Chapter 3. Expanding the Mission: NATO’s Out-of-the-area Involvement

**NATO’s Crisis Prevention and Response in Kosovo (2008-2013)**

On February 17, 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. NATO Secretary General confirmed that the Alliance will “continue to play its role as the bedrock of security in Kosovo according to its UN mandate” following the declaration of independence.\(^1\) In fact, NATO remained in Kosovo after 2008 without any change of mandate outlined in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244. The mission itself, however, underwent substantial modification. In June 2008, NATO agreed to take leading role in the deactivation of the Kosovo Protection Corps—a de facto Albanian militia created in 2000 from the structures of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—and its subsequent replacement with the Kosovo Security Force.\(^2\)

Kosovo Protection Corps was intended as a transitional post-conflict arrangement, under the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Once Kosovo declared independence, the UN post-conflict role decreased significantly and the organization reduced its presence in the province. In the aftermath of these events, the UN requested the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to assist with the KPC’s disbanding. NAC agreed to take over the executive authority in June 2008. Unlike KPC, the role of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was to serve as an all-crisis voluntary, professional, multi-ethnic, lightly armed force with a broad mandate that encompassed crisis response, assistance to civil authorities in responding to natural and other disasters and emergencies, Explosive Ordinance Disposal, and civil protection.\(^3\)

The security situation in Kosovo improved significantly after 2008 despite Belgrade and Kosovar Serbs’ initial disapproval of Pristina’s unilateral declaration of independence. Serbia chose to follow a legal path of challenging the legality of Kosovo’s independence in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The court came with an advisory opinion from 22 July 2010 which found that the Kosovo’s declaration of independence “did not violate general international law. Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework.”\(^4\)

ICJ’s decision foreclosed Serbia’s legal path to challenge the status quo and tamed Belgrade’s opposition, forcing both parties to seek a practical long-term arrangement. With the UN downsizing its presence, the European Union subsequently took over the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Kosovo through the EULEX and the EU delegation in Pristina. EU’s increased involvement helped broker a series of practical agreements between Belgrade and Pristina. A power-sharing accord was concluded in April 2013 according to which municipal bodies in the Serb-dominated northern tip of the province would retain autonomy in health care, education and regional police. Kosovo’s central government laws would apply in the Serbian municipalities, while Pristina agreed not to deploy its security forces in this part of Kosovo except during emergencies (e.g. earthquakes) and only with prior NATO authorization.\(^5\)

---

2. The United Nations officially created KPC in January 2000 in an attempt to engage the former rebels from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) into the peace process in the province. The intention was fairly straightforward—former KLA fighters were invited to join the reconstruction efforts in Kosovo by participating in a broad spectrum of operations such as disaster response services, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, demining and infrastructure and community rebuilding. Source: “Kosovo Protection Corps Training Program,” International Organization for Migration (IOM), Pristina (2004) [http://www.iomkosovo.org/files/KPC_English.pdf](http://www.iomkosovo.org/files/KPC_English.pdf), (accessed 3/10/2013), 16-17.
accord was preceded by a series of EU-brokered technical agreements aimed at normalizing relations between Pristina and Belgrade.  

The post-2008 developments had several important implications for NATO’s involvement in Kosovo. First, NATO took over UN’s job to deactivate KPC and form the new KSF. Despite notable challenges this task was accomplished by July 2013 when 2,500 troops joined KSF with approximately 1,400 of them coming from within the KPC via a NATO-led selection procedure.  

NAC declared KSF fully operational, which meant that the force had reached the “required level of self-sustainability in terms of recruiting, vetting, training of personnel, as well as equipping the Force.” NATO considers KSF capable to perform by NATO standards the tasks assigned within its mission.  

Second, the gradual drawdown of KFOR’s military presence represented a more notable aftermath of the improved security in the province. Over time NAC has been gradually adjusting KFOR’s force posture towards a minimal presence: essentially a smaller force progressively relying more on flexibility and intelligence with fewer static tasks. As a result, in July 2013 there were some 5,600 NATO troops in Kosovo—only 10 percent of the force’s initial troop deployment in 1999—provided by 30 countries. Despite the fact that KFOR’s mission—to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people in Kosovo—remained unchanged, its downsizing is a direct consequence of improved security and increased reliance on the local Kosovar police and security forces. The pace and level of future troop reductions is made by NAC based on the evolving conditions on the ground, not a specific calendar or timeline-based commitments.  

To sum up, KFOR operates in under the mandate set out in 1999 by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and focuses exclusively on crisis prevention and response. That, of course, does not preclude NATO from taking additional tasks as was the case with the introduction of the Kosovo Security Force. Finally, unlike Afghanistan, decisions on size of the military presence is driven not by pre-determined deadlines but by improved security on the ground as a result of normalized relations between Pristina, the Serbian Kosovar community, and Belgrade brokered with the help of the European Union.

