I would like to thank Professor Richard J. Harknett and the fellow graduate students at the Department of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati for providing me stimulating ideas about my research and the Charles Phelps Taft Research Center at UC for providing funding for my field research in Brussels, Belgium and Washington, DC.

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In 1993 Kenneth Waltz, a leading international relations scholar, indicated that “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are... Once the new Germany finds its feet, it will no more want to be constrained by the United States acting through NATO than by any other state.”\(^1\) It is true that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did undergo tremendous transformation, but not of the sort that Waltz expected. Thirteen years later the number of NATO allies increased from sixteen to twenty-six with ten new members from Central and Eastern Europe; it fully incorporated unified Germany and the organization became involved in out-of-area operations.\(^2\) This trend of transformation is continuing, with three countries from Southeastern Europe expecting an invitation to join the organization.\(^3\) Moreover, on September 12, 2001, for the first time in its history, the Alliance evoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provided for collective defense.

Why was then one of the leading neo-realist scholars so wrong in predicting the dynamic of post-Cold War international relations? This research is a part of my dissertation which studies the effect of the NATO expansion on European security and transatlantic diplomacy. By focusing on the particular case of NATO transformation, I preserve to the core assumptions of realism, while suggesting a modification of its logic. For the purpose of this paper I focus on two key structural realist scholars – John

\(^2\) NATO’s eastward expansion took place in two rounds. In 1999 the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) joined NATO and in 2004 seven other Central and East European countries became members -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
\(^3\) Currently Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are preparing for membership.
Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz and compare their analytical frameworks with Karl Deutsch’s concept of security communities, developed in 1957. Ultimately, I argue that security communities are not inconsistent with realism’s core assumptions, and that the concept of security communities can help us explain the undergoing dynamic in the North Atlantic Area.

Why analyze NATO expansion from a realist perspective? The current literature tends to explain the undergoing dynamic in the North Atlantic Area through a non-realist analytical framework. Much of the work focuses on the significance of the liberal and democratic frameworks, as well as the liberal nature of the current international institutional environment. Furthermore, NATO’s transformation has suggested a new research agenda that has replaced the foundationalist ontological perspective and offered a constructivist explanatory framework.

At the same time, during the decade after the end of the Cold War realism has been labeled as an “old thinking largely irrelevant to the new realities of world politics.” Therefore, the theoretical and even paradigmatic shift in the international relations research has taken place while “the basic structure of international system remains largely unchanged.” As the University of Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer indicated:

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4 The core argument of the democratic peace theory (DPT) is based on the available empirical data that no two liberal democracies have ever gone to war with each other and, therefore, democracy is researched as an independent variable that shapes international relations. See Michel Doyle Liberalism and World Politics, American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, December 1986.

5 Neoliberal institutionalism argues that international institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs … facilitate the operation of reciprocity.” In this framework, NATO is analyzed as a regional security regime which establishes stable norms and rules that lead to “stability in levels of conventional forces within the regime that cannot be explained by structural theories.” See Lisa Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, International Security, Vol. 20, No.1 (Summer 1995).


States are still the key actors in world politics and they continue to operate in an anarchic system. It is difficult to find a serious scholar who argues that the United Nations or any other international institution has coercive leverage over great powers or is likely to have it anytime soon. Moreover, not only is there no plausible replacement of for the state on the horizon, but there is little interest anywhere in the world for doing away with the state and putting an alternative political arrangement in its place. Nothing is forever, but it is a good reason to think that the sovereign state’s time has not yet passed.\textsuperscript{8}

In support of Mearsheimer’s (and in general realism’s) assumptions is the fact that the number of sovereign states in Europe has increased from slightly more than thirty to about fifty. States have disappeared breaking up into several independent entities, but except in the case of the German unification, no other country has formally ceased to exist, merging into a larger entity.\textsuperscript{9} Therefore, studying NATO’s transformation from a realist perspective constitutes an interesting and challenging research agenda.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

