) An example of genus is 'animal'; an example of species, 'man'; an example of difference, 'rational'; an example of property, 'risible'; examples of accident, 'white', 'black', 'sitting'.

(10) Genera then differ from what are predicable of one thing only, since genera are given as being predicated of several. Again, among what are predicable of several, genera differ from species because species, even though they are predicated of several, are yet not predicated of what differ in species but only in number. For 'man', which is a species, is predicated of Socrates and Plato, who do not differ from one another in species but only in number.

3. In these last two examples, *genos* might be translated "stock."

4. The same example was used to illustrate sense (a). But the point is not the same. In sense (a) it is the Heraclids, descended from Heracles, who together make up the genus. In sense (b) it is Heracles himself, who is the origin or genus of the Heraclids. See also (6).

5. *I. e.*, Athenians. Legend had it that the first king of Athens was a certain Cecrops.

6. For example the common accident blackness, but not *this instance* of blackness possessed by this black thing.

But 'animal', which is a genus, is predicated of man and ox and horse, which differ from one another also in species, not just in number.

(11) Again, genus differs from property because property is predicated of only the one species it is the property of and of the individuals under the species, as 'risible' is predicated only of man and of particular men. But genus is predicated not only of one species but of several differing species.

(12) Again, genus differs from difference and from common accidents because even though differences and common accidents are predicated of several things differing in species, yet they are not predicated with respect to what the thing is. For when we ask about the respect in which these are predicated, we say they are predicated not with respect to *what* the thing is but rather with respect to what manner of thing it is. For to the question *what manner* of thing a man is, we say "rational." And to the question what manner of thing a crow is, we say "black." (Rational is a difference, and black an accident.) But when we are asked what a man is, we answer "animal." (The genus of man was animal.)

(13) So the fact that genus is said of many things distinguishes it from individuals, which are predicated of one alone, while its being predicated of what differ in species distinguishes genus from what are predicated as species or as properties. And its being predicated with respect to what a thing is separates it from differences and common accidents, each of which is predicated of what it is predicated of, not with respect to what the thing is but with respect to what manner of thing it is or in what disposition.

(14) Thus the given outline of the notion of genus is neither too broad nor too narrow.

On species

(15) (a) 'Species' is said of each thing's form. As has been said: "First a species worthy of sovereignty."⁷

(16) (b) What is under a given genus is also called a species. In this sense we usually call man a species of animal (animal being the genus), white a species of color, and triangle a species of figure.

(17) Now if in giving an account of the genus we mentioned the species—by saying "predicated with respect to what the thing is, of several things differing in species"—and we call "species" what is under the given genus, then we must acknowledge that since both genus is the genus of

7. Euripides, *Aeolus* 15. 2. 'Species' in this sense refers to a thing's physical shape.

something and species is the species of something, each of the other, both must be used in the definitions of both.

(18) Therefore, they give the following account of species: (c) Species is what is arranged under the genus and is what the genus is predicated of with respect to what the thing is.

(19) Again: (d) Species is what is predicated, with respect to what the thing is, of several things differing in number.

(20) The last account is of the most specific species and of what is only a species, whereas the others [(a)-(c)] are also of species that are not most specific ones.

(21) This statement can be clarified as follows: In each category some things are most general and again others most specific, and yet others are between the most general and the most specific. The most general is that above which there is no other genus that transcends it. The most specific is that after which there is no other, subordinate species. What are between the most general and the most specific are all the others. These, the same things, are both genera and species, taken in relation to one or the other.⁸

(22) Let us clarify the above statement for just one category.⁹ Substance itself is a genus. Under this is body, and under body animate body, under which animal, under animal rational animal, under which man. Under man are Socrates and Plato and the particular men.

(23) Of these, substance is the most general and the one that is only a genus. Man is the most specific and the one that is only a species. Body is a species of substance but a genus of animate body. Animate body is a species of body but a genus of animal. Again, animal is a species of animate body but a genus of rational animal. Rational animal is a species of animal but a genus of man. Now man is a species of rational animal, but no longer a genus—of particular men. Instead it is a species only. Everything prior to individuals and predicated immediately of them is a species only, no longer a genus.

(24) Therefore, just as substance, being the highest, was a most general genus because there is nothing prior to it, so too man, being a species after which there is no species or any of what can be cut up into species, but only individuals (for Socrates and Plato and this white thing are individuals), is a species only, both the last species and, as we say, the "most specific."

