Copyright 2002 The Times-Picayune Publishing Company
The Times-Picayune (New Orleans)
June 23, 2002 Sunday
SECTION: NATIONAL; Pg. J12
LENGTH: 2863 words
HEADLINE: Evolving danger;
Experts know we face a greater threat from hurricanes than previously suspected.
But because the land is sinking and the coastline is disappearing, scientists
can't say just how vulnerable we are.
BYLINE: By John McQuaid and Mark Schleifstein; Staff writers
BODY:
The New Orleans area's last line of defense against hurricane
flooding is a 475-mile-long system of levees, locks, sea walls and floodgates
averaging about 16 feet high. The Army Corps of Engineers says the system will
protect the city and suburbs from a Category 3 hurricane that pushes in enough
seawater to raise Lake Pontchartrain 11.5 feet above sea level -- high over the
head of anyone standing on the other side of a levee.
That margin of error is critical because a storm that pushes the lake any higher
can force water over the top of the levees and inundate the city. The water
could quickly rise 20 feet or higher. People would drown, possibly in great
numbers.
The corps doesn't know what that safety margin is anymore. Generally speaking,
the corps says the powerful, slow-moving storms capable of overwhelming the
system are rare and the levees are safe. But corps engineers say their own
safety estimates are out of date, and an independent analysis done for The
Times-Picayune suggests some levees may provide less protection than the corps
maintains.
The corps' original levee specifications are based on calculations made in the
early 1960s using the low-tech tools of the day -- manual calculators, pencils
and slide rules -- and may never have been exactly right, corps officials say.
Even if they were, corps officials and outside scientists say levees may provide
less protection today than they were designed for because subsidence and coastal
erosion have altered the landscape on which they were built.
Experts dispute corps' estimates
According to the rough statistical analysis done by engineering consultant Lee
Butler, the risk of levee overtopping in some areas -- St. Bernard Parish,
eastern New Orleans and the Lower 9th Ward -- may actually be
close to double what the corps once thought it was. The corps disputes Butler's
numbers but has no current alternative figures.
The agency is undertaking a new study to reassess the level of protection and
another to determine whether the levees need to be raised still higher.
Measuring the risks of disaster is a technical feat that few understand. But
such exercises are critical to the future of New Orleans. If
the new corps study confirms that protection is less than previously thought,
the answers could have major effects on issues such as flood
insurance rates, future levee expansions, emergency planning, evacuation and
long-term business decisions.
Thanks to its low, flat profile and its location on the Gulf of Mexico, south
Louisiana is more at risk from a major natural disaster than most other places
in the country. The risk of a catastrophic levee-topping flood
in New Orleans is roughly comparable to the risk of a major
earthquake in Los Angeles. Because of coastal erosion and subsidence, that risk
is growing.
But judging that risk and how to protect against it can be difficult. Recent
experience tends to confirm the idea that catastrophic hurricane floods
are rare. Even if a powerful hurricane comes close to New Orleans,
only certain storm tracks could flood all or part of the city
and suburbs. Twelve storms rated Category 3 and above have hit the Louisiana
coast in the past 100 years, but only four produced major flooding in the New
Orleans area. The levee system was built largely in response to those
storms, to prevent or reduce flooding in similar events.
Analysts quantify the unthinkable
Statisticians typically define the risk that something bad will occur by
"return periods," the amount of time it takes on average for a given
event to recur. The more often something occurs, the higher the risk. For
example, many flood-protection projects are designed to shield
people from the "100-year flood," which occurs in a
given place on average every 100 years. That means that in any single year, the
risk of that occurring is 1 in a 100, or 1 percent. If the average time between floods
is 50 years, then the annual risk is double that: 1 in 50, or 2 percent.
Such statistical methods have a central role in levee design. The Corps of
Engineers' original specifications say the lakefront levees would protect the
city from a 300-year flood, defined as 11.5 feet above sea
level, not including waves that crest even higher. The levees surrounding St.
Bernard and the east side of eastern New Orleans are rated for
a 200-year flood. The hurricane levee in Lafourche Parish is
designed for a 100-year flood.
At first glance, those risks appear remote: Less than a 1-in-200 chance in a
given year sounds like pretty acceptable odds. But they actually conform to
risks that most people consider relatively common. For U.S. residents, for
example, the annual odds of being attacked with a deadly weapon are 1 in 261,
according to statistics compiled by Larry Laudan, a philosophy of science
researcher now at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, in "The
Book of Risks." The odds of someone older than 35 having a heart attack in
a single year are 1 in 77. The odds of injuring oneself on a chair or bed are 1
in 400. By contrast, the chance of dying in an auto accident in a given year is
1 in 5,000, and the chance of dying in an airplane crash, 1 in 250,000.