*Defensive Realism*

Currently, there are two different realist traditions – defensive and offensive. Defensive realists posit that states seek to balance the power of threatening states, and for this purpose they may engage in various unilateral efforts or military cooperation including, but not limited to, forming military alliances. This framework expects a multipolar world after the end of the Cold War in which “the United States as the strongest power will find other states edging away from it; Germany moving towards Eastern Europe and Russia, moving towards Germany and Japan.”\textsuperscript{10} As a result, “the presence of American forces at higher than token levels will become an irritant to

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{9} While the European Union today is largely considered as an example of a supranational entity, actually very few researchers challenge its intergovernmental foundations.
\textsuperscript{10} Kenneth Waltz, 1993, p. 75.
European states, whose security is not threatened.”\textsuperscript{11} Since NATO was created to balance against the Soviet Union and the latter is already gone, Kenneth Waltz expects that the United States will withdraw from Europe, and NATO will become obsolete. This skepticism about NATO is predetermined by the structure of the international system. An alliance can only be sustained if the structure of international politics entails the presence of a threat that “can provide sufficient glue to hold the alliance together.”\textsuperscript{12} In a Waltian world NATO expansion should be driven by the “balance-against-threat” hypothesis, which explains his post-Cold War skepticism about the future of the alliance.

In a follow-up working paper from 1998, Waltz responds to the critique of his theory by arguing that “realists, noticing that as an alliance NATO has lost its major function, see it simply as a means of maintaining and lengthening America’s grip on the foreign and military policies of European states. The survival and expansion of NATO tell us much about American power and influence and little about institutions as multilateral entities.”\textsuperscript{13} His response consists of two different types of arguments -- (a) that his theory explains outcomes that result from the distribution of power across international system and not a particular foreign policy outcome, and (b) the particular case of NATO post-Cold War expansion is driven by domestic (i.e. unit), rather than system-level variables:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Domestic politics supply a third part of the explanation for America’s championing NATO’s expansion. With the administration’s Bosnian policy in trouble, Clinton needed to show himself an effective foreign-policy leader. With the national heroes, Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel clamoring for their countries’ inclusion, foreclosing NATO membership would have handed another issue to the Republican Party in the
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
Congressional elections of 1994. [...] Votes and dollars are the lifeblood of American politics. New members of NATO will be required to improve their military infrastructure and to buy modern weapons. The American arms industry, expecting to capture its usual large share of a new market, has lobbied heavily in favor of NATO’s expansion.\textsuperscript{14}

Therefore, Waltz concludes that “reasons for expanding NATO are weak, most of them the product not of America’s foreign-policy interests but of its domestic political impulses” while at the same time reasons for opposing expansion are strong.

\textit{Offensive Realism}

Unlike defensive realism, offensive realists emphasize the distinction between the great powers and the other actors in an anarchical international system. The criteria for defining great powers “are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability,” such as sufficient military assets to fight successfully against the most powerful state in the world.\textsuperscript{15} Again, power is the key independent variable which is composed of latent power, that includes size of the population and the level of wealth, and military power.

In addition, offensive realism approaches international politics with five bedrock assumptions: (a) international system is anarchic, (b) great powers possess offensive capability which gives them wherewithal to hurt and destroy each other, (c) uncertainty about other states’ assumptions; (d) survival is the primary goal of great power and (e) great powers are rational actors.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, Mearsheimer argues that great powers “are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, p. 30-1.
survive in it. In particular they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states.”

Thus, offensive realists overcome the status quo bias of defensive realism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the expectation is that NATO must reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power. Therefore, the enlargement of NATO is seen as an aspiration of the United States to increase its relative power in the North Atlantic area. As a result, the logic of offensive realism expects that NATO should continue to enlarge because America will persist to maximize its power by taking new countries in the alliance.