(25) What are in between are species of what is prior to them, but genera

8. I. e., a species in relation to the most general genus, a genus in relation to the most specific species.

9. The rest of paragraph (22) contains the so-called "Porphyrian tree."

of

hierarchy
L. to S.

Porphyrian tree
substance
genus

X is defined. Context: taxonomic hierarchy

of what comes after. Thus they stand in two relations, (a) the one to things prior to them, in virtue of which relation they are said to be species of those things, and (b) the other to things after them, in virtue of which relation they are said to be genera of those things.

(26) The two extremes each have one relation only. For the most general genus has (b) the relation to things under it, since it is the highest genus of them all. But it no longer has (a) the relation to things prior to itself, since it is highest, both as the first origin and, as we said, that above which there is no other genus that transcends it.

(27) The most specific species also has one relation only, (a) the one to things prior to itself, of which it is a species. But it does not have the other relation, (b) to things after it, even though it is called a species of individuals. Rather it is called a species of individuals because it includes them, and again it is called a species of what are prior to it because it is included by them.

(28) Thus they define the most general genus as (i) that which, although it is a genus, is not a species, and again, as (ii) that above which there is no other genus that transcends it. The most specific species they define as (i) that which, although it is a species, is not a genus, and (ii) that which, although it is a species, we cannot divide further into species, and as (iii) that which is predicated, with respect to what the thing is, of several things differing in number.

(29) What are between the two extremes they call "subordinate" genera and species. Each of them they hold to be both a genus and a species, taken in relation to the one extreme or the other. The genera prior to the most specific species, going up to the most general genus, are called both species and subordinate genera. For example, Agamemnon, from Atreus, from Pelops, from Tantalus, and in the end from Zeus. Now as for genealogies, they lead up to one thing—to Zeus, let us say—to the origin in most cases. But with genera and species this is not so. For being, as Aristotle says, [Metaphysics III. 3, 998^b22], is not one common genus of all things; neither are all things "homogeneous" in accordance with one highest genus.

(30) Instead let us posit the ten first genera as ten first principles, as in the Categories. If then one calls all things "beings," he will do so equivocally, Aristotle says, but not univocally. For if being were one genus common to all, all things would be called "beings" univocally. But since there are instead ten first genera, the community among them is in name only, not at all in a definition that goes with that name.

(31) Therefore, the most general genera are ten. The most specific species are of a certain number too, surely not infinite. But individuals, which come after the most specific species, are infinite. That is why Plato exhorts us

X of things proper to each as all is cut qualitatively. I guess I open a bit of sub. The rest of of for more cuts are related in a complex structure

outs

[*Philebus*, 16c–18d, *Politicus*, 262a–c] to stop after going down from the most general to the most specific, to go down through the intermediary levels and to divide by differences. He tells us to leave the infinite [individuals] alone. For there is no knowledge of them. *infinita in se!*

(32) So in going down to the most specific species we must proceed by division through a multitude. But in going up to the most general genera we must gather the multitude into one. For species (and genus even more) is a combination of many things into one nature. By contrast particulars and singulars always divide the one into a multitude. The many men are one by participation in the species, but the one common man, the species, is made several by its individuals. For the individual is always divisive, but what is common combines and unites.

(33) Now given what each of genus and species is, and given that whereas the genus is one the species are several (for the division of a genus is always into several species), the genus is always predicated of the species, and all the higher things are predicated of those beneath them. But the species is predicated neither of the genus immediately above it nor of higher ones. For it does not go both ways. Either equals must be predicated of equals, like hinnibility* of horses, or else greater of lessers, like animal of man. But lessers are never predicated of greater. For you must never say animal is a man, as you may say man is an animal.

(34) Whatever the species is predicated of, the genus of that species will of necessity be predicated of them too, and the genus of the genus, on up to the most general genus. For if it is true to say Socrates is a man, man an animal, animal a substance, then it is also true to say Socrates is an animal and a substance. *ACB ⇒ XCB*

(35) Thus since the higher are always predicated of the lower, the species will be predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual, and the most general genus both of the genus or genera—if there are several, intermediary subordinate genera—and also of the species and of the individual. For the most general genus is said of all the genera and species and individuals under it, while the genus prior to the most specific species is said of all the most specific species and of individuals, and what is only a species is said of all the individuals. But the individual is said of only one of the particulars.