The risk of hurricane flooding also is much higher than for river flooding,
although the government has committed remarkable resources to protect the region
from the river. The Mississippi River levees average more than 25 feet high and
are rated for an 800-year flood. "The city is exposed to
as much as four times the risk of hurricane flooding as it is to river
flooding," said Louisiana State University engineering professor Joseph
Suhayda. "That's always been an odd issue to me. Why would the government
think that water from the lake is less dangerous than water from the river"
Scientists rely on the past
To design a hurricane-protection system, engineers must look at historical data
and try to figure out how high water will rise at certain points. Then they can
figure out how high to build the levees.
It sounds straightforward, but it is a complex challenge. Accurate hurricane
data go back only 100 to 150 years. Statistically speaking, not very many
hurricanes have hit the New Orleans area -- at least not enough
to allow a solid projection into the future.
And the recent past isn't always an accurate basis for predicting the future. A
Science magazine paper written last year by meteorologists William Gray,
Christopher Landsea and Stanley Goldenberg predicted that based on long-term
trends in sea-surface temperature, the Atlantic Ocean is entering a 10- to
40-year period of more intense hurricane activity. That means more big storms
may menace areas that are more heavily populated than during the previous such
cycle, from 1920 to 1960.
Storm surges are even harder to analyze. Flooding can vary dramatically mile by
mile, even lot by lot, depending on the storm, rainfall, land elevation, levee
heights and proximity to waterways and drainage pumps. Storm surges flowing into
Lake Pontchartrain literally slosh around, first raising water heights to the
north and west, then on the south shore. A record-setting rainfall could swell
water heights by a foot or more, something that could turn a relatively weak
storm into a killer.
Hurricane flood statistics are even spottier because scientists
often did not have the equipment positioned in enough places to measure high
water during past storms. The landscape also is changing because of coastal
erosion, sinking and even levee building. So a flood height
from the past wouldn't be the same today.
These were the challenges the corps faced in the early 1960s when it determined
most of the current levee heights around New Orleans without
computers or modern knowledge of hurricane dynamics.
Engineers wanted to prevent a repeat of the flooding that hurricanes in 1915 and
1947 had caused in the city, according to Jay Combe, the coastal engineering
chief for the New Orleans district of the corps. They needed a
single, hypothetical storm to use in the design process, something that embodied
the worst flooding conditions the area had experienced.
So they mixed and matched features of both earlier storms to devise something
called the Standard Project Hurricane. The levees would be built to protect
against that imaginary storm.
Models envision the perfect storm
Meteorologists today say the Standard Project Hurricane could not exist in
nature. It had a barometric pressure of 27.6 inches, the equivalent of a
powerful Category 4 hurricane on today's Saffir-Simpson scale. But its maximum
sustained winds were 100 mph, the equivalent of a relatively weak Category 2
hurricane. After running computer simulations in recent years, corps officials
say the Standard Project Hurricane corresponds to a fast-moving Category 3
storm.
When they tried to predict how high a storm surge their imaginary storm would
generate, engineers found the answers didn't match up with reality, Combe said.
An estimate based on a statistical analysis of real floods
showed higher storm surges were likely. So the engineers combined those two
results. They decided the levees would protect against a potential flood
of 11.5 feet above sea level. On top of that, they added several feet of
"freeboard" to block higher waves from washing over the top, along
with calibrated sloping, rocks and other features to reduce wave heights.
Combe defends the methods even while admitting that modern technology, and
perhaps changes in the landscape, make them outdated. "Given the state of
the art, the computing resources of the time, they did a crackerjack job,"
he said.
Butler basically agrees. "Those estimates are outdated, but they were very
conservative," he said.
Today, engineers can fill in many of the gaps in the hurricane and flood
data that challenged designers 40 years ago. Using computer models that
incorporate current knowledge of hurricane and flooding dynamics, they can
simulate past hurricanes in a modern landscape.
Then they can set levee heights to whatever level they find necessary. corps
engineers are using such methods to reanalyze the levee system in the agency's
new study. Butler, the engineer retained by The Times-Picayune, helped pioneer
such methods as a division chief for the corps' Waterways Experiment Station in
Vicksburg, Miss. He is now a principal partner of VeriTech Inc., an engineering
consulting firm, also in Vicksburg.
Butler estimated flood risks around New Orleans
and its neighboring suburbs.
He used historical flood information, his own modeling data and
figures from a 1996 corps modeling study. The study was not completed in part
because of disagreements between corps engineers and modelers over some results,
which the modelers say are accurate. He crunched these in a statistical program
to generate predictions of flooding at five points around the New
Orleans area and compared that with levee heights to get a rough
estimate of the risk of water coming over.
The results tend to confirm the corps' estimate of the level of protection along
the lakefront, Butler said, although he said the exact risk could not be pinned
down without more study.
