

Preface

This is a study of the three major aspects of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's transformation—the incorporation of new allies, the implementation of the new missions and the expansion of allied capabilities. In the past twenty years NATO has become a *sui generis* Alliance much different from its 1949 design to deter the Soviet threat during the Cold War. NATO's role in international security expanded tremendously: with almost two and a half dozen members, the Alliance successfully incorporated some of its former adversaries; it also introduced and expanded new partnerships with a number of nations across the globe. Today NATO is involved in peacekeeping, stabilization and reconstruction activities in the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, and North Africa; its military experts provide crucial training of Iraqi and Afghan security force. The successful completion of these new out-of-the-area missions required the introduction of rapid response force, multinational battalions and civil-military teams for stabilization and reconstruction. Yet, NATO's cohesiveness and unity was at stake on multiple occasions when the allies were unable to agree on common strategy or lacked capabilities to deal with the increasing challenges of certain operations. Drawing upon well established frameworks of alliance theory, this study explores NATO's missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. It carefully examines the advancement of new allied capabilities to support these missions such as joint task forces, rapid response force, various multinational battalions (such as the one for chemical, nuclear, biological and radiological defense) and force enablers. It also surveys critically the incorporation of the new members through programs like Partnership for Peace, the Membership Action Plan and various fora for multinational diplomacy and lobbying.

By introducing the concept of complementarities, the book re-evaluates the relevancy of club goods theory in the context of NATO politics. The argument holds that if NATO members successfully combine military resources, their interaction may enhance the capabilities of each ally and the alliance as a whole. Creating such an interactive synergy enables economies of scale to exist that promote efficiency for various alliance activities. It also provides a valuable blueprint on how NATO's open door policy for new members is related not only to the presence of democratic institutions at home and settlement of disputes with neighboring states, but also has direct implications for these nations' overall ability to transform and adapt their armed forces in order to meet the operational requirements of the new non-Article Five missions.

This book had its origins in my 2008 doctoral dissertation, sections of which appeared in the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* and in conference papers presented at as Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association, the Midwest Political Science Association, the European Consortium for Political Research, as well as symposia talks given at the Taft Center and Morehead State University. The study was supported by a fellowship from Charles Phelps Taft Research Center and a number of research and conference grants from the University of Cincinnati and Muskingum University. I would like to express my special thanks to Richard Harknett, Dinshaw Mistry, Andy Wolff, Joel Wolfe, Atanas Gotchev, Ryan Hendrickson, Georgi Genov, Dinko Dinkov, Dieter Dettke, Emily Goldman, Regina Karp, Steve Mockabee, Jim Masterson, Gale Mattox, Carries Jo Coaplen-Anderson and many friends, colleagues and students at Cincinnati, UNWE, Muskingum and Georgetown College, as well as the anonymous reviewers their for insightful comments and assistance that greatly enhanced this study. This book also owes intellectual debts to a select group of scholars and experts on NATO and transatlantic relations whose writings on NATO politics made my own research easier and more systematic and are extensively cited in the following pages. Finally, I thank Lenore Lautigar, Joseph Parry, Jana Wilson and Lexington Books/ Rowman and Littlefield Publishers for their assistance with the publication of this study.

Introduction

In November 2010 twenty-eight heads of state and government met in Lisbon, Portugal and adopted NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security. The new document reaffirmed that the Alliance continued to play central role in defending its members which also includes commitments to "deploy robust military forces where and when required," and to promote "common security around the globe."¹ Eighteen months earlier, President Obama praised NATO's unparalleled commitments to freedom, peace, security, and shared values at the Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl highlighting that these represent a strong down payment on the its future and "a substantial step forward in renewing our alliance to meet the challenges of our time."² Similarly, President Bush recognized in 2008 that an Alliance which never fired a shot in the Cold War today has become a central player in international security "leading the fight on a key battleground of the first war in the twenty-first century."³

NATO's metamorphosis was not that obvious in the early 1990s and few scholars and practitioners of international relations could picture the Alliance participating in key battlegrounds around the globe. For example, Kenneth Waltz, a leading neo-realist scholar of international relations, predicted that NATO would gradually fade away after the Soviet Union collapsed as new powerful nations emerged on the world stage. Waltz wrote in 1993: "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are [. . .] Once the new Germany finds its feet, it will no more want to be constrained by the United States acting through NATO than by any other state."⁴

Contrary to Waltz's prediction, NATO today is larger than ever in terms of membership, it has undertaken a number of missions around the globe, and is trained and prepared to conduct a variety of operations. From 1999 to 2009