**NATO’s Crisis Prevention and Response in Libya (2011)**

NATO also partnered with the African Union and the European Union on several instances in the late 2000s to provide assistance to these organizations for their operations in places like Darfur and the Gulf of Aden and other parts of the Greater Middle East and North Africa. Nonetheless, NATO’s largest out-of-the-area involvement in North Africa was Operation **Unified Protector** in Libya.

In early 2011, at the peak of the Arab Spring revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa, the Libyan opposition and the pro-Qaddafi government troops started a bloody Civil War. The UN Security Council (UNSC) demanded an immediate ceasefire in February, including an end to the current attacks on civilians. On 12 March the Arab League approached the Council to “shoulder its responsibilities by imposing an air embargo on Libyan airspace to protect the people of Libya.” The Council responded to this request by adopting UNSC Resolution 1973 by a vote of 10 in favor with 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia). The new resolution introduced a no-fly zone and tightened the sanctions imposed on Qaddafi regime. Resolution 1973 authorized individual countries and regional organizations to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country” and subsequently inform UN Secretary-General of such measures.

Two different camps emerged among NATO allies in response to these events in Libya. France and the UK advocated an early military action in implementation of a no-fly zone. France was the first to recognize the rebel forces called “Libya’s Interim Governing Council” as the new legitimate government in the country. The position of Germany and Turkey were much more reserved. Berlin shared its traditional skepticism about the use of force while Ankara’s main concern was that such use of force would be breaching the sovereignty of a Muslim nation. The United States favored

---

**Notes:**

6 Author’s personal interviews with EU officials in Pristina, Kosovo, 19 June 2013.


9 The 30 contributing nations included 23 allies and seven partners.


military action but feared entrapment into a long-standing conflict in North Africa that would further erode U.S. influence in the region. These differences among core allies once again reflected NATO’s heterogeneous nature as was in the case of Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003). The major difference from earlier cases was that the United States this time was much more reserved about the prospects of military action while France and the UK favored use or force. In fact, when the negotiations were taking place in late March between the United States, the UK, France and Turkey, France became the informal leader of this international coalition.

Two days after the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973, a meeting with key leaders from the UN, EU and the Arab World took place in Paris after which air raids commenced to enforce the no-fly zone. Initially, the enforcement was spearheaded by several parallel national operations led by the four leading powers of this coalition—France, the UK, the US, and Canada. This format lacked unified command and caused major confusion of leadership. After considering several alternative formats, the United Kingdom and the United States insisted for a military solution within NATO.

On March 23, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved Operation Unified Protector to enforce the UNSC Resolution. Four days later the NATO Secretary General announced that the Alliance would assume full responsibility for the operation under the UN mandate. The operation lasted seven full months—almost twice as long as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. During this period NATO flew in over 26,500 sorties, including over 9,700 strike sorties. Approximately 8,000 troops and over 260 air assets (fighter aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, air-to-air refuellers, unmanned aerial vehicles and attack helicopters) participated in the operation. Similarly, the operation’s naval component included 21 naval assets (supply ships, frigates, destroyers, submarines, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers). 3,100 hailed vessels and over 300 boarded vessels to enforce the arms embargo. Unified Protector covered a maritime surveillance area of around 61,000 nautical square miles and included approximately 8,000 military personnel. Fourteen allies and four partners (Jordan, Qatar, Sweden, and UAE) took part in the mission with British, U.S. Italian, French and Canadian troops sharing the bulk of allied burden.

Overall, Unified Protector was a success story—NATO conducted a limited military engagement to respond to an ongoing crisis in North Africa. The alliance sustained itself in a military action for seven months and ultimately achieved a desired political and military outcome—the removal of the Qaddafi regime in Libya—with minimal casualties and unexpected costs. Similar to Operation Allied Force, conducted twelve years earlier, Unified Protector was essentially a crisis management operation in which NATO demonstrated its improved operational capabilities, high interoperability and overall capacity to work with allies and partners. There is little doubt that the operational burden was not evenly shared among all allies—only eight of them participated in the air strikes, with the remaining six performing a mostly supportive function. Interestingly, the United States bore only about a quarter of the operation’s support sorties (intelligence, refueling, reconnaissance, etc), thus making Unified Protector a predominantly European mission.

At the same time, however, there are several notable differences between this mission and Operation Allied Force in 1999. First, unlike Allied Force, Unified Protector was endorsed by United Nations with resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2009. The campaign in Libya showed that while “Washington may not always care much about UN legalities, but its allies do […] as the influence of emerging powers grows, their voice in this issue is going to

---

13 See “War in Libya: Europe’s confused response” Comment 17, IHS Strategic Comments (April 2011).
16 Strike sorties are intended to identify and engage appropriate targets, but do not necessarily deploy munitions each time. For details, see “Operation Unified Protector: Final Mission Stats” NATO Factsheet, 02 November 2011.
18 The 24 NATO allies included Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the U.S. For details see “NATO operations in Libya: data journalism breaks down which country does what,” The Guardian, 22 May 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country (7/23/2013).
matter more, not less.”