(36) Socrates is called an individual, and so is this white thing and the one who is approaching, the son of Sophroniscus (if Socrates is his only son). Such things are called individuals because each of them consists of characteristics the collection of which can never be the same for anything else. For the characteristics of Socrates cannot be the same for any other particular.

But the characteristics of man—I mean, of man in general—are the same for several things, or rather for *all* particular men insofar as they are men.

(37) The individual then is included under the species and the species under the genus. For the genus is a kind of whole and the individual a part while the species is both a whole and a part, although a part of one thing and the whole not of another thing but rather *in* other things. For the whole is in the parts.

(38) Therefore, we have discussed genus and species, what most general genus is, what most specific species are, which genera are the same as species, what individuals are, and in how many ways 'genus' and 'species' are said.

On difference

(39) 'Difference' is said broadly, properly, and most properly. In the broad sense one thing is said to "differ" from another when it is distinguished in any way by an otherness, either from itself or from something else. For Socrates is said to differ from Plato by an otherness. And he is said to differ from himself as a child and as a grown man, as doing something or as having stopped doing it. Indeed, he always differs from himself in such othernesses of disposition.

(40) In the proper sense one thing is said to "differ" from another when the one differs from the other by an inseparable accident. An inseparable accident is, for example, greenness of the eyes, hookedness of the nose, or a hardened scar from a wound.

(41) In the most proper sense one thing is said to "differ" from another when it is distinguished by a specific difference. For example, man is distinguished from horse by a specific difference: the quality rational.

(42) In general, every difference when added to something varies it. But differences in the broad and the proper senses only make it otherwise, whereas differences in the most proper sense make it other.¹⁰ For some differences

10. Socrates as a child is "otherwise" than he is as a grown man, but he is "other" than a horse. In the former case numerical identity is preserved; in the latter it is not. But there is more involved. In virtue of the rest of (42), it is clear that by 'other' Porphyry here means *interspecific* differentiation, not *intraspecific* differentiation. The latter appears to have been overlooked in (42), although it was explicitly included in (39) as an example of "difference" in the broad sense. In (42), the contrast seems to be between specific difference ("other") on the one hand, and merely accidental differences that do not affect a thing's individuality ("otherwise") on the other. Numerical difference is not discussed.

make a thing otherwise, while others make it other. The ones that make it other are called "specific" differences, whereas those that make a thing otherwise are called just "differences." For when the difference "irrational" comes to animal, it makes it other. But the difference "being moved" makes a thing only otherwise than resting. Hence the former makes it other; the latter only makes it otherwise. It is in accordance with the differences that make a thing other that there arise the divisions of genera into species, and that definitions are given, since definitions are made up of a genus and such differences. But it is in accordance with differences that only make a thing otherwise that mere othernesses and changes of disposition arise.

(43) So beginning again from the top, we must say that among differences some are separable and others inseparable. Being moved and resting, being healthy and being ill, and any differences like these, are separable, whereas being green-eyed, or snub-nosed, or rational or irrational are inseparable.

(44) Among inseparable differences some belong by themselves, some by accident. Rational belongs by itself to man, and mortal and being capable of knowing do too. But being hook-nosed or snub-nosed belongs by accident and not by itself.

(45) Differences that belong by themselves are included in the definition of the substance and make the thing other, but those that belong by accident are not included in the definition of the substance. Neither do they make the thing other, but rather otherwise. Those that belong by themselves do not admit of more and less, but those that belong by accident, even if they are inseparable, acquire an intension and remission.* The genus is not predicated more and less of whatever it is a genus of, and neither are the differences of the genus, by which it is divided. For these differences are what complete the definition of each, and the being of each thing is one and does not admit of either a remission or an intension. But being hook-nosed or snub-nosed, or being colored in such and such a way, are intended and remitted.

(46) Thus we have seen three species of "difference." Some are (a) separable, while some are inseparable. Again of the inseparable ones some are (b) by themselves and others (c) by accident. Again among differences by themselves there are some in accordance with which we divide genera into species, and some in accordance with which the divided genera are "specified."¹¹ For instance, given that all the differences that belong to animal

11. *I. e.*, made into species. The distinction here is between "constitutive" and "divisive" differences. In the formula *species = genus + difference*, the difference is a "constitutive" difference of the species but a "divisive" difference of the genus. The most general genera have only "divisive" differences, while the most specific species have only "constitutive" differences. All other genera and species have both.