*Karl Deutsch and the Security Communities*

Karl Deutsch et al introduced the concept of security communities in 1957 as a “capacity to act as a political unit – such as its size, power, economic strength, administrative efficiency and the like,” as well as “the ability of a unit to control its own behavior and to redirect its own attention.” He defines those communities as “social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance.” Furthermore, he combines security and community and introduces the concept of security community, where “the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”

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17 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, p. 118.
A key term in his analytical framework is *integration*, which according to the level of attainment divides security communities into two types: amalgamated and pluralistic. Amalgamation means “the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit.” Deutsch uses the cases of the United States and Switzerland as examples of amalgamation where the community becomes a single governmental unit by the formal merger that leads to “one supreme decision-making center.” Although offering an insightful perspective on the integration, the concept of amalgamated communities changes the unit of analysis by assuming a merger of independent states into a single bigger unit that interacts in the anarchic world. Although a valuable framework for studying the relations within this bigger political unit, this approach does not help us understand the relations on a systemic level of interaction between the formally independent units, and, therefore, will not be discussed in this paper.

Alternatively, Deutsch suggests the pluralistic security community as a one that “retains the legal independence of separate governments” where “two separate governmental units form a security community without being merged.” Although producing a different dynamic, the pluralistic community does not change the assumption of the anarchic structure of international politics and that the states are the key units of analysis and, therefore, is consistent with realism’s basic tenets. He recognizes that “pluralistic security communities turned out to be somewhat easier to attain than and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts.” Therefore, in my analysis I will focus only on this particular variation of the security communities.

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, p. 29.
Karl Deutsch’s research has also an important contribution to defining and understanding the North Atlantic Area as a community. Deutsch argues that “certainly there is a considerable support for the tightening of the existing international organization – NATO – until it becomes a pluralistic security community. Indeed the North Atlantic Area contains sub-areas of integration, some of them already partly equipped with institutions that may or may not have the capacity to develop.”

Furthermore, Deutsch discusses the three alternative approaches of geographically defining the North Atlantic Area. The first alternative includes all countries that are “geographically located on the North Atlantic Ocean or North Sea or in the immediate hinterland of that area.” The second alternative equates the area with “NATO membership” and excludes Austria, Finland, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The third alternative confines the research to “democracies located in whatever we consider to be the North Atlantic Area.” In this definitional framework democracy serves as a key causal variable “as a requirement for integration.”

Deutsch et al favor the first option confining the definition of such a community to an area where “geography is a positive test of inclusion; the negative test is a membership in a power bloc ideologically politically incompatible with the West.”

The core conditions for the integrative process in the Deutschian model address issues such as compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making; the capacity of the participating political units to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without a resort to violence; as well as the mutual

\[\text{Ibid, p. 9.}\]

\[\text{Spain joined NATO in 1982.}\]

\[\text{Deutsch et al, 1957, p. 10.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
predictability of the behavior required for the members of such a community in order for it to function.  

Furthermore, his major contribution is that he distinguishes between the background (or “core”) conditions and the process of establishing such a community in which time is a key intervening variable because “once integration has been reached, the length of time over which it persists may contribute to its consolidation.”

Adler and Barnett reformulate the original concept of security communities presenting “a framework for the study of the emergence of security communities that is analytically organized around three tiers: (1) precipitating conditions; (2) process variables (transactions, organizations, and social learning); and (3) mutual trust and collective identity.” By focusing on mutual trust and collective identity, Adler and Barnett bring the constructivist dimension of analyzing the concept. Nonetheless, they have an important contribution in understanding the formation of these communities measured through integration. Most importantly, Adler and Barnett discuss two tiers conductive to the development of integration, namely: (a) size, power, economic strength, administrative efficiency and; (b) ability of the unit to control its own behavior and to redirect its own attention.