Second, unlike 

Allied Force, leadership within NATO came from Britain and France while the United States—short on cash and bruised by the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan—did not want to “head the charge into a third Muslim country” despite fact that the Arab League had already backed the mission. Thus, Washington effectively chose to “lead from behind” providing discreet U.S. military assistance with France and Britain leading the allied efforts. Third, the air campaign in Libya lasted longer than originally expected—almost three times as long as the 

Allied Force in 1999. During that period the Alliance demonstrated resiliency, readiness to work in a multinational environment, and preparedness to meet the challenges on the ground.

To sum up, Operation 

Unified Protector confirmed that, when tasked with the right responsibilities, the Alliance can deliver desired outcomes. A quick snapshot comparison with the campaign in 1999 shows NATO’s remarkable progress in conducting crisis response and management operations. The operational success in Libya stands in sharp contrast with NATO’s experience in Afghanistan where the mission’s goals and expectations remained unclear or unrealistic, and where changing task environment over the course of the mission led to significant operational constraints.

Chapter 4. Advancing NATO’s New Capabilities

NATO’s latest Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010 highlighted the need for “unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises” employ actively an “appropriate mix of those [...] tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security.” The document again reaffirmed the importance of essential capabilities needed to deter non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), to maintain capabilities to combat nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological threats, and to maintain an “appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces to “against any threat to the safety and security” of allied populations.”

Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States are the 13 countries contributing to the acquisition of the aircraft. For details see Kate Brannen, “NATO Signs $1.7B Global Hawk Contract,” 

Defense News 

21 May 2012, 


22 “Active Engagement,” 15-16.

23 “Active Engagement,” 15-16.

24 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States are the 13 countries contributing to the acquisition of the aircraft. For details see Kate Brannen, “NATO Signs $1.7B Global Hawk Contract," 

Defense News 

21 May 2012, 


25 See Thom Shanker, “United States to Unveil Plans to Bolster NATO Alliance,” The New 

York Times, 19 May 2012; also “NATO after Libya,” The New York Times, 18 April 2012, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/us/us-to-unveil-initiatives-to-bolster-nato.html?_r=0 (8/6/2013)

26 Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s Success in Libya,” The New 

York Times, 30 October 2011, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/opinion/31hta-
eddaalder31.html (8/6/2013).

of new types of capabilities needed to “prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyberattacks.”

The period between the Lisbon and the Chicago Summits (2010-12) was marked by concerted efforts to acquire common allied capabilities. For example, in May 2012 NATO members agreed to purchase five Global Hawk drones from Northrop Grumman in the amount of $1.7 billion, a strictly allied capability financed by 13 of the 28 allies. In the long term, every member is expected to share the operational costs of the aircraft, which is projected to be in the range of $2 billion in the next 20 years. The Alliance also pledged to continue allied air patrols over in the Baltic airspace, and announced other initiatives to share the cost of maritime patrol aircraft, route-clearance vehicles and medical facilities, helicopters and armored vehicles. Additionally, the United States committed to rotate units through training facilities in Europe in order to maintain interoperability between U.S. and European troops after the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Operation 

Unified Protector also attests to the utility of sharing capabilities and responsibilities—for example, the Canada, Britain, France, Denmark, Norway and Belgium formed a “striker coalition” against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi. Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, Greece and Romania used their capabilities to enforce the no-flight zone and arms embargo at sea.

Despite the new Strategic Concept ambitious goals to “further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including
counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations,” there is a notable pattern of shrinking defense allocations. With a few minor exceptions, the economic situation in Europe after 2009 indicates that fewer resources would be available to acquire new capabilities in the years to come. In fact, in 2010 only six of the 28 NATO members allocated at least 2% of their national budgets for defense expenses as required by the Alliance. In 2011 this number dropped down to four allies.

SMART DEFENSE MECHANISMS TO IMPROVE CAPABILITIES

In response to the shrinking defense allocations among NATO members due to austerity measures, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen introduced a new idea at the 2011 Munich Security Conference which emphasized the building of “greater security with fewer resources but more coordination and coherence.” This idea known as smart defense aims at ensuring greater security at a lower cost also by working together with allies and partners. Smart defense is intended to change “the way NATO members design, operate, maintain and discard” military capabilities in an era marked by constraints imposed by budget austerity, operational challenges, and strategic uncertainty. By joining together various multinational projects, nations would acquire capabilities that they would not be able to afford to do alone. Smart defense policies improve resource efficiency, “prioritisation, specialisation and, most importantly, multinational cooperation.”

Smart defense improves pooling and sharing of capabilities and, in general, helps better coordinate allied and partners’ efforts. It is warranted because of: (1) the necessity to ensure adequate national security policies at a lower cost (though various defense cuts); (2) needed policy adjustments in Europe due to the evolution of U.S. defense posture and; (3) the demand for a new NATO strategy in the aftermath of the anticipated completion of the combat operations in Afghanistan.