NATO expanded its membership from sixteen to twenty-eight, incorporating most of its former adversaries in Eastern Europe.⁵ Since the mid-1990s NATO has been involved in numerous out-of-area operations, such as in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), in the Mediterranean and currently in Afghanistan and Iraq. To handle the responsibilities associated with its new missions, NATO needed new multinational capabilities. These capabilities included Joint Task Forces, rapid reaction force and various hybrid forces designed to accomplish a number of military and civilian tasks ranging from nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to peace enforcement and post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, the allies agreed to enhance their interoperability as a part of NATO's efforts to operate effectively as a single entity. President Obama recognized that "these are the new missions that NATO must take on in the 21st century and these are the new capabilities that we need to succeed."⁶

What accounts for NATO's post-Cold War transformation? How has NATO been able to integrate the new allies, missions, and capabilities? Are processes of expansion and transformation interrelated? More importantly, what measures has the Alliance taken to prepare its new allies for membership, to enhance its missions overseas, and to develop new allied capabilities; and how successful have these measures been? Finally, what internal and external forces influence the patterns of NATO's transformation? These questions are examined in this book. The latter surveys NATO's management after the end of the Cold War, thus addressing understanding multiple aspects of international security and alliance politics.

THE ARGUMENT

This book makes the case that the incorporation of new allies, the implementation of new missions, and the development of new allied capabilities between the early 1990s and late 2000s cannot be studied as separate processes. Instead, the evidence suggests that these three clearly identifiable aspects of NATO's transformation are interconnected; they correspond to the goals of the organization embedded in Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely, "to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."⁷ NATO's undertaking of new missions in support of international security after the end of the Cold War aimed at peacekeeping, conflict management, and stabilization resulted in it needing new capabilities which be-

came one of the essential components of NATO's transformation. Similarly, NATO's eastward expansion in the late 1990s and 2000s, largely driven by the United States, was intended to extend stability and security in new Europe in terms of political stability, democratic institutions and market economies. Nonetheless, the integration of the new members had broader implications—in order to join the Alliance, the applicants had to transform their armed forces and improve their limited military capabilities to enhance interoperability and develop niche capabilities.

Transforming the Club offers an explanation that rests on two foundational pillars: the club goods framework and the concept of complementarities. By focusing on the expansion of new missions and capabilities, the book shows that the latter two aspects are integral to NATO's overall transformation and tie in closely with the admission of new members, as explained by the club goods theory. Club goods theory, which builds upon the economic theories of alliances, provides a loose, yet manageable analytical framework. The theory assumes that alliances function similar to clubs, providing their members with public goods like collective defense. Clubs have several intrinsic characteristics: voluntarism (i.e., states can choose whether they want to join), sharing a certain type of common good, cost-benefit analysis, and exclusion mechanisms. Members, therefore, choose to join certain clubs because, as rational actors, they anticipate certain benefits from membership. Unlike homogeneous clubs comprising of relatively similar members in terms of structure and income level, NATO operates similar to heterogeneous clubs because its allies vary in terms of size, wealth, defense expenditure, and overall capabilities. Based on their similarities, the allies can be grouped into several comparable and relatively homogeneous groups (or sub-clubs). This helps explain how the different groups or sub-clubs are involved in various forms of intergovernmental bargaining. Such bargaining rests on three core assumptions: (a) negotiations take place within a noncoercive system of unanimous voting; (b) transaction costs of bargaining and, therefore, generating information and ideas, are lower compared to the benefits of interstate cooperation and; (c) distribution of benefits reflects the relative bargaining power of the participating nations.⁸ Successful bargaining between alliance members in most of the cases leads to an optimal outcome. As a result, allies agree to manage their resources in ways that most efficiently advance specific allied capabilities needed for overseas operations. If optimality is measured in terms of outcome and overall impact on the Alliance, this may not always be completely accurate. Nonetheless, sizable and diverse institutions like NATO entail some inherent virtues—not only do they provide geographic advantages, and access to current and potential military resources, but also they serve as a tool to legitimize multilateral action. Thus, the accommodation of

NATO members' diverging identities in order to avoid possible unilateral action or formation of coalitions outside of NATO by default tends to increase optimality in terms of international legitimacy.