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ASSUMPTIONS OF THE RESEARCH

As previously stated, there are at least three reasons to focus only on the pluralistic communities. First, as Deutsch has indicated, amalgamation is a process much longer and harder to attain. Second, almost fifty years later, the North Atlantic Area has many more features of the pluralistic rather than amalgamated SC. Third, the characteristic features of the pluralistic communities are consistent with the key realist assumptions such as unit of analysis, anarchic structure, etc.

Currently, a large part of the debate in the literature has been presented as the irrelevance of realism or the irrelevance of NATO with abundant institutionalist and even constructivist arguments in support of NATO expansion. Therefore, I believe that by looking into this particular case, I am able to modify the realist logic and bring additional insight to understanding the dynamic in the North Atlantic Area. I find it intellectually challenging and enriching to analyze the security relations within the North Atlantic Area with concepts such as security communities that have lately been applied extensively to constructivist and other anti-foundationalist research agendas. In addition, from a philosophy of science perspective, I believe that political scientists should be able to build bridges between the different paradigmatic traditions of the discipline. However, my research of NATO’s transformation entails clearly positivist ontology and empiricist epistemology and I focus primarily on theoretical framework within this tradition to explain the ongoing dynamic in the North Atlantic Area.

The features of this case study demand a definition of a specific geographic region – the North Atlantic Area. The Deutschian definition of the security community is
valuable in establishing a causal relationship between a certain geographic area and the evidence for a community there; clearly the Western European countries, no matter whether they are formally a part of NATO or not, are a part of this community. Alternatively, this model rejects an automatic expansion of the community since the process requires conditions which cannot be attained over a relatively short period of time. The institutional expansion of the borders of a specific geographic region such as the North Atlantic Area can actually expand the security community there over a longer period of time. Therefore, the new NATO allies join the institutional setup of the organization, in part, because they want over time to become fully integrated into the security community in the North Atlantic Area. As a result, there is a causal link between NATO’s institutional framework and security community in which, among other conditions, time a key intervening variable.

The North Atlantic Area and The Issue of Hegemony

From a realist perspective, the definition of a certain geographic region requires further an analysis on the distribution of power there. In the “Tragedy of Great Power Politics” John Measheimer defines hegemony as “domination of the system which is usually interpreted to mean the entire world” and distinguishes between global and regional hegemons, where the former dominate the world while the latter dominate distinct geographic areas. Furthermore, he argues that “except for the unlikely event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony.”

For example, the United States is the only regional hegemon in the modern history although other states have tried to attain such a status –

32 Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 41.
imperial Japan, Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany or Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, he predicts that the principal impediment to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power. Mearsheimer explains that despite the fact that the United States is the most powerful state in the planet, it does not dominate Europe and the Northeast Asia the way that it does the Western Hemisphere “and has no intention of trying to conquer and control those distant regions mainly because of the stopping power of water.”

In this paper I do not intend to take position in the realist debate on whether the current global distribution of power is closer to what is considered to be a unipolar or multipolar world and, therefore, I assume that on a global scale we can hardly argue that a single state dominates the entire world. However, I look at the distribution of power on the regional level by focusing on the North Atlantic Area. Being “the most powerful state in the world,” the United States generally has three choices of strategic behavior: isolationism, offshore balancing and regional hegemon. While defensive realist logic would expect isolationist behavior and, therefore, argue against NATO’s expansion, offensive realism suggests two alternatives – offshore balancing or hegemonic behavior.

Mearsheimer argues that currently the United States is a hegemon solely in the Western Hemisphere and, therefore, an offshore balancer in the whole of Europe, which includes the North Atlantic Area. Going back to the Cold War period, there was very little doubt that the United States was an offshore balancer that was balancing against the other great power, namely the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, in the Deutschian definition of the North Atlantic Area, the United States had no other great power to balance against.