Analysts identify three critical components of smart defense: First, it highlights need for prioritization of national resources toward those capabilities that are line with NATO’s goals. Second, in order to maximize allied capabilities, countries need to reach highest possible level of specialization, i.e. focus their resources toward highest property projects and possibly reduce, downsize or discard spending on projects that are not essential for acquiring new capabilities. Third, as a part of these efforts, there is an expectation for cooperation aimed at pooling military capabilities to provide economies of scale and improve interoperability.

The logic is quite simple and straightforward—these new security arrangements require from NATO members and partners to focus on predetermined areas of excellence as identified by the Alliance while at the same time cutting resources (and subsequently reducing capabilities) in other areas.

Smart defense is a new initiative used by scholars and policy makers to describe post-2011 policies to improve allied capabilities. In reality, the Alliance previously initiated numerous policies to change the way its members “design, operate and maintain and discard” their military capabilities. These include the NATO Response Force (NRF), the multinational teams for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense, and different measures to improve interoperability, which were introduced subsequently at the Washington and Prague Summits in 1999 and 2002 to improve allied capabilities for crisis response and post-conflict reconstruction. These reform packages reflected a long term strategy to “deliver the right capabilities right across the Alliance” and became an integral part of NATO’s post-Cold War transformation. Earlier attempts to regulate nations’ own defense policies from outside were met skepticism among allies and partners as they naturally intervened with members’ sovereignty in designing security policies.

Smart defense’s impact expands beyond sheer management of resources and enhancement of allied capabilities and differs from previous similar ideas. It was initiated in response to NATO’s shrinking global influence and popularity due to the fact that the United States has become preoccupied with Europe and the Middle East and “has not paid adequate attention to East Asia and the Pacific, where much of the twenty-first

---

31 Giegerich, “NATO’s Smart Defence,” 71.
century’s history will be written.” This initiative also emerged as a direct response to Obama’s new Asia Pivot strategy aimed at sustaining allocation of substantial diplomatic and military resources toward Asia Pacific. Smart defense is not only driven to re-affirm NATO’s relevancy in 21 century, but also to show its ability to operate effectively by creating better integrated armed forces.

**Hub-and-Spoke and Small Group Approaches to Smart Defense**

Two distinct organizational models of smart defense specialization and coordination emerged. The first one is the so-called hub-and-spoke model that is based on multi-nationally funded centers of recognized expertise driven by strategic proximity. The second organizational model is a bottom-up approach of small group cooperation. Small groups involve several nations bound together by geography, cultural affinity, availability of resources, similarity of equipment, etc.

These models reflect different patterns of inter-governmental cooperation and specialization. Cooperation in the hub-and-spoke approach flows from already established Centers of Excellence that provide much needed infrastructure for specialization in training and education. Multinational teams operating in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense, air lift and transportation, air surveillance, engineering, mountain troop combat and others are examples of such centers of excellence.

Small group cooperation bounds together countries based on their geography, cultural affinity, common equipment and level of ambition. The bilateral cooperation treaty between France and the UK known as the Lancaster House Treaty signed in 2010 presents a good example of two governments that have committed to an unprecedented depth of their security cooperation because both nations recognize that they share common “values, global interests and responsibilities.” Similarly, the Baltic region, the Black Sea region, the Nordic and the Mediterranean areas offer ample opportunities for cooperation among smaller nations (both NATO allies and partners) based on common values, interests and responsibilities that provide economies of scale.

The idea of smart defense highlights the importance of “right” capabilities that improve capacity to connect all NATO forces (allied and non-allied) under common understanding, command and control arrangements that implement common standards, language, doctrine and procedures. Its success rests on straightforward prioritization in line with NATO’s requirements, deliberate and coordinated specialization that is also customized to each individual nation by design, not by default. Smart defense addresses multiple levels of cooperation among allies, and between them and their partners and other supra-national entities (such as the European Union).

As of September 2012 NATO Headquarters, together with its members and some partners have identified three different tiers of projects based on how advanced these projects are. Tier one includes 24 most-advanced multinational projects intended to deliver improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale and connectivity between their forces. Additionally, the allies have identified 55 tier two 56 tier three projects all of which are at early stages of their development. The major distinction between tier-one and the other smart defense projects is that these 24 projects have already identified a lead nation and contributing nations many of whom have expressed firm commitments.

A brief overview of tier-one projects indicates that 13 of the 24 projects comprise of one or several smaller groups of nations from the distinct geographic area or region. The Mediterranean countries dominate in five projects—helicopter maintenance (1.2); immersive training environments (1.4), joint logistics support (1.13), multinational medical treatment (1.15) and fuel handling (1.19). The new members from Central Europe partnered on four occasions with their neighbors and permeate Hubs of E&IT (1.5), Multinational Joint Headquarter Ulm (1.11), joint logistics support group

---


34 Author’s personal interviews with experts at NATO HQ is Brussels, Belgium, 16 May 2013.


(1.13) and multinational medical treatment facility (1.15). Lastly, nations in the Black Sea and the Baltic regions each have substantial presence in three multinational projects.