The concept of complementarities represents the study's second theoretical pillar. Two goods are considered to be complementary if "the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency) of the other."⁹ Complements include those items normally consumed along with the product in question. If the demand for one of these items increases, then the demand for its complementary product increases as well. As a result, the demand for a good varies inversely with the price of its complements.¹⁰ Further, multi-good monopoly theory holds that if two goods are complementary, then lowering the price of one good stimulates demand for the other.¹¹ This study uses the concept of complementarities to explain how NATO allies work out a compromise on a decision-making and implementation levels concerned with the distribution of resources and sharing of allied capabilities. The military resources include, but are not limited to, military personnel, various types of army, navy, and air force equipment, and defense spending. The allied capabilities are represented by various forms of international military cooperation such as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), NATO rapid reaction forces (NATO Response force or NRF), and various multinational teams dealing with nonproliferation, stability, and reconstruction that combine military and civilian efforts.

The idea of complementarities holds that if NATO members successfully combine military resources, their interaction may enhance the capabilities of each ally and the alliance as a whole. Creating such an interactive synergy enables economies of scale to exist that promote efficiency for various alliance activities. This efficiency ultimately reduces the cost of the collective defense thereby provided to the allies. Thus, the concept of complementarities establishes a direct causal relationship between the military resources of NATO allies and their specific capabilities. The concept helps us understand not only why new states join alliances, but also how these states undergo transformation, adapt their military structures to the new security environment, and share the cost and burden of nascent commitments.

The rationalist approach holds that bargaining is optimal when allies commit to managing their military resources efficiently and to the exclusive development of the capabilities that are needed for overseas operations. Hence, a causal link between resources and capabilities exists that is tested through a survey of the evolution of NATO's missions. The laundry list of NATO's new capabilities is determined by the needs of the new operations. This book makes the case that the advancement of allied capabilities is related to the evolution of the new Alliance missions and may be vertical or horizontal.

The vertical evolution can be attributed to the need for new types of missions that expand beyond simple peacekeeping, and also include crisis response and stability operations. This trend of vertical evolution is illustrated with advancement from the Combined Joint Task Force's doctrine to the NATO Response Force and various multinational teams. Alternatively, the horizontal evolution indicates how the same mission evolves over time based on a new strategic environment that leads to the development of additional and enhanced capabilities. Examples include NATO's peacekeeping and non-proliferation missions. Peace enforcement is more complex as it subsumes peacekeeping responsibilities. Similarly, the multinational teams used in various stability operations started as multinational nonproliferation efforts and gradually incorporated Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defense and post-conflict regional reconstruction. The underlying logic is that every country specializes where it has comparative advantages. The evidence from these cases shows that the optimization of resources is not linear. The member states often commit themselves to unrealistic targets, which they are later forced to review and revise in order to meet the needs of the missions and the capacity of the states to deliver.

The second pillar of the theoretical argument is the concept of complementarities. It rests on the rationalist approach and argues that there is a direct causal link between NATO membership and the advancement of member-specific capabilities. The relevancy of the concept is illustrated through several cases of regional cooperation among smaller nations such as the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), the Southeast European Brigade (SEE BRIG), and the multinational teams for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense. The optimization of resources is hardly achievable without the presence of major players like the United States and their commitments. By putting pressure on the allied governments to overcome resistance at home and conduct unpopular military reforms, Washington sometimes acts as an "agent of transformation" that facilitates intergovernmental negotiations and persuades the allies to adapt themselves to alliance needs.

THE STUDY OF NATO'S TRANSFORMATION

Most existing scholarship on NATO has focused on the puzzle of NATO expansion, on the question of whether NATO should add new members, and on the ability of the Alliance to adapt itself to the new security challenges of the post-Cold War world. This study differs from existing scholarship because it focuses on the connection between the NATO's increased membership and the advancement of its new missions and capabilities, thus illustrating that

these three dimensions of NATO's post-Cold War transformation are closely related. Such an argument makes several contributions to debates on NATO politics.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not only the largest military alliance in modern peace time history, but also one of the most extensively researched topics in alliance politics. NATO politics is the subject of numerous scholarly and policy about its functioning and management. Some North American scholars complained that during the Cold War certain European allies received free rides, emphasizing that each ally should contribute resources for collective defense proportionally to its size, while other scholars refuted these concerns contending that members should be evaluated based on their strategic value.¹²