33 Ibid.
and, therefore, on a sub-systemic level it was a hegemon.\footnote{Currently literature discusses two different understanding for balancing dynamic, which includes balancing against power (Kenneth Waltz), as well as balancing against threat (Stephen Walt). For further details see Kenneth Waltz (1979) and Stephen Walt (1987), 148.} Alternatively, there is very little evidence that any of the pre-1990 members of the North Atlantic Area were seen as a threat to balance against.

What happened after the end of the Cold War? The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist sub-system, changed the Deutschian definition of the North Atlantic Area because the division between East and West was much more political than geographic. Therefore, the expanded North Atlantic Area included the countries from Central and Eastern Europe that joined NATO in 1999 and 2004, where none of these allies has capabilities to match either the great powers in the system, or the smaller but still major actors in world politics such as Germany, France, Britain, Italy, etc. Therefore, the lack of powers (and/or threats) to balance against eliminated the options of offshore balancing as far as this particular geographic region is concerned.

Some of the international relations scholars argue that the French behavior in NATO, as well as the Franco-German cooperation in the European Union is an evidence for the new emerging pole in Europe that the United States would balance against. Firstly, it is true that the French behavior is the one of disagreement, but seen from outcomes perspective, this foreign policy behavior is far from the emergence of a new balancing dynamic. Although France is formally in opposition, it participates under one form or another in most of the NATO operations, a behavior that is hardly consistent with balancing. Although formally out of the NATO military structures France is “on the threshold,” i.e. involved in all the NATO efforts particularly in two respects -- KFOR in
Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{35} Secondly, in the same token the German political elite clearly indicated that “Germany knows and realizes that Europe (especially in the face of France and Germany) cannot be a pole in a multipolar world. There is no potential of trying to solve problems against, but only with the transatlantic partners.”\textsuperscript{36}

The very logic of the NATO expansion rejected the isolationist hypothesis. Since I do not find sufficient evidence for offshore balancing, I accept that the United States seems to have made a hegemonic strategic choice. This argument is further strengthened by stretching the definitional borders of the NAA. As a result, if the logic of this argument is correct, it undermines the stopping power of water component of offensive realism’s theory.

The United States has been a hegemon in the formation of this community except probably in the first years after the World War II when it was balancing \textit{inter alia} against the possible threat of the re-nazification of Germany. If the logic of this model is correct, then can we assume that such a community can be formed without the presence of a hegemonic strategic behavior and capabilities, i.e. without the US involvement in the last fifty years in the North Atlantic Area? The evidence from some of the historical cases brought by Deutsch et al clearly indicate the presence of a hegemon or at least an imbalance in the distribution of power in some of the pluralistic security communities, such as Sweden in its union with Finland, Poland in its union with Lithuania and Ukraine and the cases within the British Commonwealth. However, since the authors do not provide much empirical information on each of the researched cases, it is difficult to

\textsuperscript{35} Author’s personal interview with a representative from the French Delegation to NATO, Brussels, January 19, 2006.

\textsuperscript{36} Author’s personal interview with a representative from the German Delegation to NATO, Brussels, January 20, 2006.
further analyze the particular distribution of power in each of these cases without studying them separately.

From the perspective of the levels of analysis, both Waltz and Mearsheimer are structuralists, i.e. they do not mix system- and unit level arguments. In the same way, this research approaches the issue of NATO expansion from the systemic level of analysis. Deutsch, on the other hand, applies both systemic and structural variables in his model. However, he introduces time as a key dimension, realist research agenda has not been able to take into account structural changes of power used for a long period of time.

Based on the data available, I argue in this paper that Deutsch’s security communities can be studies from the perspective of offensive realism and that, under certain conditions, a long-time regional hegemon might establish and/or participate in a security community, i.e. produce the effect that Deutsch has predicted in 1957. For the purpose of this paper, I will discuss the following variables which define the essential conditions for security communities in the Deutschian model: (a) political variables for compatibility of major values, (b) economic variables for this compatibility, and (c) mutual responsiveness to the needs of the units involved in prospective integration leading to appropriate political and economic action.