NATO MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

The development of a missile Defense System to protect NATO’s European populations and territory from such attacks was among the central decisions of the 2010 Summit in Lisbon. The logic behind this capability was consistent with the smart defense’s overarching idea—namely that members would make individual contributions, but the Alliance as a whole would bring these capabilities together into a single system. While most NATO allies are not able to provide on their own such protection for their people, they can do so “by working, together through NATO” as this approach would be “cheaper, and much more effective.”

The NATO new missile defense system (MDS) differs significantly from the U.S. missile defense proposal made by President George W. Bush in 2007 that was received with hostility in Moscow and other parts of the world. The new missile defense is intended to have a “phased system of radars and antimissile missiles.” Its estimated cost is $1.5 billion spent over the course of a decade, which is significantly cheaper than the initial projections for the Bush system.

NAC officially declared “Interim Capability” for its MDS at the Chicago Summit in 2012. The interim capability represents only a first step toward full capability during which NATO relies mostly on existing missile defense systems to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats. In this first stage the United States made available their Aegis ships with ballistic missiles and a command-and-control system in Ramstein, Germany. Additionally, Turkey agreed to host a U.S. forward-based early warning radar system under NATO’s operational control, thus offering a missile shield to NATO allies in Southern Europe.

In 2013 NATO allies continued to make progress on MDS’s next phases. Negotiations with two of the allies—Romania and Poland—were under way regarding the stationing of the Aegis ballistic missile defense systems that would extend the missile shield during Phase 2 of the plan. A group 14 allies have already agreed to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles and their command-and-control ground stations for the next MDS phases. When the new interceptors and missile defense command-and-control system upgrades become operational, they would provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces.

NATO leadership has also made significant efforts to engage Russia in cooperative talks toward developing a continent-wide MDS, hoping to tame Moscow’s opposition to this initiative. The topic has been on the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), where a general agreement was reached to resume theatre missile defense cooperation and to develop a Comprehensive Joint Analysis of a future MDS cooperative framework. As of 2013, NRC negotiations have made minimal progress due to substantial differences between Russia and NATO about the aims and objectives of such common missile defense in Europe. Further discussion, including the work on the Joint Analysis of the future framework for Russia-NATO missile cooperation, is under way.

---

37 The Baltic countries have expressed their intention to partake in projects like Immersive Training Environments (1.4), Centres of Excellence as Hubs of E&IT (1.5) and Multinational Munitions Life-Cycle Management (1.23). Similarly, the allies from the Black Sea area chose to focus on projects dealing with female leaders in security (1.12), multinational flight crew training (1.24) and multinational cyber defense capability (1.27). Sources: NATO Factsheet: Multinational Projects and author’s personal interviews in Brussels, Belgium and Sofia, Bulgaria, May-June 2013.


The importance of advancing MDS capabilities is driven also by the fact that missile defense cooperation could showcase allied cooperation in an area where “many different assets, from several different European Allies, are being brought together” thus allies complementing each other’s resources to deliver “a common, integrated and shared NATO capability.”

NATO AND CYBER DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Cyber threats were first mentioned by NATO in the 1999 Strategic Concept when the Alliances referred to state and non-state adversaries that “may try to exploit the Alliance's growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems.” No specific action in this area was taken until 2002 when the decision to defend allied communication and information infrastructure from cyber attacks was included in the Prague Summit’s Final Declaration. This decision had symbolic character without any immediate headway. Progress toward cyber defense capabilities occurred after one of the allies—Estonia—experienced massive cyber attacks that began on April 27, 2007. The attacks spread quickly and in a few days had effectively paralyzed the country’s entire Internet infrastructure. Bank cards, cell-phone communication, e-government services, and other governmental and business websites were temporarily frozen. Estonia was particularly vulnerable to such attacks due to the fact that large part of its economy relied on online services.

The cyber attacks coincided with the removal of the Soviet-era war memorial from the center of Tallinn met with widespread public discontent in Russia. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks several key government websites were hit that included the Estonian presidency, the Parliament, almost all of the country’s ministries and executive agencies, and several websites of the major political parties. Similarly, private entities key to Estonian economy were badly affected by the attacks. While no Russian officials ever admitted their involvement in the cyber attacks, it was clear that the attacks were in retaliation to Estonia’s intention to remove the Soviet-style monument.

The Estonian response was very pragmatic and effective—the government closed down the sites under attack to external internet servers while trying to keep them open to users inside Estonia. This worked for a country of 1.4 million people where the majority users are speakers of a non-international language, but the same approach would not work in larger countries where foreign servers account for over half of the Internet usage. These attacks were fairly unsophisticated, but they served as a wake-up call about the potential damage that similar cyber threats can inflict on governments and institutions.