These debates continued in the 1990s in regard to the incorporation of new members and the future of the alliance, thus reflecting a broader theoretical divergence in IR scholarship. Neo-realists focused on the aggregation of power in the management of a post-Cold War NATO and made the case that the Alliance faced no real threat to balance against, which is why it was regarded an obsolete structure that was not worth to maintain or expand after 1990.¹³ Other approaches advocated NATO's re-activation in international security. Neoliberal and constructivist scholars argued that structural theories pay too much attention to the distribution of power across the international system, while at the same time undervaluing other major variables like the importance of international institutions, or the creation of security communities that modify the outcomes of alliance politics and international affairs.¹⁴ Democratic peace theorists, for example, attributed NATO's sustainability to its particular feature of being an alliance of democratic nations, where "liberal states do exercise peaceful restraints and a separate peace exists among them."¹⁵ As a result, an alliance of democracies has hidden strengths that would enable it to endure despite "internal wrangling and recrimination." These strengths would, in turn, take the form of "strong self-healing tendencies not found in alliances with one or no democracies."¹⁶ By the same token, neoliberal theorists have argued that NATO is an integral cog of the post-Cold War order established by the United States resting on the open and pluralistic way in which U.S. foreign policy is conducted, and the "web of multilateral institutions that allow others to participate in decisions and act as a sort of world constitution to limit the capriciousness of American power."¹⁷ Therefore, after 1990 NATO has embarked on a new mission of creating Europe whole and free by underpinning considerable faith in the pacifying effect of "shared democratic institutions and values."¹⁸ Finally, constructivists study NATO's management in the context of establishing "social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement,

and some popular habits of compliance.” These groups, more commonly referred to as security communities, refute the relevance of power politics and establish a novel framework of international interaction in which “the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”¹⁹ As a result, scholars of democratic peace and security communities have made the case that NATO has always been “something more than the sum of its members and its capabilities.” In addition to pacifying Europe after World War II, NATO also formed the core of a larger project that involved the preservation of the post-war order by creating a value-based community.²⁰

The preservation of this value-based community was critical for the new European security order and the manifestation of these intentions became increasingly relevant after the adoption of the Rome and Brussels declarations of 1990 and 1994, thus opening a scholarly debate on the future of NATO. This time the main discussion was about NATO’s new roles, more specifically whether it had been moving from an alliance that provides exclusively collective defense to its members, into an institution of collective security with broader global responsibilities.²¹ A growing number of scholars lately argue that NATO’s expanded membership and its new non-Article Five missions have transcended the limits of collective defense and have reshaped the alliance into a very different security institution from its original design in 1949.²² The tendency to view NATO as an institution of collective security was reconfirmed at the Washington and Prague Summits in 1999 and 2002, respectively, when the allies decided to invite seven new members into membership, and also agreed to build rapidly deployable multinational structures able to respond quickly and efficiently to various international crises, such as those in the former Yugoslavia, Africa and the Middle East.²³ Despite concerns about whether NATO would be able to meet its new responsibilities in international security, an argument has been made that “only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of the day.”²⁴

Has NATO indeed become a truly global alliance? Certainly today its domain of activities reaches well beyond Europe—the Alliance has institutionalized partnerships with almost two dozen countries from three continents and is considering close relations with many other nations all over the globe. What accounts for this expansion of NATO’s responsibilities and missions? Club goods theory and the concept of complementarities take a rationalist approach toward alliances and explore the conditions under which the individual members make commitments and honor their responsibilities in terms of allied missions and capabilities. The framework of analysis proposed in the book does not challenge the logic that NATO has become a security community that fosters democratic peace and stability in Europe. Instead,

it chooses to focus on explanations that offer a different angle to NATO's current role in international security—namely, how the Alliance reaches out to its members to cope with the gap in much needed capabilities for the new non-Article Five missions.

First, the proposed theory concurs with the explanation that, in large and diverse alliances, it is quite natural for bigger allies to bear a disproportionately higher share of collective burden, which does not necessarily reduce their value and benefits that they provide to the rest to the Alliance. Therefore, the logic of heterogeneous clubs justifies the expansion process only if new members are willing to participate actively in NATO's missions and are ready to improve their capabilities and expand mission contributions.

Second, moving out of the geographic area defined by Article Six of the North Atlantic Treaty does not automatically imply that NATO has become a truly global alliance. Under the 2010 strategic concept NATO emphasizes the importance of partnerships with relevant countries and international organizations as a key instrument in advancing cooperative security around the globe. Nonetheless, NATO still remains a regional alliance: its membership is limited to a distinct geographic area stretching on “the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”²⁵ Most of the decisions, including about the number and scope of the new missions, partnerships and capabilities, are made by its members. It is quite natural that partnerships between the Alliance and organizations with global outreach will expand in the future, the North Atlantic Council cannot substitute the legitimacy of the UN Security Council.