He said the risks may be significantly higher than the corps maintains --
perhaps double -- on the east side along levees protecting eastern New
Orleans, the Lower 9th Ward, Arabi and Chalmette. Where the corps says
the levees protect against a 200-year flood, Butler says it's
more like a 100-year flood.
Levee heights along the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet and Intracoastal Waterway
in the area range from 17.5 to 19 feet. Butler's estimates put the 100-year flood
level at 16.3 feet above sea level, meaning waves on top of that would wash over
the top and flood areas inside.
The historical record tends to confirm these results, Butler said. "All
along the levee, there has been very high water measured there for several
storms, certainly in Betsy. If you had the right kind of storm come in there,
you'd really be in trouble."
Model's accuracy under fire
The corps agrees this is a weak spot because the area is closer and more open to
the Gulf of Mexico than Lake Pontchartrain. "Flooding from a storm coming
in on a track critical to New Orleans is more likely to occur
in these areas outside the city," Combe said. "The MR-GO levee is more
likely to be affected than the area in the lake itself."
Another reason flood heights tend to be higher there, Butler
said, is that the levees protecting eastern New Orleans and St.
Bernard converge in the shape of a V. When a storm pushes water into a narrowing
space like that, the water tends to pile up and rise higher, increasing the risk
of overtopping.
Combe and other corps officials disagree with this assessment. They have a
scientific dispute about the accuracy of the computer model both Butler and the
corps use to simulate storm surges, called AdCirc for "Advanced Circulation
Hydrodynamic Model."
corps engineers think it tends to overestimate flood heights in
some areas, especially where two levees meet at an angle, Combe said. But
computer modelers, including Butler and others, defend their results and say
they have been corroborated by historical data.
Combe suggested the model doesn't account for a flow away from the levee at the
bottom of the water column, something that would reduce the volume of water next
to the levee -- and the height.
University of Notre Dame engineer Joannes Westerink, one of the modelers Combe
hired to work on the corps' current project, said he thought this effect would
be relatively small. "Levees, land, a solid wall of buildings all cause
storm surge to build up. But there is a return current: That effect does reduce
it somewhat. . . . Is it 5 percent Is it 2 percent Is it 10 percent Our best
estimates are that it's on the low end," Westerink said.
Regardless, scientists in and out of the corps say a new study is necessary
because of advances in technology and changes in the landscape. "We have
lost acres and acres, square miles of land out there near the Gulf. So
conditions and bathymetry (water depths) are different now," Combe said.
Why has it taken the corps this long to evaluate the problem No clear
bureaucratic mandate exists for reassessing the blueprints once levees are
built. Congress appropriates money for levee construction based on corps studies
that take years to complete. Dramatic changes or reassessments typically occur
after major disasters, when political momentum generates for preventing a
repeat.
"The government sort of does things strange," Combe said. "We do
things in response to the direction of Congress and the president. Local
sponsors say we need something done here, they pass a law, the president signs
it, and we go to work. Going back later and looking at pieces of a project is
something we have to look at, and we are looking at it and doing a more
up-to-date analysis. We are in the process of redoing it. But the government
wheels grind slow."
The disagreement over the computer analysis also dragged things out. A 1996
attempt to study Lake Pontchartrain-area levees broke down over that dispute and
because of bureaucratic disagreements, according to Combe and others involved.
Meanwhile, sinking, erosion and sea-level rise mean that the odds of getting
flooded have been getting worse across south Louisiana. "The frequency of
flooding is increasing at all levels," Suhayda said. "You might find
in 50 years that the risk of these infrequent events doubled. The 50-year event
became a 25-year event, the 100-year event became a 50-year event."
'I'd get out of Dodge'
New avenues have opened for floodwaters entering the New Orleans
area. The marshes and barrier islands of St. Bernard Parish have gradually
disappeared, though not as much as in areas south of the city. As a result, more
water can flow across them and into Lake Pontchartrain faster than 40 years ago.
Since it opened in 1963, the MR-GO has eroded and widened to more than four
times its original width in some areas. It now forms a giant sluice leading
straight up to the city from the southeast, into the Intracoastal Waterway and
ultimately into Lake Pontchartrain through the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal.
Proponents of closing and filling in MRGO say it has evolved into a shotgun
pointed straight at New Orleans, should a major hurricane
approach from that angle.
In any case, scientists say they want to know what the corps study finds, in
part because they want to get a better grip on what the risks are for the sake
of the city -- and for their own peace of mind.
"I think everyone familiar with this is sitting on pins and needles because
nothing has happened in that lake for 50 to 60 years and you start to think, are
we due" Butler said. "And the answer I think is yes, statistically
you're due. And that's scary. Based on my knowledge of hurricanes, I'd watch
what happens very closely -- and I'd get out of Dodge."
. . . . . . .
John McQuaid can be reached at john.mcquaid@newhouse.com or (202) 383-7889. Mark
Schleifstein can be reached at mschleifstein@timespicayune.com or (504)
826-3327.