**NATO and the Concept of Security Communities**

*Research Methods*

Methodologically, the research combines the case study approach with in-depth interviewing. The case study focuses on two parallel processes: NATO’s fourth and fifth waves of expansion and the organization’s transformation during the last decade. The interviews are helpful in learning more about the inner workings of the political process,
the interactions between the different individual actors and how the sequence of the events was viewed and responded within the broader framework.\textsuperscript{37} For the purposes of my dissertation, the choice of the interviewees is defined by two criteria: (a) they should be representatives of the national elites of the NATO members, i.e. people in decision-making or leadership roles and (b) the respondents should be experts about the topic at hand.\textsuperscript{38} That is why I focus on high-ranking representatives of the governments, such as deputy heads of missions of the national delegations and permanent representations in Brussels or the foreign and defense ministries of these countries, as well as representatives from the non-governmental organizations and lobby groups. The sample should include elite representatives from the United States, Western and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{39}

On a theoretical level Deutsch et al list background conditions: (a) the strengths of pluralism; (b) the thresholds of integration, (c) communication and the sense of community; (d) growth around core area, (e) the need for rising capabilities, and (f) the race between capabilities and loads. The strength of pluralism is defined as a capability of “acting as a unit in other ways and for other purposes.” This framework supposes two approaches in international security – through the EU Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) or NATO. While NATO has proven its capacity as an alliance to act as unit, ESDP is still at its early stage of development and will not be analyzed in this paper. The


\textsuperscript{39} The findings of this paper are based on ten interviews conducted with representatives of the governments, as well as non-governmental organizations and lobby groups in Brussels, Belgium and Sofia, Bulgaria in January and February 2006. The second stage of the research in Washington, DC is scheduled for the Fall quarter of 2006.
other variables – communication, growth around core areas and the issue of capabilities will be addressed from Deutch’s analysis of the North Atlantic Area, namely by looking at issues such as rationality and democracy, economic system and latent power, and mutual responsiveness.

Rationality and Democracy

Deutsch defines values that seem to be of major importance in the domestic politics of the units concerned. More specifically, he focuses on two core components: political ideology and economy. While the economy variable is presented “not just as communism contrasted with capitalism, but socialism contrasted with modified free enterprise,” under political ideology Deutsch means “constitutionalism and democracy.”

Deutschian understanding of political ideology inherent to democratic values is consistent with the conditions for alliance’s enlargement. The latter require: (a) functioning democratic political system (including free and fair elections and respect for individual liberty and the rule of law) and a market economy; (b) democratic-style civil-military relations and; (c) treatment of minority populations in accordance with OSCE guidelines. The significance of democracy had been further researched earlier through a case study and a pilot study in one of the new NATO members.

Furthermore, in my previous research I have argued that the hegemon plays a key role in establishing and managing the relations in the community through military

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41 See: Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, paragraphs 4–7 and 70–8; http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm, (accessed on 10/06/05).
presence and that both democracy and power turned out to be a significant component in the structure of these communities.\textsuperscript{43} At first Deutsch’s research seems in line with the liberal findings on democratic peace. Nonetheless, the definition of democracy should be seen as opposed to the other dominant ideology in Europe at that time – communism. He clearly identifies incompatibility on “fundamental differences in such matters as civil liberties and democratic procedure.”\textsuperscript{44}