In the aftermath of the 2007 cyber-attacks, a much due call for international coordination came from NATO Headquarters where the attacks were identified as “operational security issue” that “goes to the heart of the alliance’s modus operandi.” The Alliance responded swiftly by creating a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center (CCDC) in May 2008 in Estonian capital Tallinn. It included the three Baltic countries, several other East European nations (e.g. Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia), as well as Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.S. The center’s mission is to boost NATO capabilities and information sharing between allies and partners through education, research and development, and consultancy.

The events of 2007 prompted NATO to include cyber defense in the new Strategic Concept, adopt NATO Policy on Cyber Defense, and develop Action Plan with specific activities for the implementation of the new policies. The 2010 Strategic Concept pointed that cyber attacks have become “more frequent, more organized and more costly in the damage that they inflict,” thus threatening the “national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.” The Heads of State and Government tasked NAC at the Lisbon Summit to develop a revised NATO cyber defense strategy.

48 One of the hackers left a message on Estonia’s ruling Reform Party’s website insisting for apology from the Estonian prime minister and his government to the Russians and a promise that they would return the statue to its original site. For details see “The cyber raiders hitting Estonia,” BBC News Online, 17 May 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665195.stm (3/24/2012).
52 “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” (Article 12).
defense policy which was approved by the defense ministers in June 2011. It formulated the principles of prevention, resilience and non-duplication in developing NATO cyber defense capabilities. NAC, the Defense Policy and Planning Committee, and new Cyber Defense Management Board were charged with the implementation of this policy.

The revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defense mapped out a Defense Planning Process (NDPP) to guide the integration of cyber defense into national defense frameworks. NDPP set out minimum or benchmark requirements for national network connectivity and capacity to process NATO information. The Alliance established consultation mechanisms to provide “coordinated assistance if an Ally became a victim of a cyber attack that included early warning, situational awareness and information-sharing among its members. It also facilitated the completion of Memoranda of Understanding between the national cyber defense authorities and the new NATO Cyber Defense Management Board. A new NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) was introduced to coordinate the new policy.53

The emergence of NATO-led centers of excellence after 2011 indicates a tendency to institutionalize cyber response capabilities. However, the effectiveness of these measures is to be seen in the future as NATO cyber defense depends heavily on the effectiveness of national capabilities because the former, by design, only supplement the latter.

Chapter 5. Adding New Allies: Three Rounds of Post-Cold War Expansion

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

As of August 2013 no further progress has been made toward Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s (FYROM) membership into NATO. The Alliance wanted to extend a membership invitation to this nation at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, but Greece objected because of its outstanding name dispute with its northern neighbor, thus effectively blocking FYROM’s further integration into NATO and the EU.

In response to Athens’ veto, Macedonia filed a suit at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) claiming that Greece has breached the Interim Accord between the two nations concluded in 1995. The Court ruled out in December 2011 that Greece has indeed “failed to comply with Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord,” but refused to order the Greek government to refrain “from any future conduct” that violates its treaty obligations under the Interim Accord. ICJ justified its ruling with the general rule that nations are presumed to “act in good faith in their conduct” in international law.54

The Court’s decision was an important legal victory for Macedonia, but it also signaled that the name dispute is essentially political and could be resolved solely through bilateral negotiations and mutual compromise. While ongoing negotiations focused on several different proposals to the naming dispute, no acceptable solution for both parties has been reached by August 2013. Mathew Nimetz’s latest proposal in early 2013 essentially represented a new version of previous similar proposals. The UN mediator suggested a compromise according to which the country to be called “the Upper Republic of Macedonia.” The new name would be used to admit Skopje into NATO and to open negotiations on the country’s accession into the EU, which are expected to last at least five years to complete. Upon Macedonia’s admission into the EU, the former Yugoslav Republic would hold a referendum where its citizens would be asked to approve the country’s membership into the EU and its changing of the name to “Upper Republic of Macedonia.”55

Macedonia has advocated in favor of the so-called “double formula” according to which Skopje and Athens would agree on using a special name in their bilateral relations while the constitutional name—Republic of Macedonia—would be used in communications with other countries. Greece objected to this proposal and signaled it would lift the veto only if there is an agreement to the change of FYROM’s current constitutional name. Athens prefers the geographical determinant “Upper” to be placed before the word “Macedonia,” the name being “Republic of Upper


Macedonia”—a constitutional name that would be used by Skopje in its relations with the international community.  

Lack of compromise on the name dispute hurts Macedonia’s standing in international relations and its further integration into NATO and the EU. Macedonian governments used the name dispute over the years to rally domestic support for their nationalist policies, but it seems that, most recently, Prime Minister Gruevski has chosen a more pragmatic stand. For example, on July 3, 2013 he sent a letter to his Greek counterpart Antonis Samaras suggesting bilateral high-profile teams that will discuss how to resolve certain aspects of the outstanding dispute in order to speed up the negotiations process. The Samaras government delayed its response causing Skopje’s rebuttal that “Greece is dragging its feet in efforts to settle the decades-old name dispute.”