* separable in nature or itself? do not here, I think.

by themselves are: animate and sensate, rational and irrational, mortal and immortal, the difference "animate and sensate" is constitutive of the substance animal (for animal is animate, sensate substance), but the difference "mortal and immortal," and the difference "rational and irrational" are divisive differences of animal (for we divide genera into species by means of them).

(47) These divisive differences of the genera are completing and constituting differences of the species. For animal is partitioned both by the difference rational and irrational, and again by the difference mortal and immortal. The differences mortal and rational are constitutive of man, while the differences rational and immortal are constitutive of god,¹² and the differences irrational and mortal are constitutive of irrational animals. So too, since the difference animate and inanimate and the difference sensate and insensate are divisive of the highest substance, therefore the differences animate and sensate, taken together with substance, complete the genus animal, whereas the differences animate and insensate complete the genus plant. Thus while the same differences taken one way are constitutive and in another way are divisive, they are all called "specific" differences.

(48) The main usefulness of these inseparable differences that belong by themselves—but not of inseparable differences that belong by accident, and still less of separable differences—is for the divisions of genera and for definitions.

(49) They define differences by saying: Difference is that by which the species surpasses the genus. For man has more than animal: he also has rational and mortal. Animal is not *none* of these, since if it were, where would the species get their differences? But neither does animal have them all, since then the same thing will have opposites at the same time. Rather, as they think, it *potentially* has all the differences of things under it but none of them *actually*. In this way, neither does anything come from non-beings nor will opposites belong to the same thing at the same time.

(50) They also define it like this: Difference is what is predicated, with respect to what manner of thing each is, of several things differing in species. For rational and mortal, when predicated of man, are said with respect to what manner of thing man is, not with respect to *what* he is. If we are asked what man is, it is proper to say "an animal." But when we inquire what manner of animal, the proper reply we shall give is "a rational and mortal one." *i.e. out of genus?*

(51) Just as things consist of matter and form, or have a structure analogous to matter and form—for instance a statue is made up of matter (the bronze)

12. Not God (with a capital 'G'). Porphyry was a pagan and a polytheist.

and form (the shape)—so too the specific man in common consists of an analogue of matter (the genus) and of form (the difference). The whole, rational-mortal-animal, is man—just as for the statue.

(52) They also describe such differences as follows: Difference is what naturally separates what are under the same genus. For rational and irrational divide man from horse, which are under the same genus animal.

(53) They describe them also like this: Difference is that by which each thing differs. For man and horse do not differ according to genus, for both we and the irrational animals are mortal animals. But when rational is added, it divides us from them. Both we and the gods are rational, but when mortal is added it divides us from them.

(54) In working through the facts about difference, they do not say difference is just anything that separates things under the same genus, but rather whichever of such factors contributes to the being of such a thing, and what is a part of what the thing was to be. The aptitude for sailing is not a difference of man even if it is a property of man. For we might say some animals have an aptitude for sailing whereas others do not, and we might separate the former from the others. But the aptitude for sailing does not contribute to completing the substance, and is not a part of that substance, but only a "fitness" of it for sailing, since it is not like what are properly called "specific" differences. Specific differences then are the ones that make another species and the ones taken up into what a thing was to be.

(55) So much then about difference.

On property

(56) They divide property in four ways: (a) What belongs accidentally (i) to one species only, even if not to all of it, as practicing medicine or doing geometry does to man. (b) What belongs accidentally (ii) to all of a species, even if not to it alone, as being a biped does to man. (c) What belongs (ii) to all of a species and (i) to it alone and at the same time, as growing grey-haired in old age does to man. (d) The fourth kind of property: that in which belonging (i) to only one species, (ii) to all of it, and (iii) always, all go together, as risibility does to man. For even if he is not always laughing he is nevertheless called "risible," not because he always is laughing but because he has an aptitude for laughing. This aptitude always belongs to him innately, as hinnibility does to a horse. They say that these are properties in the strict sense, because it goes both ways: If a horse then hinnibility, and if hinnibility then a horse.

On accident

(57) Accident is what comes and goes without the destruction of the substrate. It is divided into two kinds. One kind of accident is separable and the other is inseparable. Thus sleeping is a separable accident, whereas being black is an inseparable accident of the crow and the Ethiopian. Nevertheless a white crow and an Ethiopian who has lost his color can be conceived without the destruction of the substrate.