Third, NATO's geographic limitation inadvertently affects the range of available resources and capabilities. Even though the new partnerships constitute an integral aspect of NATO's post-Cold War identity, they are far from establishing global commitments and responsibilities. The alliance can be a valuable partner to the United Nations, but has no capacity and legitimacy to replace the universality of the United Nations in dealing with issues of world peace and security. NATO has made huge progress in its out-of-the-area involvement, but it has a long way to go before taking on any global responsibilities. On decision-making level, the developments of the missions in Kosovo and, most importantly, in Afghanistan, indicate lack of consensus. Similarly, on implementation level the Alliance faces shortage of capabilities to deal with the new operational needs on the ground. The presentation of this argument is organized around the three aspects of NATO's transformation: admission of new members, the introduction of new missions, and the development of new capabilities. The major events accompanying these aspects are summarized in Table I.1.

Finally, this book grapples exclusively with NATO's functioning and management after 1990, and excludes other aspects of alliance politics dealing with its origin, formation, sustainability, or decline. While the expansion process has been carefully surveyed, the book does not aim to explore the individual motivations of new NATO members. The question of this research and its implications specify the scope of analysis to formal alliances, thus excluding other similar forms of international security cooperation, such as alignments and political coalitions. Although some implications are directly linked to the larger debate about the role and functioning of international institutions, the book is targeted primarily toward expanding the existing theoretical literature on NATO and does not aspire to render important contributions to the broader debate on the role and significance of international institutions. Based on deductive logic, this study generates findings that have relevancy for overall alliance politics and the management of the international system beyond NATO politics.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The book is organized into eight sections. Chapter 1 introduces the logic of club goods theory, its relevancy to contemporary NATO politics, and the method of this inquiry. Chapter 2 presents the concept of complementarities in the context of intergovernmental bargaining theory and discusses the link between the use of available resources and the advancement of allied capabilities for NATO members.

Chapters 3 through 5 review the aspects of NATO's transformation. Chapter 3 surveys the initiation and advancement of the new missions after the end of the Cold War, and explores the extent to which these out-of-the-area missions contribute to the development of new capabilities. Special attention is paid to operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. Chapter 4 examines the advancement of NATO's new capabilities and concludes that the advancement of these capabilities may be vertical and horizontal depending on the demands of the new missions. A parallel comparison between NATO and European Union capabilities in support of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is also offered. Chapter 5 deals with the most visible part of NATO's transformation—the incorporation of twelve new allies in the past decade. The chapter also surveys how NATO helped its new allies improve their capabilities relative to other EU nations like Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, which are not NATO members. Chapter 6 analyzes the advancement of NATO's new capabilities in the context of the International

Table I.1. The Three Aspects of NATO's Transformation, 1990-2010

<i>Year</i>	<i>Document</i>	<i>Implications for NATO Expansion</i>	<i>Implications for NATO's missions</i>	<i>Implications for NATO's capabilities</i>
1990-1991	London Summit Declaration and Rome Summit Declaration	The North Atlantic Cooperation Council established		NATO's strategic concept published in 1991
1994	Brussels Summit Declaration	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council established Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiated	Peacekeeping Missions Crisis Management Missions Nonproliferation Missions introduced	Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) introduced European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) acknowledged
1994	NATO's Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Madrid Summit Declaration		Nonproliferation efforts introduced	Non-proliferation capabilities introduced
1997		The Visegrad countries invited to become NATO members NATO-Russia Council Charter on a Distinctive Partnership w/ Ukraine Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO Membership Action Plan introduced		
1999	Washington Summit Declaration		NATO's latest Strategic Doctrine approved Operation Allied Force KFOR in Kosovo	NATO's latest Strategic Doctrine approved NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept approved