Montenegro

In the mean time, Montenegro, another former Yugoslav republic, was formally admitted to Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2009 and submitted its first MAP Annual National Program in the Fall of 2010 following a successful two-year Individual Partnership Action Plan cycle. The nation’s entry into MAP, a program designed to provide advice, assistance and practical support to prospective NATO members, is the last step preceding the country’s full membership into the Alliance.

Montenegro face similar challenges like the countries who joined NATO earlier in 2004 and 2009—its armed forces are oversized and geared toward traditional territorial defense, not joint operations. Additionally, the military makes up of a high numbers of conscripts; it is highly hierarchical; and equipped with outdated and inefficient technologies. The reorganization of the “largely anemic noncommissioned officer corps” and the introduction of civilian control of the military are also on the list of most urgent areas in need of reform. Beyond supporting military reforms, NATO asked this prospective member to improve its forces’ connectivity in order to benefit from working together with allied and partner forces in various peacekeeping and crisis-management operations.

Montenegrin authorities have maintained intensified contacts with Brussels since their country’s entry into MAP—NATO Secretary General paid a visit to Podgorica in 2011 followed by his Deputy who visited the country in 2012. Both top officials praised reforms and urged the country to continue efforts toward reforming its security and defense section and combating corruption and organized crime. When Montenegrin’s Prime Minister visited NATO Headquarters in 2013, he was assured that his country “is moving in the right direction,” thus signaling a possible invitation for membership at the upcoming 2014 Summit.

Chapter 6. Managing Twenty-First Century Operations: NATO’s Involvement in Afghanistan

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were introduced as a part of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach launched in 2004 to develop shared understanding of mission’s complexity and facilitate collaboration previously “lacking at the tactical level.” Against the backdrop of rising insurgency, the Comprehensive Approach was effectively replaced in 2009 a new stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy that placed Pakistan “on par with Afghanistan in strategic importance and significantly

56 “UN mediator,” 18 April 2013.
60 Since 2010, the country has contributed to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and has also indicated further willingness to partake in the post-2014 follow-on mission to train Afghan security forces. For details see “NATO’s relations with Montenegro,” NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-592D6E047-25BF7C6FD/intolive/topics_49736.htm (7/29/2013).
increased military and civilian efforts. by President Obama’s Af-Pak strategy launched a full counter-insurgency campaign (COIN) beginning 2010 and effectively ended ISAF’s stage four (see Transforming NATO’s Table 6.1, p. 206).

The Af-Pak strategy’s implementation began in 2010. It rested on three pillars: First, this initiative heavily relied on support from the allies as the United States wanted it to be a NATO- rather than a U.S.-led imitative. Second, the strategy envisioned support for the Pakistani civilian government in its efforts to take on al-Qaeda in the western part of the country along the border with Afghanistan in return for investments in Pakistan’s political and economic development. Third, the Af-Pak strategy provided for a surge in Afghanistan with an influx of 21,000 additional troops matched with enhanced investment and training of the Afghan national security forces, greater civilian investment in Afghan development and efforts to root out corruption and bad practices while at the same time enhancing the reconciliation process in the country. Fourth, it depended on diplomatic efforts to bring Afghanistan and Pakistan together including in the format of a tri-lateral dialogue that involved the United States and a Contact Group of all nations with vested interests in the region. In essence, Obama’s Af-Pak strategy allocated substantial resources toward the goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda and “its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”

The Af-Pak strategy was resourced primarily by the United States but relied on corresponding allied efforts, too. For example President Obama began his first term in January 2009 with 38,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan and added another 51,000 by the fall of 2009, some of which were previously approved by President George W. Bush’s in his last months in office. American military presence reached 100,000 in 2010. After NATO agreed to embrace COIN, an additional 50,000 allied troops were sent in Afghanistan resulting in allied and partners’ contributions reaching about 30% of all ISAF contributions during the mission fifth stage (2010-12).

Allied surge was followed by a process of gradual withdrawal by some allied contingents due to earlier commitments to self-imposed deadlines. This was the case of the Netherlands’ decision to withdraw its contingent when the coalition government collapsed in 2010. Nonetheless, the country remained within ISAF even after it terminated the combat mission in December 2010 and withdraw its contingent of 2,000 troops when 900 troops stayed in Afghanistan to train local Afghan troops. Similarly, the Dutch also left behind helicopters and F-16s in the Uruzgan province to support the Australians there. The Americans also moved in the province shortly thereafter to fill in the security vacuum left in the aftermath of the ally’s withdrawal.

Core NATO partners like Australia bore considerable burden with a 1,550 troop contingent and asked other “underperforming” NATO countries to shoulder their fair share of the burden. Australian forces took over lead responsibility for security in the Oruzgan Province following the Dutch withdrawal and supported the new COIN strategy. In 2012 the Government in Canberra subsequently decided to terminate the combat mission and withdraw ahead of schedule as soon as President Hamid Karzai declared that Afghanistan’s forces were capable of taking over responsibility for security in the Oruzgan Province. The Australian troops were expected to return from Afghanistan a year ahead of schedule and no later than November 30, 2013.