(58) They also define accident as follows: Accident is what admits of belonging or not belonging to the same thing, or what is neither a genus nor a difference nor a species nor a property, but always has its reality in a substrate.

(59) All the proposed terms have been defined—that is to say, genus, species, difference, property, and accident. We must now say what common features belong to them, and what are the properties of each.

On the community among the five words

(60) Being predicated of several things is common to all of them. But genus is predicated of species and of individuals, and so is difference, whereas species is predicated only of the individuals under it. Property is predicated of the species it is the property of, and of the individuals under the species. Accident is predicated of species and of individuals.

(61) For animal is predicated of horses and oxen, which are species, and of this horse and this ox, which are individuals. Irrational is predicated of horses and oxen, and of particulars. A species, such as man, is predicated of particulars only. A property, such as risibility, is predicated both of man and of particular men. Black, which is an inseparable accident, is predicated of the species of crows and of the particulars, whereas being moved, which is a separable accident, is predicated of man and of horse—primarily of the individuals, and in a secondary sense of the species that include the individuals.

On the community between genus and difference

(62) Including species is common to genus and difference. For the difference also includes species, even if not all that genera do. Rational, even though it does not include irrational things as animal does, nevertheless includes man and god, which are species.

* here separately in the text, a Hylt note:
in soul: 1st sep in Hylt, then not.]

(63) Whatever is predicated of a genus as genus is also predicated of the species under that genus, while whatever is predicated of a difference as difference will also be predicated of the species arising from that difference. For substance and animate are predicated of the genus animal as a genus, but they are also predicated of all the species under animal, down even to individuals. And since rational is a difference, being possessed of reason is predicated of rational as a difference. But being possessed of reason will be predicated not only of rational but also of the species under rational.

(64) It is also a common feature that when either the genus or the difference is destroyed, the things under it are destroyed too. For just as if there is no animal there is no horse or man, so too if rational does not exist there will be no animal possessed of reason.

On the difference between genus and difference

(65) It is a property of genus to be predicated of more things than difference, species, property and accident are. For animal is predicated of man, horse, bird, and snake, but quadruped is predicated only of those animals that have four feet, while man is predicated only of individuals, hinnibility only of horse and of particular horses, and accident likewise is predicated of fewer things than animal is. One must here take difference in the sense of the ones by which the genus is partitioned, not the ones that complete the substance of the genus. Again, the genus includes the difference potentially; for animal: rational and irrational.

(66) Again, genera are prior to the differences under them, because the former destroy the latter along with themselves, but are not destroyed along with the latter. For if animal is destroyed, rational and irrational are destroyed along with it. But differences never destroy the genus along with themselves. For even if all its differences were destroyed, animate sensate substance is still conceived, and that was the genus.

(67) Again, genus is predicated with respect to what the thing is, whereas difference is predicated with respect to what manner of thing it is, as has been said [(12)].

(68) Again, for each species there is one genus, like animal for man. But there are several differences, like rational, mortal, receptive of intellect, and knowledge, which divide [man] from the other animals.

(69) Also genus is like matter while difference is like form.

(70) Although there are still other common features and properties of genus and species, let these suffice.

On the community between genus and species

(71) Genus and species, as has been said [(60)], have in common being predicated of several things. (Let us here take species as species only, not also as genus, if the same thing should be both species and genus.) It is also common to them to be prior to what they are predicated of, and for each of them to be a certain whole.

On the difference between genus and species

(72) They differ in that the genus contains the species, while the species are contained by and do not contain the genera. For the genus covers more than the species does.

(73) Again, genera must be posited in advance and, when informed by specific differences, complete the species. Hence genera are prior by nature. Also, they destroy the species along with themselves, but are not destroyed along with the species. If there is a species there is certainly the genus, but if there is a genus it by no means follows that there is the species.

(74) Genera are also predicated univocally of the species under them, but species are never predicated of the genera.

(75) Again, genera surpass species by including the species under themselves, while species by their differences surpass genera.

(76) Again, neither could a species become a most general genus nor could a genus become a most specific species.

On the community between genus and property

(77) It is a common feature of genus and property that they follow from species. For if man then animal, and if man then risible.