2002	Prague Summit Declaration	Seven countries from Central and Eastern Europe invited to join NATO	Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations introduced ISAF in Afghanistan under NATO command	Prague Capabilities Commitment NATO Response Force Multinational Teams (e.g. CBRN teams) Berlin Plus Agreement with the EU (2003) NATO Response Force became fully operational
2004	Istanbul Summit Declaration	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO	NATO Training Mission in Iraq approved Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with the Middle East introduced	NATO Response Force became fully operational
2006	Riga Summit Declaration	Serbia and Bosnia joined PfP Intensified Dialog with Georgia NATO Global Partnerships confirmed	NATO involved in record number of six missions	Network Enabled Capability Alliance Ground Surveillance Program introduced Emphasis on interoperability NATO's strategic communications capability; NATO Operations Center
2008	Bucharest Summit Declaration	Three Balkan countries invited to become NATO members (Macedonia's invitation put on hold)	ISAF Mission declared top priority WMD protection of populations, territories, infrastructure	NATO Operations Center Alliance Ground Surveillance introduced
2009	Strasbourg/ Kehl Summit Declaration	Albania and Croatia became NATO members		Discussion on NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept under way
2010	Lisbon Summit Declaration		NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept "Active Engagement, Modern Defense" adopted	Focus on non-proliferation, partnerships, reform and transformation



Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. It highlights the strengths of allied cooperation, the progress made on the military and civilian sides, and the shortcomings and constraints that the allies have experienced during the mission's first eight years of operation. Finally, the concluding chapter validates the argument developed throughout the study and summarizes the main lessons about NATO's admission of new allies, the introduction of its new missions, and the advancement of new allied capabilities.

NOTES

1. "Active Engagement, Modern Defense," Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, Portugal, November 19, 2010.

2. David Morgan, "Obama Praises NATO for Afghan Support," CBS News, April 4, 2009.

3. "President Bush Visits Bucharest, Romania, Discusses NATO," The White House Factsheet, April 2, 2008.

4. Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no 2 (1993), 76.

5. NATO's eastward expansion took place in three rounds. In 1999 the three Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) joined NATO, while in 2004 seven other Central and East European countries became members – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Finally, Albania and Croatia were admitted to NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.

6. Morgan, "Obama Praises," CBS News, April 4, 2009.

7. See the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington D.C., April, 4 1949, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>, 05/18/2008.

8. Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998), 60-1.

9. Peter Hall and David Soskice, "An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in *Varieties of Capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage*, eds. Hall and Soskice (Oxford University Press, 2001), 17.

10. Arop K. Mahanty, *Intermediate Macroeconomics* (Academic Press, New York, 1980), 93-4.

11. David M. Kreps, *Course in Microeconomic Theory* (Princeton University Press, 1990), 305.

12. For details about this debate see Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, *An Economic Theory of Alliances*, *Rand Corporation* (1966); Galvin Kennedy, *Burden-Sharing in NATO* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers 1979); Casper Weinberger, "A Report to the U.S. Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense," (1984); James Golden, *The Dynamics of Change in NATO* (New York: Praeger, 1983); Charles Cooper and Benjamin Zycher, *Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing*, (RAND Publication Series, 1986) and Peter Forster and Stephen Cimbala, *The US, NATO, and Military Burden-Sharing* (Frank Cass, New York, 2005).

13. See Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace: the case against NATO expansion," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (September 1995), 9.

14. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that international institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs ... and facilitate the operation of reciprocity." In this framework, NATO is analyzed as a regional security regime establishing stable norms and rules that lead to "stability in levels of conventional forces within the regime that cannot be explained by structural theories." See Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20, no.1 (1995).

15. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4, (1986), 1156.

16. Wallace Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 294.

17. Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford University Press, 2002), 17.

18. Rebecca Moore, *NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World* (Praeger, 2007), 2.

19. Karl Deutsch, et al, "Political Community in the North Atlantic Area," in Brent Nelsen and Alexander Stubb, *Readings on the Theory and Practice of the European Integration* (Boulder, London, 1994), 118.

20. Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca Moore, "Introduction: Missions in Search of a Vision," in Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca Moore (eds.), *NATO in Search of a Vision* (Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2010), 2.

21. For detail see Zoltan Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion* (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Stanley Sloan, *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: the transatlantic bargain reconsidered* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York, 2003); Rob De Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: the battle for consensus* (Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, 1997) and Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, *NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality* (Cato Institute, Washington District of Columbia, 1998).

22. Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge University Press, 1998) and David Yost, *NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, District of Columbia, 1998).

23. For details see Jeffrey A. Larsen, "NATO Counterproliferation Policy: A Case Study In Alliance Politics," *Occasional Paper 17* (Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies, 1997); Eric Herring (ed.), *Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Frank Cass, London, 2000); Thomas Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping* (Rand Publication Series, 2001) and Geoffrey Williams and Barkley Jones, *NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the XXI Century* (The Institute for Economic and political Studies, 2001).

24. Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2006).

25. Article Six of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, District of Columbia, April 4 1949, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>, 9/20/2009.