Canada officially terminated its combat mission in mid-2011 and brought home its nearly 3,000 troops by the end of that year. The withdrawal deadline was already set in 2008 when the Canadian Parliament approved the extension of the troops’ mandate for another three years with a focus on reconstruction and training of Afghan troops, and set a pullout date no later than December 2011. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010 Canada agreed to deploy 950 trainers after 2012 to work with the Afghan troops who would perform “no offensive combat action.”

---


64 Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: the Liberal Disconnect (Stanford University Press, 2012), 175.

65 Rynning, NATO, 180-2.
France and Germany remained committed to the ISAF mission after 2011. President Sarkozy announced in January 2012 that France intended to participate in the combat mission through late-2013. Nonetheless, the newly elected French President Francois Hollande chose to stick to the December 2012 deadline as promised in his campaign. After this date only about 1,500 French troops stayed in Afghanistan to remove equipment and to help train Afghan forces. The French government continued to provide personnel and other logistical support to maintain security at the international airport and to provide essential services for the military hospital in Kabul through 2014.70

Germany stayed committed to combat operations through 2014. As of mid-2013, the country maintained a contingent of 4,135 soldiers located mostly in the northern parts of Afghanistan which generally tend to be safer compared to the rest of the country. In April 2013 the German government confirmed its commitment to provide between 600 and 800 soldiers for a training mission that would follow the withdrawal of combat troops after 2014. Berlin’s plans anticipate that the number of German trainers assisting the Afghans would gradually be reduced to around 300 in 2017.71

Similarly, the United States continued troop reduction in 2012 and 2013. President Obama ordered American troop levels—which were at 68,000 in early 2013—to be cut in half by February 2014. The United States intended to sign a bilateral security agreement with the Afghan government that would also settle the status of the U.S. troops in the country after NATO completes its mandate in 2014. In a report released in July 2013, the Pentagon’s assessment found that Afghanistan would require “continued substantial levels of assistance from the international community well into the 2015-2024 decade” long after United States troops are expected to depart.72

NATO has made steps to prepare for its sixth stage of involvement in Afghanistan. At their February 2013 meeting NATO defense ministers’ made substantial progress toward planning a new mission after 2014 intended to train, advise and assist Afghan Security Forces. A draft proposal included training force of up to 9,500 American troops matched by 6,000 allied and coalition troops. Foreign forces are expected to operate out of a central headquarters in Kabul that is linked to training bases in four sections in Afghanistan.73 Alliance’s post-2014 engagement in Afghanistan’s stabilization and reconstruction is expected to be the central topic of the 2014 NATO Summit.

Conclusions

The developments in the NATO-led missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Libya, and other places, as well as the ongoing debate about allied capabilities confirmed the argument made in this book that NATO operates as a heterogeneous club. The Lisbon and Chicago Summits validated the expectation that consensus strengthens optimal decision making and enhances the international legitimacy of allied efforts. Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011) highlighted the benefits from a balanced approach that ensured support from allies despite the fact the only 14 of them agreed to share the operation’s burden. This mission’s success was even more remarkable given the minimal yet essential U.S. involvement.

The struggling operation in Afghanistan once again validated three central premises of the book. First, the shift of mission’s task from comprehensive approach that involves post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building to counter-insurgency proved cumbersome and challenging because NATO was never fully prepared to handle the complexity of such operation. Second, the end of the combat mission in 2014 does not end allied involvement in Afghanistan—NATO will remain on the ground in the next decade as a part of small-scale missions that would focus on various aspects of the region’s stabilization and reconstruction. Third, the case of Afghanistan once again confirms the need for increasingly “coordinated political support” that will task NATO with proper and manageable responsibilities and can “remedy the structural and political crises”

emanating from unrealistic expectations about what the Alliance can accomplish.\(^{74}\)

While NATO’s own expansion has almost neared an end following the integration of 12 new allies, the acquisition of new capabilities has been a far more cumbersome aspect of NATO’s transformation. NATO Response Force, originally designed as “an all-terrain rapid reaction force, with rotating membership for land, air, naval and special forces,” was used only once to provide relief for the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.\(^{75}\) The shrinking military resources due to budget austerities forced NATO leadership to introduce new idea—like that of smart defense—to facilitate the implementation of multinational projects that could effectively introduce new allied capabilities. The logic of smart defense is congruent with the notion of complementarities where allies and partners team up in their efforts to advance specialized capabilities that they cannot acquire on their own.

If this project succeeds, then NATO 3.0—to use Sten Rynning’s metaphor—is certainly going to be radically different from NATO 2.0 of the 1990s and early 2000s when the Alliance was mostly preoccupied with crisis management in the Balkans.\(^{76}\) To implement the NATO 3.0 project, all 28 members need to come to realization that their own organization is going to benefit tremendously if they choose to outsource parts of their national capabilities to multinational settings. Such an arrangement requires sacrifices of national sovereignty in managing security policies but would be tremendously beneficial to all allies in the long run.

For further updates, see:

---


\(^{76}\) Rynning, *NATO*, 200.