(78) Also, the genus is predicated equally of its species, and the property is predicated equally of the individuals that share in it. For man and ox are equally animal, and Anytus and Meletus are equally risible.

(79) It is also a common feature to be predicated univocally, genus of its species, and property of the things it is a property of.

On the difference between genus and property

(80) They differ because genus is prior, while property is posterior. For animal must first be, and only then be divided by its differences and properties.

(81) Genus is predicated of several species, but property only of the one species it is a property of.

(82) Property is predicated reciprocally of the species it is the property of, but genus is not predicated reciprocally of anything. For it does not follow: If animal then man, or if animal then risible. But if man then risible, and conversely.

(83) Again, a property belongs to the whole species it is a property of, and only and always to that. But a genus, while it belongs to the whole species it is a genus of, and always so belongs, nevertheless does not also belong *only* to that.

(84) Again, when properties are destroyed they do not destroy the genera along with them, whereas when genera are destroyed the species the properties belong to are destroyed along with the genera, with the result that when the species the properties belong to are destroyed, the properties themselves are destroyed along with them.

On the community between genus and accident

(85) It is a common feature of genus and accident, whether separable or inseparable, to be predicated of several things, as has been said [(60)]. For being moved is predicated of several things, and black is predicated of crows, Ethiopians, and some inanimate things.

On the difference between genus and accident

(86) Genus differs from accident because genus is prior to the species, whereas accidents are posterior to the species. For even if we take an inseparable accident, nevertheless what it is accidental to is prior to the accident itself.

(87) Also, the participants in a genus participate equally, while participants in an accident do not participate equally. For participation in accidents admits of intension and remission, while participation in genera never does.

(88) Accidents have their reality primarily in individuals, but genera and species are by nature prior to individual substances.

(89) Genera are also predicated of the things under them with respect to what the thing is, while accidents are predicated with respect to what manner of thing each is, or how it is disposed. For when asked "What manner of thing is the Ethiopian?" you will say "Black." And when asked "How is Socrates disposed?" you will say he is sitting or walking.

(90) We have said how genus differs from the other four. But it happens

that each of the others also differs from the other four. Thus since there are five, each one of which differs from the other four, four times five, [it would seem that] all the differences add up to twenty.

(91) But this is not so. Rather, since when things are counted in sequence those in the second place have one difference less, because one difference has already been counted, while those in third place have two differences less, those in fourth place three, those in fifth place four, therefore all the differences add up to ten: four plus three plus two plus one. For genus differs from difference and species and property and accident; the differences therefore are four. Now it was already said how difference differs from genus, when it was said how genus differs from it [(65)–(69)]. But it remains to be said how it differs from species and property and accident; they add up to three. Again it has already been said¹³ how species differs from difference, when it has been said how difference differs from species. And it was already said how species differs from genus, when it was said how genus differs from species [(72)–(76)]. Thus it remains to be said how it differs from property and accident; and these differences therefore are two. How property differs from accident is still to be counted. For it has already been said¹⁴ how it differs from species and difference and genus, in the explanation of their difference with respect to it.

(92) Therefore, taking the four differences of genus with respect to the others, the three of difference, the two of species, and the one of property with respect to accident, all of them together will be ten, of which we have already explained four, the ones that are the differences of genus with respect to the others.

On the community between difference and species

(93) It is common to difference and species to be participated equally. For particular men participate equally both in man and in the difference rational. It is also common to them to be always present in what participate in them. For Socrates is always rational and Socrates is always a man.

On the difference between species and difference

(94) It is a property of difference to be predicated with respect to what manner of thing its subject is, while species is predicated with respect to

13. That is, it *will* have already been said. See (94)–(97).

14. Again, it *will* already have been said in the case of species (109)–(112) and difference (100)–(101). For genus, see (80)–(84).

what the thing is. For even if man should be taken [sometimes] as a manner of thing, it is not absolutely a manner of thing, but only insofar as differences added to the genus give man its reality.¹⁵

(95) Again, the difference is often observed in several species, as having four feet is observed in a great many animals differing in species. But species is only in the individuals under that species.

(96) Again, difference is prior to the species made in accordance with it. For when rational is destroyed it destroys man along with it. But when man is destroyed it does not destroy rational, since there is still god.

(97) Again, difference is put together with another difference. For rational and mortal are put together to make man a reality. But species is not put together with species so that another species results. For a certain horse breeds with a certain ass and generates a mule. But horse simply joined to ass would never yield mule.