While I do not challenge the relevance of democracy in paper as far as NATO expansion is concerned, I suggest a different analytical framework for approaching democracy, namely by linking it to the concept of rationality and exploring its significance on a systemic, rather than unit-level. From his perspective in 1957, Deutsch intuitively assumes that democracy is a much more efficient form of rule than communism. Therefore, he implicitly indicates that democracy is a political system that is able to efficiently allocate resources on a unit level relative to communism. In this case the democratic governance reflects one of offensive realism’s bedrock assumptions, namely that the states and great powers in particular are rational actors that “are aware of their external environment and they think strategically how to survive in it.”\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, in this research democracy will be analyzed from the rationality assumption. The latter is also embedded in the concept of complementarities that explains the driving forces of NATO’s transformation.\textsuperscript{46} Unlike offensive realists, I do not circumscribe rationality merely to survival, but also expand its meaning to a relationship between resources and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Deutsch, 1957, p 126.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 31.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Ivanov, Ivan D. NATO Expansion in an Imbalanced international System: the concept of complementarities, paper presented at the International Studies Association 2006 Annual Convention, March 21-25, 2006, San Diego, CA.
\end{itemize}
capabilities that explains how the new NATO members have complemented the current capabilities of the alliance, namely by distributing resources efficiently, reducing the armed forces and allocating additional funding for defense. The link between NATO as “community of values,” the economic and political motivation of westernization and rationality was also confirmed during the interviews with representatives from the NATO headquarters.47

Economic System and Latent Power

For Deutsch economics is one of the three components of the compatibility of major values, namely free enterprise. The logic of this research indicates that free enterprise increases wealth, a key component in developing latent power in Mearsheimer’s theory. The relationship between the type of economic system and latent power was discussed during my interviews with representatives from the new NATO allies. For example, Estonia’s motivation to join NATO was driven by the idea of westernization; it is a European country historically linked to the Old Continent. However, NATO membership is seen also as a part of the economic and political motivation to join the European Union. Therefore, NATO and the EU integration are seen as parallel and complementary processes that affect Estonia’s wealth in two directions: (a) the credit rating companies that were assessing Estonia were always looking at the prospects for NATO membership in terms of security commitments, and (b) for the foreign investors NATO membership was decisive in their motivations to invest in Estonia.48

47 Author’s personal interview with Mr. Juraj Podhorsky from Slovak Delegation to NATO, January 16, 2006. Personal interview with Mr. Jan Michal, The Czech Delegation to NATO, January 24, 2006 and with Mr. Toomas Kukk, Estonian Mission to NATO, January 12, 2006 at the NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium.
48 Personal interview with Mr. Toomas Kukk, Estonian Mission to NATO, January 12, 2006.
Mutual Responsiveness to the Needs of the Units and the Issue if the Use of Force

The third variable defining security communities is mutual responsiveness that is described as “the ability to predict each other’s behavior and ability to act in accordance with that prediction.”49 The issue of predictability has been extensively studied in the neoliberal literature, where cooperation is feasible with the elaboration of strategies of reciprocity that will encourage cooperation. This includes a credible promise to respond to present cooperation with a similar action, where the driving force, unlike in the realist literature, is the benefit from the absolute, not the relative gains.50

Powell suggests a valuable explanation. He directs the debate between realists and neoliberals over absolute versus relative gains, and concludes that Waltz’s characterization of the system’s political structure “does not account for the variation in the feasibility of cooperation.”51 According to his model, similar to the expectations of realists, “cooperation collapses when the use of force is at issue.” However, “if the cost of war is sufficiently high that the use of force is no longer at issue, then cooperation becomes possible,” which is what the neoliberal school would expect. The explanation for the absence of cooperation “lies in the different set of constraints that define what the states can do in the absence of anarchy.”52 Because of anarchy, the systemic constraints allow the state to exploit its relative gains “to the disadvantage of other states” without having an overarching authority to ensure that this would not happen.53 Therefore, Powell not only makes a distinction on the conditions of the use of force and

49 Deutsch, 1957, p. 129.
53 Ibid.
predictability that produces cooperative outcomes, but also implicitly directs the debate toward the security communities indicating that conditions for cooperation change significantly if a country is a part of such a community. These findings have several important implications for the case of NATO expansion.