On the community between difference and property

(98) Difference and property have as a common feature being participated equally by their participants. For rational things are all equally rational, and risible things risible.

(99) Also, being present always and in the whole species is common to them both. For even if a biped is maimed, nevertheless 'always' is said with respect to its being naturally apt [to have two feet], as [man] also has "being always risible" because of a natural aptitude, not because he is always laughing.

On the difference between property and difference

(100) It is a property of difference that it frequently is said of several species, as rational is said both of god and of man. But property is said only of the one species it is a property of.

(101) Also, difference follows from the things it is a difference of, but it does not go both ways. Properties however are predicated reciprocally of the things they are properties of, because it does go both ways in that case.

15. The term 'man' expresses *what* Socrates is. But it may in a sense also be said to express what *manner* of animal we are talking about: a rational and mortal one. From the point of view of the genus the species expresses what manner of thing is involved, but from the point of view of the individual it expresses *what* the thing is.

On the community between difference and accident

(102) It is common to difference and accident to be said of several things while it is common to difference in relation to inseparable accidents to be present always and in the whole species. For biped is always present in crows, and black likewise.

On the properties of difference and accident

(103) They differ in that the difference includes but is not included. Rational includes man. Accidents however in one way include because they are in several things, but in another way they are included because their substrates admit not just of one accident but of several.

(104) Also, difference is not increased or decreased, whereas accidents admit of more and less.

(105) Also, opposite differences are not mixed with one another, opposite accidents can mix together.

(106) Such then are the common features and the peculiarities of difference with respect to the others.

(107) How species differs from genus and difference was explained in what we said about how genus differs from the others [(72)–(76)] and about how difference differs from the others [(94)–(97)].

On the community between species and property

(108) It is common to species and property to be predicated reciprocally of one another. For if man then risible, and if risible then man. It has been said already that risible is to be taken from the natural aptitude to laugh [(56), (99)]. For species are equally in their participants, and properties are equally in the things they are properties of.

On the difference between species and property

(109) Species differs from property because a species can be the genus of other things, but a property cannot be a property of other things.

(110) Also, species has its reality prior to property, while property follows after species. For man must exist in order to be risible.

(111) Again, species is always actually present in the substrate, but property is sometimes present only potentially. For Socrates is always actually a man, but he is not always laughing, even if he is always naturally apt to be risible.

(112) Again, what have different definitions are themselves different. Now the definition of species is: being under the genus and being predicated, with respect to what the thing is, of several things differing in number, and whatever other such definitions there are. But the definition of property is to be present always and only in the species and in the whole of it.

On the community between species and accident

(113) It is common to species and accident to be predicated of several things. But there are few other common features, because accident and what it is accidental to are distinguished from one another in the highest degree.

On the difference between them

(114) The properties of each are: of species, to be predicated, with respect to what the thing is, of what it is a species of; of accident, to be predicated with respect to what manner of thing the subject is, or how it is disposed.

(115) Also, each substance participates in one species but in several accidents, both separable and inseparable.

(116) Also, species are conceived before accidents are, even if they are inseparable ones. (For the substrate has to exist in order for anything to be accidental to it.) But accidents naturally arise later and have an adventitious nature.

(117) Also, participation in the species is equal, but participation in an accident is not equal even if it is an inseparable accident. For one Ethiopian might have a color either remitted or intended with respect to blackness more than another Ethiopian does.

(118) It remains now to speak about property and accident. For it has already been explained how property differed from species [(109)–(112)], difference [(100)–(101)], and genus [(80)–(84)].

On the community between property and inseparable accident

(119) It is common to property and to inseparable accident that without them what they are observed in have no reality. For just as man has no reality without risible, so the Ethiopian would have no reality without black.

(120) Also, just as property is present in the whole species and always, so too is inseparable accident.

On the difference between them

(121) But they differ because property is present in only one species, risible in man, while inseparable accident, for instance black, is present only in the Ethiopian but also in crow and coal and ebony and certain other things. Therefore, property is predicated reciprocally of what it is a property of and is equally a property of all its participants, whereas inseparable accident is not predicated reciprocally.

(122) Also, participation in properties is equal, but one participation in accidents is more and another is less.

(123) There are other common features too, as well as peculiarities, of the things discussed above, but these are enough for distinguishing among them and for displaying the common features.