First, the causal link between the issue of the use of force and the degree of mutual responsiveness in the North Atlantic Area was confirmed during the interviews with representatives of the political elites in Europe:

> There are different countries in Europe that have a subjective sentiment whether in one form or another we need the traditional territorial defense. As we move from Southwestern and Northwestern Europe (the Iberian peninsula and Ireland) toward the Northeast and Southeast of the Old Continent, the sentiments of potential risks are increasing. In the cases of Ireland, Belgium and even Austria the idea of ceasing major military attack by foreign force is remote. On the other hand, these fears increase for the countries that are closer to the former Iron Curtain, even Turkey and Greece.\(^{54}\)

Second, the necessity of mutual responsiveness and, therefore, cooperative behavior, is also driven in part by the distribution of power. Many of the new allies realize that in order to complement the alliance’s capabilities they need to cooperate between themselves in the field of security, which they would not do if they were outside of the North Atlantic Area. The Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BaltBat) and the South East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) are cases that illustrate such cooperation. Baltbat is composed of a combined tri-national headquarters that includes representative from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, logistics and national infantry companies. Each of the three Baltic States provides one-third of the total staff that mounts to approximately 720 people. For example, Estonia’s presence in Kosovo is under Baltbat on a rotational basis, where each country sends one company for six months, followed by another Baltic

\(^{54}\) Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Antti Sierla, the Mission of Finland to NATO, January 17, 2006, Brussels, Belgium.
country. In the same way, the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) is a brigade-sized force of about 5000 troops and comprises of seven nations – Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey and is fully certified by NATO for peacekeeping operations. On February 6, 2006 the brigade took over its first overseas mission in Afghanistan under "Kabul Multinational Brigade IX.”

Third, the behavior of the states is not determined solely by NATO’s institutional membership, but also by the level of interaction within the community. As a result, the NATO non-member states, such as Austria, Sweden and Finland, “have the highest contribution per capita in the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan.” In the same way, the motivation of the new allies to join the community stimulates them to participate more actively in alliance’s new missions since they do not want “to be perceived as free-riders” and makes them commit to spend 2% of their GDP on defense.

CONCLUSION:

This paper explores the driving forces of the security communities from the key assumptions of realism and through systemic variables. It tests the theoretical assumptions against the case of NATO’s transformation in the last decade analyze the case of NATO expansion by linking three sets of variables: (a) rationality and democratic values, (b) economic system and latent power, and (c) mutual responsiveness and the use of force. Among the key arguments is that NATO expansion can be researched through a

55 Bergman Annikab. BALTBAT: The Emergence of a Common Defense Dimension to Nordic Co-operation, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, August, 2000 and author’s personal interview with a representative from the Estonian Delegation to NATO.
56 The United States, Slovenia and Croatia have an observer status.
57 Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Antti Sierla, January 17, 2006.
58 Author’s personal interview with a representative from the Slovak Delegation to NATO.
realist perspective and analyzed through the concept of security communities. Ultimately, the case of NATO’s transformation indicates the necessity to modify some of the core offensive realist assumptions such as the stopping power of water and primacy of land power, as well as the sustainability of regional hegemony in the North Atlantic Area.

By linking two different traditions in IR research such as the realist concepts of security with the Deutschian pluralistic communities, I suggest a novel approach to study international relations theory. Furthermore, the broader implications of this research bring new insight to understanding and analyzing the issue of hegemony. Lastly, this paper builds upon the concept of complementarities by testing the theoretical implications of this model with in-dept interviews with representatives of the elites in Europe.

This paper, however, needs to further expand the logic of the argument by focusing on all the six background conditions listed by Karl Deutsch, as well as the process variables for the formation of security communities. Upon the completion of the data collection, it is also necessary to further analyze the causal relationship between the evidence for security community and the strategic choice of hegemonic behavior.\footnote{A possible direction for further research would be the distinction of two types of power that define hegemonic behavior– preponderant and foundational. This analytical distinction should be credited to Professor Richard J Harknett, Research Seminar in International Relations, University of Cincinnati, Spring 2004.}
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